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Abstract
The focus of this thesis is a case study of Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad; the
first fully-fledged Islamic bank in Southeast Asia. A key feature of this thesis
is an assessment of Bank Islam over the first eight years of its operation. The
bank was 'established in 1983. Since it is approaching the end of its ten year
monopoly in the supply of Islamic banking services in the Malaysian market it is
pertinent to look at its performance to this date. Information on performance is
relevant both to Bank Islam and also to potential competitors who are making
decisions about entering this market post 1993. Given the economic climate and
the financial system in which it was forced to operate, one main thrust of this
thesis is to examine the extent to which Bank Islam has succeeded in offering
an alternative form of banking in a well-established interest-based environment.
The other key element of this thesis is a survey of Muslim bank depositors in
Malaysia. This survey was designed to try and understand why, in a country
whose population is predominantly Muslim (53 per cent), Bank Islam has only
captured a very marginal share of deposits. After eight years in existence, only 2
per cent of total commercial bank deposits were held in Bank Islam. It raises the
question of whether Malaysian Muslims are not depositing in the banking system
at all or whether they desire banking services but are not primarily motivated by
the religious factor to bank with Bank Islam. The statistical analysis of the survey
results is generally concerned with three main aspects: (i) to test several hypotheses
about the depositors of Bank Islam including those considered by earlier researchers
on Islamic banking in Malaysia: (ii) to identify the main bank selection decisions
of Muslim depositors in Malaysia; specifically the depositors of Bank Islam and
the depositors of the conventional banks: (iii) to examine the market implications
of the results obtained in order to gain some insight to how Islamic banking can
capture a bigger segment of the market of Muslim depositors.
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Chapter I
Introduction
1.1 Statement of the Problem
The emergence of Islamic banks in the 1970s set the beginnIng of a new era
in the financial system of the Muslim world. More than sixty Islamic banks can
be found all over the world today. With the exception of Iran and Pakistan where
the whole banking system has been Islamized, the other Islamic banks operate in
dual financial systems side by side with the interest-based banks.
This thesis foçjises on Islamic banking in Malaysia. Only one Islamic bank;
namely Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad has been established in Malaysia since 1983.
Since the bank is coming to the end of its ten year monopoly in the supply of
Islamic banking services; it is likely to lose its potential position in the banking
sector.
A key feature of this thesis is an assessment of Bank Islam over the first eight
years of its operation. It is pertinent to look at the performance of Bank Islam to
this date. Whilst information on performance is relevant both to Bank Islam and
its decisions regarding future marketing strategies; it is also relevant to potential
competitors in the banking sector who are making decisions about entering this
market post 1993.
The other key element of this thesis is a survey of Muslim bank depositors in
Malaysia. The survey was designed with a view to try and understand why, in a
1
country whose population is predominantly Muslim (53 per cent), Bank Islam has
only captured a very marginal share of deposits. After eight years in existence only
2 per cent of total commercial bank deposits were held in Bank Islam. It raises the
question of whether Malaysian Muslims are not depositing in the banking system
at all or whether they desire banking services but are not primarily motivated by
the religious factor to bank with Bank Islam.
1.2 Outline of Chapters
The thesis develops as follows:
It starts with a survey of the overall Islamic economic system focusing on the
justification for the system to Muslims and secondly on the issue of the prohibition
of nba which forms the foundation of Islamic banking. (Chapter II). The study then
proceeds through a literature survey of the development of Islamic banking both
in theory and practice (Chapter III); to a presentation of the Malaysian economy
and the Malaysian financial system - the context in which Islamic banking was
developed in Malaysia (Chapters N and V).
The actual development of Islamic banking in Malaysia is the story of the
evolution and framework of Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad. This is the focus of
Chapter VI. The performance of Bank Islam given the economic climate and the
financial system in which it was forced to operate is assessed in Chapter VII. The
main thrust is to examine the extent to which Bank Islam has succeeded in offering
an alternative form of banking in a well-established interest-based environment;
and if so how has it achieved it? Has its operation been geared purely with the
economic objective of profits or does its Islamic character differentiate it from the
other commercial banks in the country?
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The survey of Muslim bank depositors is the focus of Chapters VIII and IX.
Whilst Chapter VIII details the research methodology, Chapter IX reports the
findings and an interpretation of them. The statistical analysis in Chapter IX is
generally concerned with three main aspects:
1. to test several hypotheses about the depositors of Bank Islam including those
considered by earlier researchers on Islamic banking in Malaysia.
2. to identify the main bank selection decisions of Muslim depositors in Malaysia;
specifically the depositors of Bank Islam and the depositors of the conventional
banks.
3. to examine the market implications of the results obtained in order to gain some
insights on how Islamic banking can capture a bigger segment of the market of
Muslim depositors.
Chapter X concludes the thesis with an overall summary, an assessment of the
future prospects of Islamic banking in Malaysia and recommendations for further
research.
1.3 Glossary of Islamic Concepts
The following Islamic concepts are given full definitions to clarify their meaning
and avoid misconceptions.
Al-Bal Bithamin Ajil: Sale against deferred payment.
Falah: well-being attained by the satisfaction of both the material and the spiritual
needs of the human personality.
Ijarah: leasing.
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Mudarabah: trustee profit-sharing; an agreement between two or more per-
sons whereby one or more of them provide finance, while the other provides en-
trepreneurship and management to carry out a business venture with the objective
of earning profits. The profit is shared by them in an agreed proportion. Any losses
will be borne only by the provider(s) of finance in proportion to their share in total
capital.
Murabahah: sale at a specified markup or profit margin.
Musbarakah: equity paricipation.
Q ard al-Hasan: benevolent or interest-free loan.
Quran: The Holy Book of the Muslims consisting of the revelations made by
God to the Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him. The Quran lays down the
fundamentals of the Islamic faith, including beliefs and all aspects of the Muslim
way of life. In all references to the Quran in the text (e.g., 30:41), the first number
refers to the surah or chapter and the second to the ayah or verse.
Riba: a 'premium' that must be paid by the borrower to the lender along with
the principal amount as a condition for a loan. It is thus equivalent to interest.
Shariah: refers the divine guidance as given by (i) the Quran (the original source
from which all principles and ordinances of Islam are drawn), (ii) the Sunnah (the
sayings and actions of the Prophet (peace be upon him), (iii) the Ijtihad (exercise
of judgement based on the Quran and the Sunnah and (iv) the ijma the legal
consensus.
Sunnah: The second chief source of Islamic law. It refers essentially to the exam-
pies of the Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him, as indicated by his practise of
4
the faith. The only way to know the Sunnah is through the collection of ahadith.
Surah: A chapter of the Quran.
Tawhid: affirmation of the unity and oneness of God, the cardinal Islamic concept.
Zakat: The amount payable by a Muslim on his net worth as a part of his religious
obligations, mainly for the benefit of the poor and the needy.
Zuim: a comprehensive term used to refer to all forms of inequity, injustice,
exploitation, oppression and wrongdoing, whereby a person either deprives others
of their rights or does not fulfil his obligations towards them.
5
Chapter II
The Economic System of Islam
2.1 Introduction
No banking system can exist in an ideological vacuum. The conventional bank
ing system dominating the financial world today has been fashioned according to
the spirit of capitalism in which the rate of interest plays an important role. Islamic
banking is no exception. Muslim economists unanimously agree that an Islamic
banking system in its pure form can oniy be envisaged in an Islamic economy. As
a prelude to the study of Islamic banking this chapter attempts to provide the
justification for Islamic banking by examining the philosophical foundation and
conceptual framework of such an economy. To achieve this aim the chapter is di-
vided into the following main sections. Sections 2 and 3 following this introduction
will respectively examine the ideological foundation of Islam and its implications
for the economic behaviour of the individual in order to justify the need for Is-
lamic banking by Muslims. Sections 4 and 5 will discuss the prohibition of mba
and its economic rationalizations respectively. The Islamic alternatives to mba will
be examined in Section 6.
2.2 Ideological Foundation
An economic system may be defined as the sum total of devices (or institutions
and patterns of behaviour) which through their interaction give effect to economic
choice. These economic devices are based on a set of law which embodies the philo-
6
sophical outlook, traditions, intellectual orientation or sometimes the distribution
of political power in the society from which this law has emerged and to which
it applies. Joan Robinson 1 in her Economic Philosophy writes, "Any economic
system requires a set of rules, an ideology to justify them, and a conscience in the
individual which makes him strive to carry them out."
The influence of ideologies on the development of economic systems of the world
today cannot be denied. As a systematic set of beliefs, opinion and doctrines about
the political and economic phenomena of society, an ideology provides the basis
for action and the framework of reference for groups of individuals or nations who
believe in it. Hence a nation that upholds the ideology of laissez-faire capitalism
would show a strong preference for free enterprise, private property and minimum
state intervention in the economic sphere. Conversely, a society that believes in the
communist ideology would emphasize the importance of public property, central
planning and state enterprise. Similar to the other economic systems, the economic
system of Islam is also rooted in certain "ideological " foundations which apply
to a society whose members choose Islam as their way of life. This is asserted by a
Muslim economist, Abu Saud2 who writes, "there is no "Islamic Economics" per se
unless there is an Islamic ideology prevailing and applied in a Muslim community";
a note written in a similar vein to Mrs. Robinson's above.
2.2.1 Source
At the outset, the ideological foundations of the Islamic economic system is not
the product of philosophical inspiration from sources within the society, but origi-
nate from Allah, a divine source outside the society itself, and have been revealed
1 1963:13.
2 1980:59.
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in the form of the Quran or The Hoiy Book and the Sunnah or the traditions of
the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him). These two sources form the chief
sources of Islamic law known as the Shariah from which the economic principles for
the Muslim society are also derived. Because of their exogenous nature, the eco-
nomic principles in these two major sources are constant and permanent in nature.
They are not subject to change either in time or space and are therefore applicable
to all Muslim societies at any age and at any level of economic development.
Besides the above two main sources, the ideological foundations of the Islamic
economic system are also derived from the exercise of reason and logic or ijtihad.3
Ijtihad involves the process of rethinking, reinterpretation and also analogical de-
ductions by reasoning of the principles and injunctions in the Q'uran and the Sun-
nah. It deals with a question of the Shariah that emerges in society from time
to time either in the form of new social or moral problems that require solutions
which have not been clearly defined in the two chief sources of the Shariah.
Ijtihad, therefore, forms a vital instrument that provides flexibility and dy-
namism into the Islamic economic system. It allows the Muslim community to
deal with the economic problems of their time and exercise their judgement in
providing solutions which are relevant to their current circumstances without de-
viating from the permanent principles in the Quran and the Sunnah. A well-known
example of ijtihad in Islamic history is the judgement passed by Umar Al-Khattab
(the second Caliph) during the year of the famine, that no thief's hand should
be amputated when there is the slightest doubt that the crme was committed
because of hunger and not of greed. In this example the exercise of ijtihad had
The main branches of ijtthad are qiyas (analogy), ijma' (consensus) and istibsan (deviation from
qiyas on the basis of public interest).
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amounted to the suspension of a clearly defined penalty for theft 4 for the sake of
public interest or maslaha which was more overriding in view of the prevailing
circumstances at that time.
Hence, by virtue of its source the Islamic economic system is constant yet
flexible at the same time. Its structure is not rigid but is bound to change, by the
exercise of ijtihad, with the dynamic change in economic environment. Its basic
principles, however, remain constant in conformity to the permanent principles
laid down in the Quran and the Sunnah.
2.2.2 Philosophy
The economic doctrine of Islam is closely related to and is part of the Islamic
concept of life. Islam in its very essence is the complete submission to the will
of Allah and this submission is to be reflected in the life of the Muslim (one
who submits) not only in his spiritual relationship with Allah but also in his
relationships with his fellow-beings and nature. Based on this concept of complete
submission, Islam is regarded by the Muslim not just as a religion in the restricted
sense but also as a complete way of life. Hence within the overall Islamic system
exist a number of subsystems - for example the Islamic economic system, the
Islamic political system, the Islamic educational system - with specific functions
to perform, but are yet interconnected and regulated by the Shariah.
Islam is also an integrated way of life because all aspects of life are interwoven
by a network of principles and values. A single value is applicable not only to a
certain aspect of life but is relevant to a whole range of disciplines. There is no
dichotomy between secular and religious values in Islam. In the Islamic viewpoint,
4 Quran 5:41.
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the struggle for economic well-being which conforms to the moral values in the
Shariah constitutes an act of virtue and the economic activity performed assumes
an act of worship or ibadah. Such rationality is of course completely alien and
perhaps unacceptable in the conventional economic system. This is not unusual
because an understanding of the Islamic economic system cannot be gained until
the ideological bases of the system embodied in the Islamic woridview are fully
revealed.
It must be admitted that the task of elaborating the Islamic woridview will
entail a discussion of the vast matrix of concepts, principles and ethical values
found in the Quran and the Sunnah; which lies beyond the limitations of this
study. However, as all these concepts are derived or linked to the fundamental
concept of Tawhid or the oneness and the sovereignity of Allah, our discussion will
focus on this principle and its immediate corollaries.
2.2.2.1 Tawhid
Tawhid is the key concept which forms the basis of the Islamic faith. It signifies
a complete submission of a Muslim to only one god and his rejection of other sources
of value. There are two sides to the process of Tawhid. Firstly the total submission
of man to Allah alone implies the uniqueness of His attributes. It negates the
existence of other creators worthy of worship and confirms that all other beings
have to be different from Allah in every respect. As noted by Al-Habshi;
The oneness or tawhid is not only confined to number but also implies the oneness or
uniqueness in all His sublime qualities or attributes. All other beings have to be different from
Allah in every respect. In its simplest form the difference can be in terms of degree. For example,
1991:42.
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if one is rich, others are richer but Allah is the richest. ... This uniqueness in qualities makes it
easier for us to logically accept His complete independence from others and that He provides for
all and that all His creations depend upon Him.
The other side of Tawhid constitutes the rejection of all other sources of values,
except Allah. It signifies the emancipation and the restoration of man's essential
freedom from all human or (man-made) super-human bondages6 . Unless this con-
sciousness of man's freedom and independence is recognized, genuine Tawhid is not
conceivable. As clearly expressed by Siddiqi;
Tawhid presupposes a consciousness in man of his stature independent of all being and
dependent on the One Being alone. If this consciousness of independence and freedom is lacking,
genuine Tawhid is impossible, and if it is deficient and vague, the relationship with Allah will
be impure, weak and largely ineffective.
The significance of Tawhid in the life of a Muslim has an important implica-
tion on his behaviour with his fellow beings. With every man sharing the same
relationship of complete submission to oniy one god a definite relationship between
man and man is therefore clear.
Firstly Tawhid gives the Muslims the sense of being free and being equal to
other man. It means that while all men are equally dependent on Allah they are
equally free and independent of one another. Thus in the overall Islamic system
where Tawhid is genuine no subordinate relationships amongst men should exist.
A man will not fear another man more than Allah or behave as if Allah does not
exist. 7 . As the Muslim's relationship with Allah is one of love and obedience, corn-
6 Siddiqi 1989:2.
Abu Sulayman 1976:14.
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plete trust and active service, the same kind of mutual bond will undoubtedly be
nourished at the human level. Hence in the economic field, the behaviour of the
Muslim cannot be devoid of honesty, goodwill, compassion and social conscious-
ness. Because of this sense of brotherhood, the individual Muslim in seeking his
own interest is not indifferent towards the interest of others.
2.3 Implications on Economic Behaviour
2.3.1 Trusteeship and Freedom
According to the Quran, Allah has created man as the best of His creation8
and has sent him to earth on the mission of trustee on earth or Khalifah for a
limited term of life as a test.° As His agent or trustee on earth, man has been
delegated the power to utilize the abundant resources of the universe which has
been made subservient to him. At the same time he is endowed with inteffigence
and the sense of justice and discretion. While he is given the freedom to explore
and exploit the abundant resources, he is also urged by his creator to comply to an
economic order according to his will as outlined in the Shariah. This compliance
is guided by a set of ethical values which acts as constraints on economic activities
to ensure that these activities do not contradict with the objective of achieving
an equilibrium between personal spiritual ascension and the material well-being
of the individual and society as a whole. The maximum and minimum limits of
human behaviour are set by a clear-cut boundary of values (hudud Allah) in the
Shariah. All actions outside this boundary are forbidden but within those limits
man is free to use his intellectual and physical potentials to improve his life and
society. Hence the concept of freedom in Islam is relative. Whilst only God is
8 We have indeed created man in the best of moulds (Quran 125:4).
Then We made you viceroys on earth to see how you behave (Quran 10:14).
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absolutely free, man is also relatively free within the limits set by His creator.
An important implication derived from this principle of relative freedom is the
concept of ownership in Islam. At the outset, based on the first aspect of Tawhid
which signifies Allah as the only creator and provider, absolute ownership of all
resources in the universe must therefore lie only in the hands of Allah. Man as the
khalifah is just a trustee of the God-given resources.
Within the terms of this trusteeship, the acquisition of wealth in Islam is
regarded not as an end but as a means to translate the submission to Allah or tawhid
into actions. The concept of private ownership in Islam is therefore distinguished
from the concept of private property of other economic systems.1°
1. The acquisition of wealth is permitted through lawful economic pursuits
mainly as a result of work and effort and not through unjustified means."
2. The right to private ownership is justified by its utilization. Hence in Islam
land belongs to the man who tills it.' 2 On the other hand, idle wealth
decreases by the imposition of zakat or in the case of uncultivated land the
right of ownership can be withdrawn by the state and transfered to others
who are willing to utilize it. This is to ensure that the resources are for the
benefit of all and not concentrated in the hands of a few.'3
3. The utilization of the resources so acquired is directed to beneficial and
10 M.A Mannan (1985:65-73) has outlined eight basic rules governing the concept of private ownership
in Islam.
' Do not acquire wealth from each other wrongfully, nor knowingly offer it to officials with the
objective of unjustly acquiring the wealth of others (Quran 2:188).
12 The Prophet(peace be upon him)is reported to have said, "Whoever cultivates the land which is
not the property of anyone has a better title to it."(Bukhari).
13 In order that it (wealth) may not (merely) make a circuit between the wealthy among you. (Quran
59:7).
13
balanced use. Since the resources are given to man as a trust they must
be utilized in activities that would yield benefit not only to one's own self
but also to society. Private ownership of wealth therefore does not permit
extravagance or frugality in its use. 14 The acts of selfishness on the one hand
negates the terms of trusteeship whilst the wastage of God-given resources is
equated to the spreading of mischief (fa8ad,) which also violates the position
of trustee endowed to man.
2.3.2 Accountability
Closely related to the above concept of freedom in Islam is the concept of
accountability. It is based on the simple logic that while man is given the freedom
to act on his own freewill, God has sent (i) the Revealed Books as sources of
guidance for man to remain within the maximum and minimum boundaries set by
His will; and (ii) the prophets as His messengers who carried out His command
on earth setting the examples for men to follow. Hence "once God has shown the
right way"and bestowed man with inteffigence and the sense of discretion, every
person has the freedom either to submit or to deny His will. Nevertheless this
freedom is counterbalanced by responsibility whereby every person is deemed to
be accountable for his actions.'5
This concept of man being made responsible for his actions is closely related
to the Muslim's firm belief in the Day of Judgement and the existence of life after
death. Muslims believe that the life-span of every individual is divided into this
temporary life on earth and the eternal life in the hereafter. The destiny of his
14 Make not thy hand tied like a niggard's to thy neck nor stretch it forth to its utmost reach, so that
those become blameworthy and destitute.
' Every soul is a pledge for its own deeds (Quran 73:380).
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life in the hereafter will depend on his deeds on earth for which he will be justly
rewarded and at the same time be made accountable for his transgression of the
limits set by the Shariah.
At the individual level, accountability tempers the non-altruistic animal in-
stincts inherent in man. For example, it is possible for man to go to the extreme
in the economic field and resort to unscrupulous practices in the form of usury,
bribery, profiteering and exploitation inflicting injustice to others in the pursuit
of material gain. Accountability therefore acts as a moral restraint to prevent the
individual from exploiting others to satisfy his self interest. It allows man the
economic freedom to the extent of stimulating private initiative but ensures that
this economic freedom is not abused or detrimental to the promotion of justice in
the market.
It therefore follows that the Muslim view of success includes success in both
worlds. In the Islamic terminology, the ultimate aim in life which every Muslim
wish to accomplish is al-falah, that is success in terms of the blessings of Allah both
in this world and the hereafter. Expressed in the modern economic jargon, when
the Muslim compares the benefits and costs of any choice of economic action he
will have to consider the present value of all future outcome. The future outcome
is measured, not oriiy in terms of monetary gains and losses but also in the form
of spiritual rewards or retribution in the life hereafter. This concept of success is
meaningful only to the Muslim and does not make sense to either the capitalist
economic man or the Marxian proletariat whose measurement of success is confined
to the material gains only.
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2.3.3 Economic Behaviour of the Islamic Man
The economic behaviour of the economic agent in the Islamic economic system
must therefore conform to that expected of Allah 's trustee on earth. The basic
economic problem that he faces is viewed from an entirely different angle and
therefore warrants entirely different solutions compared to those in the capitalist
and communist economies.
In the capitalist economic system, the basic economic problem faced by the
economic man is the relative scarcity of resources which are limited to satisfy the
endless succession of his unlimited wants. Lionell Robbins' 6 defined economics
as, "the science which studies human behaviour as a relationship between ends
and scarce means which have alternative uses." As observed by Ariff 17 Robbins
perfected the concept of the rational economic man as "a self-seeking individualist
and who wifi maximise ruthlessly to get what he wants". The economic man
is conceived to be devoid of any ethical values. He is not concerned with value-
judgements and remains neutral between different ends. What he is most concerned
with is choosing the most efficient means in pursuing any end, whatever it may
be, in a consistent manner.
The Islamic man on the other hand views the basic economic problem of rela-
tive scarcity from a different perspective. As mentioned earlier, Allah has created
the whole universe and its contents in abundance to meet the multifarious needs
of man. It is stated in the Quran (14:34);
And He (Allah) gives you of all that you ask for, and if you count Allah's favours, never will
16 1932:16.
17 1989a:96.
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you be able to number them. Verily man is given up to injustice and ingratitude.
This verse obviously shows that to the Islamic man the problem of relative
scarcity that arises in economics is not the result of insufficiency of natural re-
sources relative to his unlimited wants. The estimate of God's unlimited bounties
is constrained by man's limited wisdom that many substitutes to the present re-
sources under man's use remain unknown until they are explored with the advance
of human knowledge. According to Ariff' 8 'where human efforts are called for to
bring certain goods into existence, the problem of scarcity arises owing to the fact
that the capacity of man is limited. The Quranic explanation that man can have
nothing but what he strives for' 9 throws considerable light on this issue." In the
case of goods already in existence, Ariff adds that the problem of "material short-
ages, economic misery and social suffering arise out of man's mismanagement of
God-given bounties.".
It can therefore be concluded that the problem of relative scarcity, from the
Islamic viewpoint, is not the result of insufficient natural resources but is due to
the limitation of man's physical and mental capabilities in exploiting the unknown
resources of the universe. In other cases, the problem of relative scarcity is pur-
posely created through hoarding and monopoly out of self-interest in the pursuit
of material success.
Since the basic economic problem is viewed differently by the Muslim in the
Islamic economy the next relevant question that arises is whether the economic
agent is neutral between ends like the economic man. The endless succession of
man's want is recognized in Islam as a God-given instinct. It is mentioned by the
18 
op cit:105.
19 Quraii 53:39.
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Prophet (peace be upon him) in one of his traditions that:
If the son of Adam (man) hai a valley of gold , he would want a second valley and if he had
a second valley he would want a third. Nothing satisfies man's want until he is returned to
dust.
However Allah has cautioned that this natural instinct of unlimited wants has
been endowed to man not as an end. by itself but only as a means to the ultimate
end of complete submission to the will of Allah and to procure His blessings.
The satisfaction of man's want must therefore conform to the values of Islam as
prescribed in the Shariah. The economic behaviour of the Muslim community can
only be adequately explained with reference to the Islamic ethics which govern
it. It is this 'ethical factor' which differentiates the Islamic man (and hence the
Islamic economic system), from the economic man in the capitalist system. As
pointed out by Ariff20 ,"The Islamic man draws upon his moral resources and acts
in accordance with ultimate ethical values, whereas the economic man indulges in
his preferences motivated by self-interest." This, however, does not mean that the
Islamic man is less rational than the economic man. The economic behaviour of an
individual is rational if he conforms to the behavioural pattern of his community. In
this sense the Islamic man is rational because his economic behaviour is consistent
with "the Islamic perception of human existence and mission in life."2'
All this shows that the Muslim cannot remain indifferent between ends in his
economic pursuits. This is in conformity with the Islamic principle that Allah has
created the earth and the whole universe "for just ends ".
20 op cit;98.
21 ibid:98.
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And We created not the heavens, the earth and all betwn them , but for just	 ( Qiiran
15:8 )
In view of this verse it is necessary for the Muslim to recognize the consequences
of his economic decisions. Just ends are those which are permissible in the Shariah
and those which conform to the ethical values in the Quran and the Sunnah. Unjust
ends are those which Allah have prohibited in order to ward off injustice, damage
or exploitation.
Here again it is apparent why the framework of the Islamic economic system
is value-laden. Just ends themselves being ethical in nature cannot be achieved
through unjust means. In the economic field, all individual business transactions
require a high degree of honesty and fairness. Cheating, usury, bribe, fraud and
similar unscrupulous practices are unjust acts which hinder the achievement of just
ends. For the Islamic economic system as a whole the supply of goods and services
in the market must be consistent with the ethical boundaries of consumption,
production and distribution in Islam.
The Shariah has prescribed the consumption of good and pure things which
Allah has made lawful or halal and the avoidance of bads which He has made
unlawful or haram. The lawful goods have been created by Allah as a means
of sustenance in the process of submission to Him while the unlawful things has
been created as a test to man. In this context, the manufacture and sale of these
Islamically prohibited goods may be profitable economic activities in the capitalist
economy but not so in the Islamic economy where the demand for such goods is
non-existent. Even the demand for the lawful goods is constrained not only by
income but also by the Islamic principle of moderation (iqtisad) and the avoidance
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of extravagance (israf). Thus, according to Mannan22 , "it is possible to conceive
that in a properly run Islamic community a consumer may refuse to buy "more
of a good ", when prices are falling or incomes rising, when he thinks that he is
exceeding the limits of "moderation" as prescribed by the Shariah.
In conclusion neither the consumer nor the producer is sovereign in the Islamic
economy. Utility-maximizing behaviour is directed only towards the achievement
of just ends. It is constrained not only by the feasibility-possibility frontier but
also by the ethical allowability constraints of the Shariah.23
2.3.4 Distributive Justice
Whilst relative economic freedom implies the promotion of justice in the mar-
ket, the promotion of social justice from the aspect of distribution is the central
function of the fiscal system of the Islamic state.
In principle, Islam recognizes the inequality of income in society because all
men are not equal in their physical and mental abilities; and wealth. The Quran
states;
He has raised you in ranks, some above others: that He may try you in the gifts He hath
given you. (2:165)
Allah has bestowed His gifts of sustenance more freely on some of you than on others
(16:71)
Although the inequality in the distribution of income and wealth is acceptable
in Islam on the basis of the above differences, the Islamic economic system is still
22 1985:10.
23 Al-Habshi 1991:45.
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required to attain social justice by ensuring that every member of the society is
not deprived of his basic needs. II the basic needs of certain individuals to live
as a human being cannot be achievec. in the market then the obligation to ensure
distributive justice becomes the responsibility of the immediate society under the
supervision of the State,
The most effective social secirity system which the state can employ is the
institution of zakat; an obligatory tax on wealth that shifts resources from where
they can be easily spared by the haves to where they are urgently needed by the
have-nots. No sector of the economy is excluded from zakat. Zakat is taxed on
all productive properties, agricultural produce, capital, savings and other forms of
hoarded wealth that reach the taxable minimum (nisab). The beneficiaries of zakat
are also explicitly defined in the Quran. Zakat proceeds can only be distributed to
the poor, the indigent, the collectors, the new converts, the emancipation of slaves,
the debtors, the way of Allah and the wayfarers; hence ensuring that the revenue
will not flow back to the payers.
Through zakat distributive justice is achieved by equitable distribution and
not equal distribution. The basic needs of the poor are met but private initiative
amongst wealth holders is not deterred. Since zakat is imposed on surplus wealth
it is often viewed as a penalty which will induce the holders of idle capital to put
these resources into productive use in order to avoid further depletion by zakat.
In summary the Islamic economic of system paves a middle course for man to
carry out his economic activities. The freedom of individual enterprise is guided by
ethical restraints to remove the impediments to economic and social justice. One
of the ways in the Shariah to eliminate these obstructions is by their prohibition.
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In the context of finance and banking the prohibition of nba is a key factor. In the
Islamic viewpoint, the taking or giving of nba is not justified and its prohibition is
fundamental for the establishment of economic and social justice from the Islamic
perspective.
2.4 The Prohibition of Riba
One of the essential requirements of Islamic banking is the complete elimina-
tion of nba from all banking transactions and operations. On the assumption that
the term nba includes interest, the direct implication of this rule is that interest
which forms the backbone of modern banking has no role in the Islamic bank-
ing system. Yet one school of thought24 believes that nba is distinguishable from
interest and that Islam has forbidden only nba, not interest. In view of such con-
troversy the following sections will examine some of the major issues surrounding
the prohibition of mba in Islam beginning with an inquiry into its meaning and
forms.
2.4.1 The Meaning of Riba
The term nba in Arabic literally means increase, expansion or growth. However
this linguistic meaning is not sufficient to denote accurately the kind of increase
prohibited because not all financial increases are forbidden in Islam. As an exam-
ple, the increase that accrues from trade is highly recommended. As translated
from the Quran
Allah has permitted trade and forbidden nba (2:275-279)
In the Shaniah, mba technically refers to the 'premium' that must be paid by
24 Sheikh Jawish 1908, F'a2lur Rahman 1964.
22
the borrower to the lender along with the principal amount as a condition for the
loan or for an extension in its maturity.25
Three elements of nba can be derived from the above definition.
1. an excess or surplus over and above the amount lent
2. determination of this excess in relation to time
3. the surplus is predetermined or fixed in advance
All three elements jointly constitute nba.
It has been suggested that in order to recognize the nature of nba which is
forbidden in Islam one has to understand the meaning of nba in its historical
perspective26 . This is based on the argument that the Pre-Islamic Arabs were fa-
miliar with the word nba and knew its customary connotation when the injunctions
against nba were revealed. The practice of lending with nba was well established
among the Arabs and between the Arabs and the Jews who were residing in the
Arab Peninsula at the time of the revelation of the Quran27 . The use of the definite
article "al" (the) before the word nba in the Qunan is therefore indicative of the
customary practice.
2.4.2 The Forms of Riba
Broadly, nba can be divided into two categories namely:-
(i) Riba on loans (nba al-duy'an)
25 Chapra 1985:56-57.
26 Mannan 1985:118.
27 Homoud 1985:20.
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(ii) Riba in barter trade (r-iba al-buyu)
2.4.2.1 Riba on Loans
Generally, Riba on loans refers to any fixed increase charged by a creditor
to a debtor, over and above the principal amount of loan due. Specifically, early
Muslim scholars who researched the kinds of nba prohibited in Islam, had described
different forms of loan transactions involving nba such as
• Riba al-jahiliyyah or nba of the Pre-Islamic period, which was well-known and
conventional among the Arabs before Islam. According to Mujahid, "nba of
the Jahiliyyah, which God has forbidden, was that if a person owed a loan he
would say to the creditor, 'I will give you so much if you extend the date for
payment ". Another kind of mba in the Jahiliyyah was reported by Imam Ra.zi
who said that the people of the Jahiliyyah used to give loans and collect nba
monthly without affecting the principal. Then, when the loan matured, the
principal amount was demanded and if the borrower was unable to meet his
obligation, the amount was increased and the payment period was extended.
• Riba al-nasi 'ah, which was the fixing in advance of a positive return on a loan
as a reward for waiting. The term nasi 'ah is derived from the root nasa 'a which
means to postpone, defer or wait.28
During the Pre-Islamic period nba al-nasi 'ah was realized when a person gave
a loan for a specified period and if the debtor was unable to pay the principal
sum, the creditor would extend the payment period on condition that the debtor
would pay a predetermined additional amount. In this case Riba was charged by
28 Chapra 1985:57.
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the creditor more or less as a reward for waiting a longer period before the debt
was paid.
• Riba al-qurud which was derived from the term Qard or loan. This kind of
nba was earned when a loan was given on the agreement that after a specified
period of time, the borrower would pay an additional amount together with
the principal sum due. It differed from nba al-jahiliyyah since it was charged
at the very beginning of the loan period. Additional nba would be charged if
the borrower failed to clear what was due from him. This form of mba closely
resembles the modern practice of fixing interest.
At this point it can be deduced that any kind of loan transaction which involves
a predetermined addition to the amount of principal due constitutes Riba on loans
which is not permitted by the Shariah. It is the predetermined positiveness of
the return which constitutes the important element of nba. 29 It does not matter
whether the addition is a fixed or variable percentage of the principal, paid in
advance or on maturity, or is paid in kind or service.
2.4.2.2 Riba in Barter Trade
Riba in barter transactions or nba al-buyu is prohibited when certain commodi-
ties are exchanged in unequal quantities or when certain goods are exchanged on
deferred delivery. The injunctions against nba al-buyu were given in the Hadiths
(sayings) of the Prophet, of which the following two are considered most important.
• From Ubada Ibnus-Samit, the Prophet said:
Gold for gold, silver for silver, wheat for wheat, barley for barley , dates for dates, and salt
29 Chapra ibid.
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for salt - like for like, equal for equal, and hand to hand; if the commodities differ, then
you may sell as you wish, provided that the exchange is hand to hand (Sahih Muslim)
. From Abu Said al-Khudri, the Prophet said:
Gold for gold, silver for silver, wheat for wheat, barley for barley, dates for dates and salt
for salt—like for like, and hand-to-hand. Whoever pays more or takes more has indulged in
nba. The giver and the taker are alike (in guilt) . ( Sahih Muslim)
On the basis of these two Hadiths, two types of nba al-buyu can be distin-
guished.
1. Riba al-fadl which arises when items of the same kind (as mentioned in the
Hadiths) are exchanged with an increase in weight of one over the other. As an
example, the spot exchange of one kilo of wheat for two kilos of wheat would
involve nba al-fadi even if there is a difference in quality between the two items.
2. Riba al-nasa 'a which occurs when one of the six items in the Hadiths is ex-
changed for an item of its own kind or for one which is similar to it in value,
on deferred delivery. This statement needs further elaboration. Muslim schol-
ars have divided the six items in the above Hadiths into two different classes
of goods. Gold and silver were classified together in terms of their value as
precious metals while the remaining four items were defined as fungible com-
modities. Hence in the case of nba al-nasa 'a the exchange of gold for silver on
deferred delivery is forbidden. Similarly the exchange of dates for barley must
take place on a spot basis to avoid nba al-nasa 'a. The exchange of gold for
wheat is permitted, however, because the transaction is not subjected to any
of the above requirements since both differ in kind or in value.
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The conditions for nba-free barter transactions is summarized in Table 2.1.
The conditions against nba al-buyu requires that:
. In the exchange of precious metals or fungibles of the same type (e.g silver for
silver or wheat for wheat), (i) equality in weight like for like, equal for equal and
(ii) prompt delivery hand to hand must be observed.
Failure to meet the first condition will lead to nba al-fadi, while the absence
of the second requirement will cause nba al-nasa 'a.
• In the exchange of precious metals or fungibles respectively (e.g gold for silver
or dates for barley) only the condition of spot delivery is required.
Table 2.1	 Conditions For Riba-Free Barter Trade
recious Metal	 Fungible Goods
Gold Silver Wheat Barley Dates Salt
	
Precious Gold ES	 S	 -	 -	 -	 -
	
Metals Silver	 S	 ES	 -	 -	 -	 -
	
Wheat -	 -	 ES	 S	 S	 S
	
Fungibli Barley -
	 -	 S	 ES	 S	 S
	
Goods Dates -	 -	 S	 S	 ES	 S
	
Salt	 -	 -	 S	 S	 S	 ES
Source: Shallah 1989:71
Key:
ES = equal weights and spot exchange
S = spot exchange
-- 
= none of above conditions required
• In the exchange of precious metals for any one of the fungible commodities in
the Hadiths any form of barter exchange is permitted. A transaction is fulfilled
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if wheat is exchanged for silver, for example, either with equal or unequal
quantities or on spot or forward delivery.
Muslim scholars3° have regarded the prohibition of nba in barter trade as a
step towards the monetization of the economy because the Prophet is reported
to have encouraged the use of money in order to avoid nba. When one of his
companions had exchanged two measures of low quality dates for one measure of
good quality dates the Prophet had warned them:
This is exactly nba. Do not do so, but when you wish to buy, sell the inferior dates for
money and then buy the dates. (Sahih Muslim)
The use of money in exchange as encouraged by the Prophet is meant to
overcome the difficulty of estimating equivalence in barter exchange.
Finally, there is disagreement among Muslim jurists as to whether nba al-
buyu affects only the six commodities mentioned in the Hadiths or whether some
general principles cover a whole class of commodities31 . This is a legal issue which
lies outside the scope of Islamic banking.
From the above discussion on the types of nba prohibited in Islam it can be
inferred that whilst the occurrence of nba in barter trade can rarely be found in
today's monetized economy the rate of interest charged by the conventional banks
seems to contain the elements of nba on loans. The question that arises is whether
interest constitutes an element of nba which is forbidden in Islam.
° Siddiqi 1983, el-Ashker 1988.
31 Homoud 1985:87.
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2.4.3 Riba, Interest and Usury
Historically, all returns derived from the lending of capital was originally known
as usury in the west and it carried no ethical connotation. However, as the abuse
in moneylending became significant in the late Middle Ages where excessive rates
of usury were charged by moneylenders, the distinction between interest and usury
became necessary. The term 'interest' ; derived from the Roman word interesse or
interval was adopted; to specify an indemnation for damage due to the delay in the
interval interesse before repayment. 32 Since then interest became distinguishabie
from usury; the former tolerated by canonical and civil courts as legal and the
later narrowed down to refer only to excessive loan charges which are iniquitous
or illegal.33
There is no distinction between usury and interest in Islam, however. Both are
elements of nba because of the predetermined positiveness of a return inherent in
both. Even though the Quran states,
Oh you believers, take not doubled and redoubled nba, and fear Allah; so that you may
really succeed. (Surat aali-Imran; 3:130)
the above verse should be interpreted, not in isolation but in the context of
the other verses pertaining to the prohibition of mba.
Two significant points can be observed in relation to the prohibition of nba
on loans. Firstly, most of the injunctions pertaining to nba on loans were revealed
in the Quran in contrast to those regarding riba on barter trade which were all
recorded in the Sunnah. Secondly, the enforcement of this injunction took place
32 Knight 1932:131
Salin 1932:194.
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gradually in several stages; in correspondence to the period of transition of the
Arab community; from the Jahiliyyah (Era of Ignorance) to the establishment of
the Islamic State when Islam was embraced and practised as a complete system
of life. The course of time was indeed necessary for the people to believe in Islam
first before the prohibition of a deeply embedded institution in the society, such
as nba could be easily obeyed. An instant prohibition could have been difficult if
not impossible.
The prohibition of nba in the Quran underwent four stages of revelation.
1. The initial stage (of encouragement):
The first verse against nba was revealed in Makkah before Hijrah.
And whatever you give (as nba) to increase your wealth increases not with Allah, but what-
ever you give in charity, seeking the pleasure of Allah will be compensated manifold. (Surat
al-Rum; 30:39)
In their interpretation of this verse most commentators agree that nba here
refers to a gift or donation given with the hope of receiving a better gift in re-
turn34 However it appears here that nba was not strictly prohibited, it was only
discouraged. Instead the people were encouraged to give donations purely for the
sake of Allah seeking a better reward from Him in the hereafter. At that early
stage of Islam the Qunan was merely preparing the souls of the people for Islam
and instil the unity of Allah in their hearts. This preparation was made through
the comparison between nba and charity by saying that those who seek reward in
the hereafter by giving donations are better than those who seek reward in this
life by increasing their wealth through nba.
' Qutb 1980, Homoud 1985.
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2. The stage of indirect warning:
And for their taking nba even though it was forbidden for them, and their wrongful ap-
propriation of other peoples' property, We have prepared for those among them who reject
faith a grievous punishment. (Surat al-Nisa'; 4:160-161).
The meaning of this verse cannot be understood unless it is placed in the
historical context in which it was set. At the time when this verse was revealed
the Jews were charging nba on loans to everybody except among themselves. This
practice was claimed to be in accordance to their interpretation of the Bible which
cites:
Deuteronomy: Verse 23:19-20
Thou shalt not lend upon usury to thy brother, usury of money, usury of virtuals, usury of
anything that is lent upon usury. Unto a stranger thou may lend upon usury, but unto a
brother thou shalt not lend upon usury.
Muslim scholars however pointed out that there is another verse in the Bible
which forbids usury in all circumstances.35
He who hath given forth upon usury, neither hath taken any increase ..... .hath executed true
judgement between man and man.
The phrase 'man and man' in this verse clearly emphasizes that usury was
forbidden to everyone. Hence by using the misinterpretation of the Jews as an
example, the Quran clarifies that Allah has already forbidden nba in His earlier
Book, the Bible, and the grave consequences for the Jews who violated the rule.
35 Homoud 1985.
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3. The stage of direct but incomplete prohibition:
Oh you believers, take not doubled and redoubled nba, and fear Allah; so that you may
really succeed (Surat aali-Imran; 3:130)
This verse was revealed at Madinah in the third year after Hijrah and was
directed to the believers (Muslims). Interpreters are agreed that only multiple nba
was forbidden at this stage. Those who continue to charge low rates of interest
were allowed to do so. However the revelation against nba did not stop here.
4. The stage of absolute prohibition
Those who benefit from nba shall be raised like those who have been driven to madness by
the devil's touch. This is because they say: Trade is just like nba while Allah has permitted
trade and forbidden nba....... . Oh believers, fear Allah, and give up the nba that remains
outstanding if you are believers. But if you do not do so, then be sure of being at war with
Allah and His Messenger. But if you repent, you can have your capital sum. Neither should
you commit injustice nor should you be subjected to it. (Surat al-Baqarah; 2:275-279)
These final verses on nba provide a comprehensive and unambiguous ban upon
all predetermined surplus on loans including all rates of interest no matter how
high or low. This conclusion is based on the following arguments.
(i) The phrase Allah has permitted trade and forbidden nba is an indirect indication
that all rates of interest is forbidden. As no limitation is set on the prohibition,
in contrast to that at the third stage, it necessarily means that all rates of pre-
determined excess, including low rates of interest are forbidden. It is, therefore,
a misconception if one says that Islam prohibits only usury or compound interest
and allows the simple interest. With reference to the verse at the third stage of
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prohibition, it is true that only the prohibition of compound interest or usury is
explicitly forbidden. However, one should also take into account other conditions
in the Shariah before passing a judgement on the interpretation of the ruling in the
Quran. An important condition in Islamic law methodology (u8u1 al-fiqh) states
that a rule or naskh which is revealed at a later stage will abrogate any previous
rule on the same matter. Hence if one applies this condition in relation to the time
period of each stage of prohibition, it would be clear that the rule which limits
the prohibition of nba to usury no longer applies. With the revelation of lines
275 to lines 279 of Surah al-Ba qarah at a later stage the rule in line 130 of Surah
aali-Imran is annulled.
(ii) The second evidence which supports the argument that nba is not confined only
to usury is contained in the text If you repent, you can have your capital sum. In this
text it is shown that those who repent from taking nba is entitled to recover only
the principal sum of loan given and not more. The term capital sum clearly defines
that a lender can only demand payment for the capital sum lent and nothing more.
Put in a different way, any payment which is demanded from the borrower which
exceeds the capital sum amounts to nba even if the sum is insignificant.
(iii) It is further argued that the prohibition of nba which is limited only to usury
can lead to arbitrariness. Qureshi (1946) posed the question, "what do they mean
by usury .....(If usury)...is the lending of money at exorbitant rates ....what is an
exorbitant rate of interest ?". Qureshi further adds that a rate of interest which
is considered moderate and reasonable today may be considered exorbitant and
excessive tomorrow. For example, cooperative societies in the 1920s were charging
interest with rates that ranged from 12 to 15% per annum. These rates were
considered reasonable at that time but exorbitant today.
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The arbitrariness between interest and usury is also evident in the financial
system where different financial institutions can charge exorbitant rates of interest
for similar type of loans. Mannan 36 writes, "In the U.S.A, for example, during the
nineteen-fifties and sixties a bank could not charge more than eight per cent as
interest whereas a finance company could charge thirty per cent to thirty six per
cent of interest per annum for a similar loan".
Based on these observations both writers argue that it is a fallacy to distin-
guish between interest and usury where the question of the prohibition of nba is
concerned. There is no real distinction between interest and usury. The difference
that exist between both is a difference in terms of degree, not of kind and hence
both are prohibited in Islam.
From the above arguments it can be concluded that (a) all predetermined
surplus on loans including interest is prohibited in Islam and (b) all rates of interest,
whether high or low, are also prohibited. As asserted in the report of the Council
of Islamic Ideology in Pakistan 1981;
there is complete anonymity among all schools of thought in Islam that the term nba stands
for interest in all types and forms.37
2.5 The Economic Rationalization for the Prohibition of Riba
As can be seen in the previous section the restriction against nba is very clear
and has to be taken as axiomatic. It is a divine order which no Muslim can reject,
nor can the real reason of the order be fathomed by the limited human mind.
Nonetheless, Muslim scholars have tried to analyse the possible reasons of this
38 1985:162.
Ahmed et al 1981:111.
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rule from various aspects. For the purpose of this study, the economic explanation
behind the ban will be of interest.
The economic rationalization for the prohibition of nba can be viewed from
three perspectives. It can be seen (i) in the light of the Quran, (ii) in terms of
weaknesses in the theories of interest and (lii) in terms of the negative effects that
interest inflicts on the economy.
2.5.1 The Quranic viewpoint—prevention of injustice
In the Quran the reason for the prohibition of nba is implied in the fourth
stage....... neither should you commit injustice nor should you be subjected to it. One can
gather from this text that the the prohibition of nba from the viewpoint of the
Quran is directed towards the prevention of injustice, one of the principal objectives
of the Islamic economic system. Injustice or zuirn in Arabic is a comprehensive term
which has a broad meaning. Literally zuirn is understood as 'putting something
not in its rightful place'. As a noun it refers to any form of wrongdoing which is
committed by man in his relationship with God, with himself and with other men.
The Quran does not specifically address the reasons behind the prohibition of nba
in the light of these three relationship. However since nba enters into the financial
relationship between men, one may be able to rationalize the reasons behind its
prohibition by considering Islam's position on individual property rights and its
concept of economic justice.
• In Islam, money represents the monetized claim of its owner to property rights
created by assets obtained either through work or through exchange, grants
or inheritance. Lending money is a transfer of this right and all that can be
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claimed in return is its equivalent and not more.3s. In this context the payment
of nba on loans can be considered as an illegitimate transfer of property rights
from the borrower to the lender or vice versa. To ifiustrate, if interest is charged
on money borrowed for consumption purposes a tran8fer of property rights from
the borrower to the lender takes place even though no extra wealth has been
created by the borrower. On the other hand, if funds are lent on the basis
of a business loan and additional capital wealth is created by the borrower
the payment of interest could account for an unjustified transfer of property
rights in the opposite direction, that is, from the borrower to the lender. This
is because the lender is entitled only to a small fraction (represented by the
interest rate) of the wealth created from the use of his funds. A justified transfer
of property rights would require that the lender is remunerated a percentage of
the profits accrued and not a fixed percentage of the loan. The prohibition of
riba eliminates the likelihood of such illegitimate transfers of property rights.
It is an injustice in Islam when a person deprives others of their rights. The
prohibition of nba therefore acts as a deterrent against such behaviour.
• In the context of economic justice, it is emphasized in the Shariah that the
waiting involved in the repayment of a loan does not itself justify a positive
reward.39
 This based on the Islamic argument that money is entitled to a
reward only if it is put into productive use. In this sense, waiting is an un-
productive activity and the payment of interest cannot be justified. Even if
one is to argue that the reward for waiting represents an opportunity cost for
a given investment, the payment of the fixed rate of interest is still not jus-
tified economically. This is because investment is often exposed to risks and
38 Iqbal et a.! 1987:2
Chapra 1985:57.
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uncertainties that the final outcome can either be positive or negative. In the
Islamic economic system any form of financial arrangement is allowed so long
as the shares of each party involved are contingent upon uncertain gains. The
element of uncertainty is crucial in establishing economic justice because it
legitimizes the distribution of possible profits and also because neither party
will be discriminated. The borrower-entrepreneur will not be forced to pay the
lender out of his own pockets in the event of losses and the lender-financier will
be remunerated to the extent of the productivity of his financial capital when
profits are made.
From the above viewpoint, interest represents a source of unjustified earning
since one party receives a monetary advantage without giving a just countervalue.
Ethically, it represents a wrongful means of acquiring property which impedes the
establishment of economic justice and fairness which is the main aim of the Islamic
economic system. 40 . Hence, in the light of the Quran the economic rationalization
of the prohibition of nba lies in the promotion of economic justice and fairness
which Islam continuously seeks. As noted earlier the fundamental aim of the
Islamic economic system is to achieve "just ends". The prohibition of nba is one
of the means towards securing those ends.
2.5.2 Weaknesses in the Theories of Interest
The second perspective from which the economic rationalization of the pro-
hibition of nba can be seen is in terms of weaknesses in the western theories of
interest. The fundamental objection of Muslim writers to the western theories of
interest relates to the fact that these theories have failed to provide a satisfactory
40 Quran 2:188, 4:29, 4:161 and 9:34.
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explanation to the question of why interest should be paid. 41 It is argued that
the existing theories of interest are merely attempts to validate the existence of an
institution that has become deeply entrenched in modern economics rather than
as attempts to justify on the basis of modern economic analysis, why the money
lender should be rewarded a fixed return on the money he lends.42
There is a wide difference of opinion among western economists regarding the
economically-logical justifications for interest. Even if one does not consider the
objections of Muslim writers the numerous western debates on the subject of inter-
est is enough to support the view that there is no clear and categorical explanation
for the existence of interest. Harberler in his Prosperity and Depression (1939) ac-
knowledges that "the explanation and determination of the interest rate gives rise
to more disagreement among economists than any other branch of economic the-
ory." Some writers such as those who focus on the money market have found an
ingenious way of avoiding the question of why interest is paid by shifting attention
to how the rate of interest is determined. For the purpose of this section some
of the theories of interest will be reviewed taking into account their weaknesses
as seen mainly by the western writers. An excellent review of the early ideas of
interest has been undertaken by Bohm Bawerk in his Capital and Interest (1922).
Much of the critics against the early theories of interest in this study will therefore
follow largely Bohm Bawerk summaries of those theories.
2.5.2.1 The Colourless or Classical Theories
The theories of interest propounded by the classical writers are called colourless
theories by Bohm-Bawerk because in his observation Adam Smith has not laid
41 Uzair 1980, Mannan 1985.
42 Abbas, Mirakhor 1987.
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down any distinct theory of interest and the foflowing clasica1 writcm such as
Ricardo, Torrens and McCulloch have based their ideas on those of Adam Smith's
without adding much or enough to form definite theories of Interest
One of the main notions of these theories is the justification of interest via the
existence of business profit. In these theories interest is regarded as a derivative of
profit. According to Adam Smith profits consist ointerest plus a risk premium. In
such countries as Britain, he thinks about half of what is normally regarded as prof-
its is pure interest on capital; the rest is payment for superintendence and risk.43
In the typical classical firm in which the capitalist and the entrepreneur are the
same person interest is hardly distinguisable from profit since the whole business
capital is provided and accrues to the same individual. In the case where capital is
borrowed, interest is treated as the compensation paid by the entrepreneur to the
capitalist for the profit made by using the latter's capital. As asserted by Ricardo,
"whenever a great deal can be made by the use of money, a great deal can be given
for the use of it"44
Schumpeter (1934) in his evaluation of the classical theory argues that the
oversimplification of interest being derived from profits and that its rate is roughly
determined and equal to that of profits is a fundamental flaw. The notion that in-
terest is derived from profit raises the problem of discovering why such a derivation
exists, and after having done so, one still needs to find out how interest arises from
entrepreneurial profits. An adequate analysis must differentiate between interest
and profits which according to Schumpeter the classical economists have failed to
do.45
Blaug 1987:46.
Mannan:121.
Conard 1959:12-13.
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From the Muslim writers' point of view the classical identification between
interest and profit provides no explanation that relates fixed interest to variable
rates of profits which may not always be positive 46 . Mahmud Ahmad47 had ear-
lier argued that such an identification reveals the failure to delineate the different
economic roles played by personal or undertaker capital and loan capital. It is
asserted that personal capital is a variety of risk capital which can serve a produc-
tive effort on negative returns in contrast to loan capital which dictates its price
of participation in the form of a fixed rate of interest. For this reason loan capital
imposes a limit to the marginal efficiency of productive effort, while risk capital,
on the other hand generates among entrepreneur the willingness to run risks on all
kinds of productive enterprises. The use of the word "profit"for "interest"has not
only failed to provide a logical explanation for the existence of interest in profits
but also created a confusion on the essential nature of these two kinds of rewards.
The classical writers also justified interest as an inducement to save. It is
envisaged that the sum saved out of a given income necessarily increases when
the rate of interest is increased and vice-versa. However this argument is not
necessarily true all the time. Keynes argued that savings do not depend so much
on interest as on the level of income and employment. Savings and investment are
determined more by income and other psychological factors rather than the rate
of interest. This Keynesian argument is empirically supported by observations of
increasing savings over periods when interest rates are falling.
2.5.2.2 The Abstinence Theory
This theory which attempts to rationalize the payment of interest from the
46 Mannan:121.
1952:178-179.
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supply side regards intere8t as a reward for abstinence from consumption on the
part of the capitalist, Senior, the founder of this theory sees abstinence as the third
independent factor of production besides labour and land. According to Senior,
"the sacrifice which lies In the renunciation or the postponement of gratification
demands compensation. The compensation is interest."48
The abstinence theory has been ridiculed and rejected mainly because it implies
positive discomfort in savings irrespective of differences in the level of abstinence
among savers at different levels of income. Whilst it is true that saving involves
sacrifice when income is low because many needs remain to be fulfilled, the act of
saving for the average saver in the upper income brackets imposes the least pain
or inconvenience. In fact personal savings for the upper income group is largely
involuntary and is the result of income exceeding customary levels of expenditure.
The question that follows is to what extent is interest a compensation for the
differences in sacrifice between the different groups of savers. It is an irony if
interest payments represent compensation for sacrifice when the low-income earners
who have to forgo a large part of consumption are paid low interests for their small
savings while the rich with large savings are paid exorbitant rates of interest when
their sacrifice in abstinence is negligible.
Another doubtful notion of the abstinence theory is the idea that abstinence
is an independent factor of production. Bohm-Bawerk notes that by nature a
factor of production must be an entity which is capable of providing productive
services and its reward should be related to its actual contribution to the ultimate
produce. The payment for labour already includes payment for abstention from
other activities and hence from this point of view interest payment is not justified.
Boh-BawxkJtL
41
2.5.2.3 The Productivity Theories
The advocates of this theory considers productivity as an inherent property
of capital. They say that capital possesses the physical productivity because with
its assistance more goods can be produced than without it. Critics such as Bohm
Bawerk do not deny the productivity of capital. However he argues that the
productivity theories fail to show that productivity per se provides an adequate
reason for the payment of interest.49 One of the questions that needs to be ex-
plained is the problem of value. To explain interest by reference to productivity,
Bawerk argues that it would be necessary to show that not only more goods are
produced with the aid of capital, but also that the value of such goods is greater
than the value of the former smaller output. Capital would presumably be of no
value if it produces nothing and conversely be of much value if it produces valu-
able goods. The problem with interest is that it represents a predetermined surplus
value which is not necessarily equal to the value of the ultimate good produced.
The objection of Muslim writers on the productivity theories of interest is
based on the argument that the justification for interest is inadequate since it is
derived from the concept of physical capital or capital goods. When the same
justification is applied to money capital a confusion would arise. 50 For instance,
the justification for the payment of consumption loans cannot be explained by the
productivity theories.5'
2.5.2.4 The Bohm-Bawerk or Agio Theory
Subsequent to his review of the early theories of interest Bohm-Bawerk pre-
49 Conard:29.
Uair 1982:40.
Marnian:122.
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sented what became known as the Agio or Austrian Theory of Interest. By this
theory interest arises from a difference in value between present and future goods.
Bohm-Bawerk believes that present goods are as a rule, worth more than future
goods of the same type and number. Interest, therefore, is a premium obtained by
present goods in exchange for future ones. This theory implies that the average
person prefers present satisfaction to future satisfaction and if he is willing to forgo
the present use of his funds, then he is entitled to some form of remuneration in
the form of interest. Three reasons are listed by Bawerk as to why people prefer
present over future:-
1. "the prospective underestimation of the future"
2. "the different circumstances of want and provision in the present and in the
future"
3. "the technical superiority of present goods over future goods"
The first reason is based on the assumption that people have a tendency to-
wards myopia or they lack the 'telescopic faculty' because of factors such as lack
of imagination, limited willpower and the shortness and uncertainties of life. As
a result it is alleged that they value present consumption more than it will be in
the future. Nevertheless, it is envisaged that there will be a willingness to forgo
present consumption for future consumption if a premium in the form of interest
can be offered. On the demand side, however, the prospective underestimation
of the future wifi create an excess demand for consumption loans. The payment
of interest on these loans is a discount which future satisfaction undergoes when
judged from the present standpoint.
This assumption of inherent myopia has been rejected by a number of valid ar-
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guments. Firstly, the assumption of deficiency of imagination and limited willpower
cannot explain the desire to bequeath fortunes to heirs and save for rainy days.
Blaug52 argues that "the loss of future enjoyment is feared quite as much as the loss
of earning power and this leads to a discount on the present."Hence in a modern
society, most people discount the future as well as they discount the present. The
assumption that people prefer present over future because of their underestimation
of the future cannot therefore be generalized.
Blaug 53 pointed out that the appropriate assumption for a static theory of
interest such as Bohm-Bawerk's is that income stream would be constant over
time. However, this assumption cannot explain the behaviour of people who are
living below subsistence or who are expecting to be better off in the future; who
will tend to prefer present over future goods and hence generating the demand
for consumption loans at a positive rate of interest. The young who are acquiring
their skills will have a high discount on the future but the old who have passed
their peak earnings would probably discount the present in favour of the future. It
is not clear which pattern of behaviour will be exhibited in a stationary economy
unless the population distribution is assumed to be of uniform age, which is rather
unrealistic. If a dynamic society is assumed where real income is rising through
time, then the explanation for the emergence of a positive rate of interest can only
be done if the dubious law of constant diminishing utility of income is assumed.
The third reason of "technical superiority of present over future goods" creates
a demand for production loans because in the context of the roundabout methods
of production, present goods can be invested now and reinvested as they accrue
52 1987:503.
op cit:500.
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tomorrow compared to goods available tomorrow which can only be invested to-
morrow. 54 In terms of physical product, it is claimed that present goods possess
the technical superiority because they yield a larger physical output than an equal
amount of goods applied to roundabout method of production in future because
of the law of diminishing returns. Bohm-Bawerk believes that the net physical
productivity alone creates a value discount on the future independent of time pref-
erence and the myopic tendency. However as Fisher and the others argue interest
cannot be explained by the productivity of capital in the absence of time prefer-
ence. It is said that if interest represents the payment borrowers are willing to
make in order to have goods today instead of tomorrow, then interest is related to
time preference.
The criticisms of the Austrian theory further support the Islamic contention
that the existing theories of interest are not based on strong grounds hence fail to
provide a realistic and concrete explanation for the payment of interest.
2.5.2.5 The Exploitation Theory
As proposed by Karl Marx, the exploitation theory, views interest as a surplus
value which is a payment representing the difference between the value of capital
goods and the value of the goods which these capital goods have helped to pro-
duce. According to the exponents of this theory "all goods that have value are the
products of human labour. The workers, however, do not receive the entire prod-
uct which they alone have produced. The capitalist exercises the control over the
indispensible means of production which the institution of private property guar-
antees him, to secure for himself a part of the workers' product." 55
 Interest is that
Blaug ibid :504.
Bohm-Bawerk:241.
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portion of labour acquired by putting the labour under coercion or exploitation.
The weakness of this theory lies in the labour theory of value upon which
it rests. According to Bohm-Bawerk, it is completely wrong to assume that all
economic goods are the product of labour alone because other factors such as
natural factors also contribute to the production process. Furthermore labour
quantities are not proportional to exchange value. It only enters the determination
of value through its influence on scarcity.56
2.5.2.6 Keynes Liquidity Preference Theory
Keynes' 57 theory of liquidity preference explains that the rate of interest de-
pends upon the state of liquidity preference, on the demand side and the quantity
of money on the supply side. According to Keynes, the rate of interest can be
defined as "the reward for parting with liquidity for a specified time." The de-
cision to keep money in liquid assets or in the form of bonds or earning assets
will determine the rate of interest. In Keynes' analysis the supply of money is
fixed but the supply of bonds will depend on the speculative demand for money.
If the supply of bonds exceeds its demand; at very low interest rates and at high
bond prices, almost everyone will prefer to hold cash with the expectation that
the price of bonds will fall and the rate of interest will rise. On the other hand,
if the demand for bonds exceeds its supply; at low bond prices and high rates of
interest, speculation will increase the demand for bonds and hence its price leading
to a fall in the rate of interest. The rate of interest is determined by the supply
and demand for money, indicating an exclusive monetary phenomenon where the
effects of real factors are absent.
56 Conard 1959:35.
1936:167.
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The flaw in this theory is that it presupposes the existence of interest. In
Keynes' argument every wealth earner conceives a 'normal' rate of interest which
exists at any one time. If the current rate of interest is higher than the normal rate,
cash holding is discouraged and bond holding is encouraged with the speculation
that the price of bonds will rise in the future. However, according to Robertson,58
"interest in the liquidity preference theory is merely a risk-premium against fluc-
tuations about which we are not certain. It leaves interest suspended, there being
interest because there is interest.". How the 'normal 'rate of interest is perceived
in the first place is not explained.
It is also argued that by ignoring the factors that causes the existence of inter-
est and focusing on the determination of the interest rates the liquidity preference
theory has shifted our attention to the problem of value when in essence the ques-
tion of interest is a problem of distribution.59
From the above survey of the theories of interest it is evident that no clear
justification for the existence of interest can be established. What is apparent is
that the problem of interest has been viewed from three divergent perspectives.
The productivity theory treats interest as a problem of production. The exploita-
tion theory explains it as a problem of distribution while the monetarists seek in
the theory of interest the problem of value. Presumably the debates on the theory
of interest will not cease to continue despite the fact that the negative effects of
interest can be felt in all sectors of the economy.
58 Afza1ur Rahman 1980:45.
Mannan op cit:123.
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2.5.3 The Negative Effects of Interest
The economic rationalization for the prohibition of interest has been presented
in the light of the Quran and in terms of the weaknesses in the theory of interest.
In addition, the rationale of the Islamic law against interest can also be seen from
the negative effects which interest inflicts on society and the economy. A little
reflection is sufficient to unravel the negative effects of interest on various sectors
in the economy especially the productive sector, the consumers and government.
As this subject has been widely discussed by Muslim writers in the past (Siddiqi
1983, Ahmad Z 1984, Mannan 1985) it will be briefly discussed here to support
the Islamic rationalization of the prohibition of interest.
The negative effects of interest in the production sector are mainly exerted on
the small producers who are often deprived of the opportunity to expand because
of their inability to secure loans from the bank. In general, the advancing of loans
by banks to the productive sector is determined largely by the collateral and the
creditworthiness of the borrower rather than by the viability of potential projects.
It is argued that since banks in the interest -based system are generally interested
in recovering the principal sum lent plus interest, their main concern would be the
safety of their capital and the ability of any venture to generate a cash flow which
can meet the interest liability. As a result loans are generally given on the ability
to pay criterion, hence depriving small businesses which cannot provide collateral
as security to the bank.
Consumers, in general, suffer from the negative effects of interest by paying an
indirect tax to the lenders because entrepreneurs often transfer the cost of interest
to consumers in terms of higher prices. The higher the rates of interest the higher
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the marginal cost of production. As a result prices of consumer goods in the
market could go beyond the purchasing power of most households. The result of
an inflationary situation, as depicted by the Great Depression in the early thirties
and the recession of the present time, causes a dampening effect on aggregate
demand leading to massive unemployment.
The Third World debt crisis of the early 1980s is a classic example of the ad-
verse effects of interest on government borrowings. The crisis was triggered by the
dramatic rise in interest-rates in the United States under the Raegen administra-
tion in 1979, which forced the interest charges on Eurodollar loans to increase three
times between 1977 and 1981. The rise in interest rates had a disastrous impact
on debtor countries. Countries that failed to meet their loan repayments had to
resort to debt-rescheduling forcing them into a vicious circle of higher servicing
cost, longer loan obligations, growing balance of payments deficits and recession.
2.6 The Islamic Alternative to Riba
2.6.1 The Concept of Profit
The prohibition of nba does not imply that capital has no price in an Islamic
economy. Islam recognizes the role of capital in production and hence its entitle-
ment to a reward. However, as has been clearly established at this stage, it is the
practice of remunerating capital with a fixed and predetermined reward that Islam
disapproves of.
The Quranic percept that Allah has forbidden nba and permitted trade (Quran
2:275) broadly implies that the Islamic alternative to nba lies in the institution of
trade. It is the consensus among Muslim jurists that the permission to trade is an
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indication firstly that profit, the gain from trade, is halal (legally permissible) and
secondly that the remuneration for capital is and should be tied to profits.
Profit, with the exception of 'exploitative' profit, is recognized in Islam by
virtue of its property as a justified and logical form of return to capital and enter-
prise. Unlike nba which is an ex ante payment that must be met whatever the
outcome of enterprise, profit represents an ex post residual which is neither fixed
nor definite. Even though the expected rate of profit can be anticipated before-
hand, the actual amount of profit realized is entirely determined by the market
through the price of the ultimate product relative to the cost of factors used in
the process of production. Hence the magnitude of profits can either be positive
zero or even negative in the event of losses. It is this variable and uncertain
nature of profits that is acceptable to Islam. Profit, unlike nba, reflects the ac-
tual outcome of enterprise in the face of business uncertainties which cannot be
avoided in the market. A clear relationship, can therefore be traced between profit
and enterprise. It can be argued that the Islamic view on profit as a return to
enterprise resembles Schumpeter's theory of profits (1963) to the extent that prof-
its arise from entrepreneurial innovation. According to Schumpeter 'profits result
from "new combinations" or innovations which are the outcome of entrepreneurial
action. Entrepreneurs pay for resources at the prices set by previous uses. Innova-
tions enable a more productive combination of these resources and hence lead to
a surplus.' 6° The notion that profits originate from innovation is consistent with
the Islamic belief that Allah has created between man a diversity of capabilities
and that man will not earn more than he has strived for. 61 An entrepreneur who
is highly organized and innovative is more likely to earn higher profits than one
60 Khan S 1984:109.
61 Al-Quran 6:165, 61:10.
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who lacks such capabilities and effort.
However good entrepreneurship does not always guarantee profits. An enter-
prise is exposed to the risk of losses because of the presence of market uncertainties
which lie beyond the control of the entrepreneur. An unexpected change in con-
sumer taste, an abrupt rise in the price of raw materials or a sudden breakdown
in production machinery amount to uncertainties which will either increase cost
or decrease sales proceeds contributing to a fall in profits or even bring losses.
The willingness of the entrepreneur to face such uncertainties and run the risk
of losses in the anticipation of profits reflects a just and logical means of factor
compensation acceptable to Islam.
Following the positive attitude of Islam towards trade and profits Muslim writ-
ers unanimously agree that when capital is to be obtained externally by enterprise,
profit-sharing would serve as the most appropriate Islamic alternative to nba.
2.6.2 Profit-sharing
By profit-sharing the debtor-creditor relationship is replaced by one of prin-
ciple and agent or that of a partnership. In a profit-sharing relationship profits
are redistributed between the the entrepreneur (user of capital) and the supplier
of funds (the owner of money capital) as compensation for their share of con-
tribution towards the realization of profits. What this necessarily means is that
profits in Islam is a reward which has to be divided between capital and enter-
prise. In profit there is the gain on entrepreneurial effort and the gain on capital.
Islamic economists view profit as the result of the combined effort of capital and
enterprise. 62 . It is argued that money capital is only "potential capital"which re-
62 Uzaii 1982, Hasan 1985
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quires the services of the entrepreneur to transform it into productive use. Capital,
therefore cannot exist as a separate factor of production but is regarded as part
of enterprise through whose efforts profits can be realized. It should be stressed,
however, that the proportion of profits distributed to the supplier of capital is a
return on capital ownership and not a return on borrowed funds in the western
sense. In profit-sharing, the financier can only claim a share when profits is real-
ized from the use of his capital. capital and no claims can be made in the event of
losses. This is because profits constitute a gain on capital while losses amount to
its erosion. Hence in the case of a loss, the entrepreneur is obliged to return the
capital to its owner minus the amount of losses incurred while he bears losses in
terms of unrewarded time and effort spent.
It is quite clear that profit-sharing promotes a healthy relationship between
the owners of capital and enterprise since both parties are rewarded in a just and
fair manner. In contrast to nba where more advantage is given to the creditor than
the debtor, profit-sharing grants an equal position to both parties involved. In the
first place, both parties have an equal position in sharing profits in accordance to
a ratio agreed between them. Secondly, both share the risks of going unrewarded
in the event of losses. The provider of capital suffers a reduction of his principal
and the provider of enterprise is deprived of any reward for his labour, time and
efforts.
There are two types of profit-sharing contracts permissible in Islam which
owners of capital and enterprise can enter into, known as the mudarabah and
musharakah. As will be outlined below, there are similarities in the conditions of
both contracts in relation to the sharing of profits and losses. However differences
in some other aspects do exist between both methods; hence opening a variety of
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options by which capital and enterprise can be combined for the common aim of
profit-sharing.
2.6.2.1 Definition
Mudarabah is, by definition, a financial contract between the owner of financial
capital and the owner of enterprise wherein the owner of capital provides a specified
amount of money and acts like a sleeping partner while the entrepreneur who
provides the labour and management utilizes that money entrusted to him, in a
productive venture with the common aim of earning profit and sharing it between
them on an agreed profit-sharing ratio.
Mudarabah is an agency contract. The user of capital acts as an agent on
behalf of the supplier of capital. In mudarabah the agent is known as the mudarib
and the supplier of capital or the principal is called the rabb al-mal. On liquidation
of the mudarabah the agent is required to return the capital with the share of any
profits attributable to the principal.
Mush aralcah on the other hand refers to a partnership or joint-venture in which
two or more persons combine their capital together to generate profits. It is a form
of equity participation similar to the modern concepts of partnership and joint
stock ownership.
2.6.2.2 Origins
It is interesting to note that rnudarabah is not mentioned in the Quran, although
numerous hadiths (traditions) attribute its practice to the Prophet and his leading
companions. 63 . Historically, mudarabah was widely practised in Arabia during the
63 Udovitch 1970:172.
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Pre-Islamic era. It was approved by the Prophet and consequently retained in Islam
because it contradicted no Islamic principles. In fact, because of its widespread
practice, the same kind of contract was known by different names to the schools of
Islamic jurisprudence in different areas. To the Malikis and Shafi'is in Arabia this
contract became known as Qirad or, to a lesser degree, Muqaradah. Both terms are
derived from the words qirdh(gnaw) and qard (cut) respectively to signify that
the owner of capital cuts off the disposition of that sum of capital from himself
and surrenders it to the entrepreneur. The Hanafis in Iraq preferred the term
mudarabah, derived from the expression 'darb fil-ard or walk on earth ',denoting
to travel for the purpose of business.64
Profitsharing arrangements resembling mudarabah were also practised by me-
dieval European traders around the near Eastern and Mediterranean areas and
were probably introduced by traders from the Muslim world. These arrangements
became known in Europe as the commenda.65
With regards to m'asharakah the Hanafi and Maliki schools of Islamic law has
divided this institution into two types namely the sharikat al-milk or propriety
partnership and sharikat al-a qad or contractual/ commercial partnership. The
first type of partnership involves the joint possession of property either through
inheritance or purchase while the latter is established by agreement to a commercial
contract by the parties involved. Since profit-sharing can only be conducted in the
sharikat al-a qad the former will not be discussed as it lies outside the scope of this
study.
64	 .Udovitch op.cit:174.
65 Udovitch op. cit:172.
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Sharikat al-a qad can be based on either capital, labour or reputation. 66 A
contractual partnership based on capital can take the form of sharikat mufawadah
in which all partners share equality in the amount of capital contribution , equality
in the division of profits and losses, equality in the delegation of authority, the
provision of surety, financial liability as well as equality in the personal status of
the partners. Such a partnership is suitable for any commercial venture in which
freedom in making business decisions are required between partners.
Another form of contractual partnership based on capital is the shavikat man
which does not require equality in any aspect of the partnership. In contrast to the
mufawada partnership in which each partner is both the agent and the guaraiitor
for his collegue, the man partnership is based entirely on the principle of agency.
Each partner is only the agent and does not guarantee any financial liabilities
to any third parties on behalf of his collegue. The man partnership would suit
locally-based trade where partners can be conveniently consulted for any business
decisions.67
2.6.3 Differences between Mudarabah and Musharakah
In view of the importance of mudarabah and mush arakah in the theory of
Islamic banking it would be worth to comparing the essential conditions of both
contracts in terms of the following:-
(a) Capital
1. Capital for musharakah can be obtained from all partners compared to mu-
darabah where capital can only be provided by the principal or rabb al-mal. If
66 Chapra 1985:252.
67 Udovitch op cit:119.
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the m'udarib also contributes a specified amount to the cap!tal contributed by
the rabb al-mal he is entitled to take the entire profit related to his portion of
the total capital before sharing the balance as agreed
2. Most jurists only accept money capital in mudarabah but allow all forms of
wealth as capital in musharakah provided that their value are assessed in mon-
etary terms. The argument against the acceptance of goods as capital in mu-
dara&ah is related to the problem of uncertainty in estimating the value of this
form of capital at the end of the mudarabah contract. In contrast to money
which is relatively stable in value over a period of time the market value of goods
tends to appreciate and depreciate and this could lead to a dispute concerning
the value of capital to be returned and the amount of profits attributable to
each party. 69 To avoid this problem both the Hanafi and Maliki schools devel-
oped a simple legal device involving the sale of the goods in question first and
the resulting revenue be considered as the capital for mudarabah.
(b) Management
The rabb al-mal is forbidden from interfering with the management of the
rnudarabah. It is important that the mudarib is given the liberty to generate profits
within the limits set in the contract without any intervention from the principaL
In contrast to the separation between the provider of capital and enterprise in
mudarabah all partners in the musharakah are allowed, in principle, to participate
in the management of the partnership although not every partner is required to
participate actively. By mutual agreement one or more partners can be elected to
manage the partnership.
66 ciq
69 Rud 1S2O Uduvitch op cit:180.
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(c) Profitsharing
The division of profits in both mudarabah and musharakah must be stated
in an agreed ratio and not in an absolute fixed amount. With the exception of
sharikat mufawada which requires equal profit-sharing ratios between partners,
any proportional ratios are acceptable in the mudarabah and sharikat man. The
agreed profit-sharing ratio may not necessarily be in proportion to the arnmmt of
capital contribution although the partner or partners who run the sharikat i'nan
may receive a larger fraction of the profits as a return for their service.
(d) Liabilities
In the rnudarabah, any losses incurred in the ordinary cause of business will be
borne by the rabb al-mal. His financial liabilities is limited by the amount of capital
contributed. The rnudarib, on the other hand, does not bear any financial liabilities
but will suffer losses in terms of his time and efforts. However the mudarib will
bear responsibility if losses are incurred as a result of his negligence or carelessness.
In the case of musharakah, losses wifi be shared among the partners in propor-
tion to their respective amount of capital contribution. Limited financial liability
is applicable only to sharikat in an. The financial liability of partners in sharikat
mufawada is unlimited where the claims of third parties can be extended to the
personal property of the mufawada partners.
By comparing the conditions of mudarabah and mush arakah listed above it
is seen that there are various ways for different people to come together for the
aim of profit-sharing. Those with either capital or expertise can combine their
resources in musharakah and share in the profits generated. For those without
capital but possess the entrepreneurial skills the goal towards profits can still be
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attained through mudacrabah. Similarly, the owners of capital who lack the time or
talent can still put their wealth into productive use either through mudarabah or
rnusharakah.
2.7 Conclusion
As we have seen in the first part of this chapter the Islamic economic system
is an integral part of the Islamic system of life. Economic relationships are very
much governed by ethical values that the economic behaviour of the Muslim differs
from that of the economic man in many respects. Although the discussion of the
Islamic economic system may seem utopian in nature, there can be no harm in
this approach70 . Since the model represents the system that all Muslims wish to
accomplish it will serve as 'the frame of reference'in any Islamic economic anal-
ysis. It serves as a logical starting point in the same manner that the model of
perfect competition has preceded more realistic analyses of market imperfections
in conventional economics.
70 Ariff 1982:2.
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Chapter III
The Development of Islamic Banking: A Literature Review
3.1 Introduction
It is shown in the previous chapter that the Muslim woridview on economics
and finance is part of an integrated and comprehensive overall system based on
Islamic values. The widespread establishment of interest-based banks in Muslim
countries, first by foreigners during the period of western colonisation (since the
beginning of the nineteenth century) and then by indigenous bankers after inde-
pendence did not, however, reflect this woridview nor did it fuilfil the needs of
devout Muslims for an interest-free banking system. 71 Although the idea of Is-
lamic banking began to develop in a number of writings from the late 1940s it only
became a reality with the establishment of the Islamic Development Bank (1DB) in
1975 followed by the Dubai Islamic Bank and the Kuwait Finance House in 1977.
By 1986 over forty Islamic banks and twenty other Islamic investment and finance
companies have been established worldwide. 72 . One of the latest newcomers into
the Islamic banking community is the Bank Muamalat Indonesia which opened its
doors in July 1992.
It is the aim of this chapter to examine how the Islamic principles have been
applied in the development of Islamic banking both in theory and practice. A
survey approach wifi be undertaken. The theoretical literature on Islamic banking
71 For a treatment of the establishment of European banks in the Islamic world by the nineteenth
century see El-Ashker 1987 pp 25-27.
72 Ahmad 1987:9.
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will be reviewed first. This will be followed by a survey of how far the theoretical
ideas have been put into practice. In particular, the results of cross-country surveys
and individual case studies will be discussed.
3.2 Theoretical Perspectives
The objective of this section is to survey the main aspects of Islamic banking
that have emerged in theory.
3.2.1 Early Thoughts
The earliest references to the concept of Islamic banking appeared in the late
1940s, as shown in the works of Qureshi (1946) and Mahmud Ahmad (1952). How-
ever as observed by Ariff73 , only passing references were made to Islamic banking
in these publications as wider issues relating to Islamic economics were their main
focus. Most of these references were brief and rather general relating to the pos-
sibilities of how interest-free banking could be implemented. Hence, Qureshi in
his book Islam and the Theory of Interest sees the Islamic bank as a public sector
institution giving what is an essentially a social service, like that of public health
or public utilities, because the bank would neither pay interest on deposits nor
charge interest on loans.
The possibilities of replacing debt-financing with a partnership between the
bank and businessmen who seek capital from the bank was envisaged by Ahmad
(1952) in his book Economics of Islam where he sees the establishment of the Is-
lamic banks on the basis of a joint stock company with limited liabilities. Deposits
are to be received on the current account and the partnership account as addi-
1988:52.
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tional sources of the bank's funds with no returns for the former and a share of
profits for the latter. Bank lending on the basis of equity participation was also
proposed. However, as observed by Ariff (ibid.) neither the working principles of
equity participation nor the sharing of losses between the bank and its customers
were clearly defined.
Instead of further expansion into the potentials of equity participation or shi-
rakat, the principle of mudarabah or principal-agency was advanced by subsequent
writers as the main premise of interest-free banking. The notion of a two-tier
mudarabah was introduced by Uzair (1952). The two-tier system enables the Is-
lamic bank to mobilize deposits on the basis of mudarabah and then disburse or
invest these funds also on the principle of mudarabah. The work by Uzair was
highly regarded by later writers for it systematically laid out how the principles of
mudarabah can be applied in the interest-free bank. Siddiqi 74 points out that
the work contains the core of all the future proposals on the subject by basing the respective
relationship between the bank and its depositors and between the bank and the businessmen
on the principle of rnudarabah.
The issues of profit distribution and the responsibility for losses were taken up
by Al-Arabi (1966). The significance of this work lay in the fact that both issues
were resolved in strict accordance with the SharIah by which profits arising from
a mudarabah contract were to be divided upon a mutually agreed profit sharing
ratio while financial losses were to be borne wholly by the financier.
A more systematic attempt at developing a comprehensive model of Islamic
banking was made by Siddiqi in 1968. The work, entitled Banking Without In-
1982:23.
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terest was written in the Urdu language and was later translated into English in
1983. This model is based both on the principles of inudarabah and shirakat or
musharakah. Like Uzair and Al-Arabi, Siddiqi envisaged a two-tier mudarabah re-
lationship between the bank and its depositors as well as between the bank and
the entrepreneur-borrower. The mechanics of each transaction were described in
considerable detail and illustrated with many hypothetical and arithmetic exam-
ples. Siddiqi75 also envisaged that interest-free banking could operate successfully
"only in a country where interest is legally prohibited and any transaction based
on interest is declared as a punishable offence."
3.2.2 Mainstream Theory of Islamic Banking
Based on the principle of the two-tier mudarabah a theory of Islamic bank-
ing built entirely on the replacement of interest by profit-sharing was developed
by contemporary writers on Islamic economics. This theory advocates that only
through mudarabah and rnusharakah can the banking system achieve the socio-
economic objectives of the Islamic economy and eliminate all forms of transactions
associated with nba from the financial system. Siddiqi 76 , as the leading author of
this theory writes that
.modern writers on Islamic economics are unanimous that any reorganization of banking
will have to be done on the basis of shirkah and mudarabah.
Ziauddin Ahmad77 further emphasizes that
all the chief merits of Islamic banking compared to interest-based banking in respect of
s 1983:13.
76 1985:9.
1987:13.
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attainment of Islamic ocio economic objectives devolve on the rcplaceirwnt of a fixed charge
on capital by profit/loss sharing.
In its simplest form the model of the Islamic bank would involve a triangular
relationship between three parties namely
1. the depositors who are the suppliers of savings or capital funds,
2. the bank which serves as a partial user of the capital funds and as an interme-
diary link; and
3. the entrepreneur-borrower who are the actual users of the capital funds.
Based on the conditions of mudarabah as explained in Chapter II, it is en-
visaged that the Islamic bank would receive 'investment account' deposits from
its depositors on the basis of mudarabah, at the first tier, with the agreement that
these deposits will be invested and any net profits generated will be shared between
both parties on a mutually agreed profit-sharing ratio.78
Hence in the first tier depositors are treated as capital owners or rabb al mal
whose deposits will be a function of profits in the production sector. The bank acts
as the agent or mudarib and each party will have a share of the net profits yielded
by the investment undertaken by the bank. The share of net profits to the bank
constitutes a return for its share of contribution (in the form of labour) towards
the realization of profits while the share of profits to the depositors represents a
78 No specific rule on the determination of the profit-sharing ratio has been formulated yet. Uzair
(1982) and Siddiqi (1983) propose that these ratios be determined by the forces of demand and
supply in the market but at the same time be regulated by the Central Bank as a policy variable
to reduce money supply and inflation. Other Muslim writers (Saqr 1978, Al-Jahri 1982, Naqvi
1983), however oppose such intervention by the Central Bank. Saqr regards such intervention as
non-Islamic because these ratios are part of the initial contract made by mutual agreement between
the individual parties and should only be altered by mutual consent. Free market bargaining seems
the more acceptable method of determination in view of the Islamic principle.
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gain on the use of their capital. It follows therefore that in the event of a loss the
depositors will bear a reduction in their deposits in proportion to the financial loss
incurred while the bank's loss takes the form of unrewarded labour.
The second tier of the rnudarabah arrangement involves the bank and the
entrepreneur-borrower. At the outset the bank will pool together the deposits
in the investment accounts and then disburse them as capital to the entrepreneurs
also on the principle of mudarabah. In contrast to its position in the first tier,
the bank now becomes the full provider of capital or the rabb al-mal and takes
the responsibility of bearing all financial liabilities in the event of a loss while
the entrepreneur takes the role of the agent or muda'rib. Profits earned from the
projects undertaken by any individual entrepreneur will be shared with the bank
at a mutually agreed profit sharing ratio. The share of profits that accrues to the
bank will in turn be shared between the bank and the depositors at the first tier
as described earlier.
The division of profits between the three parties can be summarized in the
following equations:-
Assuming that:
= total business profits realised on the investment of rnudarabah funds;
given by total revenue (R) less total cost (C) where (0 <ir> 0).
/3= bank's profit-sharing ratio in the second tier where (3> 0)
a= depositor's profit-sharing ratio in the first tier where (a > 0)
D= total investment deposits in the bank.
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M= total m'udarabah funds supplied by the bank.
(i) Beginning at the second tier, the share of net profits, rBl, received by the
bank from the entrepreneur is represented by
rHl = 
/3ir	 3.1
(ii) The share of net profit, rE, which accrues to the entrepreneur is expressed
as
rE= M
(1—/3)ir	 3.2
(iii) The amount of net profits, TB, received by the bank will then be shared
with the depositors at the first tier. Hence the share of net profits, rD, received
by the depositors from the bank is equals to
o3ir
TD =
	 3.3
(iv) The net share of profits, r gained by the bank as an intermediary between
the depositors and the entrepreneur is equivalent to
rB= D
(1—a)/3ir	 3.4
3.2.3 Relative Stability of the Islamic Banking System
The theory of Islamic banking advocates that one of the major advantages
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of an Islamic banking system based on profit-sharing is the ability of the system
to absorb shocks compared to the conventional system. Firstly, as evident from
equations 3.1 to 3.4 the entrepreneurs, the bank and the depositors will all stand to
gain or lose together in the Islamic banking system leading to a fairer distribution
of profits between the three parties. Hence the higher the profits, (ir), realised
from the project undertaken by the entrepreneur, the higher the net profits, (rE),
gained by the entrepreneur at the second tier and the higher the returns, (rD),
to the depositors at the first tier and the net share of profits, (rB) to the bank.
Since deposits are not guaranteed a fixed return but linked to the actual returns
(which may be positive, negative or zero) in the production sector, Siddiqi 79 argues
that the profit-sharing system would be more stable than the interest-based system
causing less bankruptcies and bank failures. This is because in the profit-sharing
banking system any shocks to the bank's asset position, for instance caused by
a fall in revenue from investment, would be absorbed on the liability side where
profits paid to the depositors' would adjust automatically to the change.
Khan (1987) has attempted to analyse the alleged relative stability of the profit
sharing system by considering the dynamic variant of the standard IS-LM model
subject to several assumptions.
Based on the assumptions that prices are fixed and that (i) banks are the
only intermediaries between saving and investment in the capital market, (ii) the
nominal value of deposits on the liability side is not guaranteed by banks while the
rate of returns on deposits is variable and not predetermined, (iii) investments in
the form of borrowings to the economy constitute the only form of banks' assets;
and (iv) money in the money market consists solely of currency exogeneously
1988:37.
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supplied by the government and that the proportion of wealth held in the form of
money depends negatively on the real rate of returns on deposits, Khan formulated
the balance sheet of the simplified aggregate banking system in real terms as
Assets = Liabilities
S_y
Pr
where
S= nominal value of shares
P=price level
y=real income
r=real rate of return on shares
Since prices are fixed the real value of the banks' deposits (s) is equal to the
capitalized value of the future earnings of the banks as given by:
y
s= -
r
The model ensures that equilibrium continuously obtains in the money and
capital market while real income in the goods market adjusts slowly to any varia-
tions in excess aggregate demand. Using the basic system as depicted in Figure 3.1
Khan assumes an IS shock in the form of an exogeneous fall in real bank income on
the asset side, from y" to yj. At point B there is an excess supply of money that
causes an instantaneous decline in the real rate of return on investment deposits
3.5
3.6
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r* J__
r - - -
from r to r1 at point C. As the real rate of return declines during this process of
adjustment, the real value of shares (as given by equation 3.6) falls immediately
from
s* =
to
y1
Si = -
r1
to maintain continuous equilibrium in the capital market.
Figure 3.1	 Islamic Banking System with Fixed Prices
Real rate of
return (r)	 I M
'S
Real income (y)
Long run equilibrium will once again be reached at the original steady state
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as the excess demand in the goods market (at point C) slowly moves real income
back to y.
The main point that Khan wanted to emphasize in this model is that because
the nominal value of deposits is flexible, disequilibrium in the capital market im-
mediately clears hence ensuring the stability of the system. Khan therefore argues
that
in a system of equity participation (like Islamic banking) which excludes predetermined
interest rates and does not guarantee the nominal value of deposits, shocks to the asset positions
are immediately absorbed by changes in the values of shares (deposits) held by the public in the
bank. Therefore, the real values of assets and liabilities in such a system would be equal at all
points of time.8°
Digressing from Khan's model, a different situation prevails in the interest-
based system where banks receive a predetermined fixed interest irrespective of the
level of profit realised by the entrepreneur in the production sector. The revenue
from interest which accrues to the conventional bank from its lending activity,
given that other costs remain constant, can be represented by equation 3.7
3.7r=iP
where
i= rate of interest
P= amount of principal lent to the borrower
1987:31.
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Hence even if the borrowed funds from the bank yield high profits to the
entrepreneur-borrower the return received by the bank out of the borrowed funds
remains uniformly fixed at iP.
The net profit or income for the entrepreneur-borrower after deducting the cost
of capital plus interest is given by equation 3.8
r = R— P(1 +1)	 3.8
where
R = net revenue from the project.
In so far as the interest cost iF is less than the net revenue from the project
the entrepreneur would find little difficulty in settling the cost of borrowing and
sustain a positive net profit. However if the return from the project is lower than
the interest cost, the entrepreneur runs a loss but is still obliged to pay the full
amount of the loan plus the interest cost, out of his own wealth or by borrowing
from other sources. If a large number of borrowers fail to pay their loans during
the recession, for instance, the bank's asset position will be affected and since the
rate of interest on deposits is fixed a divergence would arise between the real assets
and the real liabilities of the bank. As argued by Khan 8 ' banks may try to cover
the discrepancy between assets and liabilities through a drawdown of reserves or
by reducing net capital. However if losses exceed available reserves, the banks are
likely to be unable to pay their depositors leading to the possibility of runs on
deposits or bankruptcy. Unless the Central Bank moves in rapidly to correct the
1987:ibid.
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disequilibrium and restore public confidence bank panic might arise and trigger a
sequence of other bank failures causing instability to the whole banking system.
According to Waqar Masood Khan (1985) no such instability would arise when
banks issue shares (or investment deposits) to its depositors. In fact he envisaged
that under such a system depositors would be more inclined to retain their deposits
or shares when the value of the bank's assets decline with the hope of future
revaluation of the bank assets; rather than make withdrawals and accept a loss on
initial deposit.
The inherent instability of the traditional interest-based banking system has
also been recognized by western economists (Fisher 1937, Friedman 1957, Simon
1948, Mintz 1950) even before the current theory of Islamic banking was developed.
Simon (1948) believed the bank failures in the United States during the 1930s
were closely related to the inherent instability of the fractional Preserve system.
He proposed reform requiring the replacement of the traditional banking system
by two separate institutions namely deposit banks and investment trust in order
to differentiate the payment and portfolio functions of banks. The former which
receives only transaction balances are required to hold 100 per cent cash reserves
to guarantee payment which will avoid bank runs. The investment trust, on the
other hand, would obtain funds for lending on the basis of equity participation and
consequently the lending activities would be constrained by the amount of funds
obtained.
It may be interesting to note that Simon's proposal for 100 per cent reserve
requirement did not gain popular support initially because the banks had the op-
portunity to use deposit insurance. However recent market innovations along the
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lines of Simon's proposal have developed in the wake of the banking crisis in the
early 1980s. These alternatives which were described as 'mutual fund banking' or
'unit trust banking' based on the idea that 'banks operate as mutual funds, valu-
ing and redeeming deposits according to the current value of their asset portfolio
(which could be more or less than the face value).' 82 Under this alternative system
the payment activities of the bank are run-proof through the backing of transac-
tion balances with liquid marketable assets (such as Treasury bills) rather than
cash. The investment activities of the bank are effectively unregulated but are
also invulnerable to runs. As argued by McCulloch83:
money market mutual funds, like all mutual funds, are run proof since their obligations to
their investors are simply pro rata shares in the current value of the funds portfolio. To the
extent that depositors/investors line up at the front door to take their money out, the rate
of return to depositing new funds will increase and new depositors/investors will line up at
the back door to put their money in.
The equity-related activities of these mutual fund or unit trust funds bear
resemblance to the profit sharing Islamic bank at least on the deposit side. On
this count it is envisaged that there is some theoretical basis to suggest that Islamic
banking would be relatively more stable than the conventional banks.
3.2.4 Efficiency in Resource Allocation and Distribution.
The theory of Islamic banking also advocates that the replacement of interest
by profit-sharing would result in a more efficient allocation of resources in the
economy.
82 Lewis 1987: 142.
83	 .	 .	 .	 .see Lewis Domestic and International Banking 1987:143.
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Chapra84 argued that under the profit-sharing system the rate of interest is
replaced by the rate of profit as the criterion for the allocation of resources in the
short and long run. The rate of profits also acts a.s the mechanism for equating
the demand and supply of capital.
Resource allocation to various sectors of the economy in the short-run will be
determined by the ex-ante or expected rate of profit. Thus the higher the profits
expected from a certain economic sector or type of business, the greater would
be the flow or supply of investment directed to it and vice-versa. The allocation
of resources in the long run, on the other hand, will depend more on the ex-post
or actual profits realized. If ex-post profits from a certain sector are consistently
lower than the ex-ante profit then such sector may find it difficult to attract or
raise capital in future.
According to Chapra the two-sided evaluation of projects both on the basis
of ex-ante and ex-post profits provides a check on the misallocation of resources.
Decisions will be made entirely on economic factors and the rate of return will be
the true allocator of funds. Higher profits reveal efficiency in the real sector and
will not reflect factors that influence the interest-rates such as speculation in the
interest-based system. The variable profits also acts as a greater incentive for the
entrepreneur under the profit-sharing system to strive and make the highest profit
possible. On the other hand, since the risk of financial loss will be borne entirely
by the bank or shared with the entrepreneur under the profit-sharing agreement
banks will be induced to extend credit on the basis of productivity and viability
in order to minimize such risk.
The lending criteria of Islamic banks therefore differs from that of traditional
84 1985:108.
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banks. A bank working on a profit-sharing system has to ensure that It is financing
a specific project that is profitable and that will self-liquidate the 'loan' based on
the production, distribution and the sale of the goods and services produced. It
is argued that interest-based commercial banks generally place more importance
on the credit-worthiness of borrowers rather than on the purpose of the loan or
the productivity of the project to he undertaken.85 Even though many commercial
banks in the interest-based financial system undertake feasibility studies to secure
their loans against bankruptcies despite the collateral guarantee most commercial
banks in developing countries do not apply such rigorous techniques resulting in
many loans being extended on the basis of collateral irrespective of how the funds
would be utilized. It is therefore envisaged that a shift to profit sharing in such
environments would improve the allocation of resources more effectively.
It is also alleged that resources under the profit sharing system would be eq-
uitably distributed88 . In the first place, since there is no obligation that profits
must exceed the rate of interest on borrowed funds the entrepreneur is still able to
make a positive return even when profit is low and share this profit with the bank.
The important implication here is that under the profit sharing system projects
with low profits but which are beneficial from the socio-economic perspective will
stand a chance of acquiring bank financing. Secondly as projects would be more
closely monitored and supervised by banks under profit sharing than under con-
ventional banking less collateral would be required by the former. Because of this
reduced requirement on collateral it is expected that new entrepreneurs with lim-
ited wealth but who are innovative would also be eligible for bank financing. This
is a major advantage attributed to the profit sharing system. It opens the door to
85 Salama 1984:6.
86 Chapral985:11O.
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the small-scale entrepreneur who may have potentially high-yielding projects but
whose chances for financing in the interest-based system may be slim because of
the lack of collateral.
In summary, Muslim economists seem to agree unanimously that there is more
to Islamic banking than the mere elimination of interest provided that the main
banking operations, both on the liabilities and assets sides, are run on profit shar-
ing. As shown in the above discussions through profit sharing or equity participa-
tion Islamic banking can contribute towards the achievement of full employment
and economic growth, socio-economic justice and the equitable distribution of in-
come, mobilization and investment of savings and stability in the financial system
all of which constitute part of the goals and objectives of the Islamic economy.
3.2.5 Operational Framework
3.2.5.1 Definition
An Islamic bank is defined in broad terms by The International Association of
Islamic Banks as a bank which
implements a new banking concept in that it adheres strictly to the rulings of Islamic
Shariah in the fields of finance and other dealings87
In specific terms, however an Islamic bank can be defined as
an institution which conducts all its financial operations, as normally conducted by a
bank, in conformity with Shariah, without involving itself with nba in any way88
87 Mudawi 1984:2.
88 Ausaf Ahmad 1987:2.
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The second definition incorporates both aspects of banking and Shariah on
an equal footing. As indicated by Khan 89 an Islamic bank has to meet two basic
requirements. Firstly its operations must be based strictly on Islamic principles
and secondly it must fulfill all the requirements of sound banking. It is therefore
indicative that the Islamic bank faces the technical constraints usually imposed
on banks and is also subject to the legal arid ethical constraints provided by the
Shariah. The performance of the Islamic bank is evaluated not only in financial
terms but also by the criterion that its profits should be Islamically justified. The
existence of an independent Shariah Advisory/Supervisory Board is therefore an
essential feature which differentiates the Islamic bank from the conventional bank.
&5.2 Objectives
While profits constitute the primary objective of Islamic banks Muslim economists
also emphasize the socio-economic objectives which Islamic banks are expected to
fulfill. Chapra (1985) asserts that Islamic banks should play a goal-oriented role
rather than merely a profit-maximising role and should adjust themselves to the
different needs of the Islamic economy. Muazzam All°° adds that...
The Islamic financial system cannot be introduced merely by eliminating nba but also
by adopting the Islamic principles of social justice and introducing laws, practices, pro-
cedures and instruments which help in the maintenance of justice, equity, fairness and
human considerations.
The socio-economic objective attributed to Islamic banking relates to the in-
tegrated nature of the Islamic economy where the financial system cannot operate
89 1982:187
90 1985:60.
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in isolation oblivious to the goals of the economy in which it is an integral part. It
must be appreciated that the abolition of nba in Islam is not an isolated injunction
but it is part of a social and moral philosophy and an integral part of a set of inter-
related values (as shown in Chapter II). Thus the objective of Islamic banking, as
seen by Muslim economists, is not confined to the elimination of interest from the
conventional system but to introduce a new system which contributes positively
towards achieving the socio-economic objectives of the Islamic system.
Among the objectives of an Islamic bank as outlined by the International
Association of Islamic banks are:-
(a) To mobilize and consolidate resources in the economy through the devel-
opment of individuals' saving awareness.
(b) To direct funds into investment activities that serve the objectives of the
economic and social development of the Islamic nation.
(c) To carry out banking activities and services in accordance with Islamic
jurisprudence free from usury and exploitation.
3.2.5.3 Sources and Uses of Funds
While mudarabah and rnushanakah are regarded by Muslim scholars as the real
substitutes for interest, it is recognized that some difficulties may arise in the appli-
cation of profit-sharing in certain sectors. This is especially true when deposits are
meant for transactionary or precautionary purposes and when financing are needed
for consumption purposes. To meet such situations, the literature on Islamic bank-
ing has identified other categories of deposits and financing for the Islamic bank
as permitted by the Shaniah. Various sources and uses of funds therefore make up
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the structural framework of the Islamic banking operations.
1. Sources of Funds
Apart from equity, deposits are the major source of funds for the Islamic banks.
Khan and Mirakhor°' have divided these deposits into two forms namely transac-
tion deposits and investment deposits.
• Transaction Deposits
These deposits are transaction balances which are comparable to demand de-
posits (current and savings account) in conventional banks. The nominal value
of these deposits is guaranteed by the bank and deposits may be withdrawn at
any amount on demand. Generally, no profits are payable on the current account
and for this reason the service may be provided free of charge since the cost of
maintaining the accounts is sufficiently offset by the benefit which accrue to the
bank from the utilization of these deposits. On this argument, a fee on the current
account is regarded by some jurists as a disguised interest and therefore should
not be permitted. 92 The payment of profits on the savings accounts depends on
the agreement between the bank and the depositors. If the bank is given the right
to invest these deposits in short-term financing then profits are payable either at
the discretion of the bank or on a mutually agreed ratio.
• Investment Deposits
Investment deposits constitute the principal source of funds for the Islamic
bank operating on the profit-sharing system. These deposits which are accepted
on the principles of i-au darabah resemble shares in a firm rather than time and say-
91 1987:5
92 Presley 1988:21.
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ings deposits of the conventional banks. Thus unlike in the conventional system
where the nominal value of deposits are guaranteed, the nominal value of invest-
ment deposits is not guaranteed nor is the bank obliged to pay a fixed return on
these deposits. There are two main types of investment account deposits; specified
and unspecified. The former is limited and conditional in nature since the invest-
ment of these deposits are channelled to certain sectors or projects as specified by
the account holder. The latter is unconditional which allows the bank to invest
the deposits in any suitable projects according to the discretion of the bank. In-
vestment account deposits may be held for short-term periods of one, three, six,
nine or twelve months or for longer periods of up to five years.
2. Uses of Funds
As elaborated in the theory of Islamic banking a large portion of the assets
of the Islamic bank should be utilized into investment-related financing, namely
mudarabah and musharakah so that the bank can play a developmental role in the
economy.
Under mudarabah the bank would provide business enterprises or individuals
with 100 per cent financing for a particular economic activity on the basis of
profit sharing. The entrepreneur would undertake the management of the venture
without any interference from the bank. Profits would be shared according to a
mutually agreed ratio. Financial losses would be borne entirely by the bank while
the entrepreneur loses in terms of his time and effort put into the venture.
There is no complete unanimity among the major schools of Islamic thought
on the areas to which mudarabah may be applied. The Hanafi school restricts its
usage to trading activities such as buying and selling while some Hanbali jurists
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allow its application to finance agriculture, small businesses or workmanships. A
majority of scholars also insists that the mudarabah should only be confined to
self-liquidating transactions because in such cases the assets of the mudarabah can
be easily identified and liquidated and the proceeds can be easily distributed with
the termination of operations.93
The other form of profit-sharing method of financing is Musharakah which is
similar with mudarabah except that funds are not wholly provided by the bank but
are contributed by both parties in the form of a joint-venture or equity participa-
tion. Unlike mudarabah financing, both parties can participate in the management
of the joint-venture. Profits are to be shared according to an agreed profit sharing
ratio while losses would be borne by both parties in proportion to the amount of
capital invested.
The second category of financing which the Islamic bank can undertake is
based on contracts of exchange or sale transactions. These methods are regarded
as second-line technique in the Islamic banking literature since the purpose of
their application is to supplement mudarabah and musharakah in areas where profit
sharing is not feasible. Basically the theoretical literature has identified three main
contracts of exchange that can be employed by the Islamic bank.
1. Murabahah (cost-plus or mark-up sale)
Murabahah which literally means a way of making a profit is basically a two-
tier sale mechanism. Under this arrangement the bank buys the goods needed by
a client and then sells the goods to the client at a mark-up price. In principle, the
mark-up has to be negotiated between the two parties and cannot be determined
Presley 1988:24.
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unilaterally by the bank. The client can settle the price of the goods either in a
single payment at the end of a specified period or in instalments.
It may be worth noting that even though the mark-up seems to resemble
interest it is in fact distinguishable from the latter. Although the profit margin
is fixed and certain it is Islamically legitimate because it represents profits from
a business transaction, not a return on borrowed funds. To be consistent with
Islamic law, the murabahah transaction must satisfy two conditions. First, the
bank must take physical possession of the good or asset before selling it to the
client. By this the bank takes the full risk of the purchased goods. Secondly, to
avoid nba the profit margin should not be altered after the agreement has been
concluded. Once the sale price is fixed it cannot be altered even if the client settles
the payment earlier or later than stipulated.94
2. Bai' Muajjal or Sale at a Deferred Higher Price
Bai' Muajjal95 is similar to murabahah in many respects where the bank first
buys an asset on behalf of its client and then sells the asset to the client at a price
higher than the actual cost of the asset. The asset is delivered on the spot but
the payment is deferred. The main difference between the two transactions is that
murabahah is generally applied for short-term commercial financing (to finance
trade bills or working capital) while bai' muajjal is normally used for long-term
financing for the acquisition of fixed assets or property. The longer payment is
deferred under bai' muajjal the higher would be the profit margin set by the bank.
3. Ijarah (leasing or hire-purchase)
' E1-Ashker 1987: 150, Khan & Mirakhor 1987:170.
95	 .	 .	 .
also known as A1-Bai Bithamm Api.
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Here the bank acquires a certain asset needed by the client and then leases
the asset to the client at a fixed rate (which would cover the cost of the asset and
income for the bank) over a specified period of time. Leasing is a fixed payment
contract which is permissible in Islam. Although a fixed charge is levied on the
client it does not amount to nba because the benefit which flows to the client from
the use of the asset is certain. Besides, the bank retains ownership of the asset
and hence is exposed to risks and depreciation of the asset due to wear and tear.
Another variant of this contract is the ijara wa istigna or hire purchase by
which the client ultimately has ownership of the rented asset by paying the value
of the asset plus rent over the agreed period. In this case, the bank's share in the
ownership of the asset decreases and that of the client increases until the client
gets full possession when the full value of the asset has been paid.
Besides financing activities, the Islamic bank is also permitted to provide con-
ventional fee-based banking services such as bank draft, sale and purchase of foreign
exchange, travellers' cheques, remittances and transfers.
The bank can also advance interest-free benevolent loans or qard-aihasan on
compassionate grounds to some of its regular customers or shareholders who are
in need of finance to alleviate genuine liquidity crises in the short-term.
Apart from the above instruments the literature on Islamic banking has also
recognized the need for the development of instruments for the secondary market.
These instruments may take the form of profit-linked certificates issued by compa-
nies authorised to raise capital either through mudarabah or mush arakah. In the
case of mudarabah the bank would provide capital to a mudarabah company and in
return would receive mudarabah certificates with a specific face value. The issue of
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Mush arakah certificates on the other hand would involve a number of parties who
provide capital to a musharakah company. Both the rnudarabah and rnusharakah
certificates are redeemable and can be traded in the secondary market, The prices
and implicit returns are to be determined by market forces. These financial in-
struments are essential for, among others, they act as a means of channelling more
funds into the primary market for capital accumulation. They enable purchasers
to adjust their liquidity positions and convert their claims into cash whenever the
need arise and allow financial institutions to raise funds for long-term financing
without having to match maturities or for capital without changing their ownership
structures.
In summary it can be deduced that the operational framework of Islamic bank-
ing as perceived in theory has a greater orientation towards 'investment bank-
ing'and 'merchant banking' rather than pure commercial banking. With the
abolition of interest other instruments outside the periphery of conventional com-
mercial banking have been devised within the rules of the Shariah. The use of
profit sharing arrangements makes the commercial bank in the Islamic economy
almost equivalent to an investment bank. Its involvement in trade-related financ-
ing carries an image of merchant banking yet the developmental role attributed
to it brings it closer to a development bank. The great emphasis on profit shar-
ing stresses the commitment expected from Islamic banks towards socio-economic
development.
It is because of this multidimensional nature that Chapra 96 has described the
Islamic bank as a multipurpose bank; a crossbreed of commercial and investment
bank, investment trust and investment-management institution. Looking from
96 1985:154.
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another perspective, Rabooy (1988) argued that because of the unique character-
istic of the Islamic bank, it is more akin to an Islamic "intermediary investment
company"°7 rather than a bank.
3.2.6 Issues in Transition
The theoretical model of Islamic banking based on profit sharing assumes a
fully-fledged Islamic financial intermediation in an Islamic economy where the be-
haviour of the economic agents follows strictly to the Islamic ethics in the Shariah,
It represents an ideal model which does not fit any of the existing Muslim society
today. Nevertheless such a model provides a convenient and logical starting point;
as a frame of reference, in analysing the real world of market imperfections.
Based on the above view, it is envisaged that the establishment of Islamic
banking in the interest-based financial system of Muslim countries represents a
period of transition towards the permanent Islamization of the whole economy in
the long-run. During this transitional period the implementation of an Islamic
banking system based on profit sharing poses several practical problems. Among
the main problems addressed are:-
i) Moral Hazard
In the Islamic system honesty and integrity are essential for the successful
implementation of profit sharing based on mudarabah or musharakah. The deter-
mination of the exact amount of profits earned by the rnudarib would be necessary
to calculate the bank's share of profits. During the transitional period it is ex-
pected that Islamic banks would face a dual risk; firstly the business risk which
It is interesting to note that the Kuwait Finance House, and Dar al Islarni are registert'd as
panies or trusts not as banks to be able to carry out trade financing and equity paridpatu
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arises when the err-post behaviour of market forces differs from the err-ante and
secondly the moral risk which relates to the possibility of cheating by fund users
who may not declare accurately their profits to the bank because of lack of hon -
esty hence depriving the bank of its due share of profits or even part of the capital
supplied.
The problem of moral hazard is less serious in the capitalist system where the
obligation to pay a fixed interest irrespective of the outcome of business provides
incentives for better management in order to reap profits. In this context Waqar
Masood Khan (1985:105) suggests that some financial schemes embodying some
incentive mechanism may be devised so that fund users reveal the truth even if
they are not sufficiently afraid of God. Chapra (1982) and Siddiqi (1989) conceive
that the moral risk would tend to be high in the beginning when the system is
newly established. When users of funds realize that their ability to secure loans in
future depends on past records of good profits the tendency to cheat will decline
substantially.
ii) Competition from interest-based banks
The model of financial intermediation in the transition period is more complex
because of the presence of competition from interest-based banks. On the deposit
side the behaviour of depositors is not only influenced by the inter-temporal deci-
sion of allocating their income between savings and consumption but also by the
prospective rate of return between profits and interest. While pious Muslims are
expected to prefer Islamic banks over conventional banks on grounds of piety alone
the preference behaviour of the non-Muslims and other Muslims with lesser degree
of piety is likely to be influenced by the differences in the rates of return, the level
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of services and facilities that both banks can offer. It is assumed that depositors in
the main are risk averse; and because of the uncertainty associated with investment
deposits Islamic bank must be able to offer competitive rates of returns which are
higher than that offered by conventional banks by a risk premium to compensate
for the greater risk involved.98
Nienhaus (1989) also envisaged that Islamic banks in interest-based environ-
ment would face an instrumental disadvantage compared to conventional banks.
Whilst Islamic banks cannot employ all the instruments available to conventional
banks the reverse, however does not hold. Conventional banks are not constrained
to adopt Islamic financial instruments if they find these instruments are viable.
In the final analysis the tool box of conventional banks is actually or potentially
greater than that of Islamic banks, which may affect the market share of the latter.
iii) Legal Impediments
Even though the operations of Islamic banks are concluded under Islamic meth-
ods of financing these contracts do not come fully under the jurisdiction of the
existing civil laws. In countries where the legal system are based on English legal
principles civil courts are not sufficiently acquainted with the rationale of these
contracts to be able to handle disputes. In practice, disputes relating to these
transactions were dealt with according to the interpretation of English law which
are more often not in line with the Islamic law. In essence therefore the relationship
between the bank and client, which is that of creditor and debtor is still left un-
changed. Legal reforms are therefore necessary to safeguard banks and customers
against defaults and other abuses.
98 Yaacob 1986:113.
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iv) Trade-Financing versus Profit-sharing
Great stress has been laid by Muslim economists upon the fact that trade
financing must be regarded by Islamic banks oniy as a supplement to investment
financing. The Council of Islamic Ideology Pakistan points out that even though
the methods under trade financing are free of interest these alternatives are no
more than a second best solution from the viewpoint of an ideal Islamic economic
system. It is envisaged that profit sharing or investment-related financing must
form the principal financing operations if the socio-economic objectives of the
Islamic economy are to be achieved. Thus it is vital, according to the theorists,
to treat rnudarabah and mush arakah as first-line techniques of financing and the
other contracts of exchange as second-line techniques.
The main concern of the Muslim economists is that because of the inherent
simplicity of the profit margin method of financing and the relatively low risks
involved, there exists a tendency for Islamic banks to prefer these alternatives to
profit sharing. Such a tendency would lead to a concentration on trade financing in
the banks' financing operations hence negating the theoretical expectations on the
relative superiority of the Islamic banking system. This is because financing would
only be channelled to the tertiary sectors hence depriving the primary sectors
of real investments where the multiplier effects are greater. It is conceived that
concentration on trade financing would result in a misallocation of resources with
its associated generation of lower employment and income than can be attained
by investment-related financing. As noted by Attiyah;99
Murabaha is not suitable except for trading activities. As a result the capital deposited in
Islamic banks invigorates only trading activities whereas the assumption was that it would be
in Siddiqi 1989:56.
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distributed over all kinds of activities and between different sectors.. .So the ultimate result of the
employment of these huge funds in murabaha deals is to narrow down the activities of Islamic
banks in comparison to what they were expected to do in the light of the Islamic economic vision.
Some writers are also wary of the danger that the trade financing alternatives
would be abused by the banks in the pursuit of high profits. Siddiqi10° cautions
that these alternatives may serve as channels for
opening a back door for dealing on the basis of nba.
He argued that the determination of the mark-up can lead to discrimination
where the margin will tend to be higher the longer payment is deferred. This
would impose a burden on the client and if the rate of instalment is fixed (where
the client is obliged to pay at the stipulated time) then the the economic effects
similar to that of interest can be expected. Ziauddin Ahmad (1985) emphasized
the point that if the interest-based system is replaced largely with a system based
on mark-up then the change would denote a change only in name rather than in
substance for the new system would not be free from the negative effects of the
interest-based system. The bank bears no real risk and the inequitable distribution
of gains between the bank and the clients closely resembles the interest system.
Siddiqi101 even went to the extent of suggesting that these methods of trade
financing be abolished. He quotes,
I would prefer that Bai' Muajjal is removed from the list of permissible methods altogether.
Even if we concede its permissibility in legal form we have the overriding legal maxim that
anything leading to something prohibited stands prohibited. It will be advisable to apply
100 1985:139.
101 1983:227.
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this maxim to Bai' Muajjal in order to save interest-free banking from being sabotaged from
within.
Siddiqi further adds,
Should some pressing situations defy any other solutions, we can at least confine the use of
Bai' Muajjal specifically to them as a temporary measure, while prohibiting its use in other
situations.
This is an extreme suggestion that needs to be considered seriously especially
from the point of Islamic jurisprudence. The contracts of exchange are clearly
permissible in the Shariah since they are conducted within the boundaries of sale
or rent and not borrowings. It therefore follows that the income derived from these
sale contracts are permitted irrespective of whether there is a risk involved or not.
Moreover these contracts are essential for cases where financing cannot be carried
out on profit sharing. In the final analysis no one has the the right to pronounce
lawful things as unlawful except Allah. If the harm coming from a lawful thing
is proven greater than its benefit then it should be greatly discouraged but not
declared as unlawful. What is more important, as envisaged by Mirakhor (1987)
is for the banks themselves to assess the appropriate trade off between risk'02
and return to ensure the safety of their overall portfolio of assets. If banks are
constrained from engaging in trade-related financing the portfolio of the bank must
be considered very risky. On the other hand, banks do not operate at optimum if
they refuse to consider profit-sharing activities solely because of the risks involved
even though the expected returns from profit-sharing activities exceed the expected
return from markup. The relevant factors to be analysed by the bank are its overall
earnings and the riskiness of its total portfolio rather than the risk of a particular
102 Risk here is interpreted as variability of expected returns (Mirakhor 1987:194).
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mode of financing considered in isolation.
3.3 Islamic Banking in Practice
Even though the first attempt at Islamic banking was made in Pakistan in the
late 1950s'°3 the more well-known experiment was the establishment of an interest-
free savings bank in the rural town of Mit Ghamr, Egypt from 1963 to 1967. This
pioneer scheme was aimed to change the attitude of the rural population towards
savings and investment and to industrialize the villages without government inter-
vention. Besides its success in changing the behaviour of the rural population from
hoarding to financial savings, the most notable contribution of the bank was the
provision of investment loans on the basis of profit sharing to small enterprises,
entrepreneurs and artisans who had the skill but not the funds to set up their
own businesses.' 04 One of the unique features of the bank was the inculcation
of the sense of belonging by the bank management to the population. Hence by
continuous emphasis that the bank belonged to the people and by bringing in rep-
resentation of the local people into bank management, social control against loan
defaulters was exercised which attributed to the success of the loan schemes.'°5
Despite its success the bank lost its operational autonomy in 1967 when it was
brought under the control of the National Bank of Eygpt and the Central Bank
in 1967 due to political reasons. Nevertheless the developmental nature of this
experiment made it very prominent.
The emergence of the current breed of Islamic banks both in the Middle-East
and the West in the second-half of the 1970s may be attributed largely to the im-
103 Wilson 1985.
104 E1-Ashker 1990:60.
105 Manna" 1985:171.
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pact of the Islamic resurgence and the substantial petrodollar income. The concept
of Islamic banking was first formally discussed at the Third Islamic Conference of
Foreign Ministers in Jeddah 1972. A document which later became known as
the "Egyptian Study "addressed the basic issues in relation to the functioning
and operations of Islamic banks. It was proposed that Islamic banking was to be
implemented in three stages.
• The first stage would involve the establishment of an Islamic Advisory Agency
to provide advisory assistance in the establishment of any Islamic banking
institution.106
• The second stage would be the setting up of an international Islamic bank to
serve as a clearing house for international payments between Muslim countries
and finance reciprocal trade. Central agencies at the national level were to be
created to prepare for the subsequent establishment of local Islamic banks.
• The third stage would see the formation of local Islamic savings, investment,
and development banks to complement the umbrella institution at the national
and international levels.
Nevertheless the practical development, of Islamic banking took a different
course. The advisory agency, namely the International Association of Islamic
Banks (IAIB) was not set up until 1977 two years after the establishment of the
the first Islamic bank. In addition, the national central agencies proposed for the
second stage have yet to materialize in the various countries.
106 Wholers-Scharf 1983:77.
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3.3.1 Classification
The Islamic banks in operation have been classified into different categories
according to different criteria. Ahmad 107 has divided these banks on the basis of
the purpose of their formation into three groups namely;
(i) The commercial banks which are formed to provide normal commercial
banking services in accordance to the Shariah. The basic aim of these banks is to
make profit. Most of the existing Islamic banks belong to this group.
(ii) The development banks which are to foster the process of social and
economic development amongst member governments. The Islamic Development
Bank is the only existing example.
(iii) The special-purpose Islamic banks which have been established to fulfill
some specific purpose or to serve a special class of clientele. Examples are the
Nasser Social Bank of Eygpt and The Islamic Bank of Western Sudan. These
banks offer great potential in bringing social and economic change to its clients.
An IMF study by Iqbal and Mirakhor (1987) however classifies the Islamic
banks according to the environment in which they operate. By this classification
the Islamic banks fall into two categories.
1. Islamic banks operating in full-fledged Islamic financial systems as in the Is-
lamic Republic of Iran and in Pakistan.'°8
2. Islamic commercial banks or Islamic investment companies which operate in
107 1987:13.
108 It may be worth noting that an Islaniized banking system was briefly implemented in Sudan between
September 1984 and April 1985. However many commercial banks reverted to the conventional
system after the Numeiri regime was overthrown.
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the conventional system side by side with the traditional financial iflStittjo5
These banks may be further divided into two broad groups in accordance to
their financial structures. The first are Islamic banks in Muslim countries estab-
lished either by private or semigovernment initiatives. Examples are the Faisal
Islamic banks in Sudan, Turkey, Bahrain, Guinea, Senegal and Egypt, the Al
Baraka Islamic banks in Turkey, Sudan and Jordan; the Kuwait Finance House,
and Dubai Islamic Bank. The second are investment holding companies oper-
ating in some Muslim but mostly in non-Muslim countries; belonging mainly to
the the Dar-Al-Maal-Isianu (Geneva) and the Al-Baraka International Limited
(England).
3.4 General Evaluation of Performance
3.4.1 Islamic banks in the Islamied economy
The IMF study by Iqbal and Mirakhor (1987) contains observations on the
experience of Islamic banking in both Iran and Pakistan where the entire banking
systems have been Islamized. Individual country case studies have also been carried
out by Aryan and Gieraths (1990) respectively.
Banking in Iran underwent a three-year period of transition which began, fol-
lowing the Islamic revolution in 1979, with the nationalization of more than twenty
privately-owned banks that were facing a crisis of confidence and bankruptcy. As
a result of the nationalization exercise the number of banks in the financial system
was reduced to five commercial banks and four specialist banks.109
°° Aryan 1990:156.
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The first step towards the Islamization of the banking system, however, took
place in 1981 when commercial banks, under the advice of the Central Bank, re-
placed interest on loans with a 4 per cent service charge while deposits were offered
a 'guaranteed minimum profit' instead of interest. A lengthy period of consulta-
tion for the submission of a comprehensive bill of Islamization of the entire banking
system was to follow. Consequently, the Law for Riba-Free Banking was passed
in August 1983, by which the whole banking system was required to transform all
its operations in line with the Shariah within a period of three years. Hence by
March 1985 the whole banking system in Iran was Islamized.
Under the new Law, the banks were required to convert all their liabilities
within a year into two types of deposits acceptable by the Shariah. Deposits for
transactionary and liquidity purposes under the Islamic system are to be mobilized
as Qard al-Hasanah deposits which would constitute savings and current deposits
that yield no returns. However to attract savings the banks are permitted to
offer a variety of bonuses either in cash, kind or priority in the use of banking
services. The banks are also authorized to accept investment deposits with specific
minimum periods of maturities ranging from three months for short-term deposits
and one year for long-term deposits. These deposits are received on the basis of
profit-sharing. The rate of profit is uniform for all banks and is determined by
the Central Bank based on the overall profits of the banking system. Profits are
declared every six months and depositors who withdrew their investment deposits
before the minimum maturity period are not entitled to any profits. Aryan'1°
reports that deposit mobilization under the new system has been quite successful.
By 1987, private sector deposits with the banking system have risen in nominal
1990:166.
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terms to 20.5 per cent from 5.7 per cent in 1985. The bulk of total deposits (77%)
were investment deposits of which 60 per cent matured in the short-term. The
rates of profit for investment deposits have been relatively high ranging between 6
per cent and 8.5 per cent for short-term and long-term deposits respectively.
In terms of asset utilization, Article 3 of the new banking law stipulates the
use of the term investment deposits in "joint venture, mozarebeh, hire purchase,
instalment transaction, mozaraah, mosaqat, direct investment, forward dealings
and joaalah transactions" 1 ". Nevertheless, the pace of Islamic conversion was
relatively slower on the asset side. Aryan" 2 noted that during the first year of
Islamic operation the banking system was only able to extend 16 per cent of total
credit to the private sector in Islamic forms. This accounted for less than half
(30.5%) of total investment deposits in the banking system which implied that
the available deposits had not been fully utilised. In addition, a major portion of
the financial resources have been allocated mainly to finance short-.term trade and
commercial transactions under instalment sale (murabaha) rather than for project
financing under mudarabah or mush arakah. The bias towards short-term trade fi-
nancing was attributed, according to the IMF study, to the inadequate preparation
on the part of the commercial banks to carry out their new role as development
banks under the Islamic system. One of the major constraints was the shortage
of trained personnel to appraise potential projects for long-term financing under
profit-sharing and to monitor the progress of approved projects. Aryan' 13 also adds
that improper and unclear legal definitions regarding private property rights and
contracts under Islamic banking have also given rise to uncertainties pertaining
" Siddiqi 1988:48.
112 1990:166.
" 1990:169.
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to the distribution of assets acquired by long-term investments in agriculture and
industry. To avoid such problems, banks had preferred to concentrate their assets
in short-term trade financing.
The Islamization of the banking system in Pakistan was less abrupt than the
Iranian experience. The banking system was not nationalised. Instead Pakistan
had opted for a gradual process beginning with the introduction of interest-free
'windows' operating side by side with the interest counters of the conventional
banks to accept deposits on the basis of profit and loss sharing (PLS). During this
first phase which lasted from 1979 to 1 January 1985, steps were also taken to
develop new interest-free financing instruments in which the PLS deposits could
be invested. To implement these instruments three major finance institutions"4
had earlier converted all their transactions into interest-free methods of financing
in 1979 and a new development finance company, Bankers Equity Limited, owned
by the nationalized banks, was also set up. By July 1982 domestic banks had the
option to invest their PLS funds Islamicaily in methods such as mark-ups, hire-
purchase, mush arika and leasing in any of the four Islamized finance institutions.
The final abolition of nba was announced in June 1984. All finance transactions
by the government, state enterprises and stock companies had to operate without
interest by January 1985. The whole domestic banking system was finally geared
to Islamic banking in July 1985. Nevertheless foreign currency deposits and loans
from abroad were exempted from the new regulations.
The new system is characterized by twelve modes of non-interest finance on
the asset side. As can be seen in Table 3.1 the Islamic banking system in Pakistan
114 House Building Finance Corporation (HBFC), Investment Corporation of Pakistan (ICP) and
National Investment Trust (NIT).
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was also dominated by trade-related financing rather than equity-participation and
profit-sharing. There were six methods of trade financing relative to four based on
profit-sharing while the remaining two were fee-based services.
Table 3.1 - Pakistan: Interest-free methods of Financing
Trade-Related	 Investment-Related Others
1. mark-up/murabahah 7. musharakah 	 11. Qarz-e-hasna
2. mark-down	 8. equity	 12. service charg
3. buy-back	 9. participation term
4. leasing/ijara	 10. rent-sharing
5. hire-purchase
6. development charge
Source: Gieraths (1990:80)
The mark-down and buy-back methods are unique to Pakistan. The former
which is in effect a reduction of the mark-up by a bonus was introduced to overcome
the problem of late payments of installments and therefore act as an incentive for
early or punctual payments. The buy-back agreement, on the other hand allows
clients to purchase movable and immovable property by first selling the goods to
the bank and simultaneously buys back the same goods at a higher price (mark-
up) payable at a future date either in instalments or as a lumpsum. Although this
instrument is allowed by the State Bank of Pakistan, it is not permissible under
the Shariah according to most Islamic banking authorities because the supplier
and the bank client are the same person. The transaction is fictitious and exists
only on contract paper and is not linked to a real goods transaction.5
' Gierath (1990:186-187) has also discovered other discrepancies between the practical applications
of the Islamic financial instruments in Pakistan and the rulings of the Shariah. For instance
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Since the abolition of nba financing was replaced by widespread usage of the
mark-up system, the IMF study reported that the shift to Islamic banking in
Pakistan had not caused any disruption to lending activities. Bankers in Pakistan
claimed that the change to Islamic banking would have been tougher without
markup since the economy was not mature enough for equity-participation. 116
 Even
in 1987, three years after the transformation, most banks were unwilling to venture
into musharika or mudarabah because of high risks and the reluctance to share in a
loss with public money, even though some have set up subsidiaries for leasing and
hire-purchase activities. As stated by D.M Qureshi, managing director of Bankers
Equity;'17
This is the first stage of Islamicisation. The economy is set for mark-up, agricultural, semi-
industrial, short-cycle. Mark-up is the most crude form of Islamic finance. More mature is
musharika, then leasing; the highest is mudaraba. . .Investing in a mudaraba means trusting
the managers— something that rarely exists in Pakistani business.. .We have to use musharika
and mudaraba only for very high status clients.
The business risk associated with mudaraba and mush arika was further exacer-
bated by the absence of legal documents and operational procedures for the usage
of Islamic methods of financing other than the mark-up. For example, 30 out of
under the Mudarabali Ordinance the mudarabah company has to hold at least 10 per cent of the
mudarabah certificates floated in the market which according to the Shariah is synonymous to
equity-participation. In the case of musharika, the distribution of profits between the bank and
its clients is based on the profits projected by the latter and the provisional profits that the bank
expects. Thus if actual profits exceed the provisional profits expected by the bank the excess is
awarded to the client as a managerial bonus before the rest is distributed between him and the
bank. However if profits realized do not reach the provisional profits expected by the bank the client
must assign an increased share in profit to the bank. In the case of losses the bank is entitled to
shares of the company in equal proportion to the amount of loss it suffers. By these arrangements
the bank secures a minimum return even if actual profits fall below expectations which in principle
violates the conditions of a genuine musharika contract.
116 The Banker October 1987.
117 The Banker, October 1987:39.
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32 legal documents prepared by the Pakistan Banking Council relate to mark-up
financing. As a result the banking system is forced to resort only to mark-up
and abandon the other forms of financing.' 18 . This was evident when the mark-
up methods of financing accounted for 86.7 per cent of the investment PLS funds
of the commercial banks at the end of June 1984. Musharika accounted for 3.1
per cent and 8 per cent were in the form of equity participation, Bankers equity,
purchase of shares and the like, leaving perceptive observers with "a frustrating
feeling"
In terms of deposit mobilization, the rates of return on PLS deposits were found
to be relatively high ranging between an average of 8 per cent for savings deposit
and 11.2 per cent for one-year PLS deposits.' 2° These rates were not only relatively
higher than the rates of interest on the relevant accounts (7.5% for savings and
10.5% for non-PLS deposits) in the interest-based banks but were also higher than
the rates of interest before Islamization. Unlike in Iran, there were variations
between the rates of profits paid by banks indicating some degree of competition
for deposits. However, a more recent observation by Zaidi' 2 ' shows that with the
abolition of interest-based deposits, the average rates of profits on the PLS deposits
had fallen to a level below former interest rates even though the profits of banks
have generally remained stable or substantially improved after deducting foreign
income inflows. This position obviously conflicted with the Islamic economics
theory which treated capital and enterprise as a single factor of production by
which any increase in enterprise profits must necessarily bring about an increase
in the rate of return on capital. A possible explanation for the additional profits
118 New Horizon 1992 June:12.
119 Siddiqi 1988:48.
120 Shorter term PLS deposits and less risky savings deposits receive lower weights of profit.
121 1987:41.
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is that the banks still maintained interest-based loans made before Islamization.
Interest income from these loans could not be distributed to the PLS deposits and
has therefore gone to the bank and its shareholders as profits.
The IMF study had found no evidence to show that the effectiveness of mone-
tary policies in both Iran and Pakistan was impaired by the conversion to Islamic
banking. Credit allocation between the various sectors of the economy as the
primary instrument of control (both before and after Islamization) remained effec-
tive. The Central Bank of Iran has, however, supplemented this allocation through
variations in reserve ratios and moral suasion. Except for the rate of interest, all
other monetary policy instruments such as sectoral ceilings of credit facilities and
discount rates are still applicable in Iran. Several new instruments have also been
introduced to perform the functions previously carried out by interest. One of
these is the maximum anticipated rate of return (MARR) which acts as a yard-
stick to judge the acceptability of some credit applications submitted to banks.
The rate which is determined by the Central Bank reflects the opportunity cost of
financing other opportunities. Hence banks are authorized to finance an applica-
tion only if the anticipated rate of return on such financing is at least equal to the
MARR. Any project with a lower anticipated rate of return is therefore rejected.
The power of the MARR is similar to an interest rate since an increase or decrease
in its rate will lead to a contraction or expansion of the volume of credit. Another
instrument, the Maximum Rate of Profit (MRP), is also devised to have the same
effect of interest and is used by banks as mark-up or cost-plus. 122 The State Bank
of Pakistan also specifies a fixed range for mark-up rates for the same purpose.
The experiences of Pakistan and Iran show that the elimination of nba from
122 New Horizon June 1992:8.
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the entire banking system can be achieved without major problems. However the
conversion into a banking system based entirely on profit-sharing and equity par-
ticipation, as proposed in theory, is more difficult and requires basic changes in
the attitude of banks and society from debt-financing to equity-financing. Legal
reforms to safeguard the interest of the bank and clients and comprehensive re-
training of staff to deal with project-related lending operations are also necessary
to facilitate such transformation.
3.4.2 Islamic banks in interest-based environments
Basically, the main aim of Islamic banks in interest-based environments is to
offer an Islamic alternative to conventional banking; specifically to provide an op-
portunity for the Muslim population to avoid nba in their banking transactions.
An evaluation of the performance of these banks would therefore centre around
their ability to penetrate the local markets and continue to survive in the 'hos-
tile' environment. Yet one of the other important aspects of performance would
be the extent to which these profit-making institutions have conceded to the socio-
economic role expected of Islamic banks in theory.
Even though more than 40 of these banks had been established by the end of the
1980s, only a limited number of comprehensive studies on their performances have
been published. The earliest systematic empirical study ever published was that
undertaken by Khan F (1983) which covered Islamic banks in the Middle Eastern
countries of Sudan, the Gulf States, Jordan and Egypt. A more comprehensive
survey by Ahmad (1987) on Islamic banks both in the Middle East and elsewhere
compares the performance of these banks until the first half of the 1980s. A
collection of more recent empirical studies also focussed primarily on the Middle-
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East is offered in the volume Islamic Financial Markets edited by Wilson (1990).
Generally, the establishment of individual Islamic banks in the conventional
setting has led to the emergence of a dual financial system - usually one Islamic
bank against many nba-banks. With the exception of the seven Islamic banks in
Sudan, three in Bahrain and two each in Egypt and Turkey, the Islamic banks
in other countries such as Kuwait, Jordan, Dubai, Qatar, United Arab Emirates,
Bangladesh, Malaysia, Indonesia, Guinea, Niger and Senegal enjoy monopolistic
positions in the Islamic sector. Market shares tend to vary. The older Islamic
banks such as the Kuwait Finance House (KFH) and the Faisal Islamic Bank
Egypt (FIBE) accounted for close to 20 per cent of total deposits respectively,
between 1982-1984 partly because of extensive branch networks. The performance
of the Jordan Islamic Bank (JIB) has also been impressive where it accounted for
7.5 per cent of total bank deposits in 1987. Competition between Islamic banks in
Sudan has, however, reduced the market share of the Faisal Islamic Bank Sudan
from 15 per cent in 1982 to 7 per cent in 1986.123 For the newer Islamic banks
such as the Faisal Finaus (FFK) and the Al-Baraka Turk (ABT) in Turkey market
shares are still marginal where both banks accounted for 1.2 per cent of the total
current and savings deposits held by their conventional counterparts in 1987.124
The relatively large market share of the established Islamic banks indicate that
there is indeed a market gap for Islamic banking in the conventional environment.
The thesis that Islamic banks have reached their 'limits of growth' after filling
the market gap is rejected by Nienhaus, based on the observation that the market
shares of many Islamic banks have increased over time.
123 Nienhaus 1988.
124 Baldwin 1990:47.
102
The earliest survey by Khan indicates that Islamic banks in interest-based
environments have been successful in devising methods for the mobilization and
utilization of deposits which conform to the Shariah. On the liability side, invest-
ment accounts based on profit-sharing were found to be most popular. Savings
accounts were equally attractive only if these accounts were entitled to a share of
the profits of the bank. As in Iran and Pakistan investment accounts are received
on the basis of profit-sharing with different periods of maturity. Other studies also
show that some Islamic banks, such as the Kuwait Finance House, Faisal Islamic
Bank Egypt and Bahrain Islamic Bank, also accept investment deposits for un-
limited periods by which the deposits are renewed automatically every year unless
written notice is given, as in the case of the Kuwait Finance House, three months
before withdrawal.
Ahmad (1987) notes that the deposit structure of the 'old' Islamic banks have
undergone significant changes in the 1980s; marked by a general decline in the
significance of the current account deposits and the rising importance of investment
deposits.
This trend is particularly evident in the case of the Kuwait Finance House
(KFH) and the Faisal Islamic Bank Egypt (Table 3.2). During its first year of
operation in 1978, 50 per cent of the total deposits of the KFH were current
account relative to 26 per cent of investment deposits. By 1983 the share of
current account deposits had declined to 11.4 per cent of total deposits while the
ratio of investment deposits had risen to 40 per cent of total deposits. The same
trend is also evident in the case of the Faisal Islamic Bank Egypt. More than 96
percent of total deposits mobilized in 1983 were investment deposits and 3 per
cent were in the current accounts. Similar tendencies were also exhibited by the
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relatively new Islamic banks in Turkey where the share of current account deposits
to total deposits was relatively lower in 1987 compared with 1985. Conversely,
the proportion of investment deposits had increased by 10 percentage points from
84.7 per cent to 94.6 per cent over the same period. The fact that investment
deposits form the largest ratio of deposits in these Islamic banks show that Islamic
banking has a role to play in the mobilization of investible resources on a halal
manner. Even though returns on these deposits are not guaranteed in the sense
that they are liable to losses, depositors seem willing to accept the risk in view of
the expected profits.
Table 3.2 - Islamic Banks: Structure of Deposits
Percentage of Total (%)
	
Bank Year	 Current	 Savings	 Investment
KFH	 1978	 50.2	 23.3	 26.5
	
1983	 11.4	 47.7	 40.9
	
FIBE 1978	 24.8	 1.1	 73.9
	
1983	 3.3	 0.0].	 96.6
	
1987	 5.0	 not available	 95.0
Turkey
	
ABT	 1985	 15.3 not applicabli	 84.7
	
&FFK 1987	 5.4	 94.6
FIBS	 1979	 82.6	 4.4	 13.0
	
1983	 64.6	 4.7	 30.7
	
1987	 77.6	 10.7	 11.7
Source:Derived from Ahmad(1987), Kazarian (1991), Baldwin (1990) and Ahrned (1990)
However, a reverse trend has been observed for the Islamic banks in Sudan.
The figures for the Faisal Islamic Bank Sudan (Table 3.2) show that current account
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deposits accounted for the largest proportion of total deposits mobilized. The share
of investment deposits were just over 10 per cent. Even though these deposits
accounted for 30.7 per cent of total deposits in 1987, their ratio has fallen to
10.7 per cent in 1987.125 The relatively small percentage of investment deposits
was mainly due to the ceiling imposed by the Central Bank Sudan on investment
deposits owing to the limited investment opportunities in the domestic economy.126
In general the growth of deposits in Islamic banks has been associated with two
main factors: i) the state of the economy and ii) the rate of return. For instance, the
decline in the growth of current account deposits with the Kuwait Finance House
was mainly attributed to the slowdown in business transactions as a result of the
fall in oil-prices in the mid-1980s.' 27
 In the case of the Islamic banks in Turkey
and Egypt deposit growths were largely influenced by the high rate of inflation. As
the values of the Turkish lira and the Egyptian pound depreciate against foreign
currencies these banks tend to attract a greater proportion of dep .osits in foreign
currencies, hence, resulting in positive relationships between the growth of foreign
currency deposits and that of total deposits.'28
The experience of Islamic banks in Egypt and Turkey showed that the relative
rates of return of conventional bank deposits have posed significant influences
on the growth of the total deposits of Islamic banks. Kazarian (1990) observes
that the deposit base of the FIBE almost doubled every year during the first five
years of its establishment when the rates of return on investment deposits were
higher than the average interest rates on conventional bank deposits. 129 However,
125 Ahmed 1990:85.
126 Ariff:1988:58.
121 Wilson 1990:133.
128 Kazaria.n 1991:162.
129 For example annual rates of profit ranged between 11.5% and 12% compared to average interest
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the bank recorded negative growth rates of total deposits between 1986 and 1988
when interest rates were higher than the profits offered on investment deposits.'3°
Ahmad (1987) notes that the total deposits of the Kuwait Finance House grew
at a declining rate from 97 per cent in 1981 to 47 per cent in 1983 when the
rates of return on 12 month investment deposits fell from 13 per cent and 7.5 per
cent over the same period. The Turkish banks also experienced a decline in the
growth of total deposits in 1988 when the gross interest rates of time deposits
exceeded the gross rate of return on PLS deposits.' 3 ' These findings imply that
even though Islamic banks in the conventional environment may be regarded as an
alternative to the conventional banks in attracting deposits, in reality competition
for deposits do exist as depositors tend to compare the rates of return offered on
their deposits over time and across industry. If the rates of profit do not reach
a certain limit that will fulfill the motive to earn, some depositors are likely to
invest in other permissible forms of investment or even shift their funds to the
conventional banks.
In terms of profitability Nienhaus' 32 pointed out that even though some Islamic
banks have had some spectacular losses in the mid-80s it would be inappropriate
-to draw general conclusions from these particular cases. For instance the loss
incurred by the Kuwait Finance House in 1984 because of its heavy investments in
the real estate and construction sector was attributed to the collapse of the Soukh
al-Manakh stock market which also affected other commercial banks in Kuwait.'33
Before the crisis, the Kuwait Finance House was the most profitable Kuwaiti bank
rates which ranged between 8% and 10.5% between 1980-1983.
130 Average rate of profit was 7.8% compared with 11% average rate of interest.
'3' Baldwin 1990:48.
132 1990
Three of the six largest conventional banks in Kuwait recorded zero profits in 1985.
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in terms of asset utilization.
In general, the Islamic banks had been successful in generating profits from
their assets in the early 1980s. Both the Jordan Islamic Bank (JIB) and the Faisal
Islamic Bank Egypt (FIBE) showed relatively higher asset utilization ratios prior to
the recession in 1983. Shallah (1989:292) however pointed out that the performance
of the JIB in 1987 was lower than the other commercial banks in Jordan but was
comparatively better than most leading Arab banks which recorded an average
ratio of 0.17 per cent in 1987.
Table 3.3
	
Asset Utilization; Net Profit Before Tax To Total Assets
(%)
Bank 1980 1981 198 198 1984 1985 1986 198
KFH 1.46 1.72 2.28 0.50 0.0 0.21 0.32 n.a
JIB 0.12 1.36 2.25 1.02 1.03 0.58 0.54 0.46
FIBE 2.01 0.68 0.57 0.58 0.42 0.41 0.46 n.a
Note:n.a-not available.
Source:Nienhaus (1988), Shallah (1989).
In comparison to the other Islamic banks, the newer Turkish Islamic banks had
relatively better results. The ratio of gross profits to total assets of the Al-Baraka
Turk was 13 per cent and 17.5 per cent in 1985 and 1986 respectively. The Faisal
Finans also registered relatively high ratios of 7 per cent and 8.9 per cent for the
same years compared to the KFH, JIB and FIBE ratios which ranged between 2.2
per cent and 5.9 per cent over the period.'34
134 Nienhaus 1899.
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In general, as concluded by Nienhaus, Islamic banks operating in interest-
based environments have proved their viabilities in terms of financial performance
even though there is no clear evidence of the superiority of these banks over their
conventional counterparts.
From the perspective of the contribution of these Islamic banks towards socio-
economic development, Nienhaus raised the question of whether the individuals
who run the banks were aware of the allocative and distributive role of Islamic
banking as perceived in theory. This is because the practice of these banks in asset
utilization has clearly diverged from the theory. With the exception of the Islamic
banks in Sudan where mush arakah financing accounted for a significant proportion
of total financing in the 1980s' 35 , other Islamic banks disregarded medium and
long-term profit-sharing financing in their funding activities. Like Islamic banks
in Iran and Pakistan Islamic banks in the conventional environment have typically
resorted to short-term trade-financing based on the mark-up or murabahah in the
utilization of their resources.
Wilson136 reports that "a large proportion of funds advanced by the Kuwait
Finance House are for import finance, often on the Islamic mark-up basis." Data
on the Jordan Islamic Bank operation also show that the proportion of murabaha
financing his been increasing annually from 51 per cent in 1984 to 80 per cent
of total financing in 1987.137 Similarly in Turkey, "the bulk of the funds at ABT
and FFK, well over 90 per cent, are used to finance trade, known as murabaha
135 The proportion of Musharakali to total financing was 56% for the Tadarnon Islamic Bank in 1983.
The Sudanese Islamic Bank has given the highest priority to this financing instrument. Musharakah
accounted for 48% and 61% of total executed operations in 1986 and 1987 respectively.
136 1990:138.
137 Shallah 1990:118.
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investment .... completed within 6 months."1
Factors underlying the preference for mark-up financing are very mid irnilar
to those that have influenced the Islamic banks In Iran and Pakistan; such as the
security of the venture in terms of guaranteed profits, the relative simplicity of
the procedures involved especially for the majority of the banks' officials who were
originally trained in conventional banking, the short-term nature of deposits and
lack of expertise in project appraisal and monitoring. It was also discovered that
basically these banks do not see themselves as development banks or investment
banks but purely as commercial banks.' 39 The commercial orientation had nec-
essarily meant greater emphasis on the financing of ventures associated with the
trade and commercial sectors rather than long-term investment projects.
35 Conclusion
The survey on the theoretical and empirical literature undertaken in this chap-
ter shows that there exists a dichotomy between the theory and practice of Islamic
banking. The divergence seems to be more evident on the asset rather than on the
liability side. Empirically, whilst the mobilization of PLS deposits raises very little
practical problems, the adoption of PLS methods of financing by Islamic banks ei-
ther in the Islamic or conventional setting were below the theoretical expectations.
The greater concentration on short-term trade financing and the widespread use of
the markup financing instrument implies that the expected role of Islamic banking
as an effective instrument in socio-economic development will still remain to be
explored.
138 Baldwin 1990:50.
139 Nienhaus 1990.
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The case studies surveyed in this chapter also show that a majority of Islamic
banks have been established in the Middle-East mostly through private initiatives.
Because of this, most empirical studies have been focussed on these Arab banks.
However developments in the 1980s also show that Islamic banking is also practised
in other parts of the Muslim world. An important example is the Bank Islam in
Malaysia which will be the subject of discussion in the following chapters of this
thesis.
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Chapter IV
The Malaysian Economy: A Background Perspective
4.1 Introduction
When the first Islamic bank in Malaysia was opened in 1983 the Malaysian
economy had just undergone a period of impressive growth performance during the
1960s and 1970s and was about to face the uncertain futures associated with the
onset of the deflationary effects of the global recession on its main growth sectors.
A period of rapid structural adjustments, to accommodate for marked changes
in economic growth, was to follow. Since the assessment of the performance of
Islamic banking in Malaysia in later chapters will be undertaken in the context
of the government economic policies and the economic climate of the 1980s this
chapter aims to provide a background to Malaysia focusing on its socio-political
and economic aspects in general and special emphasis on developments which took
place during the 1980s.
4.2 Geography
Malaysia is a relatively small country situated in the central part of Southeast
Asia. It lies between Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam in the north and Singa-
pore and Indonesia in the south and is bordered by the Philippines in the east.
Geographically, Malaysia is made up of two distinct land regions separated by the
South China Sea. Peninsular Malaysia which is at the southernmost tip of the
Asian landmass forms the western part of the country and across the South China
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Sea in the east are Sabah and Sarawak located on the northern half of Borneo
island.
Malaysia lies entirely in the equatorial zone. Because of its equable climate
and abundant rainfall the country is well-endowed with natural resources. Four-
fifths of Malaysia is covered with tropical rainforest whilst most of the remaining
land area is suitably fertile for agriculture. Tin is found in most parts of the
Peninsular. The most valuable mineral resource in recent times is petroleum even
though tin (beside rubber) was the most important export-earner until the late
1970s. In general, Malaysia's rich endowment of economic resources has made it
one of the prosperous countries in Southeast Asia. The population has a mean
monthly income of M$1254 in 1990 and is ranked fifth after the established "tiger
economies" of Singapore, Hong Kong, South Korea and Taiwan.
4.3 Socio-Political Background
4.3.1 Population
The latest population estimate' 4° shows that Malaysia had a population of
about 18 million in 1990. About 81.7 per cent of the population in 1990 was
concentrated in Peninsular Malaysia, 8.5 per cent in Sabah and 9.8 per cent in
Sarawak.
On average the population is characterized by a high ratio of young people.
The median age of the population in 1988 was about 21 years old. About 59 per
cent of the total population during the same period were of working age between
15-64 years. Whilst the average annual growth rate was 2.6 per cent per annum
'4° Sixth Malaysia Plan 1991:28.
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the growth rate of the working population exceeded that of the whole population
which was indicative of a rapidly growing labour force. 14 ' Until the 1980s, a slow
growth rate of the population was encouraged. However, in 1984 this policy was
reversed to achieve a target population of 70 million by the year 2020. The aim of
this policy is to prepare a large labour force which will be needed by the economy
Malaysia develops into an industrial nation by the year 2020 as well as a large
domestic market for the manufactured goods.
4.3.2 Social Structure
The Malaysian social structure is made up of a plural society comprising
five major ethnic groups namely the Malays, Chinese and Indians in Peninsular
Malaysia and the Kadazans and Ibans in Sabah and Sarawak respectively. Broadly
speaking, however, the multi-ethnic character of the Malaysian population can be
categorized into two main groups; namely the bumiputera whose cultural affini-
ties are indigenous to the region and the non-bumiputera whose cultural affinities
lie outside the region. The bumiputera (literally 'Sons of the Soils') groups are
highly differentiated consisting of the aborigines, the Malays and the indigenes of
Sabah and Sarawak. The Malays are the major ethnic community in the bumi-
putera category. The first Malay settlers (the Proto-Malays) were known to have
established themselves in the Peninsular as far back as 1000 BC with the move-
ment of people southwards from China through the Southeast Asian landmass and
into the Malay archipelago. The non-bumiputera groups on the other hand con-
sist primarily of the Chinese and Indians as the two major communities besides
other smaller communities of Arabs, Eurasians and Europeans. In comparison to
the Malay bumiputera, the earliest massive migration of Chinese and Indians took
-' Mid-Term Review, the Fifth Malaysia Plan 1989:82.
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place only in the nineteenth century with the encouragement of the British colonial
administration.
The population structure is therefore complicated by the diversity in race and
also religion. A majority of tne population in Peninsular Malaysia are Malays
(estimated at 53% in 1990)142 followed by the Chinese (31.2%), Indians (9.8%)
and others (0.7%). In terms of religion, all Malays are Muslims. Most Chinese
are Buddhists or Taoist even though many also choose to worship both dieties
and perform other ancestral rites associated with Confucianism. There are also
other Chinese who adopt Christianity and Islam as their faith. Most Indians, on
the other hand, are Hindus although there are also groups of Indians who are
Muslims.
Economically, the bumiputera community is relatively left behind in all sectors
compared to the non- bumiputera. About 60 per cent of bumiputera live in the rural
sectors and are engaged in agriculture. The Chinese who were originally concen-
trated in the tin-mining areas now control the business and commercial sector in
the urban areas. Indians who live in non-urban areas are generally employed in
the rubber estates and those in the cities are usually engaged in commerce or are
employed in the public services.
4.3.3 Political Perspectives
To provide a better understanding of the Malaysian economic policies of the
1980s and the government support for the Islamic banking project it is necessary
to take a brief look at the political scene which had exerted a significant influence
in shaping the economic development of the country since independence.
' The whole bumiputera community accounts for 58.3% of the total population of Peninsular Malaysia.
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Firstly, it is generally agreed that because of the plural population the ethnic
factor has always been a potent force in Malaysian politics. Since independence
the interests of the three main ethnic communities, the Malays, Chinese and In-
dians have always been represented by communally-organized political parties.
Whilst the interest of the Chinese and the Indians are being represented by the
Chinese-based and Indian-based MCA and MIC parties respectively, the protector
of Malay and hence Muslim interest has always been the United Malay National
Organization or UMNO. In fact, the first post-independence government was set
up as a democratic affiance between these three parties. To maintain some balance
of power between the major ethnic groups, namely the Malays and the Chinese,
a policy of political accommodation was adopted by the leaders of the first post-
independent government. This was translated into a 'political bargain' whereby
equal citizenship, political participation, unimpaired economic opportunity and
cultural as well as religious tolerance were to be granted to the non-Malays. In
return the Malays were given control of the government and 'special rights and
privileges'. Under these privileges, the Malays were to be given certain social and
economic advantages by law in addition to their political dominance.
One of the major outcomes of this political pact was a split between polit-
ical power and economic influence in the 1960s. The three ethnic groups have
already been segregated in terms of their residence and economic roles, before
independence, by the British policy of 'divide and rule'. Whilst the Malays have
been confined to the rural, low-income, subsistence agricultural sector, the Chinese
were generally settled as urban dwellers and controlled the high income modern
sectors of trade and business. Most Indians, on the other hand, were concentrated
in the rubber plantations and remained isolated to some extent from the rest of
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the population.
The political pact, coupled by the laissez-faire system which restrained the role
of the state in the economy further aggravated the inequalities in the distribution
of income and economic opportunities between the three ethnic groups and specif-
ically between the Malays and Chinese. Even though the laissez-faire system was
relatively successful in generating national income and high economic growth on
macro terms, the main beneficiaries of the system were generally the large foreign
export sector, the domestic Chinese business class and the Malay ruling class. The
rest of the population mainly the majority of the Malays in the rural areas and the
urban middle-class remained economically left behind and did not see any benefit
in such political and economic arrangements.
Many Malays believed that even though the government was Malay-based it
neglected Malay interests because of manipulation by the Chinese.' 43 The Chinese
on the other hand, also made known their grievances in public. Despite being
economically superior they saw themselves as second-class citizens and resented
the political privileges being allocated to the Malays. The racial antagonism be-
tween the Malays and the Chinese continued to develop and was capitalized by the
opposition parties during the 1969 general election campaigns resulting in major
erosions of support towards the Affiance. A larger share of Malay voters favoured
the opposition Islamic Party (PAS) while many Chinese shifted their support to
the Chinese-majority Democratic Action Party (DAP) also in the opposition. The
defeat of the Alliance in some of its constituencies stimuhited further anxieties be-
tween the Malays and Chinese and culminated in bloody racial riots which broke
out on 13th May 1969 a day after the general election.
' Jesudason 1989:67.
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4.3.4 The New Economic Policy (NEP)
Following the racial riots, the country was run under emergency riik arid it was
during this period that serious measures were taken to ensure natIonal unity be-
tween the major communities. The weaknesses of the constitutional arrangements
and the past 'laissez-faire' policy of high growth in terms of income distribution
were recognized. The disparity in the distribution side was evident in the wide
differences of income and employment between the Malays and non-Ma.lays. In
1970, the mean monthly income of a Malay household was M$172 compared with
M$394 and M$304 of a Chinese or Indian household respectively. In terms of em-
ployment whilst the bumiputera accounted for 70 per cent of the labour force in
the agricultural sector they were highly under-represented in the modern urban
sectors. For example in 1970, 61 per cent of registered professionals were Chinese,
23.3 per cent were Indians and a mere 4.9 per cent were bumiputera. Disparity in
share capital ownership was also significant between the ethnic communities where
bumiputera individuals and trust agencies owned 2.4 per cent of total share capital
of limited companies in 1970 compared to 27.2 per cent in Chinese ownership. To
redress such disparities a new economic strategy called the New Economic Policy
(NEP) was formulated and introduced in 1971 to be implemented over a period of
20 years until 1990.
It is therefore worth noting that the NEP was the most significant feature in
the economic development policies of Malaysia in the 1970s and the 1980s. There
were two principal objectives of the NEP. The first was the eventual eradication of
poverty by raising income levels and increasing employment opportunities for all
Malaysians irrespective of race. The second objective was the restructuring of the
Malaysian society in order to reduce and eventually eliminate the identification of
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race with economic function. The restructuring process was to target three areas;
i) the patterns of employment so that no single race could be closely identified
with a single economic sector.
ii) the pattern of corporate ownership so that by 1990 bumiputera would man-
age and own at least 30 per cent of shares in the corporate sector as against 40
per cent and 30 per cent non-Bumiputera and foreign stake respectively.
iii) the creation of a viable Burniputera Commercial and Industrial Community
to form at least 30 per cent of Malaysian entrepreneurs by 1990.
One of the direct implications of the NEP was the change of government policy
from the non-interventionist laissez-faire policy of the 1960s to a policy of expanded
state intervention in order to assist the bumiputera community in achieving the
NEP targets. Public agencies, state corporations and public enterprises were set
up as instruments to implement the NEP strategies. This led to an almost oversized
public sector. As a consequence at the end of the 1970s Malaysia had one of the
largest public sectors among the developing countries' which had far-reaching
implications on the achievement of the NEP targets in terms of the efficiency and
the amount of public expenditure involved.
4.4 Economic Setting
A significant characteristic of the Malaysian economy is its strong orientation
towards an open and free-market economy. The role of the export sector is dom-
inant where exports account for 62.3 per cent of Gross National Product (GNP)
in 1990 compared to 56 per cent in 1960. Any change in export revenue will affect
144 Fisk 1982:308.
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economic activity in the short and medium term and exerts a pervasive impact
on the balance of payments, income, investment, output, money supply and the
general price level.
The traditional dependence on the export sector may be attributed to three
main factors namely the abundance of natural resources, the favourable world
demand for primary commodities in the 1960s and the 1970s and the small domestic
market. It is therefore not surprising that structural changes in the Malaysian
economy over the 33 years since independence have been largely tailored within
the context of the open economy.
4.4.1 Growth
Table 4.1 - Malaysia: Annual Growth Rate(%) of Gross Domestic
Product(GDP) in constant prices
	
Year	 1956601	 1961-65	 1966-70	 1971-75	 1976-80	 1981-85	 1986-90
_______ (1960=100) (1965=100) (1965=100) (1970=100) (1970=100) (1978=100) (1978=lOt
1	 2.9	 1.4	 6.2	 10.0	 11.6	 6.9	 1.2
2	 2.5	 6.9	 1.0	 9.4	 7.8	 6.0	 5.4
3	 0.5	 5.5	 4.2	 11.7	 6.7	 6.2	 8.9
4	 4.5	 5.8	 10.4	 8.3	 9.3	 7.8	 8.8
5	 9.9	 5.6	 5.0	 0.8	 7.4	 -1.1	 9.4
	
Averag	 4.1	 5.0	 5.4	 8.0	 8.6	 5.2	 6.8
Notes:
1 For Peninsular Malaysia only
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia, Annual Report 1990 Table Al
Compared with most other developing economies the growth record of the
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Malaysian economy over the past three decades (with the exception of the mid
1980s) has been generally rapid and impressive. The average annual growth rate
of real GDP was 6.2 per cent between 1956-1990 with an 8 per cent average annual
growth rate recorded in the 1970s. (see Table 4.1). Similar high rates of annual
domestic growth have also been recorded since 1988; the 9.4 per cent growth in
1990 being the highest achieved in recent times since 1976.
4.4.1.1 Growth in the 1970s
The high growth rates during the first two decades after independence were
mainly attributed to the favourable international economic environment in the
industrialized countries which were the main importers of Malaysian primary com-
modities. Firstly, Malaysia had benefited from the high world demand for its
rubber and tin during the post-war economic boom in the 1950s and 1960s. At
independence in 1957, Malaysia was already the largest producer of natural rubber
supplying one-third of the total world output of rubber. It was also the largest
producer and exporter of tin and accounted for 33 per cent of the total world
output.
Malaysia, however, experienced its major commodity-export boom in the 1970s
especially between 1975 and 1980 owing to the bouyant prices of petroleum and
other primary commodities. Tremendous growth rates in GDP were triggered as
total exports volume more than tripled from 1975 to 1980 following the increases
in the prices of the country's major commodity exports namely petroleum, timber,
palm-oil and even rubber and tin. The main export earner during this period was
petroleum. The volume of petroleum exports soared in 1980 as world oil prices
more than doubled between 1975 and 1980 and production increased following the
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discovery of new oil wells in the east coast of Peninsular Malaysia.
During the same period, the export of sawlogs quadrupled and that of sawn-
timber almost tripled as the prices of both timber products doubled. Even though
the importance of rubber and tin as the major export earners had declined during
the period, the exports of both primary commodities also rose as their prices more
than doubled. In the case of palm-oil, its price did not rise over the second half
of the 1970s but increased production doubled exports from 1975 to 1980. The
increase in export volumes was evident not only among primary commodities but
also in manufactured exports. The export of manufactured goods rose from M$615
million in 1970 to M$1.7 billion in 1975 and then tripled to M$6.3 billion in 198014&
4.4.1.2 Growth in the 1980s
As shown earlier in Table 4.1 the rapid rates of economic growth experienced
by Malaysia in the 1970s could not be sustained in the 1980s. The rate of economic
growth slowed down in the early 1980s but became more severe in the middle of
the decade. The trough of the economic recession was reached in 1985 when real
GDP contracted by one per cent for the first time since independence.
The decline in economic growth which began in 1980 had generally been at-
tributed to a number of external and internal factors which characterized the
structural weaknesses which had prolonged the impact of the recession into the
mid-1980s.
(a) Balance of Payment Deficit
Externally, the onset of the global recession in the early 1980s brought drastic
145 Jomo 1990:58-59.
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changes to the Malaysian export sector which had long been the main source
of revenue, employment and foreign exchange for the country. The successive
recessions in the United States and the other industrial economies In the early and
mid-1980s had adversely affected international trade which in turn weakened the
prices of Malaysia's major non-oil primary commoditie8. Increasing protectionism
in the North had also reduced the markets for Malaysian manufactured products
but the biggest blow was felt in 1986 when the price of petroleum also dropped
steeply leading to a sharp reduction in total export earnings. The overall collapse
in commodity prices brought a sharp reduction in total export earnings.
The value of imports on the demand side, however, exceeded that of exports
because of the sharp growth in the import of intermediate and investment goods.
This was due to the expansion of more capital-intensive manufacturing industries
in conjunction with the export-oriented industrialization policy. In 1980, interme-
diate goods accounted for 49.9 per cent of total imports followed by investment
goods (30%) and consumption goods (18.4%). About 60 per cent of the intermedi-
ate goods imported were construction materials to support the growth of the con-
struction industry. Infrastructural development under the NEP also contributed
to the rising import of plant and machinery.
As a result of the high import intensity and the fall in export values, the balance
of payments suffered an overall deficit of M$1,093 million. Imports of merchandise
exceeded exports by M$ 243 million at the end of 1981. In 1982, although the
overall deficit was reduced to M$614 the merchandise account balance further
deteriorated where the value of exports fell short of imports by M$1,758 million.
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(b) Large Budget Deficit
Domestically, internal structural weaknesses were also present. These had
exposed the economy to new external pressures hence prolonging the impact of
the recession into the mid-1980s. One of the main structural weaknesses was the
increased reliance of the government on budget deficits and government borrowings
in the 1970s and 1980s to finance greater government involvement in the economy
towards the achievement of the NEP targets.
Firstly, whilst government expenditure was mainly directed to finance infras-
tructural development in the 1960s, its amount had grown tremendously towards
the end of the 1970s and the first two years of the 1980s as the government's direct
participation in the economy resulted in various commercial and industrial projects
undertaken by its public enterprises.
The ratio of public sector expenditure to the GDP increased from 35 per cent
in 1971 to 41 per cent in 1972 (following the declaration of the NEP), to 55 per cent
in 1980 and 70 per cent in 1981 and 1982146. The rapid increase between 1981 and
1982 was largely due to two main reasons. Firstly, following the deflationary effect
of the fall in export revenue the government bad resorted to an expansionary fiscal
policy as a counter-cyclical measure to offset the deflationary effect of the global
recession. By increasing public sector investment the government had hoped to off-
set the sluggishness in private-sector investment. Secondly, large public investment
was also needed to finance the government's increasing emphasis in heavy indus-
tries since mid-1981. These included the setting up of the Malaysian car project,
large scale steel and cement production, heavy iron and steel manufacture, the
construction of high-rise building complexes and the Penang Bridge.
146 Jomo 1990:179.
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The direct implication of such rapid growth in public spending was manifested
in the budget deficit. Between 1979 and 1981 the budget deficit rose by 226 p.zr
cent from M$3483 million in 1979 to M$11359 in 1981.' Correspondingly, the
deficit to GNP ratio rose from 7.9 per cent in 1979 to 20.4 per cent in 1981 far
exceeding the 1980 world average of 3.3 per cent.
(c) Rising Public Debt
The fall in export revenues between 1981 and 1982 necessarily implies that the
large budget deficit had been financed largely by a mix of domestic and foieign
borrowings. Until 1980, the main source of financing for public expenditure has
come primarily from non-inflationary sources: mainly the current surplus of the
public sector and the compulsory social security contributions of the private sector
to the Employees Provident Fund. However, with the increasing overall deficit of
the public sector, the traditional sources of domestic financing were insucient to
meet the financing requirements of the government. Gross national savings had
declined to about 25 per cent of GNP between 1981 and 83. As a consequence, the
savings-investment gap, as reflected by the current account deficit in the balance
of payments, amounted to almost 12 per cent and had to be met mainly by foreign
borrowing. As shown in Table 4.2 net public sector domestic borrowings rose from
15 per cent to 31 per cent in 1982 and subsequently decreased through 18 per cent
in 1983 to 9 per cent in 1984. In contrast total outstanding public external debt
jumped by 55 per cent during 1980-1, compared to only 9 per cent the previous
year. The large increase in foreign borrowings resulted in a dramatic growth in total
outstanding public debt from 13 per cent to 29 per cent during the same period.
The highest annual rise in public debt over the 1980-87 period was recorded in
147 Jomo 1990:181.
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1982 (37%) when both net domestic and net foreign borrowings rose signfficantly
by 31 per cent and 50 per cent respectively.
Table 4.2 - Outstanding Public Debt (1980-1987) - Annual Increase
Year	 Annual Increase (%)
Domestic Debt External Debt Total Public Debt
1980	 15	 9	 13
1981	 19	 55	 29
1982	 31	 50	 37
1983	 18	 38	 25
1984	 9	 20	 14
1985	 70	 15	 10
1986	 12	 35	 23
l987'	 18	 2	 11
Note: preliminary estimates
Source: Jomo (1990:Table 8.9)
The large increase in both domestic and foreign borrowings was used to finance
the anti-cyclical public spending measure in 1981-82. Most of the growth in gov-
ernment foreign borrowings after 1980 came from market sources. The proportion
of these foreign commercial loans as a proportion of total foreign borrowings rose
from 45 per cent in 1980 to 58 per cent in 1981 and further up to 68 per cent in
1982. Much of these market loans were utifized to finance the major heavy indus-
trial projects under the heavy industrialization drive introduced by the government
in mid-1981. Since these loans generally involved higher interest rates the burden
of external debt on the Malaysian government was significant.
The strains on the government's financial position became increasing apparent
in the second half of 1982. Apparently, the increase in government spending did
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not produce the desired results. High bureaucracy and inefficiency of the oversized
public sector seemed to have slowed down the desired investment multiplier effect.
On the other hand the import of investment and intermediate goods remained high
to support the industries under the export-oriented and heavy industrialization
drive. The balance of payments suffered a trade deficit for the second consecutive
year in 1982 and the problem of twin deficits (balance of payments and budget
deficits) became unsustainable. In order to contain the growth of the external debt
and to reduce overall public sector deficit to a sustainable level as a proportion of
the GNP, an austerity drive was started in mid-August 1982. A shift in policy was
announced to reduce the role of the government in the economy and to promote
the private sector as the main engine of growth. The fiscal adjustment package
included restraint in public sector spending in the form of cuts (and abolition in
some cases) in various subsidies and other transfer payments, a freeze in public
sector recruitment, a moratorium on civil servant salaries, consolidation of the
financial position of public sector enterprises and the review of priorities and cost-
effectiveness of public sector projects and programmes.
The sluggishness of private investment between 1982 and 1985 was not suffi-
cient to offset the decline in public investment. The overall collapse in commodity
prices had brought a sharp decline in overall income which affected new private
capital formation. Aggregate domestic demand declined by 4.6 per cent in 1985
compared with an increase of 6.4 per cent in 1984. The fail in aggregate demand
was followed by a reduction in gross private investment by 6 per cent in real terms
which consequently led to stagnation in domestic activities. Economic growth at
the macro level, declined from 7.8 per cent in 1984 to minus one per cent in 1985.
The overall result was a steady rise in the rate of unemployment from 5 per cent in
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1981 to 6.3 per cent in 1984 and 7.6 per cent in 1985. Unemployment was highest
in the agricultural sector (42%) in 1983 and the manufacturing sector (48%) in
1984. By 1985 more than half of retrenched workers were from the manufacturing
sector (63%), followed by 20 per cent from mining and 11 per cent from retail trade
and related services.
(d) Economic Recovery
Economic growth picked up at a rate of only 1.2 per cent in 1986 as the export
price of Malaysia's primary commodities began to slowly improve. Several steps to
revive domestic economic activity had earlier been taken by the government since
mid-1985.
Among the measures undertaken was the creation of a M$1 billion National
Investment Fund by the Central Bank in September 1985 to encourage bank lending
to fund new investments in the productive sectors of agriculture, manufacturing
and tourism. In December 1985, a special low-cost housing programme was also
implemented to utilize idle capacity in construction and manufacturing especially
cement, steel, building materials and labour. New lending guidelines were issued
to the banking system which required commercial banks and finance companies
to channel loans for the construction of low-cost houses costing between M$25,000
to M$i00,000. Licensing regulations were liberalized and a wider range of tax
incentives for investment in the manufacturing sector was introduced to attract
foreign investors.
The important role of the private sector as the engine of growth was further
emphasized when the government actively pursued its policy towards privatization.
The privatisation policy which involved changing the status of a business, service
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or industry from state to private ownership was officially introduced in 1983 to
reduce the administrative and financial burden on the public sector. As a result of
these measures and incentives, investors' interest from both domestic and foreign
sources were revived and with the strengthening of external demand the economy
recovered in 1987 when real GDP growth was registered at 5.4 per cent per annum.
Since then annual growth in real GDP had gathered momentum and reached almost
10 per cent in 1990, the first annual double-digit growth since 1976.
In line with the shift in public policy, development expenditure under the Fifth
Malaysia Plan (1986-1990) was reduced by 35 per cent from the original allocation
of M$74 million to M$47.7 million. The overall budget deficit as a percentage of
GNP also declined from 10.1 per cent in 1986 to 4.7 per cent in 1988. The bulk of
the deficit was financed by domestic borrowings as the government took advantage
of the favourable domestic market conditions. Some of the funds were also used to
prepay several of the more expensive foreign loans thereby improving the nation's
external debt profile. Net foreign borrowings rose only by 2 per cent in 1986-87,
much lower than the rise of 18 per cent in domestic debt. (see earlier Table 4.2).
4.4.2 Structural Changes
It is obvious that Malaysia would not have been able to substantially ben-
efit from the world commodity price boom in the late 1970s and achieve rapid
economic growth if the country had not embarked on the programmes of eco-
nomic diversification which began in the 1960s. Initially, economic diversification
was largely motivated by the problem of economic instability which arose from
the over-dependence on rubber and tin exports that were subject to unstable price
fluctuations. Later, the policy of economic diversification was intensified to achieve
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other objectives such as the eradication of poverty and the restructuring objectives
of the NEP.
In general economic diversification has been pursued along the lines of agri-
cultural diversification and export-oriented industrialization. Both policies have
greatly transformed the Malaysian economy over the past three decades. Un-
til 1980 development policies have been focussed on agricultural diversification in
order to produce a broad-based composition of primary export commodities. How-
ever the unfavourable international market prices of these commodities during the
recession and the aim of the government to transform Malaysia into a newly indus-
trialized economy by the year 2000 had resulted in a shift in policy from agriculture
to manufacturing or industrialization.
Table 4.3 - Malaysia: Changing Economic Structure, 1960.1990
Export, GDP by Sectors
1960 1 1 1970 
f 1980 11990
(%ofGDP)
Export	 56.1	 62.3
GDP by Sector:
Agriculture	 37.9 32.1 26.5 18.9
Mining	 5.9	 5.7	 3.5	 9.7
Manufacturing	 8.6 12.2 16.8 26.9
Construction	 3.0	 4.5	 4.7	 3.5
Services	 44.6 44.7 47.1 42.2
Note:' For Peninsular Malaysia only
Source:Bank Negara Annual Report (1990:Table A4)
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As shown in Table 4.3 the main trend in the transformation of the Malaysian
economy between 1960-90 is the continuous and substantial decline in the relative
importance of agriculture in the GDP alongside a rapid increase in manufacturing
or industrialization. Agriculture was the largest productive sector in the economy
between 1960 and 1980 but its share in GDP has been on the decline from 38
per cent in 1960 to 27 per cent in 1980 and further down to 19 per cent in 1990.
Conversely, the share of the manufacturing sector has almost doubled during the
last three decades; rising from 9 per cent in 1960 to 17 per cent in 1980 to reach
27 per cent in 1990. With the rapid growth of the manufacturing sector and
the low prospects of primary commodities in the international market the relative
importance of agriculture in the GDP is expected to be further reduced in the
future. In contrast the manufacturing sector is projected to grow 10.5 per cent per
annum to contribute 37 per cent of Malaysia's GDP by the year 2000.148
For the purpose of this thesis, it is relevant to outline in greater detail both di-
versification policies and the structural changes that have occurred in the Malaysian
economy before and during the 1980s.
4.4.2.1 Agricultural Diversification
One of the strategies implemented during the first phase of economic trans-
formation (from 1956 through the 1970s) was agricultural diversification on the
supply side. The policy aim was not only to reduce the problem of economic in-
stability which arose from the over-reliance on rubber and tin; but also to create
employment for a rapidly growing labour force particularly in the rural areas where
agriculture was the mainstay for more than 60 per cent of the population.
The Wall Street Journal Europe:31 July 1991.
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Over the first fifteen year period (between 1956 to 1970), agricultural and
rural development received the largest proportion of total development allocations
(24 per cent) under the country's first three 5-year development plans. The main
emphasis in the 1960s was to diversify and expand the agricultural resource-base
by increasing the replanting and new planting of rubber; by new planting of oil
palm; by the extraction of hardwood timber; by the opening of new riceland; and
by the improvement of irrigation and drainage facilities. Private sector investment
in the plantation sector was encouraged by the government through the provision
of fiscal incentives for the conversion of rubber areas into oil palm estates and for
the replanting of higher yielding rubber trees.
The introduction of the NEP in 1971 heralded the turning point in agricultural
development strategies between 1970 and 1990. Firstly agricultural development
was to be carried out within the two-pronged objectives of the NEP namely the
eradication of poverty and the restructuring of society. However the main thrust
had been poverty eradication - since the agricultural sector was characterized by
low income and low productivity. Efforts to increase rural income and employment
were concentrated on two main strategies; namely (a) the modernization of tradi-
tional small-scale agriculture through in situ development programmes and (b) the
expansion of export crop production through the opening of new land settlements
schemes. Whilst the former strategy aimed to intensify land-use and to diversify
agriculture through replanting, land rehabilitation, improvement in infrastructural
facilities and the provision of agricultural support services and incentives to small-
holders, the latter involved the resettling of farmers in large-scale development
schemes organized along plantation agricultural production but with ownership of
individual holdings (of between 8 to 10 acres each) ultimately given to each settler
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after a specified period of time. Large-scale cultivation of oul-palm rubber and co-
coa were the main agricultural activities of the new land settlement schemes. The
main implementor of these schemes was the Federal Land Development Authority
(FELDA) which settled 53,000 families in 262 land development schemes in various
regions by the end of 1976. The provision of economic-sized holdings under the
new land development strategy had succeeded in raising the settlers' income above
the poverty line. In 1977, the average family income for settlers in FELDA rubber
and oil-palm schemes were MS700 and M$1500 per acre respectively.
In general, agricultural diversification has resulted in a significant change in the
composition of Malaysian agricultural exports. As shown in Table 4.4, the relative
importance of rubber as the main export revenue earner has declined considerably
from 55.1 per cent of total exports in 1960 to 3.8 per cent in 1990. In 1990, it was
overtaken by timber and palm oil which accounted for 8.9 per cent and 6.2 per
cent of gross exports respectively. Both commodities have emerged as new sources
of export revenue from the agricultural sector.
Table 4.4	 Malaysia: Gross Exports of Major Agricultural
Commodities (1960-1990)— as % of Total Exports
Agriculture	 1960 1970 1980 199(
Rubber	 55.1 33.3 16.4 3.8
Timber	 5.3 16.5 14.1 8.9
Palm Oil	 2.0	 5.3 10.3 6.2
Other	 3.7	 4.0	 2.8	 3.4
% of Total Exportr 66.1 59.2 43.6 22.3
Source: Bank Negara Annual Report (1990:Table 9.1)
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However, investments in the agricultural sector have declined considerably in
the 1980s largely because of the fall in international prices of agricultural com-
modities. The narrow profit margins are further aggravated by labour shortages in
agriculture. As a consequence, the share of agriculture has been declining steadily
from 32 per cent of the GDP in 1970 to 18.9 per cent in 1990.
4.4.2.2 Industrialization
Industrialization in Malaysia only began after independence. This is largely
because the growth of local industries was effectively discouraged by the colo-
nial policy which emphasised the export of primary commodities and the import
of British manufactured goods. The post-independence move into manufacturing
was considered a necessity not only as a sign of modernization and economic in-
dependence but also as a means of correcting the economic imbalance between
extensive plantation agriculture and limited industrialization.'49
In general the Malaysian economy has undergone three phases of industrial
development over the past three decades.
Phase 1: Import-Substitution (1958-1967)
The first step towards industrialization was the formation of import-substituting
industries promoted by the government in the late 1950s. The policy was aimed at
reducing the heavy dependence on imported consumer goods as well as to provide
employment to the growing labour force. In order to overcome the deficiency in
domestic capital and technical know-how a liberal policy was also undertaken to
attract foreign investors. The government introduced the Pioneer Industries Ordi-
149 Ariff 1985:14.
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nance 1958 by which the establishment of new factories were directly or indirectly
subsidized and protected by the government based on the infant-industry argu-
ment. The provision of infrastructural facilities, income tax reliefs, modest tariff
protection and other incentives attracted foreign private investments. Many of the
pioneer industries were newly established subsidiaries of British companies for-
merly exporters to the domestic market. Manufacturing activities were therefore
concentrated on the production, assembly and packaging of previously imported
consumer goods for the already established and captive home market.
The import-substitution strategy was quite successful in achieving its objec-
tives in the first half of the 1960s. As observed by Osman-Ran1 150 ; 'the strategy had
made some contribution to the development process of the economy. It helped to
diversify the economy, producing at least some move into manufacturing, and re-
duced somewhat the excessive dependence on imported goods. It utilized some do-
mestic natural resources, created some employment opportunities, and contributed
to economic growth.'
Nevertheless, various constraints related to the small domestic market slowed
down the process of industrialization. By the end of the 1960s, the average growth
rate had declined from over 11 per cent to 10 per cent per annum. Moreover
its contribution towards the generation of employment fell below expectations
where employment growth lagged considerably behind output growth. Since the
import-substituting industries were based on imported raw materials or imported
intermediate products the end result was a low ratio of value added to gross out-
put and poor linkages effects with the rest of the economy' 51 .
 As a result, even
1982:263.
Osman Bath: ibid.
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though imports of consumer goods declined in the 1960s it was off8et by a more
than proportionate increase in the import of investment and intermediate goods.
Import-substitution seemed to have aggravated rather than alleviated the country's
dependence on imports. As the poor performance of the import-substitution policy
became clearer the government began to undertake a strategic switch in emphasis
at the end of the 1960s specifically from import-substitution to export-orientation.
Phase 2: Export-Orientation (1968-1985)
This marked the second phase of the industrialization process which gave a
fresh impetus to industrial growth in Malaysia. This new policy was more consis-
tent with the export-led growth strategy inherited from the colonial period and a
new set of industrial legislation was enacted to attract and encourage the estab-
lishment of industries processing or manufacturing products for export.
The 1958 Ordinance was replaced with the Investment Incentive Act of 1968
which offered a wider range of incentives to industries producing for the export
markets. Foreign investment was still encouraged but was geared to the NEP
objective of restructuring society. Local participation in industrial enterprises was
established through joint-ventures between state enterprises and foreign or local
investors. One of the measures undertaken in this respect was the introduction of
licensing procedures under the Industrial Coordination Act 1975 which required
all large foreign firms with more than M$250,000 shareholders' funds to allocate 51
per cent equity participation to Malaysians, out of which at least 30 per cent were
to be held by Malay interest. Large local firms with similar shareholders' funds
were also required to fulfill the 30 per cent Malay quota in terms of ownership
and employment. Other, more liberal, incentives and concessions, still within
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the scope of the NEP, were offered to promote export-oriented manufacturing
activities. Tariff protection was increased for infant industries, longer tax holidays
and tax concessions were offered to encourage labour-intensive industries, the use
of local raw materials and the location of industries in areas allocated by the
government such as the industrial estates and free trade zones. Export promotion
by frequent overseas campaigns to attract foreign investments were encouraged by
allowing deductions for export promotion expenses. A Malaysian Export Trade
Centre was also opened in Kuala Lumpur to introduce products to importers.152
A significant feature of this phase of industrial development is the dramatic
growth of non-resource based industries producing textiles, electrical appliances
and electronic goods for exports. The establishment of these industries was mainly
attributed to the inflow of foreign investments since 1974. Capital investment
was undertaken by large multinationals locating their operations in Malaysia to
take advantage of the incentives offered by the government and the availability of
relatively cheap labour.
Amongst the three industries, growth in the electronics industries was most sig-
nificant. By 1979, Malaysia had become the world's largest producer of electronic
chips and the third world's largest exporter after the United States and Japan. Be-
sides contributing 38.4 per cent of total exports of manufactures in 1979, the other
significant contribution of the electronics industry was in the generation of large-
scale employment in the manufacturing sector. As methods of production were
labour-intensive, the electronic companies became the most important absorber of
low-skilled cheap labour in the free-trade zones. Between 1973-1979 employment
in the electronics industry grew by 436 per cent. By 1979, these companies were
Osman-Rani 1982:266.
136
providing 72,800 jobs. Wages in this subsector have also risen to the average level
for the manufacturing sector as a whole.
It is apparent that the set of policy instruments enacted by the government to-
wards export-oriented industrialization in the 1970s had facilitated the expansion
of foreign private investment and stimulated rapid industrial growth. Manufactur-
ing accounted for 8.6 per cent of the GDP in 1960 but increased to 12.2 per cent
in 1970 and further up to 17 per cent in 1980. Its share in gross exports also rose
significantly from 11.9 per cent in 1970 to 21.6 per cent in 1980.
Phase 3: Industrial Diversification (1986 onwards)
Despite the rapid growth in industrialization, the manufacturing sector was
still narrow-based as it entered the 1980s. About one-fifth of total production and
over half of manufactured exports at the end of the 1970s were made up of electri -
cals, electronics and textiles. Even though these industries were the main growth
sectors, they were vulnerable to fluctuations in external demands as indicated by
the fall in demand and the decline in private investments in these sectors during
the recession of the mid-1980s. Industrial diversification was therefore necessary to
broaden the industrial base and reduce dependence on the three traditional growth
industries.
An attempt to broaden the industrial base was made in 1981 when the gov-
ernment established the Heavy Industries Corporation of Malaysia (HICOM) to
initiate public sector involvement in heavy industries. The commitment to support
heavy industries by the government was to emulate the experiences of Japan, Tai-
wan and South Korea; which indicated that a strong heavy industries sector was
vital for the development of a successful newly industrializing economy. Among
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the projects chosen to be implemented by HICOM, through joint-ventures with
foreign investors, included the production of the national car, steel, cement, petro-
chemicals, transport equipment and shipbuilding. However, these projects have
generally met with limited success because of many constraints. One of the main
constraints was the costly investments required to finance these industries at a
time of global recession. All of the heavy industries projects were financed either
by foreign borrowings or foreign investment which adversely affected the balance of
payments and fiscal debt problem. With the exception of the national car project
which started production in 1985 the other industries were reviewed during the
austerity drive between 1982-86; some were cancelled and others were delayed at
the planning stage.
A more systematic approach towards industrial diversification was next under-
taken with the publication of the Industrial Master Plan (IMP) in 1986. The IMP
was produced as an indicative plan which suggested broad development strategies
and objectives for sectoral manufacturing industries from 1986 to 1995.' In gen-
eral, the Plan contains an appraisal of existing strategies, policy instruments and
incentives and offers recommendations for the 12 industries that were examined
under it.
Among the major problems affecting the Malaysian industrialization process as
identified by the IMP were the lack of indigenous industrial technology, shortages
of skilled and professional manpower, deficiencies in the existing industrial struc-
ture, inadequate private-sector initiatives and constraints imposed by the NEP
objectives on restructuring.
The IMP however recommended that the non-resource based industries should
153 Bank Negara Annual Report 1985:151.
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continue to be the important sources of growth until 1995. The manufacture of
electronic and electrical equipment was designated as priority industries. Devel-
opment in both sectors is recommended to follow a phased approach by which
the manufacture of consumer and simple industrial items is to be followed by
the production of more complex and sophisticated products. Rationalization and
modernization of the existing textiles was also proposed.
Further development in the resource-based industries was recommended to
help improve the trade balance and promote linkages between sectors to maxi-
mize the country's comparative advantage. The priority industries designated in
this sector are the tyre, palm-oil products, food-processing, wood-based products,
petrochemicals, tin products and building materials industries.
The promotion of heavy industries was also considered vital by the IMP on
the premise that these industries could lay a solid foundation for a more rapid
and balanced growth which would help to accelerate the process of developing
Malaysia into an industrial economy. Among the main recommendations for this
sector were the rationalization of the existing shipbuilding and iron and steel plants,
the production of the national car for the main segment of the domestic market
and the emphasis on product technology (engineering design capability) in the
machinery and engineering industry.
In line with the IMP several major policy changes were introduced in 1986 to
boost private investment, especially foreign direct investment in the manufacturing
sector. A new range of tax incentives was introduced through the enactment of the
Promotion of Investment Act 1986 which replaced the 1968 Investment Incentives
Act. In addition, the licensing procedure under the Industrial Coordination Act
139
1975 was liberalized by which oniy companies having M$1 million in terms of
shareholders' funds were required to obtain licences to engage in manufacturing
activities. Another important measure which brought a sharp increase in foreign
investments in 1988 and onwards was the liberalization of regulations for foreign
equity participation. Under the new regulation owners of firms set up between
1986 and 1990 would be granted 100 per cent foreign ownership if they export more
than 50 per cent of their products or employ 350 full-time Malaysian workers. The
impact of the Promotion of Investments Act was reflected by the rise in foreign
paid-up capital in government approved projects from M$750 million in 1987 to
M$2 billion in 1988. Between 1986 and 1988, 20 per cent of total investment was
foreign equity. As a result of the 'revival' of private investment, output growth in
the manufacturing sector between 1986 and 1988 was registered at 12.7 per cent
per year compared to the contraction of 3.8 per cent in 1985.
In summary, the manufacturing sector has undergone a process of rapid indus-
trial diversification from the narrow base traditional growth industries to a wider
range of industries producing resource-based to non-resource based consumer and
intermediate goods and heavy industrial products mainly for the exports market
and to a lesser extent the domestic market. With numerous government incentives
and other factors that have governed export-led industrial performance since the
1970s private investment in the manufacturing sector is expected to play an im-
portant role of providing the impetus to the economic growth of Malaysia in the
1 990s.
'Mid-Term Review of the Fifth Malaysia Plan:187.
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4.4.3 The Achievement of the NEP
The year 1990 marked the end of the NEP and the First Outline Perspective
Plan covering the period 1971-1990.
An assessment of the achievements of the NEP showed that not all of its
targets had been met at the end of the twenty year period. One of the encouraging
achievements of the NEP was the eradication of the overall incidence of poverty in
Peninsular Malaysia from 49.3 per cent in 1970 to 15 per cent in 1990. However,
despite the decline in the overall incidence of poverty, the gap in household income
between and within the major ethnic groups remained wide. The Mid-Term Review
of the Fifth Malaysia Plan showed that in 1987, the real mean income of the
Chinese was 65 per cent higher than that of the burniputera. Comparison by
income categories also showed that the mean income of the top 20 per cent of
bumiputera households were 40 per cent lower than that of the riom-bumiputera in
1987. Inter-ethnic income disparity was also observed in the urban areas. The
mean income of a burniputera urban household was 32 per cent lower than the
mean income of the non-burniputera in 1987. Income inequality within group is
also evident. Whilst the mean income of the bumiputera has increased from M$172
in 1970 to M$868 in 1987 the mean income of the middle 40 per cent was 11 per
cent lower at M$773; whilst the mean income of the bottom 40 per cent was 35
per cent lower than that of the average bumiputera in 1987.'
In terms of the restructuring target, bumiputera employment was still under-
represented in the commercial and industrial sectors. Instead, they were over-
represented in the unskilled and low-paid jobs even though their representation
in certain high-paid professional occupations such as accountants, engineers and
Mid-Term Review of the Fifth Malaysia Plan 1989:40.
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architects had increased from 22.2 per cent in 1985 to 29 per cent in 1990 which
was close to the 30 per cent target of the NEP.' 56
 Restructuring of ownership in the
corporate sector was, however, less successful. The estimated share of burniputera
share ownership, including trust agencies, was 20.3 per cent in 1990 which was 9.7
per cent shorit of the 30 per cent minimum target.
The performance in the creation of the Bumiputera Commercial and Indus-
trial Community, measured by selected indicators also did not show encouraging
results. 157
 There was low progress in terms of creating viable burniputera par-
ticipation in the modern sectors of the economy largely due to their small and
narrow-based business enterprises, inadequate experience and lack of management
capabilities. 158
 It was also argued that in addition to these factors, the recession-
ary climate of the first half of the 1980s had adversely affected the performance of
bumiputera businessess. In 1986, 18 per cent of total non-performing loans valued
at M$200,000 or less each and 43 per cent of loans exceeding M$500,000 were due
from bumiputera enterprises.159
4.4.4 The National Development Policy
Following the demise of the NEP the second outline perspective plan for the
1991-2000 period was formulated based on a new strategy called the National
Development Policy (NDP). The main emphasis of the NDP is growth with equity
to enable all Malaysians to participate in the mainstream of economic activities
to ensure political stability and national unity. Among the main objectives of the
NDP are (i) to attain a balanced development of the major sectors of the economy,
156 The Sixth Malaysia Plan 1991:13.
157 Mid-Term Review of the Fifth Malaysia Plan 1989:73
158 The Sixth Malaysia Plan 1991:15.
159 Mid-Term Review of the Fifth Malaysia Plan 1989:73.
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(ii) to reduce and eliminate social and economic inequalities and (ill) to build a fully
developed and industrialized nation with the ultimate goal of achieving national
unity.
4.4.4.1 Growth and Structural Transformation
The NDP aims to achieve a rapid and sustainable economic growth of '1 per
cent per annum in the nineties. Sectoral strategies will focus on further diver-
sification of the economic base and the development of export-oriented and high
value-added activities. Hence the manufacturing sector is envisaged to play an
important role as the prime-mover of the economy. The primary strategy is to
widen and deepen the industrial base which will lead to the production of higher
value-added products, increased linkages with the small-medium sized industries
and lessening dependence on the traditional growth industries.
Besides manufacturing, the services sector has also been identified as another
generator of growth in terms of GDP, employment generation and the reduction
of the large service trade deficit. Policy reformsand supportive investments will
be undertaken to promote this sector as a leading rather than a lagging sector.
The share of agriculture in the GDP is expected to continue declining from
18.7 per cent in 1990 to 13.4 per cent in 2000. Manufacturing will play a leading
source of growth; its share on the GDP is projected to grow from 27 per cent in
1990 to 37 per cent in 2000 and will account for 80 per cent of total merchandise
exports.16°
160 Mohd Kassim, M S 1991:161.
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4.4.4.2 Distributional Strategies
In terms of income and wealth distribution, the NDP still maintains the basic
strategies of the NEP to achieve the ultimate goal of national unity but with new
dimensions.
Firstly, the anti-poverty strategy will shift its focus towards eradicating hard-
core and relative poverty. It is envisaged that overall incidence of poverty will be
reduced from 17.1. per cent in 1990 to 7.2 per cent in 2000. The incidence of hard-
core poverty is expected to be eliminated in the process; the incidence of hard-core
poverty is projected at 1 per cent in 2000.
In terms of restructuring the Malaysian society, the main emphasis is to in-
crease the share and manpower quality of bumiputera in all levels of employments
particularly in the high-paid professional, technical and managerial positions in
the private sector. With regards to ownership in the corporate sector the original
target of 30 per cent share ownership is to be maintained as a general rule but
without any specific time frame for its achievement.
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter has outlined the socio-political and economic aspects of the
Malaysian economy over the past three decades since independence as well as
the direction of the economy in the nineties. It has also shown that the decade of
the 1980s was a difficult and challenging period when structural adjustments had
to conform to the impact of the economic recession. Since then there has been a
distinct shift in development policy to promote the private sector and specifically
the manufacturing sector as the main engines of growth in the 1990s. It is therefore
144
expected that the marketing strategie8 of financial institutIn will bc gear€d to
cater for the growth of private inveHtmcntM and financing manufacturing mndu.tru,
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Chapter V
The Malaysian Financial System
5.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate how far the Malaysian financial
system had developed when Islamic banking was introduced in 1983. It is envisaged
that in a financial environment where both Islamic and traditional banks operate
side by side the impact of Islamic banking is likely to be affected by the level of
financial development in the traditional banking system. Its growth is likely to be
moderated if there is a high degree of non-price competition from the conventional
banks. Whilst the bank will undoubtedly have its own niche in the market, the task
of mobilising deposits from a larger section of the population is more challenging
in a well developed financial system where a range of more attractive financial
instruments are available, a large network of traditional bank branches has been
established and various types of specialized financial institutions have been set-
up. In order to assess the performance of Islamic banking within the Malaysian
financial system (in Chapter VII) this chapter will begin with an overview of the
evolution of the Malaysian banking system and the development of the Malaysian
financial structure until the end of the 1980s. The degree of financial monetization
and financial deepening at the time when Bank Islam was established will also be
outlined. Since the assessment of Bank Islam's performance in Chapter VII will
also take into account the recessionary climate of the mid-1980s, the impact of the
recession on the Malaysian banking system will also be examined.
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5.2 Evolution of the Financial Structure
According to Thirwall (1976:20),
"a well-developed financial system has four main requisites, each of which can
contribute to the process of financial deepening and to raising the level of
savings. These four requisites comprise the monetization of the economy and
the replacement of barter as a means of exchange; the establishment of a central
bank; the development of a commercial banking system, and the development
of a co-ordinated capital market."
The fulfillment of all four requisites, according to Thiriwall, will create a well
co-ordinated framework of financial intermediation which is important for the effi-
cient allocation of capital between competing uses besides ensuring that saving is
utilized for investment purposes.
it is evident that the development of the Malaysian financial system has also
followed along this broad pattern of growth and development. The fulfilment of the
first requisite; namely the monetisation of the economy can be traced as far back
as the eighth century. The second requisite was realized when a Central Bank
was established in 1959. This was followed by the development of the financial
structure in which the commercial banks had developed into the largest and the
most important group of financial institutions by the 1980s. Even though a well
co-ordinated capital market has not yet been developed, rapid progress in the early
stages of its development are already taking place.
5.2.1 Monetization of the Economy - Stage 1
The monetization of the Malaysian economy at its earliest stage of development
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was largely attributed to the role of the port of Malacca as the halfway house for
traders from India and West Asia on the trade route to China and the Far East
in the eighth century. The use of copper cash was introduced by these traders
to replace barter trade with the people of Malacca. Later indigenous tin cash
was issued by the rulers of the Malaccan Empire in the fifteenth century. The
occupation of Malacca by the Portuguese in 1511 and the Dutch in 1641 alec
brought into circulation a variety of silver and gold coins which facilitated trade
not only in the Peninsular but throughout Southeast Asia.
Historically, the growth of a money economy in the Peninsular which subse-
quently stimulated the development of early banking and credit only began in the
nineteenth century. The growth of the tin industry under British colonial rule
added a new dimension to the country's external trade. The need for short-term
credit to finance trade by the foreign tin mining companies led to the establish -
ment of the first foreign commercial banks between 1859 and 1888. These banks,
which were commonly known as 'exchange banks', concentrated mainly in the
financing of external trade, involving primarily transactions in foreign exchange re-
inittances between London, India and China, overdrafts, advances against shipping
documents and trading in commercial bills.
The monetization of the modern economy developed rapidly in the 1920s as
the growing tin industry was complemented by large-scale rubber planting to meet
the growing demand for tyres in the mass production of motor cars in Europe.
The boom in the prices of rubber and tin in the wake of rising world demand led
to a thrive in domestic economic activity inviting new players into the banking
business. These included Chinese businessmen who established their own banks
in the late 1920s and the 1930s to meet the needs of the small entrepreneurs in
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their close-knit communities. These Chinese banks were 'clannish' in character
and each was designed to mainly serve a small client base. Bank lending was
relatively conservative compared with the foreign banks. Money was borrowed
and lent within each dialect community with a strong reliance on good faith and
communal relationships rather than on tangible assets as security. Most of these
banks lacked experience especially in foreign exchange dealings. They tended to
hold large balances with the foreign banks because of the lack of lender of last resort
facility. Nevertheless these banks played an important role in the monetization of
the domestic economy by filling a gap in the credit market to cater for the smaller
domestic businessmen who did not have sufficient access to the foreign banks.
The foreign and local commercial banks co-existed for the greater part of the
first half of the twentieth century each serving a distinct clientele with little over-
lapping of functions. A greater share of the market was dominated by the foreign
banks which formed part of an international network with close links with Sin-
gapore and London. The secondary financial market in Kuala Lumpur remained
undeveloped, however. This was because almost one-third of exports from the
Peninsula were channelled through the port of Singapore where an active foreign
exchange market was developed.
Another significant feature of the financial system at this early stage of de-
velopment was the establishment of a simple, stable and inexpensive monetary
regime called the Currency Board to promote monetary stability within the re-
gion. The Board was accorded the sole right to issue a standard coin and currency
note besides facilitating the growth of international trade. A series of legislative
reforms were passed in the early twentieth century which finally led to the issue of
a currency known as the Malayan Dollar in 1938 as the sole legal tender in Malaya,
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Singapore, the British Borneo and Brunei.
A distinctive feature of the Currency Board was its high level of external
reserves, held wholly in sterling balances and deposits, to back the currency. The
backing by sterling reserves had two main advantages. First, the Malayan Dollar
was pegged at the fixed rate of M$1=2s. 4d. and was able to attract foreign
investment into the tin-mining and rubber-plantation industries. Second, since
sterling was a key currency it facilitated trade beyond the Sterling areas. In fact,
in the 1950s Malaya was the highest US dollar exchange earner within the Sterling
Area.16'
Even though the Currency Board provided a stable and strong currency and
facilitated British foreign investment and trade, it had certain disadvantages which
restricted the internal stabilization management and long-term economic develop-
ment of the country. Money supply was affected by the economic conditions and
policies of other participating governments within the Sterling Area. Because of
the openness of the economy, any changes in the export sector were automatically
transmitted to the country's money supply via its external reserves. Money sup-
ply was determined primarily by the performance of the balance of payments and
left little scope for discretionary monetary management to alleviate the effects of
international trade on the domestic economy. By its nature, the Currency Board
system also precluded any positive role in the promotion of economic development.
In fact its minimum requirement of 80 per cent currency reserves backing had a
high opportunity cost since these resources could have been deployed internally to
finance economic development.
161 Chantrasmi et al 1982:288.
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5.2.2 Establishment of the Central Bank - Stage 2
In 1954 a Mission from the World Bank recommended the formation of a
Central Bank to fulfill the need for deliberate management of the monetary and
credit situation of the country. Two years after independence, the Central bank of
Malaya was established by ordinance in 1959.
The principal objectives of the Central Bank are;162
1. to issue currency and keep reserves to safeguard the value of the currency.
2. to act as banker and financial adviser to the Government
3. to promote monetary stability and a sound financial structure and
4. to influence the credit situation to the advantage of the country.
To meet these objectives the Central Bank was vested with the power to reg-
ulate and supervise the financial system under the Central Bank of Malaya Ordi-
nance 1958. By this ordinance the activities of all commercial banks in the country
were brought under its supervision.
In terms of the first objective the Central Bank did not assume the power to
issue its own currency until June 1967. The postponement of these powers was to
allow for a gradual transition in the process of terminating currency links with the
other participants of the Currency Board as well as to consider the possibility of
establishing a common currency between them.
Following the formation of Malaysia which comprised the Malayan Peninsular,
Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak in 1963, the Central Bank of Malaya was renamed
162 Bank Negara Malaysia 1989:98.
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Bank Negara Malaysia (Central Bank of Malaysia). A year later, the Central
Bank gave its legal notice to replace the Currency Board and entered into negoti-
ations with Brunei to establish a common currency. In 1965, however, Singapore
withdrew from Malaysia and regained its status as an independent participant of
the Currency Board. This prompted further discussions, as a result of which all
three participating governments decided to issue their own currencies while still
maintaining interchangeability of currencies until 1973.
The new Malaysian currency, the Malaysian dollar, which was later renamed
the ringgit in 1975, was issued by the Central Bank in 1967. Initially its value was
maintained at par with the old Malayan dollar at 2s. 4d.. However, the autonomy
of the Central Bank was demonstrated for the first time in November 1967 when it
decided not to devalue the ringgit following the devaluation of the sterling. Whilst
the old Malayan dollar was devalued with the sterling automatically the ringgit
maintained its gold parity the result of which the Malayan dollar was equal to only
85.71 cents.163
The currency interchangeability arrangements with Singapore and Brunei were
terminated in May 1973. The 1958 Banking Ordinance was replaced by the Bank-
ing Act 1973 which provided the Central Bank with greater power to manage
and supervise the banking system and other non-bank financial institutions which
were closely linked to it. The Central Bank was also empowered to facilitate the
financing of national development by fostering a development-oriented approach
to banking.
Non-discriminatory and more liberal exchange control regulations were also
introduced. This meant that exchange control regulations would be applied uth-
163 One Malaysian dollar was equivalent to 100 cents. Similarly one nn,ggit is divided into 100 __
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formly on all countries outside Malaysia and new regulations were made to liber-
alize payments into and out of the country. The joint-stock exchange of Malaysia
and Singapore was also abolished and a separate stock exchange for Malaysia was
set up in Kuala Lumpur.
Following the uncertainty of the international foreign exchange markets and
the instability of the U.S. dollar the Central Bank adopted a floating exchange
rate system in June 1973. Under this new system the Central Bank was no longer
bound to buy U.S dollars at the designated floor rate and the Malaysian dollar was
allowed to float upwards. With the floating of the ringgit, banks in Malaysia were
free to determine their own exchange rates in respect of any foreign currency. In
1975, Malaysia adopted the 'dirty float' by which the value of the ringgit was not
determined solely by the U.S dollar but was tied to a basket of selected currencies of
countries which were significant trading partners of Malaysia. With these changes
the inter-bank foreign exchange market in Kuala Lumpur has expanded rapidly
since 1973.
5.2.3 Development of the Financial Structure - Stage 3
One of the first priorities following the establishment of the Central Bank was
to develop an indigenous banking system - a precondition for effective monetary
management; and the establishment of special development financial institutions
to facilitate the financing of economic development.
5.2.3.1 The Banking System
(I) The Commercial Banks
At the outset, the task of building tb.e basic structure of the banking sys-
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tern involved 'the development of a Malaysian-oriented banking structure, based
on a wide network of domestic banks established on sound banking lines and the
reorientation of the operations of the foreign banks towards meeting Malaysian
needs.' 164 Between 1960 and 1967, the Central Bank concentrated on encouraging
the establishment of Malaysian incorporated banks. This institution-building poi-
icy was actively pursued. In 1960 two new commercial banks 165
 were established
with full Malaysian equity participation. This was followed by the establishment
of another domestic commercial bank' 66
 in 1966; this time with full government
ownership.
The impact of the indigenization policy was noticeable even as early as the first
half of the 1960s. There were 8 domestic banks with 12 branches in 1959. By 1962,
three years after the establishment of the Central Bank, the number of domestic
banks had increased by three but their branch offices had multiplied to 91. By the
end of 1967 the domestic banks had doubled to 16 with 161 branches. In contrast,
only three new foreign banks were established during the 10 year period. The
number of domestic bank branches had exceeded the 151 foreign bank branches.
This was mainly attributed to the Central Bank regulation which disallowed the
establishment of new foreign bank branches from 1966. The rapid increase in the
branch network had decreased the number of persons per branch office by more
than half from 71,600 persons in 1959 to 32,300 persons in 1967.
164 Bank Negara Malaysia 1989:42.
165 Malayan Banking Berhad and UMBC.
166 Bank Bumiputera Malaysia Berhad.
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Table 5.1 - Commercial Banks: Selected Data
1959 1967 % change
Total number of banks	 26	 37	 42.3
Domestic banks	 8	 16	 100.0
Foreign banks	 18	 21	 16.7
Branch Network	 111	 314	 182.9
Domestic banks	 12	 163	 1258.0
Foreign banks	 99	 151	 52.5
Persons served per office 71,600 32,300 -54.9
Total Deposits(M$million) 818 2237
	 173.5
Demand Deposits	 465.7 791.8	 70.0
Fixed Deposits	 258.7 1011.8 291.0
Savings Deposits	 93.6	 434.0	 363.7
Source;Bank Negara Malaysia (1989:Table 6.1)
The supply-leading process of institution-building and the spread of branches
both in the urban and rural areas resulted in rapid increases in the percentage of
deposits mobilized. Total commercial bank deposits increased by 173.5 per cent
during the period from M$818.0 million in 1959 to M$2,237.6 at the end of 1967.
(see Table 5.1). Demand deposits grew by 70 per cent but there was even greater
growth of fixed and savings deposits (291%, 363% respectively).
By the 'Malaysianization' policy the Central Bank also encouraged the trans-
formation of the banking system's holding of sterling assets into Malaysian assets
and balances. Instead of accumulating their funds in external reserves, as com-
monly required during the Currency Board period, domestic banks were encour-
aged to invest in domestic assets by channelling their financial resources into loans
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and advances; and investment in Malaysian public and private securities. As a
result, there was a significant change in the composition of the uses of funds in
the banking system. By the end of 1967 less than 10 per cent of total resources
in the banking system were held abroad compared to 40 per cent in 1959. The
proportion of bank resources held in the form of loans and advances also increased
from one-third in 1959 to 46 per cent at the end of 1967.
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s many significant changes have occurred in the
the structure of commercial banking in Malaysia. Commercial banks have moved
into diversified holding companies with subsidiaries engaged in the activities of
finance companies and merchant banking. Since 1986 commercial banks have also
entered the stockbroking business. Three of these banks were granted stockbroking
licences in 1987 and another had acquired shares in an existing stockbroking firm.
The development in commercial banking is also marked by the introduction
of computer technology since 1973 which has increased the speed and accuracy
of transactions. Computerisation has facilitated the calculation of interest-rate on
savings deposits on a daily basis, the installation of ATM networks for convenience-
banking, automated cheque clearing system and the opportunity to have direct
business links with the world financial market through the SWIFT (Society for
Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications) facility. By the end of 1987,
36 of the 38 commercial banks had computerised their operations. The ATM
services have also expanded rapidly since the first ATM was installed in 1981. By
the end of 1987 eighteen commercial banks offerred ATM services through 609
ATM points with a card-base of 1.6 mfflion.
Despite the growing importance of the locally-incorporated commercial banks
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in the market, the international banks still control a considerable size of the market
as shown in Table 5.2.
Table 5.2 - Market Share: Foreign Banks, 31 December 1990
M$ million % shar
Deposits	 20,366	 24.7
Loans	 21,285	 26.4
Branches	 146	 14.6
ATM	 178	 15.0
Source: Bank Negara Annual fteport 1990
There were 16 foreign banks and 29 foreign bank representative offices at the
end of 1990. A few of the foreign banks also have minority equity shares in several
domestic banks.
(ii) The Finance Companies
The second group of financial institutions within the Malaysian banking sys-
tem is the finance companies. These are deposit-taking institutions primarily en-
gaged in money-lending activities by providing loans for the purchase of consumer
durables; mainly motor vehicles on hire-purchase terms. Other forms of credit of-
fered include housing and personal loans, bridging finance, refinancing, factoring,
leasing and other types of commercial lending. These companies are not allowed to
accept demand deposits; hence their main sources of funds comprise fixed and sav-
ings deposits mobilized from the public. They tend to charge higher rates on loans
than the commercial banks but offer higher interest rates on their deposits. The
growth of these finance companies had begun in the early 1960s as wholly-owned
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subsidiaries of the commercial banks. By 1969, there were 25 finance companies
with 130 branches. In order to regulate the operations of these companies, in the
interest of depositors and to strengthen the financial system, the Central Bank ex-
tended its powers of supervision to this group. The Finance Companies Act 1969
was enforced which brought the licensed finance companies under the supervision
of the Central Bank.
(ill) The Merchant Banks
The basic structure of the banking system was complete when the Central
Bank approved the first merchant bank in 1970. Merchant banks are specialized
banks which cater for the financial needs of the corporate sector. Their fee-based
services include a full range of specialized services relating to all aspects of cor-
porate finance and corporate advisory services such as the underwriting of share
issues, acting as share registrar, corporate advice on restructuring, mergers and
acquisitions; promotion of new investment and joint ventures; and the under4k-
ing of feasibility studies. Investment advice (namely portfolio management, the
establishment and management of investment and unit trusts; and custodian and
nominee services) and banking intermediation services (such as the management
of syndicated loans, and the provision of acceptances and guarantees) 167 are also
provided for fees. Merchant banks also engage in fund-based operations such as
accepting call and fixed deposits, extending loans to clients, money-market oper-
ations and related banking functions including leasing finance, bridging finance,
discounting and rediscounting, factoring and participation in syndicated loans.
The combination of fee-based and fund-based services are essential for the effec-
tive "full service"merchant bank. The emergence of the merchant banks in the
167 Bank Negara Malaysia (1989:224).
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1970s was considered timely because it coincided with the growth of the corpo-
rate sector under the export-oriented industrialization policy and the restructuring
strategy of the NEP. To ensure that the merchant banks play their specialized role
in development and corporate financing these banks were required to derive at least
30 per cent of their income from fee-based services. There are 12 merchant banks
in operation and because of the small market the establishment of new merchant
banks has not been permitted since 1976.
• Significant Policy Changes in the 1980s
(a) Interest Rate Policy
One of the significant features of the banking industry since the late 1970s is the
increased competition between the commercial banks and between the commercial
banks and finance companies especially in retail banking to the advantage of both
savers and borrowers. This is largely attributed to the evolution of a market-
oriented system of monetary management adopted by the Central Bank. One of
the measures undertaken by the Central Bank in this direction was a shift from
the system of administered interest rate determination for the commercial banks
to one that responded efficiently to changing market conditions in 1978. Whilst
interest rates on deposits with finance companies had been freed from regulation
since 1973, the new liberalization allowed commercial banks to fix their own rates
of interest on deposits and the lending rate charged to their prime customers
for loans and advances. However, the maximum interest rates charged on loans
to priority sectors namely the bumiputera borrowers, small-scale enterprises and
individual house buyers continued to be regulated by the Central Bank. However
in response to the downwards rigidity of lending rates with falling interest-rates,
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the commercial banks were required to anchor all borrowing rates, except those for
the priority sectors, to their own declared base-lending rate (BLR) since 1983. The
BLR is the lending rate quoted based on the banks' cost of funds, after provisions
for liquidity requirements and overhead costs. Based on the BLR the interest
margin charged on each loan is to be based on the customers' credit standing,
nature of project to be financed, repayment schedule and collateral offered. The
new system was further refined in 1987 so that the interest margin should not
exceed the BLR by more than 4 percentage points depending on the credit standing
of each borrower. Commercial banks were also allowed to charge a penalty rate of
up to 1 per cent of the loan instalments in default.
(b) Single Customer Credit Limit
To prevent the overconcentration of loans in one particular sector or to a single
customer, maximum limits were set by the Central Bank in 1984. The overall limit
for large loans (which exceeds 15% of the bank's capital funds or working capital)
were set at 50 per cent of total credit facilities. The maximum limit for loans to
any single customer or sector was also set at 30 per cent of a bank's capital funds
in the case of domestic banks and 30 per cent of net working funds for the foreign
banks.
(c) Capital Adequacy Requirements
Another prudential measure is the capital adequacy requirements (CAR) which
commercial banks are required to observe. Between 1982-88, each domestic bank
was required to maintain a minimum 'free' capital ratio of 4 per cent against
its total assets in Malaysia (less long-term investments). Free capital is defined
as the shareholders' funds less fixed assets and long-term investments. The CAR
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was meant to serve as a cushion against unforeseen losses arising from banking
activities, to restrain overly rapid and imprudent growth and to protect depositors
from the 'moral hazard' of bank managers who undertake high-risk project8 which
cost more than could be covered by available capital. In 1988, a new CAR was
introduced following the Basle Capital Accord which harmonizes capital standards
internationally. By the new framework, each category of assets is weighted ac-
cording to its perceived level of risk and the adequacy of capital will be assessed
on this risk-adjusted basis. All domestic financial institutions were expected to
comply with a minimum risk-weighted capital ratio of 8 per cent by 1992.
(d) The Banking and Institution Act (BAFIA) 1989
In view of the rapid growth and the growing competition in the banking system
and the blurring of the lines of business between the commercial banks, finance
companies and merchant banks, the BAFIA was introduced on 1 October 1989
to provide for an integrated supervision of the Malaysian financial system, and
to streamline and modernize the laws relating to banking and all other financial
institutions.' 68 Under this new Act' 6 ° the Central Bank is given a wider power of
supervision over all major bank and non-bank financial institutions except those
in the capital market. Foreign banks are also required to incorporate locally by
1994.
5.2.3.2 Development Finance Institutions
The second priority in the development of the financial structure since 1960
was the establishment of development finance institutions with special roles to
168 Bank Negara Annual Report 1989:45.
169 This Act replaces the Banking Act 1973 and the Finance Companies Act 1969. The Islamic Banking
Act is not affected.
161
play in financing the development of specific sectors in the economy.. The coun-
try's first development bank called the Malaysian Industrial Development
Finance Limited (MIDF) was set up in 1960 corresponding to the beginning of
industrialization in 1958. The bank was formed with equity participation from the
Federal Government, the Commonwealth Development Corporations, the commer-
cial banks and insurance companies. Its principal role is to provide financial assis-
tance to private industrial enterprises, factory mortgage loans and hire-purchase
activities. It also operates to mobilize industrial capital in the form of equity par-
ticipation and to provide assistance for the underwriting and flotation of share
issues. These activities are funded by its main sources of funds namely its paid-up
capital and long-term loans from the Government and from domestic or foreign
financial institutions.
The Agricultural Bank of Malaysia was set up in 1969 to promote sound
agricultural development in the country. Its main function under the NEP was to
coordinate the flow of funds from the various public sector agencies'7° to farmers,
smallholders and fishermen for agricultural development. Its initial focus was on
providing short-term production credit needs to farmers in the major rice growing
areas. Since then its has expanded its loan facilities to small farmers in other
agricultural sectors to achieve the NEP target of eradicating poverty. Besides its
shareholders' fund the principal source of funds of the bank comprised fixed, giro
and savings deposits. The fixed and savings deposit schemes were introduced in
1972 to encourage the savings habit especially amongst the rural population as well
as to mobilize financial resources for its loan operations. Generally, interest rates
paid on its deposits are higher than the rates offered by the commercial banks.
170 There were at least ten agencies providing agricultural support services under the NEP to farmers
and small-holders such as subsidies, credit, extension, marketing and processing.
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The interest rates on loans tended to change from time to time to be in line with
the national policy on poverty eradication and economic development. Between
1969 and 1985, small loans of less than M$30,000 extended for poverty eradication
projects were not charged any interest. Loans to bumiputera enterprises under the
restructuring objective of the NEP, not exceeding M$50,000 were charged 2 per
cent interest per annum. However, all loans approved for the two NEP objectives
were charged a concessionary rate of 4 per cent since 1986.
To promote bumiputera equity participation in commerce and industry an-
der the NEP, the Development Bank Malaysia was incorporated in 1973 as a
wholly-owned subsidiary of the Government-owned commercial bank, Bank Busni-
putera Malaysia Berhad (BBMB). Its operation includes the provision of medium
and long-term loans to finance the purchase of fixed assets in approved projects,
for equity participation in commercially viable projects and for the provision of
guarantees for industrial equipment loans to bumiputera industrialists. The bank
also provides technical, managerial and consultancy services for the planning and
implementation of projects. Its principal sources of funds are made up of its paid-
up capital, long-term borrowings from the Federal Government and fixed deposits
from government agencies. The bulk of its loans at the end of 1987 was channelled
into the financing of manufacturing activities and the interest rates charged on
these loans vary between 6 per cent and 11 per cent per annum. One of the unique
features of the bank is the provision of short-term financing based on the Islamic
principle of musharakah in 1983 which was directed mainly to the construction
sector for property development. It was reported' 7' that one of the projects under
this scheme gave the bank a profit three times higher than what it would have
171 Man 1991:249.
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earned under the interest-based system.
One of the steps undertaken by the government to support its policy of in-
dustrial diversification in the early 1980s was the establishment of the Industrial
Bank of Malaysia in 1979. The objective of the bank is to promote and assist
in the expansion of productive capacity in capital intensive and high-technology
industries; in particular the export-oriented industries and heavy industries such
as ship-building and engineering. In 1986, the bank introduced its export financ-
ing facility which provides long-term credit facilities to industries exporting capital
goods. It also participated in the New Investment Fund scheme to revive domestic
economic activity after the recession by giving credit priorities to the manufactur-
ing sector. In the same year the bank was also allowed to participate in the Islamic
Development Bank's foreign trade financing (FTF) scheme which provided guaran-
tee facilities to Malaysian manufacturers for the import of selected raw materials.
The resources of the bank comprise mainly term loans and its shareholders' funds.
In 1987, the interest charged on its loans varied according to the type, ranging
from 4.5 to 9.5 per cent per annum.
5.2.3.3 Savings Institutions
Apart from the commercial banks and finance companies the National Sav-
ings Bank and the co-operative societies are the main deposit-taking institu-
tions in the financial systems whose main functions are to mobilize savings among
the middle and lower income groups. Both types of institution have their own
niches in the market; the National Savings Bank is readily accessible to the small
savers, especially the low income group and those in areas not adequately served
by the commercial banks and finance companies. The co-operatives societies also
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mobilize small savings from their members in various sectors of the economy.
The establishment of the National Savings Bank in 1974 was a consequence
of the reorganization of the Post Office Savings Bank which had been relatively
successful in the mobilization of savings up to 1960 but later failed to compete with
the newly established commercial banks and finance companies. By the end of 1973
only 27 per cent of total savings deposits were kept in the Post Office Savings Bank
compared to 70 per cent in the commercial banks. Among the changes introduced
by the new savings bank is a wider range of savings instruments for encouraging
savings such as the Premium Savings Certificate Scheme which gives handsome
bonus prizes, the Fixed Deposits Scheme with tax-free interest incentives and the
Save-As-You-Earn scheme. On the asset side, the National Savings Bank is obliged
to hold a certain percentage of its investments in government securities in order
to achieve its developmental objectives. Until 1984 it was one of the important
holders of public debt where at least 70 per cent of its investments were held in
government securities.
Generally, co-operative societies are not financial intermediaries and until 1986
did not come under the supervision of the Central Bank. However many co-
operatives in Malaysia collect deposits under the legal loop-hole that co-operatives
were permitted to take deposits through share subscription from their members.
These deposits are then deployed as loans to members or to finance the business ac-
tivities. The largest co-operatives are the urban credit co-operative societies which
mobilize savings from fixed income members and in turn provide them with small
loans at reasonable cost. The most popular of these urban credit co-operatives in
the 1980s were the deposit-taking co-operatives (DTC) which expanded rapidly by
offering high interest rates on deposits exceeding those prevailing in the banking
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system, opening branches throughout the country and embarking on large scale fi-
nancing and investment activities. By 1986 there were 35 DTCs with 685 branches,
a total membership of 1.05 million and deposits of M$4 billion. Nevertheless many
of these DTCs were poorly managed and in some cases lacked prudent and honest
management. The first sign of financial crisis amongst the DTCs occurred in 15
when a large DTC failed to meet deposit withdrawals. This created a major shock
to the financial system when a series of runs spread through contagion to the other
DTCs and even affected the finance companies due to depositors' nervousness0
The Central Bank had to intervene and with the promulgation of the Essential
(Protection of Depositors) Regulations 1986 the DTCs were brought under the
supervision of the Central Bank. The assets of 24 DTCs were suspended and their
activities investigated.
5.2.3.4 Other Financial Intermediaries
Another extension to the Malaysian financial system is a group of intermedi-
aries which complement and supplement the activities of the major financial in-
stitutions. These include the housing credit institutions which operate on a much
smaller scale than the banks and the deposit-taking institutions. Other financial
institutions designed to mobilize the savings of the bumiputera community and to
promote their equity ownership in the commercial and industrial sectors also come
under this group.
(i) Housing Credit Institutions
The importance of the housing credit institutions reflects the government policy
of promoting home-ownership since 1970. Whilst the commercial banks represent
the largest single source of housing credit in the country, the second major source
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of housing credit for the middle and higher income group in Peninsular Malaysia
is the Malaysia Building Society followed by the Housing Loans Division of the
Treasury which provides housing credit to employees in the public sector. The
Malaysia Building Society was the pioneer institution in the private sector special-
ising in housing finance. It was established in 1950 as a wholly-owned subsidiary of
the Commonwealth Development Corporation at a time when very little housing
credit can be obtained from the commercial banks which preferred to concentrate
on trade financing and the financing the manufacturing sector. It became a public
quoted company in 1963. The major source of funds of the company are derived
from its shareholders'funds and long-term debentures from the Employees Provi-
dent Funds. The role of the Society as the leading housing credit institution gained
additional significance in 1976 when it was appointed to manage a new housing
loan scheme to promote ownership of low-cost housing amongst the low income
group. Under this scheme borrowers earning less than M$500 were eligible for
loans of up to 90 per cent of the value of the houses, inclusive of land costing
not more than M$25,000 each. The remaining 10 per cent end-financing could be
obtained either from the Employees Provident Fund or the commercial banks and
finance companies. In 1985 the government introduced another low-cost housing
loan scheme called the Special Low-Cost Housing Programme (SLHP). It is an
accelerated programme which required the commercial banks and finance compa-
nies to make firm commitment to provide end-financing to at least 60,000 units
of low-cost houses costing M$25,000 or less each between 1986-88. The aim of
the programme was to utilize idle capacity in the construction and manufacturing
sectors especially cement, steel, building materials and labour. In general, the
interest rates charged by the commercial banks were set at a ceiling rate of 10 per
cent, while the interest rates of the Society tend to vary between 8.25 per cent to
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10 per cent depending on the amount of loans approved for different categorIs of
property. With the implementation of the SLHP the maturity perLods of hising
loans had lengthened significantly from an average of 10-15 years to 20-25 years
(ii) National Mortgage Corporation (Caganias)
Because of the long maturity period of each loan and the maximum, ceIling
interest rates on loans under the SLHP the banking system and the building sod-
eties faced a growing risk of liquidity problems aid an interest-rate risk. This was
because the bulk of deposits in the banking system had maturIty periods of less
than 18 months which implied that the banks faced the risks implicit in borrowing
short and lending long. At the same time the banks also faced the real possibility
of their cost of funds rising above 10 per cent per annum during the tenure of
the housing loans. To eliminate both the liquidity and interest rate risks a sec-
ondary mortgage market was created in 1987. The national mortgage corporation,
Cagamas Berhad, was incorporated in 1986 for this purpose with equity partici-
pation from the Central Bank, the commercial banks, the finance companies and
the merchant banks. With a M$500 million advance from the Central Bank the
initial role of Cagamas Berhad was to purchase the existing housing loans from the
primary lenders, repackage these loans into bearer fixed-rate bonds and then issue
these securities for sale in the capital market to long-term investors. By selling
the housing loans to Cagamas the primary lenders can obtain new sources of funds
which not only reduced the above risks but also provided finance to new loans and
investments.
(ill) Tabung Haji
In the context of this study it would be relevant to describe two other in-
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stitutions which have been specially established for the economic development of
the bumiputera/ Muslim community. The first is the Pilgrims Management and
Fund Board or Tabung Haji which serves two functions - as a financial institu-
tion and as a pilgrims' management body. The Board which was established as a
merger between the Pilgrims Savings Corporation and the Pilgrims Affairs Office
by statute in 1969 originally began as a voluntary initiative to enable intending
pilgrims to institutionalize their savings for the purpose of performing their hajj
or pilgrimage to Makkah. Prior to that, pilgrims without sufficient savings tended
to sell all their properties to finance their hajj and as a result many faced dire eco-
nomic consequences upon their return. As the commercial banks and other savings
institutions were unacceptable to prospective pilgrims because of the presence of
interest Tabung Haji was formed to mobilize savings on the basis of profit not
interest. Tabung Haji not only accepts deposits from prospective pilgrims but also
manages their transportation and general welfare during the hajj. Deposits are
accepted through the post-offices, direct counter collections and monthly salary
deductions. Funds derived from the accumulation of savings are invested in Is-
lamically legitimate investments and profits are distributed among the depositors
in the form of bonus after zakat deductions. Nearly one-half of the investments
have been taken in the form of equity participation in public-listed manufacturing
companies. Through these share investments Tabung Haji acts as an instrument
to increase Muslim equity participation in share ownership. The Tabung Haji has
grown enormously in terms of total resources, volume of deposits and the number
of depositors. Its total resources have multiplied from M$12.9 million in 1969 to
M$971 million at the end of 1988. The number of depositors has also increased
tremendously from 7,000 in 1969 to more than 450,000 in 1988. At the same time
the size of its deposits amounted to M$790 million compared to M$7 million in
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1969.
(iv) The National Unit Trust Scheme (ASN)
It is generally agreed that the most significant financial intermediary that has
been established to achieve the NEP objective of securing 30 per cent ownership
by the burniputera community in the corporate sector is the National Unit Trust
Berhad (Amanah Saham Nasional Berhad or ASNB). The ASNB was set up in
1979 as a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Perbadanan Nasional Berhad (PNB)
which in turn is the subsidiary of the Bumiputera Investment Foundation.
As a unit trust the function of the ASNB is to serve as a medium through
which small individual bumiputera investors can acquire a share of the portfolio of
investments under the National Unit Trust Scheme or popularly known in Malaysia
as the ASN scheme. The investor is known as the unit-holder who does not actually
hold shares directly in limited companies but rather owns units which form a share
in a portfolio of investments owned by ASNB. All burniputera individuals as young
as 18 years old are eligible to become a unit-holder under the ASN scheme. A
unit-holder is allowed to own a minimum of 100 units and a maximum of 50,000
units. However unit-holders who cannot afford to buy the minimum 100 units in
one purchase are allowed an initial purchase of the first 10 units at M$1 each.
The purchase of the next 90 units need not be paid in cash but can be done by
crediting the dividends declared on the basic investment of 100 units. To ensure
that each unit-holder would own at least 100 units under the Scheme until 1990,
the small saver was not permitted to sell this basic 100 units until that year. Hence
by 1990 each ASN unit would be guaranteed at par value of M$1, irrespective of
any change in the market value of the portfolio of shares held by the Scheme.
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It is worth noting that the unit-holders were guaranteed dividends of at least 10
per cent per annum until 1990 based on the fact that the portfolio investments
of the Scheme comprised largely the shares of blue-chip companies purchased by
ASNB from PNB. Nevertheless since its inception in 1981, the dividends paid had
exceeded 10 per cent per annum except in 1987 when a 9 per cent dividend was
paid because of poor corporate performance. Incentives have also been offered to
attract greater participation such as the issue of a bonus of one unit for certain units
held and special credit facilities from commercial banks to finance the purchase of
additional units. After 1990, the portfolio of investments held by the Scheme was
listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange. The ASN units now have a market
value and these units can be transacted but only directly with the Scheme to ensure
that ownership would remain within the bumip'utera community. Despite the novel
principle on which the ASN Scheme operates, only 44.8 per cent of an estimated
5.09 million eligible members of the burniputera community had participated in
the scheme by the end of 1987. Public opinion indicates that one of the main
reasons for the large percentage of non-participation is the fact that the investment
portfolio of the ASNB includes interest-based financial institutions. Nevertheless
the ASN scheme had become an important vehicle for mobilising the savings of
the bumiputera community and in achieving the 30 per cent equity ownership in
the industrial and commercial sector by 1990.
5.2.3.5 Development of the Money Markets
Overlapping the policy of institution-building in the banking system is the de-
velopment of the money market to facilitate secondary transactions for short-term
funds. The basic structure of the money market has developed since the establish-
ment of the Central Bank in 1959. Clearing houses were set up in Kuala Lumpur
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and Penang in 1960 to facilitate the clearing of cheques among the commercial
banks. The first discount house was established in 1963 to assist the intermedia-
tion of short-term bills; backed by the lender of last resort facilities by the Central
Bank. The Stock Exchange of Malaya and Singapore was established in 1962h7 to
promote a capital market under the guidance of the Central Bank. The issuance of
Treasury bills by the Central Bank on behalf of the Government as instruments of
monetary management took place in 1964. A more active secondary market began
to develop with the introduction of a range of securities with varying maturities,
different interest rates and terms of redemption to meet the investment needs of
various investors.
With the rapid growth of the domestic economy in the late 1970s as reflected
by the boom in the prices of primary commodities and manufactured goods, there
was increasing demand for new financial instruments and investment opportunities
for the financial system to match the higher levels of savings. The limited supply
of Treasury bills and other maturing government securities was not sufficient to
meet the growing and diverse needs of investors. Two new papers were therefore
introduced by the Central Bank in 1979 to further develop the money market
and increase the efficiency in the mobilization of private savings. These were the
bankers acceptances and negotiable certificates of deposit.
With the introduction of these two new financial instruments, the usage of
repurchase agreements (Repo) transactions increased significantly in the 1980s
especiaJJy when interest rates were low and liquidity was in excess during the
recession. A Repo transaction is a short-term deposit or loan backed by a collateral
172 The Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange was set up in 1973 following the termination of the currency
interchangeability arrangements with Singapore.
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of securities that can be traded in the secondary market. It involves a borrower
who needs very short-term funds and an investor with surplus funds to spare. In a
typical Repo transaction, a borrower A and an investor B may enter an overnight
Repo agreement for M$10 million at the going rate of 5 per cent per annum.
A would receive M$10 million in cash from B and issue Malaysian government
securities worth M$10 million as collateral to B. On the following day, B pays the
principle sum of M$io million plus interest amounting to M$1,370 and returns the
securities to A. As a Repo instrument, a bankers acceptance (BA) is a negotiable
bill of exchange drawn and accepted by a commercial bank or a merchant bank
for the purpose of facilitating trade financing by importers, exporters, buyers or
suppliers. It can only be drawn for short-term trade financing of up to 200 days and
are payable in multiples of a thousand ringgit, with a minimum denomination of
M$30,000. On the other hand, a negotiable certificate of deposit (NCD) is a receipt
for a fixed or time deposit placed with a commercial bank. Unlike the receipt for
ordinary time deposits the NCD is negotiable or transferable. The name of the
depositor is not written on the NCD and the principal sum of the deposit would
be paid on the date of maturity by the issuing bank to whoever is the bearer of
the NCD on that date.
The initial response of the corporate sector towards the BAs was relatively more
positive than for the NCDs. The last resort facility provided by the Central Bank
on the BAs promoted public confidence and the requirement that BAs must be
discounted at least once in the secondary market before qualifying for rediscounting
with the Central Bank had also resulted in active trading of BAs compared to the
NCDs. The NCDs were initially less popular partly because of the higher interest
paid on fixed deposits in 1979. It seemed that more weight was attached to high
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interest than to liquidity (which could be resolved by the traditional overdraft).
Nevertheless the volume of NCDs has grown significantly especially when interest
rates on fixed deposits dropped sharply in 1987. During such period of excess
liquidity business enterprises found It more profitable to park their surplus funds
in the form of NCDs. To promote active trading in the secondary market for
NCDs, merchant banks with a minimum capital of M$30 million each were granted
permission to issue their own NCDs in 1987 followed by the finance companies with
the same capital base in 1990. By 1988, three other new instruments were traded
in the money market namely the interest-free Malaysian Government Investment
Certificates, the mortgaged-backed Cagamas bonds and the Floating Rate NCDs.
Financial Deepening
The availability of a wider range of financial instruments had added depth to
the financial market as the accumulation of financial assets continues to increase
at a faster pace than the accumulation of non-financial wealth or the GNP. At the
time Islamic banking was introduced in Malaysia in 1983, the ratio of broad money
supply (M2) 173 to GNP at current prices was 0.64; by 1989 it had increased to 0.71.
Both ratios are relatively higher than that of the other Southeast Asian countries
with the exception of Singapore which recorded higher ratios of 0.73 in 1982 and
0.91 in 1989. A study by the Central Bank 174 shows that the M2/GNP ratio has
been relatively more stable in developed economies including Singapore compared
to Malaysia which reflects a more rapid process of monetization in Malaysia. The
degree of monetisation of the Malaysian economy may also be reflected in the
holdings of broad money, M2 per capita. In 1982, M2 per capita was US$1,091
' comprising currency and all deposits with the major financial institutions.
Occasional Paper No.1 July 1984.
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and has risen to US$1,600 in 1989. In terms of the maturity structure of deposits
and the length of bank loans it is evident that there has been an increase in the
share of longer-term deposits of more than one year in maturity. In 1970, 82.8
per cent of total private sector deposits were in the form of short-term deposits
(mainly demand and savings deposits). By 1983, their share has fallen to 63.4
per cent compared to the increase of longer term deposits to 17.3 per cent. By
the end of 1990, demand deposits accounted for 15.8 per cent of total deposits
mobilized, savings deposits accounted for 16.2 per cent whilst the bulk was held in
fixed deposits which accounted for 68 per cent of total deposits mobilized by the
banking system. A similar trend has also been noticed in the length of loans and
advances. Whilst short-term loans of one year or less accounted for 71.9 per cent of
total loans in 1970 and 43.7 per cent in 1983, the proportion of long-term loans of
more than four years in maturity has been on the upward trend from 16.6 per cent
in 1970 to 38.6 per cent in 1983 and 60 per cent in 1990. The above indicators
show that the Malaysian banking system had reached the stage of considerable
maturity when Bank Islam was incorporated in 1983.
5.2.4 Capital Market Development - Stage 4
The fourth and last requisite for a developed financial system envisaged by
Thiriwall as stated at the beginning of this chapter is a well-coordinated capital
market. The capital market in Malaysia is relatively small and undeveloped com-
pared to the money and foreign exchange markets. Nevertheless the development
of an effective capital market is one of the major objectives of financial development
in Malaysia as is the case in other developing countries.
The Malaysian capital market consists of a primary securities market which
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deals in the issue of new government and corporate securities and a secondary
market in which existing securities are being traded. The instruments in the capital
market include all public and private debt securities with maturities exceeding
one year, corporate stocks and shares with no fixed maturities and commodity
futures. The largest component of primary funds raised is through the issue of
government securities. Even though the primary issue of corporate stock and shares
is relatively small, it has expanded rapidly since the 1960s. The bulk of secondary
transactions in the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange, is in corporate securities. This
may be attributed to the fact that secondary transactions of Malaysian government
securities (MGS) are conducted mainly in the money market and also because a
majority of MGS are held by non-bank financial institutions such as the provident
fund which tend to hold these securities until maturity.
The latest development in the Malaysian capital market is the rapid growth
of the private debt securities market. Prior to 1987 the private debts securities
market was virtually non-existent in Malaysia.. The first major move was the issue
of M$100 million worth of the mortgage-backed Cagamas bond in October 1987.
Within one year three issues of Cagamas bonds were made with a total value of
M$900 mfflion. Secondary trading of these bonds which is carried out through a
network of principal dealers within a selected group of financial institutions has
been relatively active. This partly reflects the attractiveness of the bonds in terms
of yield, shorter maturity (up to 5 years), the bearer form of certificates, the
exemption of transactions from stamp duties and their eligibility as a secondary
liquid asset.
Following the success of the Cagamas bonds and the favourable monetary
conditions in recent years, several large corporations with good credit standing have
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also raised funds through the issue of medium and long-term bonds, promissory
notes and convertible bonds. These papers are issued with a defined life and final
maturity and pay an agreed return to investors. In general the maturity range
varies between two and ten years with coupon rates ranging from 3-8 per cent.
Even though the market is still in its early stages of development, rapid growth in
funds raised through the above methods has been registered; rising from M$609
million in 1988 to M$77 million in 1989 and a big jump to M$1.7 billion in 1990.
5.3 The Impact of the Recession
What is important to recognize is that the Islamic bank began its operation in
a highly competitive financial environment. In addition the bank was confronted
with a recessionary climate barely two years after its establishment. It is therefore
relevant to outline the impact of the recession on the Malaysian banking system
as a background to our assessment of the performance and policy of the Islamic
bank during that period.
Whilst the real side of the economy, suffered a stagnation of minus one per
cent during the 1985/1986 recession the financial system also faced a series of
shocks which brought into focus the overcommitment of many banks and non-
bank financial institutions during the period of exuberant growth in the second-
half of the 1970s and the early 1980s. The adverse business conditions were also
compounded by weak management and in some cases fraudulent business practices
that caused heavy losses to some of these financial institutions.
Generally, the recession has led to a 'large overhang of non-performing loans
in the banking system'.' 75 Between 1975 and 1984 there was a rapid rise in bank
175 Bank Negara Annual Report 1989:133.
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lending which averaged 22.8 per cent. A distinctive feature of bank credit during
the period was the significant proportion of loans in property and construction. By
the end of 1985, the proportion of total property loan (construction, housing and
real estates) accounted for 34.5 per cent of total loans outstanding in the banking
system, compared with 26.4 per cent at the end of 1980. In terms of total new
loans of the banking system, the percentage extended to the property sector rose
to 54.8 per cent at the end of 1986 from 32.2 per cent at the end of 1980.176
The overconcentration of bank credit in the property sector reflected a number
of factors which included the policy undertaken by the Central Bank to encourage
home ownership through bank financing since 1977, credit to bumiputera contrac-
tors and property developers which accounted for the largest amount of credit
granted to the bumiputera community under the NEP, the demand for commercial
property in the manufacturing sector and the demand for high quality commer-
cial and residential property by the expatriate workforce with the influx of foreign
investment.
The last factor was of significance because it had pushed up the prices and
rental of quality office space and residential property in the major urban centres
resulting in a bout of speculation in property. As indicated by a survey conducted
by the Central Bank in 1985, the rent and prices of superior quality buildings
tripled between 1975 and 1983 bringing about an escalation in the supply of such
property in the market. The survey showed that the supply of high-rise cot ial
property in Kuala Lumpur more than doubled from 12 projects in 1984 to 29 in
1985. A similar trend was also evident in the case of condominium projects where
nine were completed in 1985 compared to four the previous year.
' Bank Negara Annual Report 1985:157, Sheng 1989:9.
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In addition to overlending to the property sector, bank credit was also extended
for share speculation in the stock exchange. As corporate profits remained strong
over the 1977-1984 period, the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange Index rose from
100 in 1977 to a peak of 427 in early' 1984 as a result of speculatkrn in corporate
securities.17
It was against this background of domestic over-Investment in real estates and
wide speculation in equities that the impact of the recession on the real side of the
economy began to be transmitted to the financial system.
Firstly, private savings declined by 22.4 per cent in 1985 as a result of lower in-
come following the fall in commodity prIces. Private investment, however declined
less sharply by 17.9 per cent because of the slow adjustment in private sector ex-
penditure. Growth of deposits with the banking system as a group fell sharply
from 20.3 per cent in 1984 to 10.3 in 1985 whilst total loans rose by 14 per cent.
As a consequence the loans-deposits ratio of the banking system rose to 94 per cent
at the end of 1985. The tight liquidity was reflected by high interest-rates. The
mode deposit rates of the 12-month fixed deposits ranged between 9.5 per cent to
10.5 per cent per year in May 1985 while the high demand for loans caused the
mode base lending rate to remain at 12.25 per cent per annum since 1984.
The relatively high real rates of interest was an issue of concern because with
the economic slowdown, low inflation and declining international interest-rates;
downward adjustments were needed to encourage private sector investment as well
as relieve the debt-servicing burden of corporations. At the same time, an adequate
real rate of interest was also necessary to promote deposits in the face of the
widening of the savings-investment gap.
'	 heng 199:9.
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Despite measures undertaken by the Central Bank to ease liquidity by reducing
the statutory reserve requirement and the minimum liquidity ratio of the commer-
cial banks in mid-1985 the liquidity of commercial banks was stifi tight. The
commercial banks later reduced their base lending rates bringing the mode base
lending rate from 12.25 per cent to 10.75 per cent per annum and the 12-month
fixed deposit rate to 7.5 per cent per annum.
The first major event which triggered a series of shocks to the Malaysian bank
ing system was the collapse of a large public-listed company in Singapore in Decem-
ber 1985 followed by the sudden suspension of the Kuala Lumpur and Singapore
stock exchanges for three days. The direct impact of both events was a run on a
finance company associated with a prominent Malaysian businessman with inter-
ests in the Singapore quoted company. The arrest of the businessman in January
created another spell of withdrawals which was later contained after liquidity was
provided by the Central Bank.
Investors' confidence in the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) was greatly
undermined when the integrity of contracts on the KLSE was increasingly being
questioned. This resulted in the decline of share prices and severe dimunition in
the value of shares. The market capitalisation of all shares quoted on the KLSE
declined by M$11 billion at the end of 1985 followed by another M$1O.1 billion
in the first quarter of 1986.' At the same time the property market was also
on the brink of collapse. By 1986, the price and rental value of prime property
in Kuala Lumpur was driven down due to oversupply and forced selling. Many
entrepreneurs were caught in a triple squeeze with a sharp decline in income flows,
178 Bank Negara Annual Report 1985:22.
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collapse in asset values and a rise in debt-servicing. 17 . As a result of the significant
concentration of bank credit in the property sector, the adverse conditions in that
sector were transmitted to the banking system in the form of a high incidence of
non-performing and bad and doubtful debts for the first time in history at the end
of 1985. Hence between 1985 and 1986, the commercial banks in particular were
confronted with 'the growing problem of non-performing loans, brought about by
the combination of the recession, overgearing by many corporate clients, decline in
the security values in land and shares and in some instances, poor credit evaluation
and loan documentation."8°
In response to the non-performing loan crisis, the Central Bank introduced a
set of guidelines which required banks to set aside provisions for bad debts and
interest-in-suspense beginning from the 1985 financial year.
Table 5.3 - Banking System: Outstanding Interest in Suspense &
Bad Debts Provisions 1985-1988 (M$rnillions)
Financial	 Interest-in Bad Debts Total as %
Year	 Suspense	 Provisions of total loan
1985	 1,500	 2,493	 5.6
1986	 2,844	 4,056	 9.7
1987	 4,242	 5,188	 12.9
1988	 5,932	 5,722	 14.5
	
Average Annual Growtl 59.5%	 33.6%
Source:Sheng 1989 Table 3.
179 Sheng 1989:10
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The high incidence of non-performing loans was reflected by the large provisions
made. By 1988 these provisions amounted to M$11.7 billion or 14.5 per cent of
gross loans of the banking system covering approximately 47 per cent of total non-
performing loans. The difficulties of the private sector in servicing their debt during
the recession were evident in the rapid rise in the interest-in-suspense component.
As shown in Table 5.3, interest-in-suspense grew at an average annual rate of 59.5
per cent from M$1,500 million in 1985 to M$5,932, while provisions for bad debts
rose at a slower rate of 33.6 per cent from M$2,493 in 1985 to M$5,722 in 1988.
The impact of these large provisions was severe cuts in bank profits. Many
banks reported lower profits while some suffered heavy losses. However, four
medium-sized domestic commercial banks' 8 ' incurred substantial losses largely be-
cause of their involvement in the property sector. It was found that these four
banks had expanded their loan base excessively between 1980-1985 depending on
collateral with little consideration for project viability and cashfloW. According to
the Bank Negara Annual Report'82 these four banks had problems of 'overstretched
managerial resources, poor procedures and controls and instances of fraud leading
to lax control over loans and the high incidence of non-performing loans.' which
reflected poor and in some cases dishonest management. To protect depositors' in-
terest and to maintain public confidence in the banking system all four commercial
banks were rescued and restructured by the Central Bank by 1989.
Besides the commercial banks, finance companies that lent aggressively to
finance real estate development and share acquisition were also hit with losses. By
1984, 11 out of the 47 finance companies reported losses; eight of which were new
namely United Asian Bank Berhad, Perwira Habib Bank, Sabah Bank Berhad and Oriental Bank
Berhad.
182 1989:133.
182
companies which started between 1979 and the early 1980s. The Central Bank
had to assume control over four finance companies which were unable to inject
new capital to cover their losses.
In summary the recession in the Malaysian economy was manifested in the
financial system by heavy losses in various financial institutions. These losses were
characterized by the high incidence of non-performing loans in the banking sector
and the inability of the deposit-taking cooperatives to meet deposit withdrawals.
Both had emanated from aggressive lending into the property sector and share
based lending which cannot be sustained during the unfavourable economic en-
vironment. The problem has also been compounded by the lack of prudent and
trustworthy management.
5.4 Conclusion
In conclusion, the structure of the Malaysian financial system has developed
tremendously from the relatively simple structure of the Currency Board in the
1950s. Starting with the policy of indigenisation and institution-building the Cen-
tral Bank has undertaken a supply-leading approach to financial development. By
the time Islamic banking was introduced in 1983 the Central Bank had brought 38
commercial banks, 41 finance companies and 12 merchant banks under its supervi-
sion. The market-oriented approach to interest rate determination, computerisa-
tion and the widespread network of branches of the major banks in the early 1980s
had also fostered greater competition in retail banking within the banking system.
At the same time development banks and specialized institutions designed both to
finance development in specific economic sectors and to facilitate the achievement
of the NEP targets have also been established. It is apparent that the banking
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structure was almost complete with specific institutions to mobilize resources and
supply funds in order to promote economic development. Nevertheless, with the
exception of Tabung Haji there remained a gap in the system for the establish-
ment of an interest-free bank as an alternative to western banking for the Muslim
community.
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Chapter VI
Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad: Evolution and Framework
6.1 Introduction
Malaysia became the first country in Southeast Asia to join the Islamic Bank-
ing movement when Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad (hereinafter referred to as Bank
Islam or BIMB) first opened its doors on 1st July 1983. The bank was established
to function side by side with the interest-based banks. However, unlike other mdi-
vidual Islamic banks which were established by private initiatives, Bank Islam was
established with full support from the Malaysian government not only in terms of
legislative provision but also by becoming the major shareholder of the bank. This
chapter aims to provide an overview of Bank Islam. It will begin with an outline
of the evolution of the bank followed by a discussion on its overall framework,
organizational structure and modes of operation.
6.2 Evolution
The establishment of Bank Islam may be attributed to a combination of factors
which had acted favourably towards the establishment of a fully-fledged Islamic
bank with full approval and assistance from the government. Triggered by the
impact of the Islamic resurgence which began in the early 1970s, the demand for
Islamic banking amongst Malaysian-Muslims became more pressing towards the
end of the decade. In addition, the feasibility of Islamic banking was attested by
the impressive success of the Pilgrimage Management and Fund Board (Tabung
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Haji), the only Islamic financial institution set up to mobifize savings of Muslims
intending to perform the pilgrimage. From the political perspective, it is envisaged
that the Malay-led government was obliged to support the Islamic cause for the
achievement of certain political objectives. On the other hand, the developmental
policy of the Central Bank, as shown in Chapter V, can also be viewed as a
contributory factor that had motivated the government to hold a major share in
the bank.
6.2.1 The Malaysian-Muslims
Since Muslims in Malaysia are predominantly Malay in terms of their racial
identity, the study of Islamic banking in Malaysia will inevitably develop against
the background of this ethnic community. At the outset there is a deep-rooted
relationship that bonds Islam and the Malay identity. Islam has always been
the religion of the Malays since the official conversion of the first Malay ruler of
the Malacca Sultanate in the fifteenth century. Over the centuries, the original
animistic beliefs of the Islamized Malays have been gradually substituted by ideas
and institutions inspired from the Quran and other sources of Islamic law. The
internalization of Islam has been so profound that Islamic belief, sentiments and
values now serve as the foundation of the Malay culture and value system that
Malay identity is almost interchangeable with Muslim identity.
Because of this strong bondage, afl Malays in Malaysia are born Muslims and
by constitution the proselytization of Malays by other faiths has not been permit-
ted. Islam is the declared official religion even though this did not suggest that
Malaysia is an Islamic State. In the context of the Malaysian plural society Mus-
lims are therefore identifiable with the Malays or bumiputera; as a result Muslim
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interest is almost inseparable from the Malay or bumiputera interest, politically.
The 1980 population census showed that there were 6.9 million Malaysian
Muslims in 1980; representing 53 per cent of the total population of 13.07 million.
A majority of these Muslims (88.4%) were located in the Peninsula in 1980. Some
75.4 per cent of them were concentrated in the rural areas and comprised 60.5 per
cent of the rural population in 1980.
As reflected by the socio-economic position of the Malays, Muslims in Malaysia
traditionally live in the rural areas depending on agriculture as their livelihood and
they constitute the majority of the poor in the country. Before independence in
1957 and in the 1960s, the Malay-Muslims were economically identified as subsis-
tence farmers and fishermen in the rural areas. In 1990, although most Malays
continue to live in the rural areas, an increasing number of them have migrated to
the urban areas. A majority of urban Malays are employed in the public sector.
Those working in the private sector are mostly employed in the unskilled and lower
paid jobs and a sprinkling 30 per cent work as professionals such as accountants,
engineers and architects with high income.
Given the Muslim underdevelopment the establishment of Islamic banking in
the 1980s would not have been possible without legislative and financial support
of the government. Unlike the Chinese businessmen who set up the first domestic
banks in the 1930s, Muslims in general did not have the resources to establish
their own bank. Malay entrepreneurs in the 1980s were still dependent on state
assistance to survive in the business and commercial sector and establishing a bank
was likely to be beyond their financial means generally.
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6.2.2 The Impact of Islamic Resurgence
"The decade of the 1970s in Malaysia coincided with the rise of the da 'Wa (Is-
lamic proselytization) phenomenon marked by the mushrooming of private Muslim
organizations for the purpose of spreading the message of Islam to Muslims and
non-Muslims alike" (Hassan, 1987:182). This phenomenon was largely prompted
by events surrounding the worldwide resurgence of Islam at the international level.
The success of the Iranian Revolution in 1979 followed by the establishment of the
Islamic Republic of Iran exerted a tremendous impact upon Muslims around the
world. Muslims began to perceive that an Islamic movement can gain political
power and preserve that power in the form of an Islamic State even in modern
times. More importantly, the implementation of Islamic laws by the Iranian gov-
ernment to Islamicize the economy, the education system and the cultural life of
the people showed that an Islamic state does have its own identity. This provided
a great inspiration to young Muslims in other countries, including Malaysia, to
emulate the changes in Iran in the attempt to exert an exclusive Islamic identity
amongst themselves.
The internal factors that have motivated the increasing awareness towards Is-
lam amongst the Malays are more complex to explain. Nevertheless, studies on
Islamic resurgence in Malaysia' 83 have observed close associations between the mas-
sive turn towards Islam amongst urban Muslims and the ethnic situation. It was
perceived that large scale movements of Malays to the urban areas and of Malay
students into the universities at home and abroad under the NEP, had created
an increasing awareness among the Maiays of their ethnic identity. It was argued
that because the urban atmosphere was ethnically alien compared to the villages
183 
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(where everyone were of the same race and shared the same religion, culture and
language) the newly-arrived Malay migrants had become acutely conscious of their
own ethnic identity and had turned to Islam as a medium to assert this identity
since all Malays tend to be Muslims and that a vast majority of non-Malays are
not Muslims.
At the society level, the renewed commitment to the Islamic faith was mani-
fested by the greater conformity to the Islamic way of life. This was evident in the
case of daily prayers, attire, food, lifestyles and even in the conduct of business.
Various Islamic organizations and societies committed to the pursuit of Islamic ide-
als have also mushroomed, generating renewed scholarly interest in Islam amongst
the Muslim intellectuals and their young followers. The most influential Muslim
youth organization ABIM was advocating the idea of Islam as a comprehensive
system which touches all aspects of human life. This new understanding of Islam
was echoed in countless seminars and forums consequently leading to calls for the
establishment of an Islamic economy, an Islamic education system, an Islamic legal
framework and most of all an Islamic state.
The idea of setting up an Islamic bank in Malaysia was one of the resolutions
which emanated in these public discourses and debates. The establishment of an
Islamic alternative to western banking was seen as the first important steps to-
wards the elimination of nba in the economy which would eventually lead to the
establishment of an Islamic economy. The demand for Islamic banking in Malaysia
became more pressing as more Islamic banks were being established abroad. Con-
tinuous pressure was also made on the government to assist in the formation of
such a bank.
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The first formal resolution was passed by the 'Bumiputra Economic Congress' in
1980 calling upon the government to allow Tabung Haji to establish a full-fledged
Islamic bank in Malaysia. A year later, another resolution was adopted by the
'National Seminar on the Concept of Development in Islam' requesting the gov-
ernment to take immediate actions in legislating an Act that would facilitate the
establishment of banks and financial institutions on Islamic principles in Malaysia.
Besides these public demands, independent and private efforts were also un-
dertaken jointly by some Malay/Muslim-based organizations such as the Tabung
Haji, the Muslim Welfare Organization of Malaysia (PERKIM), the Development
Bank of Malaysia, Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Berhad and Malay leaders from other
financial institutions to expedite the formation of the Islamic bank. The first prac-
tical step undertaken was the establishment of a committee called 'The Study
Group on Islamic Banking Committee'. The objective of this committee was to
study various aspects of Islamic banking and its implementation in Malaysia. Its
efforts culminated in a study tour of some Islamic banking institutions in the Mid-
dle East, including the International Association of Islamic Banks and the Faisal
Islamic Bank in Cairo; and the Faisal Islamic Bank Sudan; after which a memo-
randum was made to the government containing two main proposals. Firstly, it
was proposed that the establishment of an Islamic bank should be coordinated
at the national level and secondly that a National Steering Committee on Islamic
Banking should be appointed by the Prime Minister. These proposals were ac-
cepted by the government and in response the National Steering Committee on
Islamic Banks was appointed on July 1981. The seriousness with which the issue
of the establishment of the bank was pursued was also evident at the Cairo Seminar
on Islamic Banking and Economics held in August to September 1981 where the
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Malaysian delegates constituted the largest group sent by any individual country.
6.2,3 The Response of the Government
The writers on Islamic resurgence in Malaysia also indicate that the UMNO-
led government in the 1970s viewed the da 'wah phenomenon with some degree of
apprehension for a number of reasons and found it necessary to deal with this new
wave of Islamic fundamentalism.
It was argued that the growing popularity of ABIM and its central message of
the importance of Islam as a deen; a self-sufficient way of life that holds the key to
all man's problems' 85 worried the power-holders in UMNO who saw a new threat
to its approach of political compromise between the major ethnic groups. Even
though ABIM had never outwardly called for the creation of an Islamic state 186 it
had made justifiable criticisms of some government policies which were considered
oppressive and unjust in several respects.
The views of ABIM had also struck a responsive chord amongst a large section
of the Muslim population. Many of ABIM supporters were young, educated Mus-
lims within the Malay middle class. According to Muzaffar 187 this middle-class
tendency had 'generated tremendous fear among the UMNO leaders because until
the resurgence, the Malay middle-class was solidly behind the party'. Moreover,
Islamic resurgence was more in line with the principles of the Islamic opposition
party, PAS which was fast gaining support from the Muslim masses. Its public
support for the Islamic state, its criticisms on the failure of the NEP to eradi-
1 see Funston 1981, Muzaffar 1986, Hassan 1987
185 Funston 1981:174.
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cate poverty and its open intentions to change the existing economic system were
important issues which UMNO could not afford to ignore.
In response to these imminent threats UMNO began efforts to project an Is-
lamic image by responding to the Islamic resurgence. At the same time, the
success of PAS in winning many seats in the 1969 elections led to its inclusion in
the UMNO-led coalition government from 1973 to 1978. This saw the creation of
numerous Islamic Affairs divisions and committees in the government and a series
of Islamic programmes over the media. The main aim was to emphasize how much
the UMNO-led government had done for Islam and the importance of supporting
the government's moderate approach to Islam in order to avoid the dangers of
religious extremism in a multi-religious society.'88
The response of the UMNO-led government to appease its voters within the
Malay middle class became more pronounced with the introduction of its Islamiza-
tion programme in 1982. This programme which was aimed at the Malay middle
class includes the 'inculcation' or the 'infusion' of certain 'Islamic values' in
government administration, the dissemination of Islamic values in schools and uni-
versities, the implementation of new Islamic laws on Muslims and the establishment
of Islamic institutions.
The establishment of Bank Islam by the government therefore came under
this series of Islamic reforms. It was claimed to be a manifestation of UMNO's
commitment to undertake a gradual Islamization process of the Malaysian social
and economic institutions. Sceptics however saw it purely as a political strategy to
gain Malay political support for the general elections. It was envisaged that since
PAS had moved out of the coalition in 1978, the establishment of an Islamic bank
188 Muzaffar 1986:6.
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was meant to 'take the thunder away from PAS. 189
 in the 1982 general elections.
As asserted by Muzaffar (1986); given the capitalistic structure of the economy, the
benefits of the Islamic bank in terms of financing and profits would flow mostly to
the Malay middle-class and UMNO could hope to win their support on this account.
In the context of gaining support from the rural Malay voters, the Islamic banking
project would provide an Islamic image to UMNO and would benefit the party in
diluting the support of the rural Malays towards PAS, UMNO's chief rival in the
rural areas.
6.2.4 The Success of Tabung Haji
The readiness of the government to accept the proposals of the Study Group
towards the formation of the National Steering Committee on Bank Islam may also
be attributed to the fact that the Study Group was spearheaded by Tabung Haji
the Pilgrimage Management and Fund Board, which had showed a profitable track
record in mobilizing deposits from Muslims. When the Islamic banking proposal
was submitted by the Steering Committee in 1981, Tabung Haji had proved to be a
successful interest-free financial institution. By the end of 1981, the total resources
of Tabung Haji had reached almost M$300 million. About 51,000 Muslims had
become its depositors since 1969 with total deposits amounting to M$108 million.
It had 40 branches all over the country, three fully-owned subsidiaries and had
interests in 25 private and 50 public companies. Its profits before zakat was M$32.4
million from which it was able to pay dividend at a competitive rate of 9 per cent
per annum to its depositors.
Obviously, it was the achievements of Tabung Haji which provided the plat-
189 Ariff 1988:200.
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form for the viability and credibility of Islamic banking in Malaysia. The impres-
sive figures of Tabung Haji's success served to indicate that a potential market
had already existed for Islamic banking services in Malaysia. In this respect it
was conceived that the the establishment of Islamic banking in Malaysia was not
without historical antecedents.' 9 ° Even though generally speaking the demand for
Islamic banking in Malaysia is closely related to Islamic resurgence, a closer study
of the establishment of Tabung Haji would reveal that the idea of an Islamic finan-
cial institution for the Muslims in Malaysia has been conceived in 1959 ten years
before contemporary Islamic awareness even began in Malaysia.
It may be worth noting that the establishment of Tabung Haji was proposed
primarily on economic grounds by an economics lecturer, Ungku Abdul Aziz from
the University of Malaya as a result of his research' 9 ' on the Malay-Muslim popu-
lation living in the rural economy in the 1950s.
The study by Ungku Aziz revealed two important facts about the saving be-
haviour of the Muslims. Firstly, their biggest single motive for savings was for
the purpose of the hajj or the pilgrimage to Makkah. Secondly, such savings
were made through uninstitutionalized and traditional methods of savings mainly
to avoid nba in the interest-based banks.' 92 Ungku Aziz was concerned by the
substantial amount of money being hoarded and laying idle outside the financial
framework as well as the economic plight of some pilgrims who returned to nothing
after having sold all their possessions to perform the hajj. To provide a remedy
to the situation, Ungku Aziz presented a memorandum to the government in 1959
entitled "A Plan to improve the Economic Position of Future Pilgrims." In this
Ariff 1989:2
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paper Ungku Aziz suggested that since the savings facilities in the interest-based
banks were unacceptable a solution that could mobilize the savings of the Muslim
population for productive use would be to establish a financial institution which
would involve profits instead of interest.
The need for an interest-free financial institution was further emphasized in
another study by Chou' 93 which revealed that less than five per cent of the Muslim
majority states of Kedah, Perils, Kelantan and Trengganu had any form of deposit
account with the banking system.
As a consequence of these findings and the endorsement of Ungku Aziz's Plan
from the point of Shariah by Sheikh Mahmud Shaltout, the Rector of Al-Azhar
University Eygpt the Pilgrims Savings Corporation was set up through an Act of
Parliament in 1962. The Corporation began its operations in November 1963 to
receive savings from Muslims and then to utilize these funds in Shariah permitted
investments for profits. Six years later the Corporation was expanded under a
new name, "Tabung Haji" or the Pilgrims Management and Fund Board to serve
not only as an interest-free savings institution for intending pilgrims but also as a
service organization that would manage the affairs of Malaysian pilgrims.
As a non-bank financial institution the role of Tabung Haji has been rather
limited and its operations lay outside the boundaries of commercial banking. This
implied that the establishment of Islamic commercial banks would not impede
the growth of Tabung Haji nor cause a major drain in its deposits. As an in-
stitution which serves special functions for pilgrimage it was envisaged that the
savings facilities at Tabung Haji would continue to attract long-term savings for
the purpose of pilgrimage. Nonetheless, the needs of the Muslim population for
Command Paper No 22,1962:7.
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interest-free transactionary deposit facilities and Islamic modes of financing could
oniy be fulfilled by a full-fledged Islamic bank.
In summary it was the success of Tabung Haji, the public demand for Islamic
banking and most importantly the favourable political climate that had prompted
the government to fully support the establishment of an Islamic bank in Malaysia.
UMNO had the political will to embark on such a project, the constitutional power
to legislate it and the resources (with the large increase in oil revenue in 1980) to
provide financial support in terms of share ownership.
As expected, the support given by UMNO to the Islamic banking project
did not go uncriticized. Sceptics saw that the Islamic banking scheme had been
"designed to introduce non-nba alternatives as a marginal operation so that the
demands for total change in the economic system [could] be thwarted "194 To both
ABIM and PAS the scheme, in fact the whole concept of Islamization pursued by
the government, did not reflect a genuine commitment to Islam as a complete way
of life. Since the Islamic bank should exist in an interest-based financial system,
ABIM saw it "as a form of patchwork within a system alien to Islam"° 5 . Similarly,
PAS rejected the scheme which it viewed "as 'cosmetic Islamization', as a sort of
label stuck onto a system that had nothing to do with Islam" 196 . According to
PAS, Bank Islam was not an Islamic bank, but was merely a 'Halal bank' in view
of its interest-free characteristic •197
In conclusion, whatever the real intentions of the government were in support-
ing the Islamic banking scheme it cannot be denied that the political climate has
194 Islamic Finance, July 1982:56.
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played a major role in leading to the birth of Bank Islam.
6.3 The Framework of Bank Islam
When the National Steering Committee on Islamic Banking (henceforth re-
ferred to as the Steering Committee) submitted its report on 5 July 1981 it outlined
the framework of Bank Islam into three major aspects namely (a) the legal and
regulatory framework (b) the organizational framework and (c) the operational
framework. Since all the recommendations of the Committee were accepted by the
government, our discussion wifi also follow along these lines and will draw heavily
on the proposals and the recommendations of the Committee.
6.4 The Legal and Regulatory Framework
The essential prerequisite for the establishment of an Islamic bank in Malaysia
was a legal framework which would enable the bank to operate on the principles of
the Shariah. The existing Banking Act 1973 did not fit the needs of Islamic banking
because it required all banks in Malaysia to operate exclusively through interest
and at the same time prohibited all forms of trading in the banking operations
(Banking Act 1973, Section 31). A new Act which conformed to the principles
of Islamic banking was therefore necessary. Upon the recommendation of the
Committee, an Act modeled on the Banking Act 1973, was legislated and passed
in 1983 known as the Islamic Banking Act 1983.
6.4.1 The Islamic Banking Act 1983
The details of the Act are shown in Appendix A. Basically, the Act draws spe-
cial provisions which would enable the formation of Islamic banks in Malaysia and
allow these banks to operate on the principles of Shariah. The normal practices
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of prudent banking contained in the Banking Act 1973 are stifi retained. As in
the case with other commercial banks in Malaysia the Islamic banks would also be
subjected to the supervision and the regulations by the Central Bank. The essen-
tial differences are the additional Islamic supervision by a Religious Supervisory
Council and specific liquidity requirements which apply oniy to the Islamic banks.
As shown in Appendix A the Act is divided into sixty sections which are grouped
into eight parts which can be summarized as follows:-'98
Part I gives the title of the Act, its commencement and application through-
out Malaysia. The interpretation of terms pertaining to the operations of the
Islamic banks are also defined here.
Part II underlines the requirements of the licensing of Islamic banks in Malaysia.
There are two important provisions here;
(i) The Islamic bank should be incorporated as a licensed public limited
company under the Companies Act 1965.
(ii) The operations of the Islamic bank must be supervised by a Religious
Supervisory Council to ensure compliance with the Shariah.
Part III underlines the financial requirements and duties of the Islamic bank.
The Bank is required to maintain as reserves certain percentages of its cap-
ital funds, reserve funds and liquid assets as determined or approved by the
Central Bank. It is also obliged to provide the Central Bank with information,
bank statements and statistics about its annual financial situation and banking
operations.
198 Ismail 1983:57.
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Part IV deals with the ownership, control and management of Islamic banks.
Part V relates to the restrictions which the Bank is obliged to observe in its
business.
Part VI outlines the powers of supervision and control vested to the Central
Bank over the Islamic banks such as to investigate and examine the books of
the banks, documents or the accounts of any individual customer under the
conditions of secrecy.
Part VII provides for miscellaneous matters such as indemnity, the priority of
savings account liability, the penalties on directors and managers; the prohibi-
tion of the receipt of commission by the Bank's staff and the application of the
other laws in the Companies Act 1965 which do not contradict the provisions
in the Islamic Banking Act 1983.
Part VIII contains provisions for certain consequential amendments that need
to be made to the Companies Act 1965, the Banking Act 1973, the Finance
Companies Act 1969 and the Central Bank of Malaysia Ordinance 1958 in order
to enable the Islamic Bank to carry on its operations
In relation to provision (i) in Part II above, which requires the establishment of
the Islamic bank as a public limited company it may be worth noting that within
the Malaysian legal environment, a bank can also be established as a statutory
body. However, it was felt that the establishment of an Islamic bank as a private
business concern would be more viable. This was because the bank would be in
a better position to conduct its business if it was given the same autonomy as
the other interest-based banks, without being constrained by the regulations that
were normally imposed on statutory bodies. It was also argued that although
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some of the corporate objectives of the bank pertained to the social and spiritual
well-beings of society the bank should be a business concern which, in the final
analysis, had to depend on factors such as business viability and performance for
its survival. Based on the opinion that profits were acceptable in islam and that in
Islam the concepts of viability and profitabffity as a basis for all business dealiogs
did not contradict the Shariah the establishment of the bank as a public limited
company would be more in line with the concept and the philosophy of an Islamic
bank.
Besides being an interest-free bank, the supervision of the Islamic bank by an
additional body called the Religious or Shariah Supervisory Council further differ-
entiates the Islamic bank from its interest-based counterparts. The importance of
the religious advisory committee is to supervise the operations of the Islamic bank
in respect of their compliance with the Shariah. As emphasized in Part II 5(b) of
the Islamic Banking Act;
"The Central Bank shall not recommend the grant of a license, and the Minister
shall not grant a license unless... there is in the articles of association of the bank
concerned, provision for the establishment of a Shariah advisory body to advise
the bank on the operations of its banking business in order to ensure that they do
not involve any element which is not approved by the Religion of Islam"
The Steering Committee recommended that the presence of a Religious Super-
visory Council was vital because the Bank, in the course of its operation, was likely
to meet with problems in determining the legality of certain proposed activities
from the standpoint of Shariah. To instil public confidence in the Islamic legality
of the Bank operations, it was also felt that members of the Religious Supervisory
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Council should comprise Muslim religious scholars in the country and that mem
bership should be a minimum of three and a maximum of seven. Decisions by
the council should be based on Islamic consensus (ijma and not on the basis of
majority; and that the Bank auditors were required to ensure that those decisions
were adhered to by the Bank.
The provisions in Part III requires Bank Islam to fulfil certain statutory reserve
and liquidity requirements set by the Central Bank. There are two rthnimum
liquidity ratio requirements which Bank Islam has to comply.
(i) the primary liquidity ratio of 10 per cent which is expressed as a ratio of
total liquid assets to total deposits excluding the investment account liabilities.
(ii) the secondary liquidity ratio of 5 per cent which is expressed as a ratio of
liquid assets to investment account liabilities.
The minimum liquidity requirement for the second ratio is relatively lower
because the liability of investment deposits are not fully guaranteed by the B&uk
under rnudarabah.
With the enactment of the Islamic Banking Act 1983 it is apparent that the
Malaysian government has no intention of Islamizing the entire financial system as
in Iran and Pakistan. By making the necessary amendments to the Banking Act
of 1973 Islamic banking has been given a status equal to that of the interest-based
system. Both systems are expected to operate parallel to each other under the
supervision of the Central Bank. The survival of the interest-based system was
assured by the Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir Mohammad "who once remarked that
the new bank was not going to hurt anybody but it would definitely please those
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who did not use the services of interest-based banks on the grounds of religion"99.
6.4.2 The Government Investment Act 1983
As shown in Chapter V the early 1980s coincided with the period of financial
deepening in the development of the Malaysian financial system. New financial
instruments such as the BAs and NCDs have been introduced to facilitate trans-
actions in the money market. Hence when the Islamic banking proposal was made
the Steering Committee also took into account the need to create an Islamic fi-
nancial instrument for the secondary market. This led to the enacment of the the
Government Investment Act 1983200 which authorizes the Central Bank to issue
profit-bearing government bonds which give returns in the form of dividends rather
than interest. These bonds are called the Malaysian Government Investment Cer-
tificates (MGIC) with maturity periods of one year or more and can be bought in
the multiples of M$lO,000 Since these certificates are money market instruments,
their transactions are not restricted to the Islamic bank but are open for purchase
by other financial institutions in the market.
Another distinct characteristic of the MGIC is that even though it is called
an investment certificate, in principle it operates on the basis of Qard al Has an
or benevolent loan. This is because the repayment of the principal is guaranteed
upon maturity and the payments of dividends are not based on the principle of
profit and loss sharing. Instead the rates of dividend are determined according to
the absolute discretion of the Ministry of Finance, and hence the dividends paid
can be regarded as hiba, a gift or an incentive in return for the benevolent loan.
199 Huq 1986:10.
200 Details of the Act is shown in Appendix B.
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In summary, the legislation of the above two Acts has enable the Central Bank
to initiate and supervise the development of Islamic banking in Malaysia. The
first Act provided the necessary amendments to the existing banking regulations
to allow Islamic banks to operate without interest and also to engage in trade and
commerce which was initially prohibited in the banking system. The second Act,
on the other hand, has helped the Islamic bank to meet its liquidity requirement in
terms of its liquid asset holdings. As these certificates are regarded as liquid assets
and are transferable they serve as a means for the Islamic bank to comply with
the liquidity requirements prescribed by the Central Bank. At the same time this
Act provides a solution to the problem of interest-free short-term investments by
the Islamic bank for its surplus funds, a problem which is common to all Islamic
banks in the absence of the Islamic money market today.
6.5 The Organizational Framework
According to the Steering Committee on Islamic Banking the organizational
structure of the Islamic bank must essentially reflect its corporate objectives and
primary functions. At the same time flexibility should also be given to the man-
agement of the bank in making suitable changes to the existing structure at any
one time, depending on the stage of development and emerging needs.
At the outset, the primary objective of Bank Islam is
to conduct all business of the company.. .in accordance with Islamic principles, rules and
practices.201.
Following this, its corporate objective is
201 Ismail 1983:55.
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to operate as a commercial bank functioning on the basis of Islamic principles, providing
banking facilities and services to Muslims and the whole population of this country, with viability
and capability to sustain itself and grow in the process.202
6.5.1 Organizational Structure
In order to achieve the above objectives, the organizational structure of Bank
Islam has been set up as shown in Appendix C. This structure reflects the initial
conceptualization of the possible activities of the bank and has been viewed by the
bank management as a dynamic set-up capable of being modified and improved in
the light of actual experience.203
With reference to Appendix C. the organizational structure of Bank Islam can
be divided into two separate sections according to function. On the one end are
three Divisions which perform the line functions of (a) Retail Banking, (b) Trade
Finance and Treasury and (c) Corporate Banking. At the other end are three
other Divisions with staff functions of (a) Human Resources, (b) Accounts and (c)
Legal and Secretarial. Each division is in turn divided into departments which are
further divided into units as deemed necessary.
A significant feature of the structure pertaining to the line functions is that
the trade finance functions were deliberately separated from the ordinary retail
banking business. The main purpose is to strengthen the capability of the Bank
in providing trade finance services which are usually short-term in nature as part
of its effort in finding short-term investments for its surplus funds.
At the apex of the organization are the Board of Directors comprising the
202 Ismail op.cit:58.
203 Ismail ibid.
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nominees of the bank's major shareholders who are elected at the Annual General
Meetings. The Managing Director and the Internal Auditor report directly to the
Board while the Shariah Supervisory Council advises the Board on all areas of
operation related to the Islamic rulings.
The management of the bank is spearheaded by a Management Committee
consisting of the Managing Director and the Senior General Manager and the
general managers of the Divisions.
6.5.2 Branch Network
In relation to its corporate objective of providing Islamic banking services
across the country Bank Islam needs a network of branches in all areas partic-
ularly where the population is predominantly Muslim and where the need for
Islamic banking is apparent. The Steering Committee recommended that Bank
Islam would be in a better position to reach its potential customers through its
branch network if it is given a monopolistic position during the first ten years of its
operations204 . This means no license would be issued for the establishment of other
Islamic banks until 1993. With this ten-year monopoly status, the bank manage-
ment has drawn up plans to open three to four new branches per year subject to
the approval of the authorities until it reaches its tenth year of operations in 1993.
During its first year of operation (July 1983-June 1984) Bank Islam was given the
permission to open four branches. By June 1991 its network of 29 branches has
reached the capital towns in all the states and the bank is now concentrating on
establishing its branches in the smaller towns.
204 Steering Committee Report: 40-41.
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6.5.3 Subsidiary Companies
Bank Islam has formed the following three subsidiary companies with special
functions namely to facilitate in its financing and investment activities.
1. The Al-Wakalah Nominees Sendirian Berhad which is owned wholly by Bank
Islam. Its function is to provide portfolio management and nominee services
for the bank and its customers.
2. The in-house leasing company, Syarikat A1-Ijarah Sendirian Berhad which is
also owned wholly by the bank. Its principal activity is to acquire and lease
fixed assets to the bank.
3. The Syarikat Takaful Malaysia Sendirian Berhad, an 87 per cent owned sub-
sidiary which is mainly engaged in the takaful or Islamic insurance business.
The paid-up capital for these subsidiaries is obtained from the shareholders'
funds of the bank.
6.6 Operational Framework
As a commercial bank the basic function of Bank Islam is that of a financial
intermediary which accepts deposits from the public and invests them for the
purpose of profits. Generally the operational framework of Bank Islam is similar
with other Islamic banks in terms of the mobilization and utilization of deposits.
Its funds are derived from its shareholders as well as from its depositors.
6.6.1 Sources of Funds
Almost the whole of the bank's funds are obtained internally from its share-
holders and depositors. These two types of funds are managed separately by the
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Treasury Department of the bank.
6.6.1.1 Shareholders' Funds
The main component of the shareholders' funds on the credit side of the bank's
balance sheet is its paid up capital contributed by its shareholders.
When Bank Islam was incorporated its authorized capital was declared at
M$500 million divided into 500 million ordinary shares of M$1 each. Its initial
paid-up capital was recommended at M$i00 million by the Steering Committee;
which would place Bank Islam among the top five domestic banks in Malaysia in
terms of capital and reserves based on the 1981 figures. The recommendations for
a sizable paid-up capital was based on two premises.
First, a sizable capital would reflect the strength and the stability of the Bank;
two important factors that would attract deposits either for investment or trans-
actionary purposes. Second, the absence of interest on the current and savings
accounts in Islamic banking would mean that the cost of funds in these accounts
must be adequately covered by capital and reserves. On this argument, the larger
the amount of the bank's capital, the larger the deposits it can accept in the form
of these accounts.
The recommendations of the Steering Committee were not fully accepted be-
cause when Bank Islam started its operations its initial paid-up capital was M$80
million which was M$20 million less than the amount recommended by the Steering
Committee.
With regards to its shareholders it was recommended by the Committee that it
would be wise if the participation in the paid-up capital of the bank in the initial
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stage was not offered to the public in view of the uncertainties and challenge
that the bank was likely to face in its pioneer stage of developments. Instead it
was suggested that the initial shareholders should include only the Government
of Malaysia which would hold the largest amount of shares, Tabung Haji, other
Islamic statutory bodies and qualified enterprises in the public and private sectors.
The purpose of granting the biggest proportion of shares to the government was
to promote public confidence in the bank and also because of the large amount of
initial paid-up capital proposed of, which only the government was in a position
to buy a large share. It was planned, nevertheless, to list the bank on the stock
exchange at a later stage, when it had developed into a successful and profitable
institution. 205 Hence when Bank Islam was incorporated on 1st July 1983 its list
of shareholders were as follows:
Table 6.1 - Shareholders of Bank Islam as at 31 December 1989
Shareholders
Ministry of Finance
Tabung Haji
PERKIM
State Religious Council
State Religious Agencies
Federal Agencies
Total
M$ million I %
30	 37.5
10	 12.5
5	 6.25
20	 25.0
3	 3.75
12	 15.0
80	 100
Between March 1990 and January 1992 several capital restructuring exercises
205 Steering Committee Report ibid:21.
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were undertaken by Bank Islam to increase its paid-up capital in order to accom-
modate for the growth of its assets and also to prepare for future expansion.
In March 1990, the federal government stake of M$30 million was reduced to
M$16 million (20%) when an investment company JAMI (joint Arab-Malaysian
Investment) 2°° bought 17.5% (M$14 million) of the government stake.
The first injection of fresh capital began in April 1990 with the issue of 197,000
new ordinary shares at M$1.05 each to eligible employees of Bank Islam under the
Employees' Share Option Scheme (ESOS). Following the issue the paid-up capital
increased to M$80.07 million.
Further new share issues and capital restructuring were made in 1991 to pave
the way for the public listing of Bank Islam on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange
(KLSE). These include:
1. the new issue of 116,500 shares of M$1.00 each at par under ESOS.
2. the issue of one special share of M$1.00 to the Minister of Finance on behalf
of the Malaysian government.
3. the issue of 3.6 mfflion shares at M$1.00 each to acquire 36.15 per cent equity
from minority shareholders in the Islamic insurance subsidiary company. On
the basis that one new Bank Islam share was to be issued for every one share
of the subsidiary company held, Bank Islam ownership over the subsidiary was
increased from 51 per cent in 1983 to 87.15 per cent.
206 A consortium owned by the SAAR Corporation, Dallah Al-Baraka Group and A1-R.ajhi Banking
and Investment Corporation.
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4. a rights issue involving 27.8 million of new shares at M$1.50 per share.
5. a public issue of 18.2 million new shares of M$i.00 each at M$2.00 per share;
of which 1.6 million have been allocated to eligible employees and directors
of Bank Islam and the remaining 16.7 million to the Malaysian public. In
conjunction with the public issue the paid-up capital of Bank Islam was listed
on the KLSE on 17 January 1992.
Hence as a result of these new share issues the paid up capital of Bank Islam
was increased to M$133.4 million with a new capital structure as shown in Table
6.2.
Table 6.2
	 Bank Islam: Capital Structure as at 30 January 1992
No. of
Initial share capital
ESOS (extension)
Special Issue(Minister of Finance)
Acquisition of Insurance Subsidiar
Rights Issue
ESOS(new shares)
Public Issue
Total Share Capital
79,900,000
2,654,500
1
3,615,000
27,894,500
116,500
18,228,000
133,408,501
Source:Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad
With the capital restructuring scheme the Malaysian government share own-
ership has been further reduced to 15.9 per cent. Nevertheless it still remains the
major shareholder, followed by JAMI Company (13.8%) and Tabung Haji (10.4%).
On the whole 51 per cent of Bank Islam ownership belong to bumiputera inter-
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ests, as required by the KLSE. The remaining 49 per cent are held by minority
shareholders including 13 per cent from the Middle-East.
Specifically, the additional equity was needed by Bank Islam for three main
reasons; namely
(a) to improve its capital adequacy ratio in order to comply with the Central
Bank's capital adequacy requirement of 8% minimum. As at 31 June 1991 the
capital adequacy ratio of Bank Islam was slightly below 10%. However, the ratio
doubled to 20% after the flotation exercise.
(b) to increase the nominal credit limit to a single customer which the Central
Bank has set at 30% of the shareholders' fund of commercial banks (including
Bank Islam. A bigger shareholders' fund would give the bank a higher credit limit
to a single customer and a greater competitive advantage in the market.
(c) to inject capital into existing and new subsidiaries.
Bank Islam also benefits from the public listing in terms of creating a ready
market for the shares held by its existing shareholders who would be able to buy
and sell the shares in accordance to their preferences. It also allows Bank Islam to
raise additional funds directly from the capital market and have greater flexibility
in its investment in future. The public is also now able to participate directly in
the equity of the bank and a share in its profits.
6.6.1.2 Customers' Deposits
Deposits form the largest source of funds for Bank Islam. At the end of June
1990 deposits from customers accounted for 85.6 per cent of the total liabilities
of Bank Islam as a group. The bank accepts deposits from its customers through
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three types of accounts, namely:-
1. Current Accounts
2. Savings Accounts
3. General Investment Accounts
In addition, deposits are also received under the Special Investment Accounts
from selected clients in the corporate and government sectors.
1. Current Accounts
These accounts are operated in the same way as the current accounts in the con-
ventional banks. Deposits are received on the principle of al-wadiah !,adhamanah
or safe-keeping with guarantee. Under this arrangement Bank Islam accepts de-
posits and guarantees their safe custody and refund on demand. Cheque books are
given to the depositors for the purpose of withdrawals which can be made at any
amount up to the total of credit balances available in the individual's account.
Current accounts are opened, from the point of view of the depositors, to
serve as means of transaction, payment and liquidity. Hence no returns or profits
are expected from the bank. Moreover, permission is granted by the depositors
for Bank Islam to utilize these deposits as its own resources and that all profits
generated would belong to the bank.
In practice however, Bank Islam pays 25 per cent of profits generated from the
use of current account deposits which belongs to its government and institutional
depositors. This is to remain competitive with other commercial banks which pay
interest on the large credit balances of their institutional depositors.
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Any individual or entity wishing to open a current account in Bank Islam has
to abide by certain requirements set by the Rules of the Association of Banks
in Malaysia. Firstly, the applicant is normally required to be introduced by an
acceptable third party who is preferably a customer of the bank. The necessity for
an acceptable introducer is a legal requirement which is followed by all commercial
banks in Malaysia as a matter of prudence. Cases of dishonest use of cheques in
the past have shown that a bank is considered negligent by the court and has to
suffer losses and damages if the account holder involved has not been properly
introduced. 207 . The introducer, however, does not bear any financial liabilities on
behalf of the account holder. A further requirement for opening a current account
is a minimum deposit of M$500 and if the average daily balance is less than M$1000
for a period of six months, which is considered not profitable to the bank, a service
charge of 10 ringgit can be imposed on the depositor and will be debited from his
account.
2. Savings Accounts
As implied by its name the savings account is a deposit account. It serves as
a means for depositors to place their savings in safe-custody at Bank Islam and
earn returns on their deposits at the same time. Deposits for savings accounts are
accepted by Bank Islam on the principle of al-wadiah yadhamanah. As with the
current accounts, these deposits are guaranteed and may be withdrawn on demand.
The Bank is also given permission by the depositors to utilize their deposits. In
principle all profits generated will belong to Bank Islam. Even though the bank
is not liable to distribute these profits it does give some returns to the savings
account depositors from time to time as a form of gift or bonus. The rate at which
207 Phang 1991:95.
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these returns are given is determined by Bank Islam at its absolute discretion. At
present Bank Islam pays 50 per cent of the profits generated from the use of the
savings account deposits to its depositors. Profits are payable half yearly and are
calculated on a minimum monthly balance basis.
A savings account can be opened with a minimum deposit of M$1 and an
introduction is generally not required. Depositors are provided with the Savings
Pass Book in which their credit balances are recorded and this book must be
handed to the Bank when making withdrawals. Other usual services connected
with the savings account are also provided to the depositors.
3. General Investment Accounts
These accounts are provided for investors who are willing to invest their funds
on the principle of mudarabah for various periods of time as specified below:
1 month	 12 months	 36 months
3 months	 15 months	 48 months
6 months	 18 months	 60 months and over
9 months	 24 months
The general account deposits are categorized according to their periods of
maturities. Short-term deposits refer to those not exceeding one year maturity,
medium term deposits are those placed for periods between one to three years
while those which mature after three years belong to the long-term category. By
mudarabah investment account depositors are regarded as the rabb al-mal (owners
of capital) who will bear all financial losses in proportion to the amount of deposits
invested. Bank Islam acts as the mudarib (user of capital) who is responsible of
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investing the deposits in profitable ventures and will share the generated profits
with the depositors at an agreed profit-sharing ratio. At present Bank Islam offers
the distribution of profits in the ratio of 70 to 30 in favour of the depositors.
Under mudarabah, depositors are not allowed to participate in the management
of the invested funds. When a deposit is placed in the general investment account
it is assumed that the depositor contractually agrees with the existing investment
portfolio of the Bank and accepts the fact that not all of the projects in the portfolio
may be generating profits. By this agreement Bank Islam is able to organize the
depositors' funds into a single pooi (as shown in Appendix D) from which they will
be utilized into short-term, medium-term and long-term financing and investments
irrespective of the terms of deposits. Through this method of central-pooling no
project or investment can be individually identified with any individual or groups
of depositors or specifically matched with deposits of certain periods of maturity.
It allows the Bank to regard the financing and investments undertaken as on-going
concerns which can be continuously financed by replacing matured deposits with
the incoming deposits. This implies that long-term investments are not necessarily
financed by long-term deposits. A succession of short or medium term deposits
can be used to fund a long-term investment at different stages of development.
In respect to profit-distribution the principle of mudarabah also dictates that
profits will only be recognized on a real basis, that is when cash is actually received
after an investment venture is completed or "when the legal right to receive it
exists" 208 . The distribution of profits for the investment deposits are explained in
detail in Appendix E. As shown in the accompanying table in Appendix E; the
distribution of profits are based on the monthly average daily balances and weights
208 Hamat 1985:11.
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of ascending order are given in accordance to the periods of maturity. It is logical
that deposits of longer terms of maturity should be paid higher rates of profits.
Bank Islam has set the minimum deposit for the general investment accounts at
M$500. On the maturity of their deposits the depositors are given several options
by Bank Islam. They can either collect both the principle and any profits realized,
collect only the profits and reinvest the principle or reinvest both the principle and
the profits for another specified period. However should the investments made by
the Bank suffer losses the depositors may get part of his principal or none at all
depending on the real amount of loss incurred.
In practice however, Bank Islam exercises prudence to protect the deposits
of all its depositors including the general investment account depositors by cre-
ating and maintaining general provisions for doubtful financing and investments.
These provisions are debited regularly from the gross income derived from the
employment of depositors' funds, following the legal opinion of the Hanafi and
Maliki schools, at certain percentages as determined by the Board of Directors209.
In strict mttdarabah terms these general provisions should be charged against the
profits distributed to the investment account depositors. However on the basis of
prudence and conservatism Bank Islam has adopted the policy of charging these
provisions against the undistributed profits so that the shareholders wifi also share
the burden of losses with the rabb al-ma1210 . By making these provisions the Bank
Islam can avoid violent fluctuations in the rates of profits that it actually pays to
the depositors and will also be able to give some returns to the depositors in the
event of losses.
209 Hamat:15.
210 Hainat ibid:16.
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Moreover profits derived from all investments of customers' deposits are ploughed
back into the central pool to be distributed between the Bank and its depositors.
This practice conforms to the legal opinion of the Shafie School. From the point
of profits and losses this method reduces the likelihood of losses on the part of the
general investment account depositors since high profits in productive sectors can
offset any losses incurred by investments in other areas211.
4. Special Investment Accounts
These accounts are similar to the general investment accounts with the ex-
ception that they are reserved for the corporate customers of the Bank and for
investments from the government. Since deposits received from these groups of
depositors are normally of high net worth they are given special allowances by the
Bank. For instance, the period of maturity and the profitsharing-ratios are indi-
vidually negotiated and if deposits are received on the basis of limited rnudarabah
the depositors may stipulate specific projects or sectors in the economy to which
their funds should be invested by the Bank.
6.6.2 Application of Funds
As mentioned in the previous section all the funds received by the bank from
its shareholders, and its corporate, government and ordinary customers are placed
together in a central pooi. These funds are then divided into two categories namely
the shareholders funds and the customers' deposits. From here the funds will be
disbursed into various forms of financing and investments as permitted by the
Shariah to generate profit. Basically, the funds from the customers' deposits in
each branch are utilized by the branches themselves to extend financing facilities to
211 Committee Report:29.
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its depositors. The financing activities of the branches rest under the management
of the Treasury Department at the Head Office.
Broadly speaking the financing activities of Bank Islam fall into the following
three main categories;
1. Equity or project financing
2. Term financing
3. Trade financing
The financing facilities are provided to depositors, either individuals or entities,
that fulfill the terms and conditions of each type of financing. Generally an eligible
applicant must have an account at the bank for a minimum period of six months
before application. He must also be a person of good integrity and of sound mind.
An eligible entity or a company, on the other hand, is generally required to have
opened an account at Bank Islam for at least one year and its business must be
lawful from the point of Shariah.
6.6.2.1 Project/ Equity Financing
Equity financing refers to the provision of capital by the bank to individuais
or entities for the purpose of funding potentially profitable projects either by the
principle of mudarabah or mush arakah. Both methods of project financing are
available at Bank Islam as shall be explained below.
(a) Mudarabah Financing
These are short and medium term financing of twenty-four months or less,
though in practice short-term financing of 1 year is preferred by the bank. Mu-
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darabah financing may arise, for instance, when a customer (referred to as the
contractor) needs an advance to meet his working capital requirements to finance
a specific tender from the government or from a well-established company. The
bank may grant the contractor 100 per cent financing and have a share in the prof-
its realized under the terms of rnudarabah. Nevertheless, the contractor must first
satisfy the normal eligibility requirements of the bank and must show evidence of
his ability to undertake and complete the tendered project without dispute. The
feasibility of the project to be undertaken will also be scrutinized.
To appraise the ability of the contractor Bank Islam undertakes a credit anal-
ysis which will consider the following factors;
i) the capacity to borrow - This is to ensure that the applicant has been vested
the power to borrow, in the case of a limited company by the Board of Directors
or by all partners of a partnership.
ii) character/integrity - Since 100% financing is to be provided by the bank,
the character of the contractor is the most important criteria in determining the
extension of the mudarabah facility. Character, in this context, refers to the deter-
mination to pay and the bank branch is required to investigate every aspect of the
contractor's character. This may be done by seeking character references from rel-
evant parties regarding the contractor's habits, lifestyle, his associates and record
of honest dealings. His/her past credit records are also consulted from the con-
tractor's other bankers by making bank enquiries. Bank Islam must be convinced
that the contractor wifi be determine to work hard and complete his contract to
his best effort even in adverse condition.
iii) capacity to generate income - If the contractor has a business firm, his
219
ability can be assessed from the financial and non-financial aspects of the firm.
The capacity of the firm to generate income from the financial aspect would be
reflected by its liquidity and profitability. The non-financial capacity of the firm to
generate income, on the other hand, may be assessed by examining the quality of
management, selling prices, costs and expenses, the quality of product and services,
the availability of raw material and the effectiveness of its labour force.
When the bank is satisfied with the eligibility of the contractor a deed of
assignment between Bank Islam and the contractors would be completed. The
deed outlines the details of the rnudarabah financing facility. These would include
the profit sharing ratio mutually agreed between the two parties. This ratio can
be 30:70, 40:60 or any other ratios negotiated. The deed also serves as security
for repayment of the facility to the bank whereby the contractor agrees that all
payments for work done in the project will be paid directly by the third party (the
contractee) to the bank. The principal sum of the mudarabah Inancing facility
will be deducted by the bank and any excess sum will be distributed between the
bank and the contractor according to the agreed ratio. If proceeds are paid in the
form of progress payment based on goods and services delivered, the agreed ratio
of profit sharing is taken out each time the progress payment is received from the
third party and the rest goes to the bank as repayment for the financing facility.
In this way the m'adarabah contract automatically dissolves upon full payment by
the third party.
The deed of assignment is then sent to the third party and when receipt is
acknowledged, the amount of rnudarabah funds to be disbursed by Bank Islam to
the contractor will be credited to the contractor's account or paid directly to the
suppliers of input.
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(b) Musharakah Financing
In contrast to mudarabah financing where full financing is provided by Bank
Islam mush arakah financing involves capital contribution by both the bank and
its prospective partner or partners. Both parties have the rights to participate in
the day to day running and the management of the partnership or sharikat. The
profits of the sharikat will be distributed according to a mutually agreed ratio and
losses will also be shared in proportion to each party's capital contribution.
At Bank Islam mush arakah financing can be granted under two arrangements:-
1. On the basis of partnership.
This can be carried out through a joint-account between the bank and its
partner(s) without forming any separate legal entity or through the formation of
a registered partnership firm. This form of musharakah financing is easier and less
costly to initiate but it imposes high risks on both parties in the sense that there
is unlimited liability. For this reason Bank Islam is generally willing to finance
only short-term projects which do not exceed 12 months under this method. In
accordance to its policy of prudence and conservatism the Bank extends this form
of musharakah financing only to its well-known customers who possess good credit
worthiness and integrity and also to selected established companies or government
corporations with good track records.
2. Through the incorporation of a joint-venture limited company (under the
Companies Act 1965).
In this form of musharakah financing the bank and the other capital contribu-
tors become the shareholders of the company with limited liability. Except for its
221
high cost of incorporation this method has many advantages. It is suitable for long
term ventures (of more than one year) or for projects with long gestation periods
because the company can exist indefinitely. Since the company is a separate legal
entity the bank can also finance projects which require high initial overhead costs
or which need minimum direct supervision and control without running the risk of
subjecting its assets to the claims of creditors. For areas in which the bank lacks
expertise or prefers non-participation the management of the company can be del-
egated to a third party while supervision and control can be effectively exercised
by the bank through the appointment of representative(s) to the Board of Direc-
tors or management team. Among the types of joint-venture companies that Bank
Islam is willing to became a shareholder are those which deals in property and real
estates, printing, stationery and publication because these businesses conform to
the objectives of the bank's corporate taxation policy.
One of the essential aspects of musharakah financing pertains to the form and
the ratio of capital contribution involved. Under mush arakah the capital contri-
butions can be in the form of cash or valuable assets. At Bank Islam capital
contribution in the form of assets are normally accepted for musharakah financing
under the joint-venture limited company arrangement.
The most common forms of capital assets accepted by the bank are land, prop-
erties, plant and machinery and equipments. For example a partner can contribute
his land as capital for a housing development joint-venture with the Bank in return
for shares of the company issued under his name.
The capital contribution ratio on the other hand can either be on a 50:50,
60:40, 20:80 or any other ratios depending on the credit standing of the Bank's
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partner(s), the degree of risk or control that the bank is willing to undertake as
well as the nature of financing required by the partner(s). In the case of bridging
finance, for instance, the bank's ratio may be smaller since the partner will be
able to improve his cash flow when progress payments for the project are received.
However if the bank wishes to have control on the joint-venture then a larger ratio
which represents more than 50 per cent capital contribution by the Bank would
be more appropriate.
The determination of profits and the profit sharing ratio for musharakah fi-
nancing at Bank Islam will also depend on the entity of the sharikat. For the
partnership the amount of profit realized can be known periodically from its au-
dited Profit and Loss Account at the end of its financial year. In cases where the
value of goods sold can be quantified in terms of sale proceeds and costs at the
point of sale profits can be determined at on an ad-hoc basis and distributed at the
time of sale of each unit of goods. As for the limited company its audited accounts
are normally known several months after the end of its financial year. However if
profits can be recognized at the point of sale, (after the sale of housing units for
example) profits can be distributed immediately.
The profit-sharing ratio between the Bank and its partner(s) is determined at
the time of agreement. It wifi depend on several factors such as the capital con-
tribution ratio whereby the highest contributor would obviously want the highest
share of profits, the extent of management to be undertaken by each partner, the
Bank's cost of funds and the Bank's lending guidelines. While the profit-sharing
ratio is applicable to short-term ventures and to the partnership it may not be
suitable for long-term project financing under the limited company arrangement
since it would be difficult to determine profits at intervals. For such projects a
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dividend policy is adopted by the Bank whereby part of high profits at any one
time can be retained to provide for attractive annual dividends in the future.
There are two types of musharakah financing which the bank can undertake
with its partner(s). The first is the ordinary musharakah by which both parties
share the ownership of the venture until it is completed. The other takes the form
of mush arakah ending with single ownership where ownership changes gradually to
rest finally in the hands of one party as pre-agreed. In both types the liquidation of
the Bank's capital contribution can be settled upon the completion of the project
or it may be progressively reduced if the project income is received in terms of
progress payments or when units of goods produced are sold.
By the reduction method; in the case of a partnership the Bank's contribu-
tion may be reduced at a progressive rate on a redemption basis. Hence when
income is received each time the Bank's capital contribution and profit portion is
reduced. For a joint-venture limited company a payment schedule may be negoti-
ated in which the Bank's share in the company will be transferred at intervals to
its partner(s) so that the Bank's shareholding will be zero at the end of the project
period.
6.6.2.2 Term Financing
Besides project financing the customers' deposits are also utilized to provide
medium and long-term financing to eligible depositors who wish to acquire fixed
assets or use the services of assets over a certain period of time. The funds are also
employed for the provision of short-term financing to deserving depositors. The
main Shariah modes of financing employed by Bank Islam for term financing are
Al-Bai Bithaman Ajil (Deferred Sale), Al-Ijarah (Leasing) and Al-Qardhul Hasan
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(Benevolent Loan).
(a) Al-Bai Bithaman Ajil
This is a deferred sale contract by which an individual can buy fixed assets
from the bank at an agreed price which will be settled at a deferred date either by
a lump sum or by instalments.
Al-Bai Bitharnan Ajil involves a two step procedure on the part of the bank.
The bank will first purchase the asset required by its client. Following this it will
sell the asset to the client at an agreed price which would comprise the cost price
of the asset and the bank's margin of profit.
At Bank Islam this facility is normally extended for the purpose of acquiring
land, new houses, existing houses and shares. The maximum terms of financing
also vary in accordance to the asset type; involving twenty years for houses, fifteen
years for 'shophouses'and ten years for land. In some cases the duration would be
determined by the age factor by which payments have to be settled by the time
the client reaches the retirement age of fifty five.
To be eligible for financing the client is required to open an account at Bank
Islam preferably six months before application. If repayments are to be made by
installments the average monthly credit balance in the account should be sufficient
to cover the estimated monthly instalments. A deposit equivalent to the amount
of six months installments is also required for long term financing which exceeds
five years. The net disposable income of the borrower should also be adequate to
pay the monthly installments to avoid undue hardship. A collateral is also needed
to ensure that the Bank can fully recover any outstanding amount of the facility
in cases of default.
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As at 31st January 1991, the rates of profit margin for financing taken by
individual customers are set at a flat rate of 8 per cent per year for land, 'shop-
houses' and other purposes such as buying shares. For houses the rates vary in
accordance to the cost price of the houses paid by the Bank as shown in Table 6.3.
Table 6.3 - Rates of Profit Margin on al-Bai Bithamin Ajil as at
31.1.1991
Asset	 Cost-price 3ank's Profit Margin
% per annum
House	 < 25,000	 6
25,000-99,000	 7
_________ ^ 1000,000	 8
Land
Shophouse independent	 8
Others	 of price
Source:BIMB data, compiled by the author.
The profit margin for clients in the corporate sectors are determined in accor-
dance to the competitive rates expected in the market.
Until 1990 the repayment schedules for installments were based on the 'sum
of year's digits' (SOD) technique. However this method of repayment proves
unfair to customers if they wish to redeem their assets after the first few years of
the financing period. This is because the rate of repayments decreases (as shown
in Appendix F) towards the end of the period which implies that the cost of
redemption would be too high for the customers during the initial years. To avoid
such injustice the Bank has revised the method of repayment to the current rate
226
of returns technique in 1991 by which the rates of repayment remain constant over
the whole instalment period.
(b) Al-Ijarah
Financing under the principle of al-ijarah or leasing is provided by Bank Islam
to customers who wish to use the services of certain assets owned by the Bank at
a rental rate agreed by both parties. Another variant of leasing which Bank Islam
employs is al-Bai ul Takjiri or leasing which ends with ownership (hire-purchase).
Under the normal al-ijarah contract the Bank purchases the asset required by the
customer and leases it to him for a fixed period on a lease rental basis. However
under the latter mode of leasing both parties would agree that at the end of the
rental period the customer will eventually buy the asset from the Bank at an agreed
price with all the previously paid lease rentals considered as part of the purchase
price.
As at 31 January 1991 the main assets leased by Bank Islam are personal
computers for a maximum duration of three years. The customer is also required
to pay a deposit equivalent to the amount of five times the rental instalments which
would cover a month of rental advance, three months security deposit and a month
of prepaid rent for the final month of leasing. The profit margin for the Bank for
the leasing services it provides is set at 7.5 per cent per annum.
(d) Al-Qard al Hasan
Literally speaking, Al-Qard al Hasan are benevolent loans. The provision of
these loans by Islamic banks can be regarded as the discharge of their social respon-
sibility to help the needy. The Qard al Has an scheme at Bank Islam is a new facility
which was recently introduced in 1990 at the request of the National Muslim Trust,
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the Yayasan Pembangunan Ekonomi Islam Malaysia (YPEIM) which deposited an
initial fund of M$250,000 for this purpose. Under this scheme interest-free loans
of up to M$1,000 can be granted to deserving customers whose monthly household
income is M$250 or less. The main purpose of these loan is to finance small eco-
nomic projects capable of increasing the income level of the borrowers. A service
fee is charged to cover the administrative costs in processing each application.
In line with the target of the new National Development Policy of eradicating
hardcore poverty, Bank Islam has also introduced another Qard al Hasan scheme
since early 1992. The scheme is implemented in cooperation with the Amanah
Ikhtiav Malaysia, a national trust which extends interest-free loans to poor house-
holds to enable them to undertake income-generating activities under close super-
vision. The role of Bank Islam in this scheme is to provide further interest-free
loans to successful 'graduates' of the Ikhtiar project as a means to further expand
the economic activities initiated with the help of the national trust at the first
level. The fund for this scheme is derived from the 'retained zakat fund' of the
Bank ( which comprises one-eighth of the total amount of zakat paid annually by
the bank).
Bank Islam also regards its purchases of the interest-free short-term Malaysian
Government Investment Certificates issued under the Investment Act 1983 as
benevolent loans to the government. The funds for these loans are derived from
the shareholders' funds managed by the Treasury Department of the bank.
6.6.2.3 Trade Financing
The trade financing activities at Bank Islam are managed by the Trade Finance
Department. The main users of the trade financing facilities are customers from the
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commercial and business sectors who need short-term financing either to facilitate
trade such as for the purchase and sale or the import and export of goods and
machinery or to acquire working capital in the short-run.
• Letters of Credit
The types of financing that are normally needed to facilitate trade are those
connected to letters of credit. These are instruments used to facilitate payments
to suppliers through the banks. The normal procedure would require the buyer
to place a deposit at the Bank at an amount equivalent to the full price of the
purchased or imported goods. The bank would issue a letter of credit and make
payments to the supplier through a negotiating bank. A fee is charged by the bank
for this service.
Bank Islam uses part of its customers' deposits to provide financing to buyers
to settle their letters of credit. The Bank does this by issuing letters of credit
under the principle of musharakah or murabaha . Under the former arrangement
the Bank and the buyer become partners in the purchase of the goods. Both parties
will make capital contributions to finance the letter of credit which will be issued
by the Bank with payments forwarded to the suppliers through the negotiating
bank. Hence when the goods arrive from the suppliers they will be sold and profits
derived will be shared between the two parties. However if the letter of credit
is issued under the principle of murabaha or mark-up sale the Bank will buy the
goods on behalf of the buyer first by advancing payments to the negotiating bank.
On receipt of the goods, it will sell them to the buyer at an agreed price which will
include the cost of purchase and the mark-up set by the Bank. The buyer pays
the Bank either in full or by installments in the short-run.
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• Working capital Acquisition
This facility is provided for traders or producers who require short-run financ-
ing to acquire working capital in the form of raw materials, spares and replace-
ments, stock and inventories or semi-finished goods. Financing is provided by Bank
Islam under the principle of murabahah.
i). The Bank will appoint the trader or producer as its agent to purchase the
required goods for working capital on its behalf and settles the purchase price from
its own funds.
ii) The goods are subsequently sold to the producer or trader at an agreed price
with a profit margin for the Bank. The trader or producer is allowed to settle this
sale price on a deferred term normally not earlier than 30 days and not later than
200 days.
iii) The agreed sale price is paid by the customer on the due date.
6.6.2.4 Securitization and Debt Trading
To complement the development of new financial instruments in the interest-
based money and capital markets, Bank Islam was allowed to securitize the above
working capital financing under murabahah through the issue of al-dayn debt-
certificates. This facility was introduced by Bank Islam in 1991 with the issue
of a Bill of Exchange known as the Islamic Accepted Bill (lAB) to finance credit
import and export as well as domestic sales.
The JAB is the Islamic version of the Banker's Acceptance (with the exception
of interest) whereby it is drawn by an exporter/supplier and accepted by Bank
Islam or any other bank which is the drawee or acceptor of the lAB.
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The procedures for accepting and repurchase of the lAB can be briefly de-
scribed as follows:-
• Accepting Procedure
i) The exporter presents the export bill to the Bank to arrange for financing
up to the full amount of the value of the exported goods. The Bank will in
turn undertake to collect the proceeds of the export bifi and obtains authoriza-
tion from the exporter to have control over the bill and its proceeds until the
financing has been repaid by the exporter.
ii) An lAB, with a maturity period not longer than 200 days, is drawn by the
exporter and accepted by the Bank. The Bank then purchases the JAB and
credits the proceeds to the account of the exporter.
iii) The Bank would have received the proceeds of the export bill before the
day the lAB matures so that it can discharge the lAB. If the export bill is not
settled by the prescribed date of maturity the Bank may either repurchase the
JAB or obtain other funds from the exporter to settle the discharge of the JAB.
• Repurchase Procedure.
The JAB is traded in the secondary market through repurchase agreements
(Repos). Any financial institution may sell the JABs with a separate agreement
to repurchase them at an agreed price on a specified future date. On the
other hand, it may buy JABs with a separate agreement to resell them at a
specified future date. However the period of the repurchase agreements should
not exceed the maturity date of the lAB and the JAB cannot be sold on a call
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basis. Upon the maturity of the lAB, the holder will present the JAB through
his bank to the accepting bank for payment through the Clearing House.
Bank Islam may also resell the JAB to the Central Bank if the item8 to be
exported meet the list of goods and other guidelines of the Central Bank under its
export-promoting "Export Credit Refinancing Scheme" to take advantage of the
special terms of this scheme.
Following the success of the Cagamas bonds issues, Bank Islam has also com-
peted in the market to lead-manage the issue of Islamic debt certificates by a
leading oil-company. This facility was syndicated among ten participating insti-
tutions with Bank Islam acting as lead manager to provide a deferred-sale al-bai
Bithamin Ajil financing facility to a leading oil company for the purchase of equip-
ment for its local refinery. The financing facility was securitized under the concept
of Bai' al-Dayn (debt trading) whereby the oil company issued a series of promis-
sory notes known as Shahadah al-dayn certificates with amounts and maturity
dates according to the repayment schedules of the financing to the participants
of the syndicate. These notes may be traded in the secondary market under the
repurchase agreements facility.
6.6.2.5 Other Uses of Funds
Excess funds received by the Treasury Department from its branches and a
portion of its shareholders' funds are also used to bridge the funds of any branches
experiencing temporary shortages. When these funds are transferred to the affected
branch they are considered as investment deposits called 12-month Investment
Account Deposits and are recallable on demand. The relevant branch is required
to return the funds when its situation improves, plus the prevalent ratio of profits
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for these deposits for the number of days they are held.
6.6.2.6 Investment
Part of the shareholders' funds and customers' deposits is managed by the
Investment Management Department. These funds were to be utilized in the fol-
lowing types of investment under the inusharakah arrangement.212
1. setting-up wholly-owned subsidiaries
2. taking up equity as a shareholder in unquoted companies
3. purchase of shares in public companies quoted on the KLSE for long-term
investment
4. portfolio investment in shares of public companies quoted on the KLSE. This
investment is managed by the Bank's subsidiary, A1-Wakalah Nominees Sdn
Berhad, that also provide portfolio investment services to its customers for a
fee.
6.6.2.7 Other Banking Operations
The Bank also undertakes fee-based activities such as foreign exchange trans-
action, letter of credit, letter of guarantees, remittances, sale of travellers' cheques,
portfolio management and nominee company services in return for fees and com-
mission. These do not involve the use of the customers' deposits. Other income is
also derived from the fees on returned cheques and on financing and loan process-
ing.
212 Ismail 1992:68
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6.6.2.8 Maintenance of Statutory Reserves and Liquid Assets
Like the other commercial banks in Malaysia Bank Islam is required to fulfil the
statutory reserve and liquidity requirements set by the Central Bank. Hence one
of the important functions of the Treasury Department is to manage the statutory
reserve for the whole Bank by ensuring that each branch complies with the level of
statutory reserves required against its total deposits every fortnight. The statutory
reserve requirement for the whole Bank wifi be placed by the department with the
Central Bank using the funds maintained by all branches.
To fulfil the Central Bank liquidity requirements the Treasury Department is
also responsible to manage the liquid assets for the whole bank as required by the
Central Bank. These liquid assets are held in the form of
(a) Cash-in-till at all branches
(b) Balances with local banks, agent banks and correspondent banks for
clearing, remittances and letter of credit purposes.
(c) Balances with the Central Bank
(d) Malaysian Government Investments Certificates
(e) Other forms of liquid assets allowed by the Central Bank from time to
time.
6.7 Conclusion
This chapter has shown that the favourable political climate has played a major
role in leading to the establishment an Islamic bank in Malaysia. The Malay-led
government had the political wifi to respond to the demands for Islamic bank-
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ing services by Muslims who form the majority of the electorate. In view of the
Malay/Muslim underdevelopment the establishment of the Bank may not have
been possible without the financial support from the government. The operational
framework of the Bank outlines an extensive range of banking services in com-
pliance with the Shariah. These include equity-participation and profitsharing as
recommended in theory, trade-related services based on the markup and the issue
of new financial instruments to keep pace with the current development in the
Malaysian money and capital markets. The extent to which these banking services
have been fully utilized by Bank Islam in the mobilization of deposits and the
allocation of its resources will be examined in the following chapter.
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Chapter VII
The Performance of Bank Islam
7.1 Introduction
Whilst the overall profile of Bank Islam was described in the previous chapter,
the main concern of this chapter is to evaluate the performance of Bank Islam in
terms of its viability as a financial intermediary in the economic sense as well as
its performance as an Islamic bank from the Islamic economic perspective. The
main thrust is to examine the extent to which the Bank has succeeded in offering
an alternative form of banking in a well-established interest-based environment.
As recognized in Chapter V, at the time Bank Islam was introduced in 1983 there
were already 23 locally-incorporated commercial banks and another 15 foreign
banks in the market. In addition specialized development finance institutions were
already serving the financial needs of the Malay/Muslim community to achieve the
restructuring target of the NEP. Our aim therefore is to find out the impact of
Bank Islam in the mobilization of interest-free deposits in such an environment. On
the other hand, given that Bank Islam has been set up specifically as a commercial
bank (as declared in its corporate objective), the main question that arises is
whether the Bank has directed its funds purely to achieve the economic objective
of profits or does its Islamic character differentiate it from the other commercial
banks in the country? This chapter is divided into four main sections. Section 2
will examine the relative position or the market share of Bank Islam within the
domestic banking system. Sections 3 and 4 will study the performance of Bank
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Islam in the execution of its function as a financial intermediary specifically in the
mobilization of deposits and the utilization of funds. Finally an evaluation of the
Bank's financial performance will be undertaken in Section 5.
7.2 Market Share of Bank Islam
In view of its position as the only Islamic bank in Malaysia, the market share
of Bank Islam relative to the other domestic commercial banks in the Malaysian
banking system would be the first indication of its significance to the economy. As
a new corner into the banking system one would not expect the Bank to occupy a
large share of the market. However a growing market share would be a good sign
of its performance and its viability in the 'hostile' environment.
Tables 7.1 and 7.2 show the market shares of Bank Islam in relation to the other
locally incorporated commercial banks in Malaysia in terms of certain indicators
for the years 1984 and 1989213 respectively. A comparison between both tables
reveals that:-
• The growth of its assets over the past eight years has transformed Bank Islam
from being one of the smallest banks in 1984 to a medium-sized bank in 1989.
The assets of Bank Islam were worth M$563 million in 1984. This represented
a negligible 0.8 per cent of the total assets of the domestic commercial banks
in 1984. By 1989, its assets had grown to M$1.7 biffion which expanded its
market share to 2 per cent and placed it as the thirteenth largest commercial
bank joining the ranks of five other banks of similar assets size. This is a
commendable performance in the sense that apart from becoming a medium
sized bank, Bank Islam was also the top bank in its peer group and has also
213 This is the latest data available in the Kuala Lumpur Bankers Directory.
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Table 7.1 - Commercial Banks (locally incorporated): Assets,
Deposits, Shareholders' Funds & Profits as at 31 December 1984
's1$'000)
	Sbareholdcrs'	 Net Prc.tax/Auter
Assets	 Dcposits	 Funds	 Tax + (Profiu/Loss
Name of Institution	 Size	 Ranking	 Size	 Ranking	 Size	 Ranking	 Size	 Ranking
Malaya Banking Berhad'"
Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Berhad
United Malavan Banking Corporation J3crhad
Public Bank Bcrhad
Development and Commercial Bank Ilerhad
United Asian Bank Bcrhad
Perwira Habib Bank Malaysia Berhad
Malayan United Bank Berhad
Kwong Yik Bank Berhad
Hock Hua Bank Berhad
The Pacific Bank Berhad
Southern Bank Berliad
	
22,067,881	 1	 14.066,847	 2	 1,132,053	 1	 121.343+
	
21,102,385	 -	 -
7.494.271
5.811,853
4. 154,t)34
3.543.871
2,346,128
l.544),000
1,341,262
1.313,330
1.073,118
1,050,906
Bank Utama I Malaysia) Bcrhad	 1,026,600	 13	 725.334	 13	 38,163	 17	 6,051 +	 14
Sabah Bank Bcrhad	 844,688	 14	 657,873	 14	 39,590	 15	 1,005	 19
The Oriental Bank	 838,795	 15	 731,953	 12	 38,127	 18	 2,955	 17
Bank of Commerce Berhad
	 762,055	 16	 478,064	 16	 25,348	 21	 1,653	 18
Malaysia French Bank Berhad
	 731,467	 17	 307,380	 18	 46,559	 13	 7,867	 12
Bee Hin Lee Bank Berhad
	 684.315	 18	 472,634	 17	 38,608	 16	 6,404	 13
Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad	 563,429	 19	 241,355	 19	 80,364	 7	 (1,2&)	 21
Hock Hua Bank (Sabah) Berhad	 307,107	 20	 215,348	 21)	 26,213	 20	 8,358	 11
Wah Tat Bank Berhad
	 215,307	 21	 163,812	 21	 13,480	 22	 4,080	 15
Kong Ming Bank Berhad e
	180,217	 22	 154,797	 22	 11,929	 23	 3,096	 16
Bank Buruh (Malaysia) Berhad'	 167,759	 23	 68,868	 23	 28,213	 19	 438	 20
*	 Position as at 31 December 1983.
Position as at 30 June 1984.
Position as at 31 August 1984.
'	 Position as at 30 June 1985.
+	 Including Contra Accounts
SOURCE: Arab-Malaysia Merchant Bank Berhad, The Kuola Luntpur Bankers Director/, 1986.
Bank Islam Malaysia. Annual Report 1984
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Table 7.2 - Commercial Banks(locally incorporated): Assets,
Deposits, Shareholders' Funds & Profits as at 31 December 1989
(M$'OOO)
	
Shareholders'	 Net Pretax/AFter Tax#
Assets^	 Deposits	 Funds	 Proflt/(Loss)
Names of Institutions	 Size	 Ranking	 Size	 Ranking	 Size	 Ranking	 Size	 Ranking
Malayan Banking Bcrhad*** 	 33.533,180	 I	 22,744,892	 1	 1,257,232	 1	 181,884	 1
Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Berhad**	 30,694,305	 2	 20,458,244	 2	 (106,435)A	 22	 (1,044,431)	 23
United Malayan Banking Coiporaxion Berhad	 10.654,565	 3	 6,427,852	 4	 503,846	 3	 25.620	 5
PublicBankBerhad	 9,502,933	 4	 7.179,081	 3	 551.042	 2	 86,026	 2
Development And Commercial Bank Berbad	 6,973,793	 5	 4.321.125	 5	 370,215	 4	 15,697	 9
UnitedAsianBankBerhad*
	 3,964,319	 6	 2,174,563	 6	 74,907	 11	 26.680	 4
PerwiraHabibBankMalaysiaBerhad	 3,114,825	 7	 1,832,168	 8	 (241,221)	 23	 15,626	 10
Kwong Yik Bank Berhad***	 2.743,767	 8	 1,879,883	 7	 133,484	 6	 (9,508)	 22
BankofCommerceBerhad****	 2,727,482	 9	 1,725.975	 10	 105,077	 8	 19,840	 7
Southern Bank Berhad	 2,532,262	 10	 1,674,444	 11	 174,490	 5	 39,026	 3
Malaysian French Bank Berhad	 2,319,099	 11	 1,033,106	 15	 61,679	 I4	 11,767	 12
MtJl Bank Berhad	 2,234,696	 12	 1,732,015	 9	 87,402	 9	 16,051	 8
BanklaIamMa1aysiaBerhad*
	 1,713,878	 13	 1,229,234	 12	 84,680	 10	 11,640	
_J_
HockHuaBankBerhad	 1,524,231	 14	 1,170,806	 13	 109,518	 7	 23,290	 6
Oriental Bank Berhad*	 1,514,905	 15	 921,576	 18	 (10,682)	 21	 5,122	 16
ThePacificBankBezhad	 1,490,983	 16	 970,766	 16	 64,013	 13	 13,574	 11
BanHinLeeBankBerhad	 1,434,645	 17	 1,078,283	 14	 71.268	 12	 5,760	 15
BankUtama(Malaysia)Berhad*	 1,230,210	 18	 970,145	 17	 30,902	 18	 (4,216)	 21
Bank Buruh (Malaysia) Berhad***	 655,265	 19	 429,422	 20	 35,952	 16	 2,602	 20
Sabah Bank Bcrhad*	 629,370	 20	 512,667	 19	 31,828	 17	 8,776	 14
Kong Ming Bank Bethada	 453,924	 21'	 387,572	 21	 16,423	 20	 2,985	 19
Hock Hua Bank (Sabah) Berhad'	 310,294	 22	 226,059	 23	 36,571	 15	 4,654	 17
WahlatBankBerhad	 301,385	 23	 249,692	 22	 18,256	 19	 3,682	 18
+ Including Contra Acenunta
*	 Position as at 31st December, 1988	 ****	 Position as at3lstAugust, 1989
**	 Position as at 31st March, 1989	 A	 Shareholders' funds increased to M$1J76 million by 31.1229.
*	 Position as at 30th June, 1989
SOURCE Arab-Malaysia Mcrchant Bank Berhad. The Kuala Lunipur Bankers Directory, 1990
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surpassed the more established medium-size banks such as the Hock Hua and
Pacific banks which were ranked tenth and eleventh in 1984 but have moved
to lower positions in 1989.
• The most remarkable growth for Bank Islam is its market share of deposits
which expanded from 0.7 per cent of total domestic bank deposits in 1984 to
2.4 per cent in 1989. Bank Islam was ranked nineteenth in 1984 with total
deposits amounting to M$241 million relative to the domestic industry total
of M$35 billion. By 1989, its deposits had risen by almost 400 per cent to
M$1.2 billion. With a greater market share its relative position in the domestic
market had also improved to the middle twelfth position in 1989.
• In terms of its capital base, it is evident that the Bank's shareholders' funds
increased only by 5.3 per cent during the period; from M$80.3 million in 1984
to M$84.7 million in 1989. This rise was mainly generated by the increase in
the Bank's reserves while its paid-up capital remained constant. Because of the
small increase, the Bank's market position, in terms of its shareholders funds,
was relatively lower in 1989 - from seventh in 1984 to tenth in 1989. (However
as described in Chapter VI, the paid-up capital of Bank Islam was increased to
M$133.4 million in January 1992 which was likely to have improved its market
position considerably.)
• In terms of profitability, Bank Islam incurred a pre-tax loss of M$1.3 million
at the end of its first financial year in 1984. However, the Bank was able
to breakeven within a year and earned a profit of M$4.4 million ringgit in
1985. The Bank has in fact been profitable every year since then. In 1989 its
pre-tax profits were recorded at M$9.9 million placing it among the thirteen
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most profitable banks in Malaysia. It is also worth noting that Bank Islam
came into operation at a time when the Malaysian economy was in a recession.
As noted earlier in Chapter V, several shocks have hit the banking system
between 1985 and 1987. The collapse in property prices in 1986 was the biggest
plight which left many commercial banks with large amounts of bad and non-
performing loans. Several banks were rescued from closure by the Central
Bank and a number of finance companies and deposit-taking co-operatives were
taken under receivership. Bank Islam was also reported to have had its share
of non-performing loans; in fact a little more than the other banks in the
beginning of its operations. 214 However, the ability of Bank Islam to survive and
remain profitable despite the unfavourable market environment is a significant
indication of its viability. As can be seen in Table 7.2 the profits of Bank Islam
in 1989 have surpassed that of some of the bigger banks (for example Bank
Bumiputra, Bank Utama and Kwong Yik Bank which suffered losses).
It can be deduced from the above figures that, except for its capital base, the
market shares of Bank Islam have expanded considerably over the first six years
of its operations. Whilst the market share of its assets has increased from 0.8 per
cent in 1984 to 2 per cent in 1989, its market share of deposits has expanded from
0.7 per cent in 1984 to 2.4 per cent in 1989. Obviously, the market share of Bank
Islam is relatively marginal compared with the industry total. Nevertheless it is
also worth noting that many of the other domestic banks are also small in size.
Whilst the largest share of the market is dominated by the two top banks (Malayan
Banking and Bank Bumiputra), which together accounted for 74 per cent of total
assets and 83 per cent of total deposits in 1989, Table 7.2 shows that sixteen banks
214 Malaysiaii Business June 1991:10.
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(69.5% of total domestic banks) had assets which accounted for 3 per cent or less
of the domestic industry total in 1989. Each of these banks also accounted for less
than 4 per cent of total deposits mobilized by the domestic banks. Looking from
this perspective, the market share of Bank Islam is not insignificant compared with
the other small banks.
In summary the 'middle' position of Bank Islam and the growth of its mar-
ket shares are encouraging signs which suggest the potential of Islamic banking
in the Malaysian economy. Nonetheless, the performance of Bank Islam cannot
be evaluated in term of its market share alone. Equally important is to judge its
performance in terms of its growth and functions as a financial institution promot-
ing the novel concept of interest-free banking in a well-established interest-based
market.
It is worth noting that the declared corporate objective of Bank Islam is 'to
operate as an Islamic commercial bank functioning on the basis of Islamic princi-
ples, providing banking and financial facilities and services .... with viability and
capability to sustain itself and grow in the process'216
On the basis of the above objective the aim of the following sections is to
examine the success of Bank Islam in its operation as an Islamic commercial bank
specifically in the mobilization of funds from the surplus units and the disbursement
of these funds through the various methods as described in the previous chapter.
7.3 Mobilization of Deposits
Given the Malaysian environment in which the financial market is being mo-
215 Ismail 1982:58.
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nopolized by interest-based banks and where the population has developed a cer-
tain degree of financial habits, it is pertinent to evaluate the success of Bank Islam
in promoting the concept of interest-free deposits and profit sharing as an alterna-
tive to interest. Among the appropriate performance indicators are the growth and
structure of deposits, the distribution of depositors and the expansion of branch
network.
7.3.1 Growth of Deposits
One way to evaluate the success of Bank Islam in deposit mobilization is to
examine the growth of its deposits. The size and growth of deposits are integral to
any commercial bank since deposits constitute the main source of funds to finance
income-generating financing and investment activities. The expansion and future
development of a commercial bank therefore depends very much on the continuous
growth of its deposits.
Table 7.3 and Figure 7.1 show the size and the growth of total deposits over the
first eight years of Bank Islam's operation. In general the growth of total deposits
has undergone three distinct periods.
The first period, between 1983 and 1985, may be identified as a period of high
deposit growth as indicated by the dramatic rise in deposits by 165 per cent per
annum during the last six months of the first financial year before slowing down
to a high rate of 70 per cent per year at the end of the second financial year.
The second period which lasted between July 1985 and June 1988 represented an
interval of moderate growth as deposits increased between 20 and 43 per cent per
year. The third period, however, showed a time of declining growth when deposits
contracted by 0.7 per cent in 1990 and further down by 3.8 per cent in 1991.
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Table 7.3 - Bank Islam: Total Deposits and Growth Rate 1984-1991
Financial Year	 Total Deposits Annual Growth
(as at 30th June)	 M$ million	 (%)
December 1983	 91.0	 0.0
1984	 241.3	 165.0
1985	 410.2	 70.0
1986	 581.2	 41.7
1987	 833.7	 43.4
1988	 1022.2	 22.6
1989	 1229.2	 20.2
1990	 1220.9	 -0.7
1991	 1175.1	 -3.8
Source: Bank Negara Annual Report 1983, BIMB unpublished data 1984-1987, BIMB Annual
Reports 1988-1991.
The substantial growth of total deposits during the first two years signified
two important points. Firstly, it indicates that there was a positive response from
the public to the setting up of the Islamic bank. Apart from the motivation to
avoid nba amongst pious Muslims, the high response was also instigated by the
high publicity surrounding the establishment of the bank. The official opening of
its first branch by the Prime Minister, (who also became the first account holder)
had effectively promoted public confidence and drew a lot more depositors than
was anticipated. This high confidence was reflected by the fact that more than
2,000 accounts were opened in the first four days of business. The large stream
of depositors suggested that there was indeed a gap in the market for interest-free
banking for Muslims including those who were not necessarily motivated by the
religious factor in the first place.
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Figure 7.1 - Bank Islam: Total Deposits and Annual Growth
(1984-1991)
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Secondly, it can be deduced that the substantial growth of deposits was largely
attributed to the religious motivation rather than the motive to earn. This is based
on the observation that the growth of deposits was not affected by the rates of
interest on deposits offered by the interest-based banks.
As shown in Table 7.4, the rates of interest on conventional bank deposits
were much higher than the rates of profits offered by Bank Islam on its savings
and investment deposits. The interest rates on savings were 7.5 per cent per
annum in 1984 and 1985 compared to the 5 per cent profits on savings offered by
Bank Islam. Similarly the rates of interest on fixed deposits varied between 8 per
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cent and 10.75 per cent per annum whilst the highest rate of profit on investment
deposit was only 7.25 per cent per year during both years. Even though interests
on conventional bank deposits were much higher than the rates of profits offered by
Bank Islam, the flow of deposits into the new bank did not seemed to be affected
by this factor. As mentioned earlier outstanding deposits at the end of the first
financial year stood at M$241 miffion of which M$91 million were mobilized within
the first six months alone. This was followed by a rapid rise of 70 per cent at the
end of the second financial year with total outstanding deposits at M$410 million.
Table 7.4 - Rates of Profit and Average Interest Rates on Deposits,
1984-1985 (% per annum)
Type of Deposit
	
	 Bank Islam Conventional Bank
Dec 1984 Dec 1985 Dec 1984 Dec. 198
Savings	 5.14	 5.18	 7.50	 7.50
	
Investment/Fixed General Investment Fixed 	 Deposit
	
1 month	 5.76	 5.80	 10.00	 10.50
	
3 months	 6.12	 6.17	 10.50	 8.50
	
6 months	 6.48	 6.53	 10.50	 9.00
	
9 months	 6.84	 6.89	 10.50	 9.00
	
12 months	 7.20	 7.25	 10.75	 9.00
Source: Man (1986) Table 4.3 & Table 4.5
It is apparent that a majority of depositors who saved or invested at Bank
Islam between 1983 and 1985 were indifferent towards the higher rates of interest
on deposits at traditional banks. It seems that these depositors were religiously
motivated in that they were willing to earn a lower but legitimate rate of return
on their deposits. The substantial amount of deposits mobilized also suggests that
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considerable amounts of idle funds had been kept outside the financial system prior
to the establishment of Bank Islam. It can therefore be deduced that the rapid
growths in deposits in the first two years tend to be more closely associated with
the religious rather than the rate of return factor.
Table 7.5 - Annual Growth of Deposits by Type 1985-1991
Type of Deposit	 Annual Growth (%)
BANK ISLAM	 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Current	 7.8	 31.6 117.3 54.0 -7.5 51.2 13.0
Savings	 78.0 68.2 45.5 34.3 18.8 17.6 17.0
Investment 1	83.2 40.0 34.0 23.9 25.9 -25.1 -11.5
Total Deposits	 70.0 41.7 43.4 22.6 20.2 -0.7 -3.8
COMMERCIAL BANKS 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Current	 -1.7 -4.4 18.7 13.9 27.2 17.7 10.8
Savings	 12.9 14.7 42.8 15.6 9.5
	 3.7 -2.4
Fixed	 9.3	 6.5 -9.8 0.5 10.9 -1.1 37.5
NCD	 18.7 14.7 42.8 15.6 9.5
	 3.7 15.0
Total Deposits	 8.7	 7.4	 5.1 6.1 13.8 10.1 16.5
Note:' includes special investment deposits.
Source:Bank Islam Annual Reports, Bank Negara Annual Reports 1985-1991
After the initial upsurge, the trend in deposit growth took a different course in
the next six years between 1986-1991. As shown earlier in Figure 7.1, even though
there were absolute annual increases in the amount of deposits mobilized, a no-
ticeable declining trend in deposit growth can be observed in terms of percentages.
These small percentages may be partly due to the large deposit base but it is also
noticed that the slowing down in deposit growth was also caused by other forces.
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At the outset, the smaller increase in total deposits was largely attributed to
the impact of the economic recession which was at its worse between the second
half of 1985 and throughout 1986. A look at the growth rates of the different types
of deposits reveals a general decline across the board in 1986. As can be seen in
Table 7.5, the growth of both savings and investment deposits were much lower in
1986 relative to their rates in the previous year. Whilst the rise in savings declined
by 10 per cent, the growth in investment deposits registered a large fall of 43 per
cent. The decline in business activity was also reflected in. the current account
deposits which grew only by 31.6 per cent from 7.8 per cent in 1985.
The slow down in deposit growth was experienced not oniy by Bank Islam but
also by the entire commercial banking industry. As Table 7.5 shows, total deposits
of the interest-based commercial banks declined in 1986 as fixed deposits grew only
by 6.5 per cent and current account deposits contracted by 4.4 per cent reflecting
the sluggish growth in income throughout the economy as a result of the decline
in export prices and the austerity drive by the government (as described earlier in
Chapter IV).
The rate of growth in total deposits improved in 1987 showing a rise of 43 per
cent. As evident in Table 7.5 much of this increase was caused by a substantial
rise in current account deposits which recorded a growth of 117 per cent. This was
in line with the upward trend of 18.7 per cent in the current account deposits of
the interest-based banks. Since current accounts are normally used for transaction
purposes and are mostly held by the corporate sector the high growth of these
deposits reflected the increase in business receipts following the revival of business
activity as the economy began to show signs of recovery in 1987.
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It is interesting to note however that as the Malaysian economy continued to
strengthen and the growth of total deposits in the commercial banking system
has improved to double digits since 1989, the expansion of Bank Islam's deposit
base was relatively slower and was in fact stationary in 1990. According to the
management of Bank Islam the decline in deposit growth was mainly attributed
to the decline in the amount of investment deposits as a result of the rapid rise in
the interest-rates offered on fixed deposits by the conventional banks. As stated in
the Bank Islam Annual Report 1990, the fall in the volume of investment deposits
was "mainly due to the fact that during the year the Bank's rates of profits on its
investment accounts were becoming less attractive when compared with the rapidly
increasing rates of interest paid by the conventional banks" 216 A comparison
between the rates of profits on Bank Islam investment deposits and the rates of
interest on fixed deposits offered by the conventional bank as well as the growth
in investment deposits supports the above statement.
As shown in Table 7.6 and Figure 7.2, there seems to be an inverse relationship
between the growth of Bank Islam investment deposits and the rates of interest
on fixed deposits between 1986 and 1991. Unlike the trend in the first two years,
when investment deposits rose tremendously despite the lower rates of profits, the
growth of investment deposits was higher during the recession of 1986 and in 1987
and 1988 when the rates of profits offered by Bank Islam were higher than the
12 months interest-rates on fixed deposits. However when average interest rates
exceeded the profits of investment deposits in 1989 the growth of these deposits
began to slow down and dropped drastically as the margin between interest and
profit widened in 1990 and 1991.
216 BIMB Annual Report 1990:43.
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Table 7.6 - BIMB & Commercial Banking Industry: 12 Month
Deposits - Returns & Annual Growth (1985-1991)
Type of Deposits	 1985 (1986 1 1987 I 19881 1989 f 1990 1991
Investment/Fixed	 Yields & Annual Growth (%)
Yields:
Profits	 7.5	 6.7	 5.9 4.6 4.5	 5.0	 5.4
Interest	 7.25 7.0
	
4.2	 4.2 5.1	 6.0 8.0
Annual Growth:
Investment Deposits 83.2 40.0 34.0 23.9 25.9 -25.1 -11.5
Fixed Deposits	 9.3	 6.5 -9.8 0.5 10.9 -1.1 37.5
Source:BJMB Annual Reports 1985-1991, Bank Negara Annual Reports 1985-1991
Depositors' behaviour in anticipation of rising interest rates was reflected in
the high preference for short-term investment deposits especially those that mature
within 3 to twelve months which would enable the depositors to shift their funds
out of Bank Islam on maturity. Since 1988, about 95 per cent of total investment
deposits were due within a year. Hence when interest-rates on fixed deposits of
1-12 months increased to an average range of 6-7.5 per cent per year in 1990,
it was observed that maturing investment account deposits, in particular those
belonging to institutional depositors were not reinvested. 217 As a result the growth
of investment deposits fell from 25.9 per cent in 1989 to minus 25.1 per cent in
1990 and further down to minus 11.5 per cent in 1991.
This recent trend in deposit growth indicates several points.
1) After the idle resources prior to the establishment of Bank Islam have been
absorbed during the initial years, further mobilization of investment deposits be-
217 Bank Negara Annual Report 1990.
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Figure 7.2 - BIMB & Commercial Banking Industry: 12 Month
Deposits - Yields & Annual Growth
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yond the pious group would depend more on the expected rates of returns rather
than on the religious motivation to avoid nba.
ii) The rates of return for deposits based on profits are much higher than the
the rates of return based on interest during the recession which suggests that the
former is relatively more stable and adjusts more easily to the economic recession.
iii) Depositors tend to compare the returns on deposits between the two sys-
tems which means that the Islamic bank in a monopolistic Islamic sector does face
competition for deposits from the interest-based banks.
iv) The average rate of return on deposits has not been very competitive. Even
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though the rates of profit on investment deposits have increased since 1989 the rise
was not sufficient to match the rapid rise in the rates of interest offered by the other
commercial banks hence resulting in a decrease in the Bank's deposits base.
7.3.2 Structure of Deposits
Table 7.7 and Figure 7.3 show that the bulk of total deposits is made up of
investment accounts. On average investment deposits accounted for 74 per cent of
total deposits in the 1980s but have declined to 54 per cent in 1990-1991 because
of the competition from the fixed deposits of the interest-based banks. As noted
earlier, a majority of these deposits were held in the short-term. Even though Bank
Islam offers to accept investment deposits at varying rates of maturities ranging
from one month to five years, in reality 90 per cent of these deposits were placed
for a period of one year or less.
The ratios of the savings and current account deposits to total deposits were
almost equivalent throughout the period. The volume of savings deposits has
grown more than nine folds from M$26 million in 1984 to M$249 million in 1991.
These deposits accounted for less than 15 per cent of total deposits in the 1980s
but have increased their share to 21.2 per cent in 1991.
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Table 7.7	 BIMB: Structure of Deposits 1984-1991
Type of Deposit	 Amount (M$ million) as at 30 June
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Current	 39.9 43.0 56.6 123.0 139.4 129.0 195.0 220.0
Savings	 26.1 46.5 78.2 113.8 152.8 181.5 213.4 249.5
Investment' 	 172.2 315.4 441.0 588.9 729.4 918.1 688.1 609.2
Other	 3.1	 5.3	 5.4	 8.0	 0.6	 0.5	 124.4 96.1
Total	 241.3 410.2 581.2 833.7 1022.2 1229.1 1220. 1175.1
Type of Deposit _____ Percentage of Total(as at 30 June) _____
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Current	 16.6 10.5 9.7 14.8 13.6 10.5
	
16.0 18.8
Savings	 10.8	 11.3 13.5 13.6 14.9 14.8	 17.4	 21.2
Investment	 71.3 76.9 75.9 70.6 71.4 74.7 	 56.4 51.8
Other	 1.3	 1.3	 0.9	 1.0	 0.1	 0.0	 10.2	 8.2
Total	 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Note: includes special investment deposits.
Source:BIMB unpublished data 1984-1987, BIMB Annual Reports 1988-1991
The proportion of current deposits to total deposits has also been increasing
steadily over recent years from 10.5 per cent of total deposits in 1989 to 18.8 per
cent in 1991. Prior to 1989, the shares of these accounts have fluctuated in tandem
with the growth pattern of the economy. The shares of current accounts in total
deposits were very low during the 1985-1986 recession - the lowest was recorded
in 1986 with a share of 9.7 per cent of total deposits (Table 7.7). As the economy
recovered in 1987, the proportion of current deposits in the total also increased to
14.8 per cent during the same period. As noted earlier, this trend may be explained
by the fact that the current accounts at Bank Islam were generally held by the
government and statutory authorities and business enterprises for transactional
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purposes. Hence when business receipts declined during the recession, the ratio
of current account deposits to total deposits also fell. On the other hand, the
large increase in the share of these deposits in 1987 was largely attributable to the
increase of business receipts following the revival of economic activities during the
year.
Intra-industry and inter-bank comparisons show that the deposit structure of
Bank Islam compared favourably with the industry norm and the deposit structure
of other medium-sized conventional banks.
As can he seen in Table 7.8 the respective shares of Bank Islam's current
and savings accounts to total deposits, (16% and 17.4% respectively) for the 1990
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financial year, were close to the industry figures (18.2%, 16.3% of total deposits
respectively). In fact the Bank's share of investment deposits (56.4% of the total)
was higher than the industry's share of fixed deposits.
The distribution of Bank Islam deposits was also comparable to the deposit
structures of two other banks of similar size, with the exception of savings deposits
where the Bank Islam figure is relatively lower. Its share of current account to total
deposits however, was in close proportion to that of the Hock Hua Bank while the
share of investment deposits in the total can be compared with the proportion of
fixed deposits mobilized by the Ban Hin Lee Bank.
Table 7.8 - Deposit Structure: Bank Islam, Medium-Size Banks &
Industry. (1990 Financial Year)
_______	 Percentage of Total Deposits (%)
Bank	 Current Savings Investment Fixed Total Deposits:
Account Account Account Deposil Due within 1 yea
Industry	 18.2	 16.3	 41.0	 not available
Bank Islam	 16.0	 17.4	 56.4	 94.5
Ban Hin Lee
	 17.3	 20.5	 58.5	 84.0
Hock Hua	 20.7	 24.6	 53.6	 94.1
Source:Bank Negara Annual Report 1990, BIMB Annual Report 1990, Ban Hin Lee Bank Annual Report 1990,
Hock Hua Bank Annual Report 1990.
7.3.3 Depositors
The total number of Bank Islam's depositors stood at 306,400 in 1991. The
growth of depositors appears to be in line with the growth of deposits with a
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remarkable initial growth of 75 per cent in 1985 followed by a declining trend in
later years reaching only 13 per cent in 1991.
Table 7.9	 BIMB: Structure of Depositors 1984-1991
Type of Deposit	 Number of Depositors (as at 30 June)	 ______
1984 1985 1986	 1987	 1988	 1989	 1990	 1991
Current	 4,392 7,488 9,320 12,064 15,041 17,529 20,371 24,203
Savings	 32,012 55,50' 89,700 126,441 166,416 198,550 230,53 260,705
Investment	 4,658 8,833 12,607 14,583 19,979 19,709 19,141 20,696
Other	 0	 77	 85	 99	 105	 206	 325	 798
Total	 41,062 71,905 111,712 153,187 201,541 235,994 270,375 306,402
Type of Deposit _____ _____ Percentage of Total(as at 30 June)______ ______
1984 1985 1986	 1987	 1988	 1989	 1990	 1991
Current	 10.7	 10.4	 8.3	 7.9	 7.5	 7.4	 7.5	 7.9
Savings	 78.0	 77.2	 80.3	 82.5	 82.5	 84.1	 85.3	 85.1
Investment	 11.3	 12.3	 11.3	 9.5	 9.9	 8.4	 6.8	 6.8
Other	 0.0	 0.1	 0.1	 0.1	 0.1	 0.1	 0.2	 0.2
Total	 100.0 100.0 100.0	 100.0	 100.0 100.0 100.0	 100.0
Source:BIMB unpublished data 1984-1987, BIMB Annual Report 1988-1991
The depositors of the general investment accounts were mainly business en-
terprises and private individuals. It is evident that even though these accounts
constituted the largest proportion of deposits, they have attracted fewer deposi-
tors. Because of the relatively smaller number of depositors relative to the large
deposit base the average size of an investment account is estimated at M$45000.
This seems to imply that the Bank has a relatively high dependence on a small
percentage of depositors for the main source of funds. For example, in 1989 close
to 75 per cent of total deposits were placed by 9 per cent of total depositors. It is
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therefore not surprising that withdrawals by a small percentage of these depositors
will affect the growth of total deposits significantly.
In contrast to the investment accounts, the savings account drew the largest
number of depositors but with small balances. About 32,000 savings accounts
were opened during the first financial year but with deposits accounting for only
10.8 per cent of total deposits. The number of depositors for these accounts has
increased steadily from 32,000 in 1984 to 260,000 in 1991; accounting for 85 per
cent of total depositors (Table 7.9). The savings deposits were mainly mobilized
from the general public of whom 90 per cent were Muslim individuals from the
middle and lower income groups. The average credit balance of a savings account
was estimated at about M$959 as at 30 June 1991 although, it is suspected that
there would be many accounts with smaller balances especially those belonging
to the lower income depositors. The popularity of the savings account may be
attributed to the bonus paid on these accounts and the fact that 'these accounts
could be easily opened with a minimum deposit of M$1.
Current account depositors accounted for 7 to 10 per cent of total depositors.
The current accounts were less popular amongst individual depositors partly be-
cause these accounts do not yield any financial returns and also because several
requirements such as an introducer and a minimum deposit of M$500 have to be
fulfilled before a current account can be opened.
Finally, the impact of Bank Islam in mobilizing deposits from the non-Muslims
have been rather unsuccessful. As can be seen in Table 7.10, only one per cent of
total depositors were non-Muslims at the end of 1989; whose deposits accounted
for only 0.25 per cent of total deposits. It is apparent that more than 90 per cent
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of depositors were Muslim individuals mostly with savings accounts as denoted by
their small share of deposits. The largest proportion of deposits (72.25%) however
is derived from the corporate sector which comprised about 5 per cent of total
depositors.
Table 7.10 - Distribution of Depositors by Type as at 31 December
1989
Depositors	 Number % Amount($'OOO) %
Muslim Individual	 236,975 94.63	 314,927	 27.5(
Non-Muslim Individua 2,532 1.00 	 2,844	 0.25
Corporate	 10,922 4.37	 827,719	 72.2
Total	 250,429 100	 1,145,490	 100
Source: Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad: unpublished data
In summary Bank Islam has played a significant role in the mobilization of
deposits without interests. The rapid growth of its deposits in the first two years
of operation show the important contribution of Bank Islam in the mobilization
of savings and investments that otherwise would have been kept idle outside the
banking system because of mba. The large proportion of deposits held in investment
accounts is indicative of public confidence in the concept of profit-sharing as an
alternative to interest. Nevertheless the susceptibifity of these deposits to interest
rate changes in recent years also suggests that the growth of deposits in future
would most likely depend on the rate of return factor rather than the religious
motivation.
258
7.3.4 Expansion of Branch Network
Another useful indicator of the performance of a commercial bank in deposit
mobilization is its ability to mobilize deposits from as many potential depositors
as possible through its branch network. In banking, branch expansion serves as
a non-pricing method of attracting more deposits by bringing the bank to the
people. For the Islamic bank the expansion of branches especially into the rural
areas deserves special consideration since pious Muslims who are expected to form
its largest clientele of loyal customers are mainly located in the rural areas. On
the other hand, the setting-up of branches in the rural areas may not be cost-
effective because of the greater uncertainties about the commercial feasibility of
such a project and that the profit expectations in the initial years are generally
not promising.218
The dispersion of the Bank Islam branch network shows that the Bank had set
up 29 branches throughout the country by the end of the 1991 financial year. The
branching policy of the bank can be divided into two stages. The first stage which
took four years to complete (1983-1987) has involved the establishment of at least
one branch in all the fourteen state capitals. Thus by mid 1987 the Bank had
opened eighteen branches of which fourteen were located in the 14 state capitals,
three others in the city of Kuala Lumpur and another in Sungal Petani, a Muslim
populated major town in the north-west of Peninsular Malaysia. The second stage
of branch expansion began in 1988 following approval from the Central Bank earlier
in 1986 which endorsed the Bank's plan to open eighteen more branch offices within
a period of three to four years (Annual Report 1986:34). These branches were to
be located in the secondary towns.
218 Nieuhaus 1988:13, Wilson 1990:24.
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Table 7.11 - BIMI3: Branch Distribution in Town Board or Local
Authority Areas (Total Population ^ 10,000) as at 30 June 1991
Area	 Population	 No. LIMB	 Area	 Popul.aticu No. BLMB
Total Population Malay Total Branches Total Population Malay Total Branc&i
> 10,000	 '000 '000	 > 10,000	 _____ - _________
1. Kuala Lumpur	 305.4 919.6	 4	 18.Muar	 25.5 65.2	 1
2. Kuala Terenggani 166.3 180.3 	 1	 19.Sibu	 25.2 45.3	 -
3. Kota Bharu	 143.0 167.9	 1	 20.Miri	 25.0 52.1	 -
4. Johor Bahru	 137.4 246.4	 1	 21.Pangkal Kaion 21.0 21.6	 -
5. Kuaritan	 78.7 131.5	 1	 22.Butterworth	 19.8	 78.0	 1
6. Taiping	 55.5 146.0	 -	 23.Batu Pahat	 19.2 64.7	 1
7. Petaling Jaya	 55.4 207.8	 1	 24.Sungai Petani 16.4 45.3	 1
8. Kelang	 51.7 192.1	 1	 25.Keluang	 15.8 50.3	 -
9. Ipoh	 49.1 293.8	 1	 26.Melaka	 15.4 87.5	 1
10.Seremban	 41.1 133.0	 1	 27.Port Dickson	 13.4 24.4	 -
11.Georgetown	 40.7 248.2	 -	 28.Peringat	 13.2	 13.8	 -
12.Sandakan	 31.4 43.1	 -	 29.Teluk Intan	 13.2 49.1	 -
13.Kota Kinabalu 	 30.7 56.0
	
1	 30.Sbah Alam	 12.6 19.0	 1
14.Alor Setar	 29.7 69.4	 1	 31.Pasir Mas	 11.9	 13.4	 1
15.Tawau	 26.8 43.2	 -	 32.Kemaman	 11.9 16.0	 1
16.Dungun	 26.1	 29.0	 -	 33.Kadok	 11.6	 11.7	 -
17.Kuching	 26.1 72.6
	
1	 34.Lahad Datu	 11.6 14.9	 -
Source:Derived from Malaysia 1990-1991 Yearbook, Berita Publishing pp 78-79. There are 67 local authority areas
having population > 10,000. Only 34 are shown in Table 7.11.
Based on the definition that areas having 10,000 or more population are defined
as urban centres219 the distribution of Bank Islam branches in Table 7.11 shows
that the Bank has concentrated its branch network mainly to serve the urban
Muslims. Twenty-three of the total 29 branches or 79.3 per cent of total branches
as at 30 June 1991 were located not only in urban towns or local authority areas
219 Fifth Malaysia Plan 1985:182
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with population exceeding 10,000220 people but also in those with more than 10,000
Malay population. Four Bank Islam branches have been set up in the capital city
Kuala Lumpur which had a total population of 919,400 in 1980 out of which
305,400 (33.2%) were Malays. Bank Islam branches have also been established
in three other towns with high percentages of Malay/Muslim population namely
Kuala Trengganu (85%), Kota Bharu (92%) and Johore Bahru (85.6%). The rest
of the branches were in selected towns generally with no less than 40 per cent
Muslim population.
With the exception of six other areas 22 ' where the rest of the Bank Islam
branches are located, Muslims living in the rural areas and even in urban areas
having less than 10,000 Malay population are stifi not affected by the impact
of Islamic banking as the bank branches have not yet reached these areas. A
plausible explanation for this situation is that the Bank may have been constrained
by the cost-effectiveness of setting full-service branches in these areas in view of
the relatively small Malay/Muslim population or the low savings that could be
mobilized. This may be deduced from the performance of existing branches in
the poorer states, (that is, states with per capita GDP lower than the national
per capita GDP) namely Trengganu, Kelantan, Kedah, Perlis and Pahang which
registered low deposits compared to the large number of depositors.
For instance at the end of the 1990 financial year, the nine branches in these
states accounted for 44.3 per cent of total depositors but with deposits which
constituted oniy 23.7 per cent of total deposits (Table 7.12) which implies that
higher operating costs may be involved to maintain these funds.
220 Based on the 1980 population census.
221 Jertih, Kangar, Temerloh, Pant Buntar, Tanipin and Bangi.
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Table 7.12 - BIMB: Distribution of Depositors and Deposits in Lower
Income States (as at 30 June 1990)
State	 Number of Percentage of Total (%)
Branches__________ _________
__________ __________ Depositors Deposits
Trengganu	 2	 11.1	 5.5
Kelantan	 2	 11.6	 6.0
Kedah	 2	 10.7	 7.7
Pahang 1
	 2	 8.5	 3.8
Penis	 1	 2.4	 0.7
Total	 9	 44.3	 23.7
Source: Computed by the author from BIMB data on deposit position as at 30 June 1990.
Perhaps this may partly explain the latest plan of the Bank to set up mini-
branches instead of full-service branches in so-called "strategic areas" •222 As an-
nounced by Dr Abdul Halim, the Managing Director of Bank Islam, the establish-
ment of a minibranch would incur M$150,000 operating cost annually compared
with M$500,000 to run a full-service branch hence saving the Bank 30 per cent of
operating cost if a minibranch is set up. The smaller cost involved will also imply
that the minibranch wifi take a shorter time to breakeven.
The plan to set up mini-branches instead of full-service branches may be seen as
an effort of the management of Bank Islam to balance between its social obligation
of providing interest-free banking services to all Muslims and its objective to remain
profitable. The plan offers a broader network of branches to serve the small savers
and small borrowers in the rural and remoter areas whose dispersed locational
character, low income and hence low savings do not justify the cost of setting up
222 New Straits Times 18 January 1991.
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full-service branches as in the urban areas.
It can be concluded therefore that Bank Islam has not reached the captive
market of Muslims in the rural areas. The Bank has only grazed the tip of the
iceberg in its deposit mobilization policy. Savers in the Malaysian rural areas are
still not affected by the impact of Islamic banking since the current branch network
has only reached the Muslims in the urban areas.
7.4 Application of Funds
Having examined the performance of Bank Islam in the mobilization of de-
posits, we now turn to the other side of the balance sheet and examine how the
Bank has allocated its resources into earning assets by the various methods of Is-
lamic financing and investments as described in Chapter VI. The main aim of this
section is to examine (i) the growth of customer financing in order to gauge the
extent to which customer deposits have been effectively utilized into credit and
(ii) whether the business strategy of Bank Islam in the deployment of funds has
been based purely on commercial grounds or has the Bank geared its financing
operations towards the generation of socio-economic development as expected in
theory.
At the outset the general performance of Bank Islam in the application of
its funds can be gauged from the growth and structure of its total assets. This
is because assets constitute the use of the bank's funds. Asset growth therefore
constitutes an important indicator of business growth.
The asset structure of Bank Islam shows that the largest proportion of its
earning assets during the 1984-1991 period was in the form of customer financing
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(Tables 7.13 & 7.14). Except for three years (1984, 1987 and 1989) customer
financing accounted for more than half of the Bank's total annual assets. On
average the ratio of customer financing to total assets was estimated at 54 per cent
annually. The highest ratio achieved was 62.6 per cent in 1985 while the minimum
ratio was recorded at 46 per cent in 1987.
The next major item of the Bank's assets was the bank's investment in the
Malaysian Government Investment Certificates (MGICs) and quoted and unquoted
shares. On average, these investments accounted for about a quarter (27%) of total
assets ranging from the lowest proportion of 13.9 per cent during the recession and
the highest ratio of 38 per cent in 1988.
Together, customer financing and investments constituted between 72 per cent
and 92 per cent of total assets over the 1984-91 period. The rest of the bank's
assets were made up of cash and bank balances223 , which constituted about 6%
of total assets on average, and other assets such as investments in subsidiaries,
amount due from subsidiaries, bifis receivable, prepayments, intangibles and fixed
assets which accounted for an average of 18 per cent of total assets during the first
four years and 8 per cent between 1988-1991.
As Table 7.14 shows, the assets of Bank Islam stood at M$325 million at the
end of its first financial year in 1984 and rose four and a half times to M$1357
million at the end of June 1991. This rise has been achieved at a relatively high
annual average growth rate of 33 per cent in the 1980s. However, total assets grew
at a marginal rate of 2 per cent in 1990 as a consequence of the decline in deposits
and financing and contracted by almost 3 per cent in 1991.
223 These includes the statutory reserves with the Central Bank.
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Table 7.13 - BIMB: Structure and Growth of Assets 1984-1991
Asset Type	 -	 Amount M$ '000 (as at 30 June) ______
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Cash & balances with banks 20.3 24.6 36.7 38.4
	 50.6 72.0 100.3 102.7
Customer Financing	 161.1 322.0 395.3 428.6 609.4 666.1 807.8 789.3
Investment	 73.2 71.7 135i 315.4 432.5 507.8 379.1 337.3
Other Assets	 70.9 95.9 115.1 149.9 41.6 122.4 109.0 127.9
Total	 325.5 514.2 682.8 932.3 1134.1 1368. 1396. 1357.2
Total Asset Growth (%)
	
0.0 57.9 32.7 36.5	 21.6 20.6	 2.0	 -2.8
Source:BEMB Annual Reports 1984-1901.
Table 7.14
	 BIMB: Structure of Assets 1984-1991
Asset Type	 Percentage of Total (as at 30 June) _____
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Cash & balances with banks 6.2 4.8 5.4 4.1
	 4.5 5.3 7.2	 7.6
Customer Financing	 49.5 62.6 57.9 46.0 53.7 48.7 57.9 58.2
Investment	 22.5 13.9 19.9 33.8 38.1 37.1 27.1 24.8
Other Assets	 21.8 18.7 16.8 16.1	 3.7	 8.9	 7.8	 9.4
Total	 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Financing & Investment	 72.0 76.5 77.8 79.8 91.8 85.8 85.0 83.0
Source:BIMB Annual Reports 1984-1901.
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7.4.1 Customer Financing - Growth
In general, the growth of customer financing over the eight year period was
largely dominated by two factors namely the growth of total deposIts and the un-
favourable loan climate during the recession; as characterized by the slow growths
in the mid 1980s and modest growths in subsequent years (Figure 7.4). The rate
of financing was, however, very high during the first two years of operations. The
amount of credit rose by 99.8 per cent between 1984 and 1985 but the fastest
growth was during the second half of the first financial year when the amount of
financing increased four times from M$407 million to M$161 million. The increase
in financing was much faster than the growth in deposits as indicated by the loan
to deposit ratios which increased from 45 per cent at the end of 1983 to 78 per
cent in 1985.
The rapid increase in financing operations during the first two years was largely
attributed to the substantial increase in deposits which provided sufficient resources
for the Bank to meet the demand for interest-free financing in the market. The
most significant demand was from individuals seeking finance for the purchase of
residential houses. Presumably these individuals had avoided taking housing loans
from the government or the conventional bank previously because of nba. As at
31 December 1984, 35 per cent of total loans were extended to the property and
construction sectors, of which 25 per cent were term loans to individuals for the
purchase of residential houses. The relatively high percentage also reflects to some
extent the confidence of the bank in approving such loans in view of the boom in
the property sector in the early 1980s.
After a phenomenal start, the growth of financing slowed down considerably
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Table 7.15 - Customer Financing: Annual Growth 1984-1991
Year	 Amount1 Loan/Deposit 	 Annual Growth (%)
________ (M$niillion) Ratio(%)
	
Bank Islam 2
 Commercial Banks3
Dec 1983	 40.7	 45	 0.0	 24.0
1984	 161.1	 67	 295.0	 18.3
1985	 321.9	 78	 99.8	 12.6
1986	 395.3	 70	 22.8	 6.8
1987	 428.6	 53	 8.4	 -0.3
1988	 609.3	 60	 42.2	 8.1
1989	 666.1	 55	 9.3	 19.0
1990	 807.8	 66	 21.3	 20.3
1991	 789.3	 67	 -2.3	 20.4
Note: 1 less provision for bad and doubtful debts, 2 as at 30 June, as at 31 December.
Source: Bank Islam Annual Reports, Bank Negara Annual Reports 1984-1991
Figure 7.4 Bank Islam & Commercial Banks: Annual Growth of
Financing
•	 Bank Islam	 °	 Commercial Banks,
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in the next two years. In 1986, financing grew at a rate of 22.8 per cent and only
increased by 8.4 per cent in 1987. The slow-down in financing operations reflected
the weak demand for loans throughout the banking system following the decline of
economic activities as economic growth plunged into stagnation in the second half
of 1985 and recovering only at 2 per cent in 1986. As can be seen in Table 7.15 the
growth of commercial bank credit declined from 12.6 per cent in 1985 to 6.8 per
cent in 1986 and was stationary in 1987. One of the major factors which further
contributed to the sharp decline in 1986 was the collapse of property prices. The
mounting of non-performing loans as a result of over-extending into the property
sector and the series of runs in the banking system caused by the scandals of the
deposit-taking cooperatives have forced commercial banks to be more cautious in
approving new loans even though economic growth picked up by 5 per cent in 1987.
In the case of Bank Islam the shift towards a conservative financing policy was
expressed by the Managing Director, Dr Abdul Halim 224 in 1985 who stated;
The results of its operation during the first two years give us confidence as to its future.
The bank has laid down a fairly cautious plan for the next two years. The outlook is one of
somewhat slow but steady growth, to be achieved with prudence and caution.
It is apparent that the change in policy was necessary for the Bank to adapt to
the unfavourable economic climate to ensure a reasonable return to its depositors
as well as its own survival. The Bank had earlier incurred a loss at the end of
its first year of operations. Although the loss was considered normal, since new
banks normally take at least three years to breakeven, it was reported that the loss
was also caused by cases of bad debts on financing. 225 Further failures may prove
224 1985:13.
225 Shanmugam 1990:23, Malaysian Business June 1991:10.
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disastrous not oniy to the bank but also to the Islamic banking philosophy.
To minimize the risk of loan default the bank has since adopted a 'commit-
tee system' whereby all financing applications must be approved by one of five
financing committees depending on the amount of financing required. The system
acts as a protection to ensure that all loans are double-checked before any deci-
sion is made. This is because the cost of non-performing loans is greater to Bank
Islam compared to the other commercial banks since additional charges cannot be
imposed on late repayments.
That the bank had been more prudent in its financing policy may be supported
by the fact that its levels of provision for non-performing loans were lower than
the industry average. As can be seen in Table 7.16, the amount of reserves put
aside by the Bank to cover for bad and doubtful debts ranged between 1.0 and 3.4
per cent of total loans during the recessionary period. These were relatively lower
than the industry figures which ranged between 3.8 and 7.6 per cent during the
same period. (The industry figures are higher if interest-in-suspense is included.)
It is not known how much of Bank Islam's financing was non-performing during
the period. However it is worth noting that total provisions for bad and doubtful
financing constituted (i) specific provisions which covered specific accounts which
have been reviewed and identified as bad and doubtful and (ii) a regular general
provision to cover losses which were not specifically identified. Based on this
information we can safely deduce that the percentage of non-performing loans or
bad debts to gross loans were lower than the industry average in view of the fact
that the Bank would have put aside more provisions if the incidence of such loans
had been higher.
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Table 7.16 - Provisions for Bad and Doubtful Debts, as a Percentage
of Total Loans (1987-1990)
Financial Year 'rovisions for Bad and Doubtful Debts
Year	 Bank Islam 1 Commercial banks2
1985	 1.0	 3.8
1986	 1.7	 5.7
1987	 2.7	 7.3
1988	 3.4	 7.6
1989	 4.3	 7.3
1990	 4.2	 6.1
1991	 4.6	 4.8
Note:' calculated as a percentage of gross financing, 2 excludes interest-in-suspense.
Source:Bank Islam Annual Reports & Bank Negara Annual Reports (1987-90)
Nevertheless, in spite of its prudent policy the quality of financing seems to
have deteriorated in recent years. The ratio of bad and doubtful debt provision to
total financing has been on an upward trend rising from 3.4 per cent in 1988 to 4.6
per cent in 1991 which is in contrast to the industry trend which seems to move
in the opposite direction.
After two years of low growth the volume of financing rose significantly by
42.2 per cent in 1988. This was in line with the average growth of credit in the
commercial banking system which also showed a marked increase of 8.1 per cent
from minus three per cent the previous year. This general improvement in bank
credit was mainly attributed to the improvement in economic activity as economic
growth reached 8.9 per cent in 1988. Because economic growth after the recession
was led by strong domestic demand, there was a substantial demand for credit from
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the commercial and manufacturing sectors. As a result even though the property
sector was still one of the leading sectors for loan growth in 1988, a larger share
of credit of the banking system was extended to manufacturing and commerce
rather than to the property sector. This was also true for Bank Islam. At the end
of the 1988 financial year, almost 20 per cent of the bank's total financing were
directed to the manufacturing sector compared to 12 per cent in 1987. For the
first time since its establishment the Bank had diversified its credit away from the
property sector. Nevertheless, priority was still given to housing loans especially
for the purchase of medium and low-cost housing in line with the policy of the
government to utilize the idle capacity in the construction sector. The growth of
Bank Islam's financing rose by 21.3 per cent per year in 1990 which was close to the
industry rate of 20.3 per cent. However the amount of credit extended contracted
by 2.3 per cent in 1991 mainly because of the decline in total resources caused by
the decline of total deposits for two consecutive years since 1990. Nevertheless,
the decline in financing was slower than the decline in deposits as indicated by the
loan-deposit ratio which increased by 1 per cent from the previous year.
In summary the growth of Bank Islam's financing activities was very much
influenced by the prevailing economic conditions of the 1980s and the growth of
total deposits. The rapid growth in financing during the first two years of the
bank's operations was curtailed during the recession. Although there was modest
growths afterwards, the expansion of financing activities in the early 1990s was
constrained by the slower growth in deposits. However the injection of additional
working capital following the Bank's flotation in January 1992 is expected to have
provided a larger base for further asset expansion.
271
7.4.2 Financing Portfolio
The most striking feature of Bank Islam's financing portfolio during the period
was the predominance of the so-called 'second-line techniques of financing' rather
than the 'first line techniques' as recommended in theory.
As illustrated in Table 7.17, more than 90 per cent of total financing has been
extended under the markup arrangements of Bai Bithamin Ajil (deferred sale),
murabahah (cost-plus) and ijarah (leasing or hire-purchase). In fact since 1988, 99
per cent of total financing has been extended by one of these methods.
Table 7.17 - BIMB: Structure of Customer Financing 1984-1991
Type of Financing	 Percentage of Total (as at 30 June)
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Bai Bithamin Ajil 49.3 68.5 77.1 78.7 77.6 75.9 70.8 73.7
Ijarah	 9.1	 5.9	 4.9	 3.4	 3.2	 3.1 11.2 13.0
Murabahah	 37.3 22.7 15.5 15.0 19.1 20.9 17.8 13.2
Subtotal	 95.7 97.1 97.5 97.1 99.9 99.9 99.8 99.9
Musharakah	 1.2	 2.0	 2.2	 2.1	 0.0	 0.0	 0.0 0.0
Mudarabah	 3.0 0.9 0.3 0.3	 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0
Qard al-Hasan	 0.1	 0.0	 0.0 0.5	 0.0 0.0	 0.1 0.1
Total	 100.0 100.0 100.( 100.0 100.0 100.( 100.( 100.0
Source:Derived from BIMB unpublished data 1984-1987, BIMB Annual Reports 1988-1991.
The most predominant was term loans under the deferred payment sale method
of Bai Bithamin Ajil. Between 1984 and 1991, these deferred sale contracts ac-
counted for the largest proportion of total financing. At the end of the first financial
year, more than M$80 million worth of financing have been extended under this
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Figure 7.5	 131MB: Strurture of Financing 1984 & 1991
1984
1991
ILIIII1 Bai Bithamin Ajil	 Iarah	 Musharakah
!llll Mudarabah	 Murabahah	 I Qard ai-Hasan
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method which accounted for 49.3 per cent of total financing. By 1987 its relative
importance has risen to 78.7 per cent declining marginally to 73.7 per cent of total
financing in 1991. These contracts were mainly provided to finance the purchase of
land, the purchase or construction of residential houses and the purchase of capital
goods by large corporations. The duration of these loans usually exceeds one year
to a maximum of twenty years.
A majority of financing extended under Bai BithamIn Ajil was small loans not
exceeding M$100,000 for the purchase of medium and low-cost residential hou8es
by individuals. Since 1988, the Bank has devoted an increasing proportion of these
small loans to finance the purchase of low-cost houses costing M$25,000 or less.228
Bank Islam has also utilized the Bai Bithamin Ajil contract to syndicate large
scale corporate financing. Its first attempt was to lead manage a MS 125 million
deferred sale contract for the multinational Shell oil corporation to part finance the
company's purchase of equipment for its local refinery. This facility was syndicated
among ten participating financial institutions, each of which contributed funds in
exchange for promissory notes, called shahadah al-dayn certificates, issued by the
corporation. These debt certificates which mature in seven years can be securiti.zed
and traded in the capital market.
Because of its concentration on Bai Bithamin Ajil an average of 60 per cent
of total financing extended by Bank Islam was for periods of over five years and
only about 18 per cent was short-term loans which mature within a year (see Table
7.18). This structure distinguishes Bank Islam from the interest-based banks in
Malaysia which have greater shares of loans in the short-term rather than in the
medium or long term.
BIMB Annual Report 1988:33.
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Table 7.18 - BIMB, Hock Hua Bank & Domestic Commercial Banks:
Financing Maturities 1988-1990
Repayment Period	 Percentage of Total Gross Financing (as at 30 June)
BIMB	 Hock Hua Bank Domestic Industry
1988 1989 1990 1988 1989 1990 1988 1989 1990
Within 1 year	 21	 21	 17	 62	 63	 60	 50	 48	 51
1-5 years	 19	 19	 23	 16	 15	 15	 8	 10	 10
Over 5 years	 60	 60	 60	 23	 23	 23	 41	 42	 39
Total	 100.0 100.0 100.( 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1OO.
Source:BIMB Annual Reports 1988-1990, Hock Hua Bank Annual Reports 1988-1990, Malaysia: Economic Report 1992
Table 1.6.
In contrast to Bank Islam an average of 50 per cent of domestic commercial
bank lending between 1988 and 1991 matured within a year and only 40 per cent
of total loans were term loans for periods of over five years. A . clearer pattern
showing the predominance of short-term loans can be seen in the portfolio of the
Hock Hua Bank whereby about 62 per cent of its loans matured within a year and
less than a quarter were long-term loans of five years or longer.
The above difference between Bank Islam and the traditional commercial bank
is primarily due to the difference between the accounting practice adopted by both
systems. Unlike the interest-based commercial banks which tend to follow the
"matching convention" by which short-term loans are mostly undertaken in view
of the predominance of short-term deposits227 , Bank Islam has adopted the "on-
going concern convention" which permits it to organize all its customers' deposits
into a single "pooi of funds" from which it will undertake short, medium or long-
227 90 per cent of deposits of Hock Hua Bank deposits for instance mature within a year.
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term financing irrespective of the maturity periods of deposits placed by individual
depositors. By this method on-going long-term financing can be financed by in-
coming deposits in place of the maturing ones. This method is adopted because
around 60-70 per cent of Bank Islam deposits at any point in time constitute
investment deposits which are short-term in nature and the distribution of profits
on these deposits would be more realistic if it is based on cash profits generated
from the Bank's on-going projects during the period the deposits are placed.
The small proportion of short-term financing provided by Bank Islam high-
lights the problem of providing Islamically legitimate short-term credit facility or
'overdrafts' by Islamic banks. Since these loans are often needed for consumption
purposes and contingencies which cannot be based on the markup or profit-sharing
arrangement Islamic banks are unable to resolve the basis on which these loans
should be remunerated. Even though the extension of overdrafts on the basis of
benevolent loans (qard-al-hasan) is permissible it is less suitable for the devel-
opment of short-term credit facilities on a commercial and profitable basis. In
some ways the absence of such a facility may have affected the competitiveness of
Bank Islam in the market especially in attracting deposits from potential current
account depositors who are accustomed to the overdraft facility provided by the
interest-based banks.
The second most common form of financing extended by Bank Islam during the
period was trade-financing on the principle of murabahah or mark-up sale. This
constituted short-term financing in the form of letter of credit provided mainly
to traders and wholesalers to facilitate the import and export of goods. Since
this facility is self-liquidating it provides the Bank with a quick way of making
profits with minimum risks. The proportion of trade financing ranged between
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15 per cent and 37 per cent of total annual financing and its growth seemed to
correspond closely to market conditions; with negative growth during the recession
in 1986 and 1987 and a sharp rise by almost 65 per cent with the improvement in
economic activities in 1988. It is interesting to note that the percentage of trade
finance in the Bank's financing portfolio is below the average of other Islamic banks
in the Middle-East. As noted earlier in Chapter III, more than 80 per cent of the
financing operations of the Jordan Islamic Bank, Kuwait Finance House and the
Islamic banks in Turkey were concentrated on short-term trade financing.
Nevertheless, it is envisaged that the share of trade financing in the Bank's
portfolio is likely to be higher in the 1990s in view of the government policy of en-
couraging export-oriented industrialization. The introduction of two new Islamic
financial instruments to facilitate trade financing; namely the Islamic Accepted
Bifis and the Islamic Export Credit Refinancing in 1991 indicates the Bank's fore-
sight to expand its trade financing operations in future. According to Dr Halim,
"any financial system has got to be ready to support a country's trade especially
exports" 228 In this respect Dr Halim sees the prospects of Bank Islam penetrating
the Muslim market in trade financing. At present the Bank is the lead designated
bank in the special bilateral payment scheme between the Central Bank and its
counterparts in Iran and Pakistan.229
Hire-purchase agreement under ijarah was relatively undeveloped in the 1980s
as shown by its share in the total which ranged between 3.1 to 9 per cent of total
financing. However its importance in the Bank's financing portfolio has increased
to 11.2 per cent and 13 per cent in 1990 and 1991. It was notable that the amount
228 New Horizon July 1992:16.
229 Under this arrangement each central bank guarantees international trade payment on behalf of its
importers.
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of financing under ijarah rose by 340 per cent in 1990 to M$92.6 million from M$21
million in 1989. This rise was mainly attributed to an ijarah financing facility worth
M$63.5 million extended to an oil refining company to finance the installation of
equipment.
It is apparent from the preceding analysis that the structure of Bank Islam's
financing portfolio reflects the corporate objective of the Bank; specifically "to
operate as a commercial bank" which by its nature will be more inclined towards
debt-financing rather than equity-financing. The Bank's deemphasis on equity-
financing can be seen from the amount of financing allocated to both mudarabah
and musharakah. The Bank seemed to have made some small attempts at equity-
financing at the beginning by committing about 2 per cent and 1 per cent of total
financing per year under rnusharakah and mudarabah respectively between 1984-
1987. However since 1988 the ratio of both methods have become almost negligible
in the Bank's financing portfolio.
It can therefore be deduced that, except for the absence of nba, the financ-
ing portfolio of Bank Islam does not differ significantly from the interest-based
banks. The bulk of financing provided were still bound by the collateral and
credit-worthiness criteria rather than project viability and profit-sharing. Never-
theless, whilst not concentrating on profit-sharing Bank Islam is 'superior' to the
traditional interest-based banks to the extent that a majority of its loans are in the
longer term and the cost of borrowing does not rise with the rise in interest-rates.
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7.4.3 Sectoral Distribution of Finance
In terms of allocational performance, the basic criterion of evaluation would
be the extent to which Bank Islam has directed its funds to finance activities or
sectors which are deemed essential for economic growth or social equity.
As Table 7.19 shows the Bank has concentrated mainly in extending finance
to the property sector throughout the past 8 years of its operation. However,
lending to this sector was concentrated more on residential houses rather than
commercial properties. More than 30 per cent of total financing were directed
to the housing sector during the first three years of operation. As noted earlier,
this high concentration was largely attributed to the high demand and the boom
in the property sector. In addition it reflected the inability of the Bank as a
new business concern to move beyond the trade-related means of financing.230
The percentage of finance to the property sector remained high accounting for an
average of 25 per cent of total financing in the second half of the 1980s. This was
mainly instigated by the Central Bank which encouraged all commercial banks
to make strong commitments in providing more housing loans for the purchase
of medium and low-cost houses as an anti-recession means to absorb the excess
production capacity in industries producing materials for the construction sector.
Excluding the housing sector, the share of financing directed to the construction
and real estate sectors was relatively small in the initial years but has risen annually
and was close to the industry ratio of 17 per cent in 1991.
The distribution of finance to the other sectors of the economy shows that the
Bank has based its direction of lending in accordance with the relative importance
of each sector in the Gross Domestic Product.
230 Molid Ya.acob 1986.
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Table 7.19 - BIMB: Distribution of Financing By Major Sectors (%)
1984-1991
	
Bank Islam	 Commercial Bank
Sector	 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991	 1985	 1991
Agriculture	 0.5	 3.3	 2.4	 3.7	 5.2	 5.2 5.3 5.2	 5.9	 4.8
Manufacturing	 5.0 3.8 13.6 12.0 19.6 28.4 34.2 30.3	 17.6	 24.2
Services	 29.6 32.8 21.0 38.1 21.2 15.4 13.1 13.9 	 31.4	 27.1
Construction & Real Estate 1.4 2.9
	 5.8	 16.7 26.9 25.9 20.6 18.1	 21.8	 17.0
Miscellaneous plus Housing 43.9 33.8 34.1 25.6 25.0 25.1 26.8 32.5 	 12.9	 12.0*
Others	 19.6 23.4 23.1 22.3 5.9	 4.1	 n.a n.a	 10.4	 14.9
Note: * excludes housing loans sold to Cagainas.
Source: Bank Islam (unpublished data 1984-1986), Bank Islam Annual Reports 1987-1991, Bank Negara Annual Report
1985 & 1991.
Hence it can be observed that the smallest share of total financing was directed
to the agricultural sector which accounted for 0.5 per cent of total financing in 1984
and has increased only to 5.2 per cent of total financing in 1991. Even though
the share to total financing is comparable with the commercial banking industry
average of 4.8 per cent in 1991, one would expect a larger commitment from Bank
Islam since a majority of Muslims in Malaysia are engaged in agricultural activities.
However this 'neglect' may be explained by the fact that the Bank is constrained
by the distribution of its current branch network which is mainly concentrated in
the urban areas. Secondly, the Bank is unable to compete with other development
finance institutions and state agencies which are already serving this sector. The
Agricultural Bank, for example, provides credit facilities to the small farmers and
fishermen at a very low rate of interest of 4 per cent per annum as well as interest-
free loans to the hard-core poor farmers to venture into viable agricultural projects.
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Figure 7.6	 Distribution of Finance by Sectors 1991
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Nevertheless there is still a market gap for Bank Islam in the agricultural sector
especially among medium scale farmers and agricultural entrepreneurs who may
not wish to use the services of other financial institutions because of nba.
In contrast to the agricultural sector, the proportion of total financing to the
manufacturing sector has expanded significantly especially after the recession from
12 per cent in 1987 to 30.3 per cent in 1991. The diversificatipn of lending into
the manufacturing sector reflects the increasing importance of this sector as the
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main engine of growth for the national economy, as discussed in Chapter IV.. Apart
from financing small manufacturing enterprises, Bank Islam has created a niche in
syndicating large capital loans for corporations in the petroleum refining Industry.
Besides the Bai Bithamin Ajil financing facility for the Shell oil subsidiary company
in 1990, the Bank has also lead-managed another M5O million in joint venture
musharakah participation with the other financial institutIons to raise capital for
the same oil company. The other facility was an ijarah financing to another oil
refining company in 1990 where the bank funded MS63.5 million for the leasing
of capital equipment to the company. It is expected that with the Increase in its
shareholders' funds after the flotation in 1992, the Bank will continue to expand its
niche in providing large financing to the industrial sector. Whilst the ability of the
Bank to become the sole funder for large corporate financing was previously limited
by its small capital base; it is now able to compete in the market. With a bigger
share capital of M$133 million the Bank can expand into large scale financing
within the 30 per cent (of shareholders' fund) credit limit as set by the Central
Bank.
Based on the above facts and figures it does appear that Bank Islam has played
a limited role towards the socio-economic development of the Muslim community,
specifically in terms of exploiting the benefits that can be reaped from equity fi-
nancing as envisaged in theory. Its loan portfolio has followed a pattern similar
to that of the other interest-based banks in the country Its niche appears to be
among residential house buyers and industrialists. The former is an important
contribution of the bank in promoting house-ownership especially amongst Mus-
lims who hitherto have been constrained from taking housing loans either from the
government or building societies because of nba. The fact that a high proportion
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of these loans are small loans directed mainly to the middle and low income group
proves that the Bank does cater to the needs of this group of clients. Neverthe-
less, the Muslims in Malaysia had generally expected Bank Islam to play a more
enterprising role especially in providing finance to the newly-established Malay en-
trepreneurs. It was argued that the Bank could have made a greater contribution
towards achieving the restructuring objective of the NEP had it resorted seriously
to equity-financing rather than debt-financing. 231
 Because of its concentration on
the 'second-line techniques' the Bank has also been accused of being concerned
only in making profits and neglecting the welfare elements in its operations.232
At the outset, the predominance of the 'second line techniques' in the financing
portfolio of Bank Islam may be attributed to the Bank's effort to remain viable
at the initial stage of development. On the one hand, the Bank has to ensure a
reasonable rate of return to its depositors in order to encourage deposits. On the
other, it has the responsibility of earning profits for its shareholders and also to be
able to survive in the market. The uncertainty of profits and the lack of investment
opportunities during the recession implied that there was a greater risk of loss
associated with mudarabah and musharakah in such an adverse economic condition.
As a consequence the Bank had to resort to the 'second line techniques' whereby
expected profits could be predicted from the mark-up or profit-margin and that the
risk of loss would be minimized by the collateral requirement. Project-financing,
especially mudarabah is not easy to operate and requires experts or trained bank
personnel in project evaluation and supervision which Bank Islam, as an infant
bank lacks. Based on these impediments, it was envisaged that Bank Islam would
have faced grave consequences had it ventured into mudarabah in a big way in the
231 Ariff 1989:16
232 Man 1988:91.
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mid198Os.233
Apart from the above constraints, another important and fundamental factor
that has resulted in the lack of equity-financing is the negative attitu4e of the
present management towards the theory of IslamIc banking as advocated by the
writers on Islamic banking. Basically, the present management does not accept the
theory that Islamic banking should be organized solely on the basis of mudarabah
and musharakah. According to Dr Abdul Halim,234 the theory which implicitly re-
jects the application of the markup and the profit margin contracts lacks the basis
of the Shariah and contradicts the Quranic injunctions which permitted trade as
an alternative to nba. He points out that the so-called 'second line techniques' of
financing are contracts of exchange based on the principle of trade which are not
only legitimate but also encouraged in the Qunan. On the other hand, the legiti-
macy of the two-tier mudarabah is dubious, since not all madhab (schools) accept
the view that a bank which acts as the mudarib can enter into a second round
of rnudarabah transaction with the entrepreneur-borrower. Dr Abdul Halim also
believes that an Islamic commercial bank has no direct responsibility in promoting
socio-economic development. This view is based on the argument that the place
of the Islamic commercial bank is in the business or tijani sector with the prime
objective of making profits. Nevertheless its contribution to the development pro-
cess is in the form of zakat that it pays from the accrued profits. Socio-econorthc
development, on the other hand, lies directly in the hands of the State and enforced
by state-agencies and specialized financial institutions.
The preceding arguments impiy that the financing portfolio of Bank Islam is
233 Ariff 1989:30.
234 1989.
-
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likely to remain concentrated on the 'second line techniques' in the near future.
Unless there is a change in the attitude of the management it would seem unlikely
that the Bank will direct its customers' deposits mainly into the profit-sharing
type of financing as conceived in theory. As emphasized by Dr. Abdul Halim
as a commercial bank which provides a variety of banking and financial services
Bank Islam will provide both debt-financing and equity financing. The immediate
strategy of the Bank in equity financing is to develop a venture capital subsidiary
that will raise capital in the secondary market through musharakah.
In summary the financing portfolio of Bank Islam has mainly been geared
towards the provision of interest-free finance to the extent that nba is not in-
volved in any of its transactions. This refers to the predominance of trade or sale
related financing where the Bank earns its profits by charging a markup. Equity-
participation has only been confined to large corporations to minimize the risks
of loss. Finance to the lower income group has been concentrated in soft areas
of finance mainly housing which reflects a high degree of risk aversion and con-
servatism on the part of the Bank at the expense of exploiting the potentials of
higher profits. Even though the Bank has managed to report profits since the
second year of its operation, the rates of returns on investment account deposits
have been relatively low, ranging from 5 per cent to 7.5 per cent over the period.
The dividends paid to shareholders were also marginal ranging from 2 per cent to
5 per cent between 1988 and 1991.
Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that Bank Islam has been successful in the
disbursement of its funds to deficit units for profits without endangering its via-
bility and survival in the process of growth as stated in its corporate objective.
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7.5 Financial Performance
7.5.1 Revenue, Income and Profitability
Notwithstanding its social obligations to the development process, the ultimate
test for Bank Islam, as a financial intermediary, lies in the ability of its managerner.
to generate income and profits that will ensure its existence in the market
The Bank made its first profit in the second year of its operation in 1985 and
has remained profitable since then (Table 7.20). Pre-tax profits were relatively low
during the recession with the lowest profit of M$3.7 million in 1986. However, as
the economy recovered and the amount of deposits and financing expanded, profits
before tax grew strongly between 1987 and 1990 with a record growth of almost
60 per cent per annum in 1989. Nevertheless, the growth of pre-tax profits has
moderated in recent years rising only by 35.4 per cent in 1990 and marginally by
3.4 per cent in 1991. The small rise in pre-tax profits was consistent with the
decline in the growth of income as a consequence of the fall in deposits and the
volume of financing.
The ability of the Bank to remain profitable reflects the higher amount of
income and revenue over its expenditure. The operating revenue of the bank which
constitutes income derived from its pool of depositors' and shareholders' funds
stood at M$97.7 million in 1991 compared to M$36 million in 1985. About 90 per
cent of the Bank's operating revenue is derived from its depositors' funds; which
consists primarily of income from financing and investment in the MGICs. Income
from the shareholders' funds, on the other hand, which is made up mainly of income
from fee-based services as well as investments in the MGICs constitutes only 10 per
cent of total revenue. The large share of income derived from the depositors' funds
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Table 7.20 - Bank Islam Group: Revenue, Income and Profits
1984- 1991
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Income from:
Depositors' Fund	 n.a n.a n.a n.a 64.3 80.9 81.3 84.2
Shareholders'funds	 n.a n.a n.a n.a 7.0	 7.9	 10.4 13.5
Operating Revenue	 n.a 36.1 50.1 62.6 71.3 88.3 91.7 97.7
Less:
1.Profits to Depositors n.a 17.7 26.6 32.7 34.7 45.4 45.1 49.5
Income	 u.a 18.4 23.5 29.9 36.6 43.4 46.6 48.2
Expenditure	 n.a n.a n.a n.a 30.4 33.5 33.2 34.1
Pre-Tax Profits 	 -1.3 4.4 3.7
	
4.5	 6.2	 9.9	 13.4 14.1
Profit After Tax
	 -1.8 2.6 2.2	 0.9 2.9	 5.2	 6.9 8.4
Annual Growth	 (%)	 ____
Operating Revenue	 n.a 5.4 38.9 24.8 13.6 24.9 3.3 6.8
Income	 n.a n.a 27.7 27.3 22.4 18.6 7.4	 3.4
Expenditure	 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 10.2 -0.9 2.7
Pre-Tax Profits	 n.a 138 -15.9 21.6 37.7 59.7 35.4 3.4
2.Profit to shareholders n.a n.a n.a n.a 29.6 35.5 36.2 34.7
Profitsharing Ratio 1:2
	
54:46 56:44 55:45 59:41
Note: n.a - not available
Source: BIMB Annual Report 1984-1991
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provides evidence of the Bank's reliance on financing and investment rather than
on fee-based banking services. Because of its greater contribution, the depositors'
fund has been attributed a greater profit-sharing ratio relative to the shareholders'
fund. In 1991, the ratio was 59:41 in favour of the depositors.
The growth of Bank Islam's expenditure has been relatively modest rising at a
rate of 10.2 per cent in 1989 and 2.7 per cent in 1991. The decline in the growth of
expenditure in 1990 and 1991 was mainly attributed to the decline in the amount of
provision for bad and doubtful debts. It was observed that whilst the cost of other
expenditure items increased during the three year period the amount of provision
for bad and doubtful debt fell from M$8.8 million in 1989 to M$5.5 million in 1990
and further down to M$3.5 million in 1991. On the other hand, personnel costs
which constituted the largest portion of expenditure has continued to expand from
41 per cent of total expenditure in 1990 to 46 per cent in 1991 in line with the
recruitment of new staff as the bank established two to three new•branches every
year.
7.5.2 Return on Assets and Equity
Even though the growth of its pre-tax profits has moderated since 1990, the
pre-tax return on assets (ROA) 235 , as denoted by the ratio between net-profit before
tax and average total assets, has improved tremendously over the past few years
rising from 0.4 per cent in 1988 to 1.3 per cent in 1991. (Figure 7.7)
Since the pre-tax return on assets ratio measures the capability of the manage-
ment in generating profits from its assets, the overall increase in the profitability
reflects the expansion in the financing and fee-based activities over the period. The
235 This is calculated in terms of Bank lalam as a Group which includes its subsidiaries.
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overall increase in profitability reflects the expansion in the volume of financing
and increased fee-based activities over the period.
Figure 7.7 - BIMB: Asset Growth & Return on Asset
85	 86	 87	 88	 89	 90	 91
Assets	 -	 Pretax Return
Source: IM8: Public Listing Prospectus 1991
The profitability of Bank Islam has also improved from the shareholders' point
of view. The after-tax return on equity (ROE), as represented by the ratio of the
Bank's profit after tax to its average shareholders fund, has risen every year except
in 1987 when net profit before tax was very low at M$O.9 million compared to the
average shareholders' funds of M$83.3 million. In 1988 the ROE ratio (at the Bank
level) was 3.5 per cent compared to 0.01 the previous year. By 1991 it has risen
to 8.7 per cent.
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The relatively high return on equity in 1988, was reflected in the Bank's de-
cision to pay a maiden dividend of 2 per cent to its shareholders that year. The
dividend payout has increased by one percentage point annually but has remained
lower than the profits pay-out on investment account deposits. This may be ex-
plained by the fact that total deposits represented a higher proportion of total
liabilities which implies a higher risk on the part of the depositors. Nevertheless,
the margin between dividend and profit pay-outs has been closing up every year
from 2.6 per cent in 1988 to 0.6 per cent in 1991 which reflects the expansion
of share capital and the decline in deposits. As can be seen in Table 7.21 total
deposits stood at 13.7 times to total equity in 1989 but has declined to 11.8 times
in 1991.
Table 7.21	 BIMB: Return on Equity, Dividend, Deposit to
Shareholders' Fund
(As at 30th June)
	 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Return on Equity	 1.1 3.5 5.9 7.6 8.7
Dividend	 0.0	 2.0	 3.0 4.0	 5.0
Deposit to Shareholders' funds(times) 9.9 11.9 13.7 13.2 11.8
Deposit to Totai liabilities (%)
	
86.8 88.6 89.8 87.4 86.6
Source: BIMB Annual Report 1984-1991
Interbank comparisons shows that Bank Islam has a competitive position
among the other interest-based banks of similar size. As evident in Table 7.22,
its pre-tax return on assets (ROA) for the 1990 financial year is higher than that
of the Oriental and Ban un Lee banks. The return on equity (ROE) ratios also
show that Bank Islam had the highest return on equity among the peer group. Its
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return on equity ratio was 15.6 per cent in 1990 which was higher than the ratios
for the other banks. This implies that Bank Islam has provided a more attractive
return on investment to its shareholders.
Table 7.22 - Pre-tax Rates of Return (%)
Bank	 Return on	 Return on
Asset (ROA) Equity (ROE)
Bank Islam(FY 1991)	 1.3	 18.0
Bank Islam(FY 1990)	 1.1	 15.6
Hock Hua (FY 1990)	 1.7	 11.4
Ban Bin Lee(FY 1990)	 0.8	 8.4
Pacific (FY 1990)	 1.2	 12.0
Oriental (FY 1990)
	 0.6	 11.0
Source:BIMB: Public Listing Prospectus 1991
7.5.3 Liquidity
One of the serious problems faced by Bank Islam in maintaining the trade-off
between risk and return on its assets is the persistent problem of excess liquidity.
Essentially, the Bank is required to comply to a primary liquidity requirement of
10 per cent of its current and savings deposits and 5 per cent of its investment
deposits. However, the liquidity ratio of Bank Islam has always exceeded the above
requirements. The average primary liquidity ratio, 236
 was 12.9 per cent between
1988 and 1991 with the highest ratio of 15 per cent in 1989 (Table 7.23). Its
secondary liquidity ratios237
 has far exceeded the 5 per cent minimum requirement.
236 This is expressed as the ratio between cash and balances plus MGICs pledged for interbank settle-
ment over the sum of current and savings deposits.
237 This is represented by the ratio of the sum of cash plus MGICs to investment deposits
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Between 1987 and 1989, an average of 56 per cent of total investment deposits
were held in liquid assets mainly in the form of MGICs. The highest ratio in 1988,
reflects the rise in the Bank's investment in the MGICs which rose by 38 per cent
from 1987. The problem of excess liquidity is unique to Islamic banks primarily
because of the lack of Islamically accepted short-term investments in the secondary
market. As shown in Table 7.22 even though the interest-based banks also suffer
from excess liquidity 238 their rates are lower than that of Bank Islam because of the
availability of relatively more short-term investments in the money market ranging
from overnight loans to government securities.
Table 7.23 - Liquidity Ratios 1987-1991
Bank
	
	 Liquidity Ratios (%)
1987 198k 1989 1990 1991
Bank Islam
Primary Ratio n.a 13.9 15.0 11.2 11.6
Secondary Ratic 53.7 59.8 55.2 45.9 43.6
Ban Hin Lee	 18.9 29.6 43.9 29.1 n.a
Hock Hua	 n.a 27.5 38.4 28.5 n.a
Source: BIMB: Annual Reports 1987-1991, Ban Bin Lee Annual Reports & Hock Hua An-
nual Reports relevant years.
For Bank Islam the problem of excess liquidity is partially mitigated by the
issue of the MGICs by the Central Bank. In the 1980s, more than 90 per cent of
the Bank's liquid assets were held in the MGICs. One of the recent attempts by
Bank Islam to reduce its concentration on the MGICs is the issue of the shahadah
238 The liquidity ratio for the interest-based commercial banks is set at 17 per cent of total deposits.
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al-dayn debt certificates in 1990. The medium term nature of these certificates pro
vide higher profitability than the MGICs whilst still provide liquidity to the Bank
through securitization in the capital market. A sharp decline can be noticed in the
secondary liquidity ratio in 1990 and 1991 as the Bank reduced its investments in
the MGICs following the introduction of the shahadah ad-dayn debt certificates.
7.6 Conclusion
From the preceding analysis we can conclude that Bank Islam has proved to
be a viable financial institution for the mobilization of interest-free deposits based
on the principle of profit-sharing.
Our analysis of Bank data has shown that the religious factor rather than the
economic factor was more closely associated to deposit growth in the first two years
of operations. Based on this observation and looking at the high growth of deposits
and the number of depositors during that period it can be deduced that Bank
Islam has fulfilled a developmental role of mobilizing savings and investment that
conventional banks have previously failed to attract. Nevertheless, the bank has
experienced significant withdrawals of investment deposits in recent years following
the rapid rise in interest-rates on fixed deposits. This implies that the future growth
of deposits wifi depend on the ability of Bank Islam to offer competitive rates of
return. It should also consider expanding its branches into the rural areas where
a captive market is presumably ready to be exploited.
On the asset side, the performance of Bank Islam has been constrained by
the recession in the mid-1980s and the decline in deposits in recent years. In
view of the 'hostile environment' the Bank has adopted a policy of prudence
by concentrating on trade-related methods of financing and soft areas of finance.
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Because of the deemphasis on equity participation and profit-sharing methods of
financing the performance of Bank Islam has fallen below public expectations on
its developmental role.
Nevertheless Bank Islam has proved its commercial viability and profitability
which is a good signal for a competitive market in Islamic banking after the end
of the Bank's 10 year monopoly in 1993.
294
Chapter VIII
A Survey Of The Market: Methodology And Fieldwork
8.1 Introduction
Having examined the functional and financial performance of Bank Islam based
on the facts and figures obtained from secondary sources published by Bank Islam,
the Central Bank and other official publications it is pertinent to extend this study
to the other side of the counter specifically to explore the banking behaviour and
perceptions of the depositors and the non-depositors of Bank Islam. The main
objective of this study is to find out the bank selection criteria of Muslims who bank
at Bank Islam on the one hand and Muslims who are not the depositors of Bank
Islam on the other; and consequently examine their implications for the marketing
of Islamic banking services to a bigger segment of the Malaysian population.
The significance of Muslim individuals as the target market for Islamic banking
in Malaysia cannot be underestimated. Their continuous support is essential to
ensure the survival of an institution which has been specially set up to meet their
religious obligations. The stagnation of Bank Islam's total deposits in 1990 and
1991 is an indication that Islamic banks cannot depend entirely on the corporate
sector for deposits when interest rates are rising. It is envisaged that the rate of
interest does not matter to a majority of Muslim individuals. Yet many still do
not patronize Bank Islam due to other factors which have denied the Bank of its
potential market share.
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In broad terms, the Muslim market can be divided into three segments: the
strict or pious Muslims who totally avoid the nba banks, the less strict Muslims who
hold accounts both at Bank Islam and the interest-based banks; and the least strict
Muslims who have accounts only at conventional banks. The banking behaviour
of these groups are expected to differ from each other and an understanding of
these differences may provide some useful implications on how the Islamic banking
services should be marketed to meet the banking needs of each group. There is
a set of questions to be addressed in this study; for example: What factors have
attracted depositors to Bank Islam?; why do other Muslims prefer the conventional
banks?; how would depositors respond if interest-based banks were allowed to
open Islamic counters?; were depositors aware of the different methods of Islamic
financing available at Bank Islam?; what kind of bank services are needed?; and
are these services available at Bank islam?
This chapter provides the research methodology of this market study. Section
2 introduces the research design. Section 3 outlines the objectives and hypotheses.
Section 4 discusses the development and administration of the field work while the
methods of statistical analyses are presented in Section 5.
8.2 The Research Design
A research design is simply the framework or plan for a study used as a guide
in the collection and analysis of data. Its purpose is to ensure that the study will
be relevant to the problem being investigated and that economical procedures will
be undertaken. The choice of a research design therefore depends greatly upon the
nature of the study and the amount of resources available.
There are many types of research design and many ways of classifying them.
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According to Sellitz et al (1976), research can take the form of three bask designs—
either exploratory, descriptive or causal depending on the fundamental objective
of the research. Churchill (1983) further explains that the objective of exploratory
research is to gain insight and ideas, to establish prIorities for further research and
to clarify concepts. Descriptive research, on the other hand, is typically concerned
with determining the characteristics of certain groups or of testing the relationships
between two variables. Causal or explanatory research takes the form of experi-
ments and is concerned with identifying cause-and-effect relationship. Taken as a
whole these three basic designs can be treated as different stages in a continuous
process of study which generally begins with exploratory research as the initial
step followed by descriptive and eventually causal research.
Based on the above classification and the limited resources available to the
researcher, this study is best described as exploratory and descriptive because it
involves initial steps such as the identification of factors, describing the charac-
teristics of Bank Islam depositors and non-depositors and testing the existence of
relationships. The main objective of choosing such an approach is to prepare the
ground for future experimental research where cause -and-effect relationship can
be investigated.
8.3 Research Objectives and Hypotheses
There are two main objectives of this study.
1. To examine the banking behaviour of the different categories of Bank Islam
customers and determine the factors that have influenced them to bank at
Bank Islam.
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2. To examine the perception of the Muslim non-depositors of Bank Islam, to
find out why the conventional banks were more preferred and to identify the
main reasons which had discouraged this group from opeiling accounts at Bank
Islam.
8.3.1 Hypotheses - Depositors of Bank Islam
It may be expected that the interest-free nature of Bank Islam gives the bank
a competitive edge over its interest-based counterparts ir deposit mobilization
among Muslims. It is also envisaged that since the market is predominantly Mus-
lim the bank can depend on the religious motivation to attract customers. The
examination of Bank Islam performance in Chapter VII, however indicates that
the role of the religious factor may have been overemphasized. Whilst the religious
motivation may have been effective during the initial years as shown by the rapid
growth of deposits and depositors the relatively slower growth of both variables in
recent years could imply the interplay of other factors. The secondary data has
also shown that institutional customers have withdrawn their deposits from Bank
Islam when interest rates on conventional bank deposits rose in 1990. This study
will attempt to find out if individuals would also respond in the same manner.
Earlier researchers on Bank Islam have drawn several hypotheses about the
customers of Bank Islam. Man (1986:52) has made the following conjectures;
1. 'some depositors come to the bank because they fully accept the Islamic prin-
ciples regardless of the rate of profits.'
2. 'quite a large number of them will continue to be customers only if the bank
can maintain a reasonable rate of profit.'
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3. 'the majority of depositors still maintain contacts with conventional banks, at
least by holding current account deposits.'
In another study, Mohd Yaacob (1986:112) envisaged that,
1. 'pious Muslims virtually provide the captive market for the Islamic bank....(and
are)... .expected to prefer the Islamic bank over the conventional banks in plac-
ing their funds.'
2. 'the majority of Bank Islam depositors are new depositors who have had no
accounts in conventional banks before.'
3. 'the non-Muslims and less pious Muslims form the non-captive open market
source of funds and this group of savers is likely to respond differently to
differences between the rates of returns offered by the Islamic bank and the
conventional bank.
Both studies seem to indicate that at least two categories of Bank Islam depos-
itors can be identified namely (a) those who bank exclusively at Bank Islam and
(b) those who bank at Bank Islam and yet hold other accounts in the conventional
bank. As seen earlier, Man (1986) envisaged that many of Bank Islam depositors
would belong to the latter category. As stated by Man 'the majority of depositors
still maintain contacts with conventional banks ...'.
Mohd Yaacob (1986:216) notes that a majority of Bank Islam depositors would
be newcomers into the banking system hence bringing into the Islamic bank new
deposits which could not be mobilized by the interest-based banks before. It
is envisaged that this hypothesis is more relevant to Islamic banks in the rural 	 -
economies where the religious motivation to avoid nba is still high. This is based
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on the findings by Ungku Aziz (as described in Chapter VI) which show that a
sizeable portion of savings in the rural areas were kept out of the banking Bystem
because of lack of halal outlets.
The subject of interest in this study, however, is not the rural Muslim but the
urban Muslim. This is based on the fact that, in general, only the latter has been
been exposed to Islamic banking in Malaysia. As we have seen in Chapter VII the
branches of Bank Islam are concentrated mainly in the urban areas. Moreover,
whilst depositors in the rural areas may be considered as the loyal depositors of
Bank Islam, it is the urban Muslims (with their different levels of piety) who
pose the real test for the viability of Islamic banking in the competitive urban
environment.
Our main hypotheses are:-
(i) The Islamic bank depositors in the urban areas have developed the financial
habit of institutionalizing their savings even before the establishment of the Islamic
bank. It is expected that hoarding was not customary in the urban areas and that
a majority of depositors, even those who now bank exclusively with Bank Islam
had held accounts in the interest-based banks previously.
(ii) The establishment of Islamic banking in the urban areas has mainly effected a
transfer of resources within the market by attracting funds that might have been
placed in the interest-based banks; with little impact on mobilizing new deposits
which the interest-based banks had failed to attract.
(iii) A majority of depositors are likely to hold accounts in both the Islamic and
nba banks for the purpose of convenience.
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(iv) Depositors who bank exclusively with Bank Islam are more committed in
avoiding nba and hence form the loyal depositors of the Islamic bank.
(v) The religious motivation, rather than convenience or social influence is the
main reason why depositors choose Bank Islam as their primary bank.
(vi) Depositors who do not bank exclusively with Bank Islam are more likely to
forgo Islamic banking for the sake of convenience.
(vii) Depositors who bank exclusively with Bank Islam are not likely to agree with
the establishment of Islamic counters at the conventional banks.
8.3.2 Hypotheses: Muslim depositors of Riba banks
The third group of Muslims who form the potential market for Islamic banking
in Malaysia are Muslims who hold bank accounts only in the conventional banks.
To the best of the researcher's knowledge no research on the Malaysian financial
market has been devoted to investigate the bank selection behaviour of the Muslims
or Malay depositors of the conventional banks. Nevertheless, it is envisaged that
the bank selection criteria for these depositors would not differ much from the
typical conventional bank depositor.
Several studies conducted separately in the United States have shown that de-
positors are mainly motivated by 'convenience' in their bank selection decisions.
Kaufman (1969) reported that convenience and the quality of services were con-
sidered most important by customers in selecting a primary bank. It is noted that
the term 'convenience' has many connotations to consumers and hence differ-
ent aspects of convenience need to be considered. These would include locational
convenience, transportation facilities and transactional convenience. A study by
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Bowers (1969) showed that fifty-eight per cent of the population sample surveyed
rated convenience to home and work as the most important determinant of their
bank choice. Other factors have also emerged in more recent studies. For example
Anderson, Cox and Fuicher (1976) found that 'recommendation by friends' was
ranked more influential than 'locational convenience'. This finding is supported
by another study (Tan 1981) carried out in Singapore which reported that con -
sumers tend to follow the advice of friends, neighbours and family hence giving
less importance to convenience when selecting a bank. Chua (1989) also found
that Malaysian depositors tend to attach high importance on the financial services
(which include the rates of interest on deposits and loans) besides convenience and
social influence.
Whether the bank selection behaviour of Muslims who bank entirely with the
nba banks are similar with that of the typical conventional bank customer will be
investigated.
On the assumption that Muslims who bank with the interest-based banks are
less committed in avoiding nba the following hypotheses will be tested.
(i) Muslims who bank with the interest-based banks do not perceive that interest
is the same as nba.
(ii) These Muslims are motivated to bank primarily with the conventional banks
because of convenience.
(iii) These Muslims are not motivated to bank with the Islamic bank because of
the lack of convenience.
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8.4 Fieldwork: Methodology and Administration
Since this study is exploratory in nature the sample survey would be the most
appropriate method of data collection. By this method, data is collected only
from a portion of the population from which appropriate inferences about the
population can be made. Even though this would mean that the sample serves
only as an approximation of the entire population it has been recommended as
highly accurate if done with care239.
To ensure that findings based on the sample survey is a reasonably accurate
representation of the population, it is necessary that the sample is selected in such
a way that findings based on it are likely to correspond closely to those that would
be obtained if the whole population were studied240 . Obviously a sample which
represents the population perfectly can rarely be created but the chances of forming
a representative sample can be considerably enhanced if certain requirements and
procedures are followed.
A good sample is one which is free from bias and error in the selection process.
According to Yates241
 bias may arise because of the following reasons;
1. The 'representative' sample is deliberately selected
2. Failure to cover the whole of the chosen sample (as a result of unreturned postal
questionnaires for instance) and
3. Substitution of another convenient member of the population when the chosen
unit is not available.
239 Bailey 1987: 83
240 Sellitz op.cit:73
241 1971:9
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It is universally agreed that the simplest and perhaps the only way to avoid
these causes of bias is to draw the sample either entirely at random or at random
subject to restrictions which are necessary to improve accuracy but do not intro-
duce bias into the results. 242 . Random or probability sampling does not, however,
mean haphazard sampling. A random sample can only be obtained by following
some proper probability process such as the drawing of lots or using a table of
random numbers. De Vaus243
 asserts that because the characteristics of most ran-
domly selected samples will be close to those of the population, the probability
theory can be used to help make inferences about the true population.
Sampling error, on the other hand, refers to differences between the sample and
the population which arise because of improper sampling. 26'. Such error depends
on two main factors245 ;-
(a) The variability of the key characteristic under study.
The more varied the population with respect to the relevant characteristic,
the larger the potential sampling error will be. One way to reduce this kind of
sampling error is to stratify the population into blocks so that the units in each
block or stratum are as homogeneous as possible. Each strata is then sampled at
random according to definite proportions so that each stratum will be represented
in these proportions in the sample.
(b) The size of the selected sample.
The larger the sample the smaller will be the sampling error. According to
242 Yates 1971, Bryman 1990
243 1990:53
244 Bryman op.cit:103
245 De Vaus op. cit, Yates op cit:17
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Yates, other things being equal, the random sampling error is approximately in-
versely proportional to the square root of the number of units included in the
sample. Thus a sample size of 100 gives a sampling error of 10%, a sample of 400
has a sampling error of 5% and if the sample is increased to 1,000 cases the sam-
pling error will fall to 3%. Sampling error can therefore be reduced by increasing
the sample size up to a certain level.246
8.4.1 The Sampling Process
The following six steps as outlined by Churchill 247 served as a useful guide to
the researcher in drawing the sample for this study;
1. Define the population.
2. Identify the sampling frame
3. Select the sampling procedure
4. Determine the sample size
5. Select the sample elements
6. Collect the data from the designated elements.
8.4.2 The Population
The population or the target group for this study would comprise the depositors
of Bank Islam and the Muslim depositors of the interest-based banks. Because the
establishment of Bank Islam is to cater for the banking needs of the Muslims it is
Most survey samples are limited to a maximum of 2000 cases since beyond this point the extra
cost is uneconomical in terms of achieving greater accuracy. For example an increase from 2000 to
2500 cases only reduces the sampling error from 2.2% to 2%.
247 1983:342.
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decided to limit the population in this study only to Muslims. Non-Muslims who
have accounts either at Bank Islam or the conventional banks would be excluded,
and so would the conventional bank depositors who had accounts at Bank Islam.
In other words the population of Bank Islam depositors would include those who
bank exclusively at Bank Islam and those with at least two bank accounts - one
at Bank Islam and the others at conventional banks. However the population
of depositors interviewed at the conventional banks must not have any account
at Bank Islam. Hence two population samples have been selected in this study.
There were, however several options on how these two samples could be selected.
One of the possibilities was to select a representative sample of Muslim de-
positors from all the branches of Bank Islam in the country. Correspondingly,
non-customers would be drawn from conventional banks in the same areas as the
respective branches. However after reviewing the location and dispersion of the
Bank Islam branches (as shown in Figure 8.1), it was envisaged that enormous re-
sources would be required and many administrative and organizational difficulties
would arise if the survey was to be conducted at all the branches simultaneously
within a specified period of time period.
The most suitable method of data collection for such a sample would be the
mail questionnnaire but as indicated in the research literature this method usually
suffers from a low response rate and requires follow-ups (and additional time and
resources) if the response rate needs to be improved.248
Another alternative was to select customers from an urban and a rural location.
At the outset such a sample would closely represent the Muslim population, which
were predominantly rural, besides providing the opportunity to make inferences
248 Bailey 1987, Babbie 1973.
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on the rural Muslims who were assumed to be previously unbanked and more reli-
giously motivated than their urban counterparts. However the idea was abandoned
after making the following observation. It was found that of the twenty-seven Bank
Islam branches at the end of December 1990 seventeen (62.9%) were located in the
capital towns249 , as shown in Figure 8.1, and the remainder in secondary towns
which were classified as urban centres. 25° Since all the Bank Islam branches were
located in the urban areas the attempt to capture the rural Muslims in this study
was therefore considered not feasible.
Taking into account the limited resources available to the researcher it was
decided to narrow down the alternatives within the Kuaia Lumpur area where the
researcher was based. As can be seen in Figure 8.1 there were four Bank Islam
branches in Kuala Lumpur. Using the elimination process, branches at Jalan Tun
Razak and Jalan Perdana were considered unsuitable in terms of their location
and the type of customers served. The former was located within -the premises of
Tabung Haji and the latter at the Islamic Centre. It was envisaged that the sample
from both branches would most likely be heavily biased towards people who work
in both organizations. The representativeness of a sample from such a population
would be questionable.
An observation of the locations of the Jalan Raja Laut and Medan MARA
branches showed, however that both branches were conveniently located in the
centre of Kuala Lumpur in an area where other conventional bank branches were
also closely concentrated. As can be seen in Figure 8.2 the Jalan Raja Laut
branch is almost surrounded by the branches of three of the top four domestic
capital towns can be taken as proxies for urban areas. (Shaninugain 1989).
250 Urban centres refer to gazetted areas with population of 10,000 or more. (Fifth Malaysia Plan
1986-1990 p 182)
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banks in Malaysia (namely Malayan Banking, UMBC and Public Bank) while
the Medan MARA branch is close to the branch of Bank Bumiputra the second
largest domestic bank. 25 ' It became clear that the Jalan Raja Laut area met the
criteria required for a representative sample of the depositors of Bank Islam and
the conventional banks respectively. The choice of the Jalan Raja Laut area was
considered justified after considering the following factors:-
1. The Jalan Raja Laut area was situated in the heart of Kuala Lumpur.
Not only was it a centre for commerce and business where people from
different walks of life converged but several government departments and
many private sector offices were also located within the area. As can be
seen in Figure 8.2 the banks were also located between two main traffic
arteries.
Based on these observations it was envisaged that the population of depositors
sampled from the Bank Islam branch and the conventional banks were not likely to
be biased to only one section of the urban population. The probability of selecting
a bias sample of people from the same occupation, age-group, socio-economic sta-
tus and education would be avoided thus enhancing the representativeness of the
sample. In the case of Bank Islam, the Jalan Raja Laut branch was the first Bank
Islam branch to be established in Malaysia. Because of the religious motivation, it
is envisaged that the depositors of the Jalan Raja Laut Branch would also include
Muslims who were based outside the Jalan Raja Laut area which would add to the
representativeness of the selected sample.
2. The close proximity of the Bank Islam branch and the other conventional
bank branches assured the existence of a competitive environment in which
251 Refer to Figure 7.2 in Chapter VII to see the ranking of the domestic commercial banks
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Figure 8.2 - Jalan Raja Laut: Location of Commercial banks as at 31
December 1990
OLIDAY 1NFi CITY CENTRE
:
CITY HALL
'V\ "hi!
0 Bank Buiniputra Malaysia Berhad
OBank Islam Malaysia Berhad(Jalafl Raja Laut)
QBank Islam Malaysia Berhad(Medafl MARA)
QMalayafl Banking Berhad
PubliC Bank Berhad
GUMBC
Source:.Kua].a Lumpur Bankers' Directory 1991
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these banks operated. The conventional bank depositors were most likely
to be aware of the existence of Bank Islam in the area and had the fea-
sible option of selecting Bank Islam as their alternative bank. Similarly
the conventional banks were easily accessible to the depositors of Bank Is-
lam giving them the same opportunity of transferring their accounts to the
interest-based banks if desired.
3. The concentration of the banks in one area fitted the resources available
to the researcher. The researcher would also save a lot of traveffing time
between the banks when coordinating the administration of data collection.
Based on the above considerations it was decided that the sample of Bank
Islam depositors was to be drawn from the Jalan Raja Laut branch and nba bank
depositors would be selected from the branches of the following top four domestic
banks in the same area namely; (i) Malayan Banking Berhad (MBB) (ii) Bank
Bumiputra Malaysia Berhad (BBMB) (iii) United Malaysian Bank Corporation
(UMBC) and (iv) Public Bank Berhad (PBB).
8.4.3 The Sampling Frame
The method of data collection for this study was originally planned on the
assumption that the ideal sampling frame as identified in the research literature
would be accessible to the researcher. The sampling frame refers to a list of all
elements in the population from which the elements for the sample are to be drawn.
Examples are directories, lists, records, electoral rolls and census statistics. In the
case of this study the ideal sampling frames would be the lists of all depositors at
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the Jalan Raja Laut branch and all depositors at the selected conventional bank
branches. The availability of such lists would enable the researcher to stratify the
population according to the various accounts and then select depositors from each
group in proportion to the whole population. The researcher would also be able to
sample the population through the use of a table of random numbers which would
ensure random sampling and prevent biasness.
However after some correspondence with the Head Offices of Bank Islam and
the other conventional banks it was found that accessibility to the targeted lists was
not possible. The main reason given was the constraint stated in the information
and secrecy clause in the 1989 Bank and Financial Institution Act. 252 Because
of this constraint the researcher had to devise and develop alternative sampling
frames. Following discussions with collegues at the Faculty of Economics and the
Statistics Department of the University of Malaya, it was decided that the sampling
frame can be in the form of a specific time period during which all 'depositors who
fulfilled the definition of the population as mentioned in the preceding section and
who came to the selected bank branches would form the elements of the population
and stood an equal chance of being randomly sampled.
A period of two weeks (from 23rd March 1991 until 8th April 1991) was chosen
as the appropriate sampling frame. Whilst the two-week period was granted by
the management of Bank Islam, Bank Bumiputra and UMBC for the survey to be
carried out on their premises, only one week permission (from 28th March until 3th
April 1991) was given by Malayan Banking and Public Bank. Both time periods
formed good bases as both covered end of month peak period during which many
252 Under this Act any director or officer of any licensed institution is prohibited from disclosing or
publishing any information relating to the affairs or account of a particular customer without the
permission of the customer or to any persons other than those permitted by the Act. (Banker's
Journal Malaysia December 1989:22)
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customers normally visit their banks to do business.
8.4.4 The Sampling Procedure
The 'random arrival' method of sampling was chosen. By this method the
daily banking opening hours were divided into one hour intervals. An interviewer
would be stationed near the entrance of the bank hail and specific times within
the hour would be set to select and interview a depositor at random. For example
the interviewing time may be set at every 30 minutes past the hour. Thus all
depositors who entered the bank hail at exactly 10.30 a.m stood an equal chance
of being selected but only one will be selected at random and approached to be
interviewed. Tithe selected depositor refused to be interviewed a new time will be
set to sample the next respondent.
Table 8.1 shows the plan of the sampling procedure which was applied in
sampling the depositors of Bank Islam. Two interviewers were assigned to Bank
Islam. Each was required to interview one depositor at every half hour interval
making a total of four respondents in every hour with the exception of certain
times (for example between 2 p.m and 2.30 p.m on weekdays) as shown in Table
8.1.
Both interviewers were not allowed, however to sample two depositors at the
same time. For example only one depositor who entered the hail at 10.30 a.m would
be selected. Thus if interviewer A had selected a customer at 10 a.m, interviewer
B would set his target time at 10.15 a.m. Since the interview was estimated to
take about 20 or 25 minutes to complete, the next customer to be interviewed by
A would be randomly selected from those who entered the bank hail at 10.30 a.m.
The next interview by B would take place at 10.45 a.m.
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Table 8.1 - Sampling Schedule of Bank Islam Depositors
Time Period 23.3.91 until 8.4.91
Number of interviewers: 2
Monday to Thursday
Time Schedule	 No. of Respondents (per day)
lOa.m-lla.m	 1111
lla.m-12a.m	 1111
12a.m-lp.m	 1111
lp.m-2p.m	 1111
2 p.m - 2.30p.m	 1 1 - -
Total: 18 x 9=162 respondents
Friday (2 days)
Time Schedule	 No. of Respondents (per day)
lOa.m-lla.m	 1111
11 a.m - 11.30 a.m	 1 1 - -
Friday Prayer Break
2.45p.m-3.45p.m	 1111
3.45 p.m - 4.15 p.m	 1 1 - -
Total: 12 x 2=24 respondents
Saturday (3 days)
Time Schedule	 No. of Respondents (per day)
9.30 a.m - 10.30 a.m 1 1 1 1
10.30 a.m - 11.30 a.m 1 1 1 1
Total: 8 x 3=24 respondents
Total sample Size=2 10 respondents
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The same principles of random arrival method of sampling was also applied
at the conventional banks. Hence for banks which granted the two week period
the daily five hours bank opening time during the weekdays (11 days) and the two
hours opening time on Saturdays (3 days) were divided into one hour intervals.
The same procedure was also applied to the other two banks which gave the one
week permission (5 weekdays). However only one interviewer was stationed at each
bank and only one respondent was required to be sampled within an hour. This
was deliberately planned to allow sufficient time for the interviewer to sample a
Muslim customer who did not hold any account at Bank Islam and exclude those
who had.
It is worth noting that the interviewers were told to follow trictly to the time
schedule and Were regularly supervised to ensure that the instrjiction was properly
carried out. By strict adherence to the set time schedule a systematic random
method of sampling was therefore implemented. Every depositor who came to
the selected banks during the two weeks and one week time frame stood an equal
chance of being randomly selected hence avoiding the problem of sampling bias
which could arise if sampling was done only on a certain day of the week or at a
particular time of day only.
8.4.5 The Sample Size
The next step was to determine the size of the two samp1e. As discussed earlier
sampling error can be reduced by increasing the size of the sample. However there
is seldom a definite rule as to how large a sample should be for a given study.
According to Dc Vaus (op. cit) the size of the population from which the sample is
drawn is largely irrelevant for the accuracy of the sample because what is important
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is the absolute size of the sample itself. As indicated by Fowler (1988) too small a
sample may affect the generalizability of the study. Gay 253 has however provided
the following guidelines in determining the sample size;
In general, the minimum number of subjects believed to be acceptable for a study depends
upon the type of research involved. For descriptive research, a sample of 10% of the population
is considered minimum. For smaller population 20% may be required. For correlational studies
at least 30 subjects are needed to establish the existence or nonexistence of a relationship. For
causal-comparative and experimental studies, a minimum of 15 subjects per group will give some
degree of confidence that conclusions reached concerning differences between groups are valid
It is also suggested that 'deciding what sample size to use is almost always a
matter more of judgement than of calculation' 254 . For example if subgroups were
to be analysed separately, the sample should be sufficiently large so that when it is
reduced into separate subgroups, according to age, class or sex for instance, there
will be enough cases in each subgroup.
Besides accuracy, time and cost are also key factors to be considered. A com -
promise between these three factors will determine the final sample size for a given
study.
In the case of this study the sample size of the Bank Islam depositors was
originally planned at 200 cases. However the time schedule allowed more deposi-
tors to be randomly sampled at the same cost. As a result a total of 210 Muslim
depositors were sampled from the Jalan Raja Laut branch. It is also worth noting
that the completed questionnaires were also checked frequently to count the num-
253 1976:77.
254 Hoinville et xi 1977:61.
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ber of first customers sampled (those who opened accounts at Bank Islam in 1983)
to ensure that sufficient number of cases in this subgroup 255 were sampled so that
meaningful inferences about this subgroup could be made.
The size of the sample of the Muslim depositors of the conventional banks was
relatively smaller with 170 cases. This was mainly due to the relatively shorter
time frame of one week granted by two of the selected conventional banks. It
was noted however that even though the sample of non-customers was 40 cases
less than that of the customers the difference in sampling error between both
samples was marginal at 7 percentage point. Bearing in mind that the sampling
error is approximately inversely proportional to the square root of the sample size,
the sampling error for the customers' sample was calculated to be 6.9% at 95%
confidence level compared with 7.6% for the non-customers' sample at the same
level of confidence.256
8.4.6 The Survey Instruments
The collection of data in survey sampling can be undertaken either by using
questionnaires, interviews, observations or a combination of any of these methods.
Choosing the most appropriate method of data collection is one of the most far-
reaching decisions that a researcher must make257 If data are to be collected using
the questionnaire further decisions have to be made on how the questionnaire is to
be administered; should it be by mail, face-to-face, in groups or individually. If the
interview method is chosen on the other hand this would warrant further decisions
255 at least thirty as suggested by Gay (1976)
256 Even though the sampling errors may appear rather large, the actual sampling errors are assumed
to be smaller since the population is homogeneous in terms of race and religion and great diversity is
also not expected in terms of other key variables such as age, occupation and education. Moreover
the sampling error for the overall group of 380 cases is 5.13% which is quite reasonable.
257 Fowler 1989:61.
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about whether the interview will be conducted over the phone or in person. On
top of this the researcher must also decide on how the questions are to be asked.
Should they be open or closed? The time involved in the data collection exercise
also tends to vary by mode. Some methods (such as the interview) require more
trained staff than others and the mail and telephone surveys generally cost less
than personal interviews. Mail surveys however are prone to low response rates.
Each form of data collection therefore has its advantages and disadvantages. The
researcher has to weigh the strengths and weaknesses of these methods and choose
the one which suits his/her study situation.
The survey intrument adopted in this study are two questionnaires of closed-
end questions which will be administered to the two samples of Bank Islam depos-
itors and non-depositors respectively. Basically the questionnaires are designed in
such a way so that most respondents will be able to fill in the answers without the
aid of the interviewer. However in cases where the questionnaire cannot be self-
administered the interviewer will read the questions to the respondents and record
the answers. This method is known as the recording or interview-schedule 258
 in the
literature. The interview-schedule is preferable when the reading and writing skills
or the level of motivation of the respondent is estimated to be low 259 . Some of the
respondents in this study were expected to fall into these categories and the use of
the interview-schedule would help to minimize the probability of non-completion.
Nevertheless the instrument used is still a set of structured questions which is the
questionnaire. The interview-schedule and the questionnaire only differ in terms
of the method of administration and Bailey 26 ° has in fact referred to both types
258 Moser 1986, Bailey 1987.
259 Fowler 1988:63.
260 1987:106
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under the generic name "questionnaire".
The decision to use closed-end questions with multiple choice answers took
into account the advantages of such a method, the size of the sample, the type of
population involved and the type of data to be collected.
At the outset, the questionnaire is the most widely used technique of data col-
lection (De Vaus 1991). It is highly structured whereby each respondent is asked
the same set of questions and is only required to check the proper response from
a set of alternative answers provided in the questionnaire. Information gathering
is therefore strictly controlled. Open-ended questions often produce all kinds of
answers which are difficult to code and may not be comparable across respondents.
Moreover a questionnaire which contains too many open-ended questions may frus-
trate the respondents. These questions may be left unanswered if the respondent
finds them too demanding in terms of his time and effort which' would in turn
result in a low response rate which the researcher clearly wishes to avoid.
The relevance of multiple-choice questions in this study is quite apparent. It
was anticipated that both speed and clarity were important in order to get a high
rate of response in this study since most respondents were expected to visit the
bank during the lunch hour or had taken a few minutes off their working time and
hence had not much time to waste. A vast majority of the questions are therefore
presented either in checklists with a list of items to choose from or in Likert-style
formats with rating scales asking the respondents to indicate how strongly they
agree or disagree with a certain statement. In all the questions the respondents
are only required to tick the relevant box or circle a number. Complex double
negative sentences, double-barelled and leading questions have also been avoided.
319
The objective is for the respondent to answer the questions with much ease and
speed in order to acquire a high response rate.
It is worth noting, however, that some of the checklist questions are provided
with the additional category called 'other (please specify)' to allow for unantici-
pated responses. The Likert-scale questions are also given the 'no opiriion'response
to avoid forcing the respondents to offer opinions on issues on which they have no
opinion (De Vaus op cit).
For the researcher, data from closed-end questions would be relatively easier
to process and analyse especially when large samples are involved. In this study
data were to be collected from a large overall sample of 380 cases. Open-ended
interviews may b time-consuming when administered on such a large number
of respondents. Because answers might not be uniform the researcher may also
misinterpret the answers and thus miscode the responses. In contrast, because
standard answers can be selected from multiple-choice questions these are much
easier and quicker to code with greater accuracy. This would not only save time
and money but would also result in greater reliabffity.
Finally the multiple-choice questions suit the type of data to be collected in
this study. Since the method of analysis requires nominal and ordinal data (to be
discussed in detail later) the former can be obtained from the checklist format and
the latter from the Likert-style questions.
8.4.7 Questionnaire Design and Pilot Tests
Before any questionnaire reaches its final draft it is usually preceded by many
stages of preliminary research and pilot tests. In developing the questionnaire for
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this study the researcher had consultations of successful University of Durham
PhD theses also addressing Islamic banking 201 , books and articles on marketing
research262 , questionnaires of other studies on bank depositors in general and
Islamic banking in particular204.
Based on the preliminary research, the first draft of two questionnaires fr
the two samples in this study were developed and translated into the Malay lan
guage. An important element in questionnaire design that was pointed out t the
researcher was to format the questions in accordance to the computer requirement
so that the data produced could be processed and analysed using the Statistical
Package for Social Science (SPSS).
The questionnaires were then put through a pilot test. The questionnaire was
given to eight Malaysian postgraduate students at the University of Newcastle
who still held bank accounts in Malaysia. Four of these students had accounts
with Bank Islam while the other four had accounts with the conventional banks.
Among the aims of the pilot test were;
• to check the wording of each question in terms of clarity and understanding,
• to eliminate ambiguous and repetitive questions,
• to find out the length of time needed by respondents to complete the question-
naires and
• to identify other faults in terms of layout and the ordering of the questions.
261 The researcher owes thanks to Dr Ramadan Shallah and Dr Saad Harran for preliminary discussions
on the relevant questions that can be developed. The former has examined the experience of Islamic
banking in Jordan and the latter in the Sudan.
262 Churchill 1983, Dodge 1982, Ho 1987, Channon 1987.
263 Chua 1989, Bolton Commitee Report 1971.
264 Bashir 1982, Al-Mashal 1987, Jabr 1989.
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The respondents were asked to comment on the above points. Based on the
comments from the pilot test several modifications were made to the wording of
some questions. It was noted that since the questionnaire was to be answered by
'the man in the street' it was important to write the questions in simple Malay.
Some questions considered less important to this study were omitted to reduce the
length of the questionnaires. Contingency questions which applied only to certain
people were also rearranged in separate sections and given clear instructions to
avoid confusion.
It is worth noting that both questionnaires were again piloted for the second
time in Malaysia to ensure their reliabilities. Taking into account that the first
test was piloted on respondents with high academic education the questionnaires
were then piloted on a different category of respondents. Six Muslim clerical staff
at the Faculty of Economics University of Malaya who were depositors of the
interest-based banks were asked to complete the questionnaires. and give their
comments. The questionnaire for the Bank Islam depositors was tested on ten
employees of the Public Service Department at Wisma PKNS Jalan Raja Laut.
The feedback from both pilot tests resulted in further minor modifications even
though the basic content of the questionnaires remained unchanged. Finally the
questionnaire was read by a senior lecturer at the International Islamic University
whose area of interest was Islamic banking. 265 After some revisions the final drafts
of the questionnaires were then typed on the computer to obtain neat and good
quality layouts which were aimed to encourage good response from the respondents.
265 Here the researcher is indebted to Zakariya Man of the Kuliyyah Economics International Is-
lamic University Kuala Lumpur. Thanks are also due to Sulaiman Abu Bakar and Yasmin Azhar
of Bank Examination Section, Central Bank MaInysia for fruitful discussions on improving the
questionnaires.
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8.4.7.1 Questionnaire Content
Two separate questionnaires namely the Bank Islam Depositors Questionnaire
(referred to as the Bank Islam Questionnaire after this) and the Commercial Bank
Depositors Questionnaire (or the Commercial Bank Questionnaire hereinafter)
have been designed to obtain data from the two samples respectively. The Bank
Islam Questionnaire is relatively longer and more detail than the latter in view
of the fact that the subject of greater interest in this study are the depositors of
Bank Islam.
As shown in Appendices G and H the front covers of both questionnaires
contain brief introductions to the respondents and specific instructions to the in-
terviewers. The respondent is assured of his/her anonymity and the confidentiality
of the responses. The label Faculty of Economics University of Malaya was also
printed in bold, again to encourage good participation from the respondents.
In general the question content in both questionnaires can be divided into three
distinct types as classified by Dillman (1978:80) namely behaviour, attitude and
attribute questions.
Part 1 of the Bank Islam Questionnaire (Appendix G) comprises behaviour
questions which aim to establish the banking habit of the depositors. The re-
spondent is asked when his/her account at Bank Islam was opened, whether other
accounts are also held in the conventional banks and whether he/she had saved in
commercial banks before the establishment of Bank Islam. The objective of these
questions is to differentiate the different categories of Bank Islam customers and to
investigate if any differences can be identified with respect to their banking habits.
The questions in Part 2 are also behaviour questions. The respondent is pre-
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sented with a list of factors which may have influenced his/her decision to bank at
Bank Islam. The degrees of influence are arranged in progressive order from the
lowest scale 1 which measures 'no influence'to the highest scale of 5 which denotes
the 'strongest influence'. The respondent is required to indicate to which extent
each factor has influenced him/her to open an account at Bank Islam.
Part 3 contains a mixture of behaviour and attitude questions. Section (a) aims
to elicit the respondent's awareness of the services of Bank Islam. This is followed
by a question on the respondent's awareness about nba. The last two questions are
attitude questions; the first on the difference between nba and interest and secondly
on the imminent introduction of Islamic counters at interest-based banks.
Parts 4 and 5 are made up of attitude questions in the Likert-style format. The
questions in Part 4 aim to tap the respondent's evaluation of Bank Islam in terms
of its image, location and services. A short-list of services yet to be provided by
Bank Islam are presented in Part 5 and the respondent is asked to tick the extent
to which each service is needed.
Part 6 of the questionnaire consists of attribute questions designed to obtain
information about the respondent's demographic characteristics. These include
questions on his/her gender, age, education, religion, education, occupation and
income. The distance of Bank Islam from the respondent's home and workplace
are also of interest.
It is worth noting that many writers recommend that these personal ques-
tions are best asked at the end of the questionnaire so as not to discourage the
respondent. As noted by Oppenheim (1966:57);
.such questions should come right at the end of the questionnaire, by which time we can
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hope to convince the respondent that the inquiry is gnrnue.
The same advice is also given by De Vans (114);
Commence with questions the respondent will enjoy answenugDo not start wh dgnio-
graphic questions such as age, marital status etc.
Finally some blank spaces were left at the end of the quetIonnaire in Part 7 to
give the respondent an opportunity to note down any problems faced when doing
business with Bank Islam and also to give suggestions if any.
The content of the Conventional Bank Depositors Questionnaire (Appendix
H) is very similar to its Bank Islam Questionnaire. However the layout of the
questions can be divided into three distinct sections. The first section consists of
Parts 1 and 2 which are related to the respondent's behaviour and attitude towards
his/her current interest-based bank. The questions in Part I aim to measure how
far each of the listed factors has influenced the respondent's choice in selecting the
current bank while the respondent's evaluation of the bank in terms of its image,
location and services is tapped in Part 2.
The second section which comprises Part 3 concerns Bank Islam and aims to
elicit the respondent's awareness and perception of the Islamic Bank. All questions
in this section are identical to those of Part 3 in the Bank Islam Questionnaire.
Finally the respondent's demographic characteristics are established in Part 4
which forms the third section of the questionnaire.
Similarity in question content between both questionnaires has been kept as
close as possible so that comparative analyses between the two samples can be
undertaken.
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8.4.8 Administration of the Fieldwork
Before the main fieldwork could be carried out in the halls of the selected banks
the researcher had to carry out two important tasks, The first task was to obtain
permission from the Head Offices of the respective banks. For this purpose the
researcher approached the Public Relation officers of the five banks, With the letter
of introduction from the Deputy Dean of the Faculty of Economics University of
Malaya and the Chairman of the Department of Economics University of Durham
written permissions were granted by the management of the banks without much
delay.
The next task was to select and train interviewers who would assist the re-
searcher in carrying out the survey. Because the survey was to be carried out
simultaneously at the five banks it was necessary to employ the services of inter-
viewers. These interviewers play a central role in sampling the respondents, asking
questions and recording the answers. Adequate training was therefore essential
before the major fieldwork begins.
Fowler (1988:107-114) has listed several characteristics of 'good interview-
ers' which researchers should look for. Among them are:-
i) good reading and writing skills. Many survey organizations prefer interview-
ers who have college experience or at least completed high school.
ii) above 21 years old. Some evidence suggest that data collected by teenagers
are not as good (Sudman et al 1974).
iii) an ability to work at flexible hours as surveys require interviewers to be
available when respondents are available.
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iv) 'a knack of instantly engaging people personally and a kind of confident
assertiveness in order to enlist cooperation.'
Since the timing of the fieldwork coincided with the beginning of the long
semester break of the University of Malaya the job attracted several undergradu-
ates. However only six interviewers were required. Ad hoc interviews were con-
ducted and eventually six third year undergraduates who fitted the above criteria
were selected.
The interviewers were trained for two consecutive days. The first day was
devoted to explaining various aspects of the fieldwork to the interviewers.
• The interviewers were briefed on the specific purpose of the survey and the
anticipated uses of the data so that these basic information can help answer
queries from respondents when enlisting cooperation.266
• Detailed explanation and demonstration on the random arrival sampling proce-
dure were given. The focus of discussion was the sampling schedule (as shown
in Table 8.1). The importance of strictly following this method of sampling
was stressed.
• All the items in the questionnaire were discussed. The interviewers were taught
the appropriate manner of approaching the respondents and enlisting cooper-
ation. They were also reminded to ask questions exactly as written and record
the answers as instructed.
The next stage was to conduct experimental interviews and role playing which
are obviously one of the most important aspects of interviewer training. These
266	 was discovered during the fieldwork that some respondents expressed their reluctance to coop-
erate if the survey was carried out on behalf of political parties.
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exercises, which were carried out on the second day, provide an opportunity for the
interviewers to put their newly acquired skills into practice and for the researcher
to provide the necessary help. The researcher conducted the first interview as an
example followed by the interviewers who took turns playing the roles of respondent
and interviewer.
After the intensive training programme the interviewers were ready to begin the
fieldwork on the designated day. Two interviewers were based at the Bank Islam
branch while the other four were assigned to each of the four conventional banks
respectively. Each interviewer was introduced to the respective bank managers for
the purpose of identification and was also made to wear a photo name-tag for the
same purpose.
The following points were noticed during the fieldwork.
• A vast majority of the respondents were happy to answer the questionnaire
when approached by the interviewers. Those who refused for the first time were
offered an incentive of M$5. The response rate was 100% as all questionnaires
were completed.
• Self-administered questionnaires at Bank Islam took about 10 minutes to com-
plete while those conducted by the interview-schedule took about 20 to 25
minutes at Bank Islam and 15 minutes at the conventional banks. It was found
that most respondents at Bank Islam preferred the interview-schedule while
both methods were frequently used at the conventional banks.
It is important to note that even though the fieldwork was carried out by the
interviewers it was consistently supervised by the researcher who made frequent
rounds to the five bank branches which were located almost next door to each
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other. To monitor the job each interviewer was required to fill in the day and time
of each interview as well as his name on the front cover of each questionnaire. The
completed questionnaires were collected and checked by the researcher at the end
of every working day.
8.5 Statistical Techniques and Data Treatment
The collected data were brought back to the University of Durham to be pro-
cessed and analysed. The data were first coded and entered into columns so that
analysis by the SPSS computer programme could be carried out.
To analyse the data both descriptive and inferential statistics would be utilized.
Descriptive statistics are those which summarize the data and describe the pattern
of responses obtained from the questionnaire. These statistics include frequency
distributions, histograms and bar charts. However in this study only frequency
distributions wifi be used to see the number of cases that fall into each category.
These distributions will be summarized by measures of central tendency such as
the median, mode and mean.
Central tendency is one of the most important ways of summarizing a distri-
bution of values for a variable as it indicates the most typical value in the distri-
bution. 267 The mean may be the most well-known measure of central tendency
compared to the median and the mode. However whether the mean, median or
mode should be used depends largely on whether the variables to be analysed are
nominal, ordinal or interval. In the case of this study reference will be made to
the guidelines as shown in Table 8.2 in choosing the most appropriate measure.
267 Bryman 1991: 82.
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Table 8.2 - Appropriate Measures of Central Tendency
Variable level Central tendency 	 Dispersion
1. Nominal	 Mode	 variation ratio
2. Ordinal	 Median/ Mode	 decile range
3. Interval	 Mean! Median standard deviation
Whilst the purpose of using descriptive statistics was to summarize the data,
detect missing or miscoded data and derive important information about the typ-
ical distribution of each variable, two other salient aspects of data analysis in this
study are factor analysis and testing the association between key variables by using
inferential statistics.
The technique of factor analysis is employed to analyse the data collected for
Part 2 and Part 1 of the Bank Islam and the Conventional Bank questionnaires
respectively. Its purpose is to identify which variables constitute .the main bank
selection criteria for the depositors of both banks. Given the list of fourteen likely
variables in the Bank Islam Questionnaire, it is possible to reduce this large set,
by factor analysis, to a smaller set of more general underlying factors - each group
of factors having certain characteristics in common or are measuring the same
underlying dimension.
The extraction of these groups of factors is based on the correlations be-
tween the variables whereby only factors having eigenvalues (to be explained later)
greater than one are considered significant. Since this technique is best explained
with the data it will be discussed further in Chapter IX.
Having identified the main motivational factors for the main samples further
analysis can be done using inferential statistics to test the hypotheses designed for
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the subgroups. The relevance of inferential statistics lies in the fact that inferences
can be made from the sample to the population; specifically whether the trends
described in the sample are likely to represent the population from which the
sample is drawn. In the case of this study, inferences will be based on the tests of
statistical significance at the 0.05 level.288
A number of statistical techniques have been designed to test the relationship
between two variables. These techniques are classified as bivariate methods of
analysis and here again certain rules of thumbs can be referred to in deciding
which methods are appropriate for this study as shown in Table 8.3.
Based on Table 8.3 the relevant inferential statistics in this study would be
the chi square to test the relationship between nominal variables; and the Mann-
Whitney U-test and the Kruskall-Wallis tests when the combinations are between
ordinal and nominal variables. In addition the Spearman Rank Correlation would
also be utilized to measure the relationship between the ordinal variables.
The purpose of the chi square test is to see if two variables pf a crosstabulation
are statistically independent. In this test the null hypothesis is phrased to state
that no relationship exists between the two variables. If the null hypothesis cannot
be rejected using the chi-square statistics this implies that the two variables do
not have anything in common and hence are statistically independent of each
other. It is worth noting, however that the chi-square oniy tests the relationship
or association between two variables and does not indicate which causes the other.
268 As a rule of thumb 0.05 is appropriate for small samples and 0.01 or lower for larger samples (De
Vaus 1991:191).
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Table 8.3 - Guidelines for Selecting Measures of Associations
Variables	 Appropriate	 Inferential
(level of measurement)	 Methods	 Statistics
1.Nominal/nominal	 Crosstabulations clii square
2.Ordinal/ordinal	 Rank Correlation Test of significance
(many categories)	 of Spearman's rho
3.Interval/interval	 Crosstabulations	 Test for significance
(few categories) 	 of Pearson's r
4.Nominal/ordinal	 Crosstabulations
(dichotomous nominal	 1. Mann-Whitney U-test
variable)
(nominal variable more	 2. Kruskafl-Waflis test
than2 categories)	 __________________ _____________________
5.Nominal/interval	 Comparison of means F-test (one-way analysis
of variance)
6.Ordinal/interval	 Rank correlation	 Test for significance
of Spearman's rho
7.Interval/interval	 Scattergram	 _____________________
Source: Derived from De Vaus (1991) Table 11.5
On the othr hand, both the Mann-Whitney U-test and the Kruska.11-Wallis
test are nonparametric or distribution-free tests which require less strict assump-
tions about the underlying population and the type of data to be analysed. Unlike
parametric test (such as the F-test and the t-test) which require data to be mea-
sured on interval levels and that samples are drawn from normal populations,
nonparametric tests do not require the shape of the underlying distribution to be
specified even though samples need to be selected at random. As stated by Norusis
(1988:139);
When data are ordinal - or interval but from a markedly nonnormal distribution - the Mann-
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Whitney test is the procedure of choice... .Significant levels for nonparametric tests can be
determined regardless of the shape of the population distribution since they are based on
ranks.
Nonparametric tests can also be used on nominal data. As indicated by Siegel
(1956:33);
Nonparametric methods are available to treat data which are simply classificatory, i.e., are
measured in a nominal scale. Non- parametric technique applies to such data.
Last but not least, these tests have the advantage of being applicable or.
samples. This is again confirmed by Siegel (1956:32) who states;
If sample sizes as small as N=6 are used, there is no alternative to using a nonparametric
statistical test unless the nature of the population is known exactly
In relation to the Mann-Whitney U-test Siegel also adds that the test is;
one of the most powerful of the nonparametric tests, and it is a most useful alternative to
the parametric t-test when the researcher wishes to avoid the t-test's assumptions (p. 116)
Both the Mann-Whitney and the Kruskall-Wallis tests will be used to explore
the differences between scores on two variables. For example to find out if de-
positors and non-depositors differ in terms of their income. Since there are only
two groups (depositors and non-depositors) to be compared the Mann-Whitney
test will be used. 269
 It will compare the number of times a score from one of the
samples is ranked higher than a score from the other sample. If the two groups
are similar, then the number of times this occurs should also be similar for the two
groups. (Bryman 1990:129).
269 The Kruskall-Wallis test is applicable to variables having more than two categories.
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Chapter IX
Findings and Analysis
9.1 Introduction
In line with the main objectives of the survey as stated earlier in Chapter
VIII the statistical analysis in this chapter is generally concerned with three main
aspects;
1. to test several hypotheses about the depositors of Bank Islam including
those considered by earlier researchers on Islamic banking in Malaysia.
2. to identify the main factors influencing bank selection decisions among Mus-
lim depositors in Malaysia, specifically the depositors of Bank Islam and the
depositors of the conventional bank.
3. to examine the market implications of the obtained results in order to gain
some insights to how a bigger market can be captured.
9.2 Analysis of Bank Islam Depositors
As discussed in Chapter VIII (Section 8.3.1) the depositors of Bank Islam
can be divided into two main categories; namely those who bank only at Bank
Islam and those with other accounts in conventional banks. Which of these two
groups of depositors forms the majority of Bank Islam depositors would reflect the
success of Bank Islam in providing an Islamic alternative to western banking. If a
majority of depositors bank only with Bank Islam this may imply that the Bank
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has exerted a great impact on mobilizing savings without interest. Man (1986:87),
however envisaged that a majority of depositors would not bank exclusively with
Bank Islam and still maintain contacts with the conventional banks.
To assess this expectation the following null hypothesis was tested.
• H0 : The depositors of Bank Islam are equally distributed between deposi-
tors who bank only at Bank Islam and depositors who hold other accounts
in conventional banks.
The survey finding as shown in Table 9.1 seems to agree with Man's viewpoint.
Table 9.1 - Frequency Distribution of Bank Islam Depositors
Do you have accounts Frequency Per cent Cumulative
in other banks?	 Per cent
Yes	 129	 61.4	 61.4
No	 81	 38.6	 100.0
Total	 210	 100
Table 9.1 shows that more than half (61.4 per cent, N=129) of Bank Islam
depositors had accounts in other banks and only 38.6 per cent (N=81) bank exclu-
sively at Bank Islam. The null hypothesis can therefore be rejected which implies
that a majority of depositors do not typically bank only at Bank Islam
but hold other accounts in the conventional banks too.
We shall examine each category of depositors in turn.
9.2.1 Depositors who bank exclusively at Bank Islam
It is generally assumed that because this group of depositors do not hold ac-
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counts in the conventional banks they are the pious Muslims who are conscious
of avoiding nba or interest as required by the Shaniah. It is assumed that these
depositors had never saved in traditional banks because of the presence of inter-
est and became newcomers of the banking system with the establishment of the
Islamic bank. How far these assumptions are true can be further examined. The
following null hypothesis will be first tested.
• H0 : Depositors who bank only at Bank Islam typically held accounts in
conventional banks previously.
Table 9.2 - Frequency Distribution: Held Conventional Bank
Accounts Previously
Did you save in
	
Frequency Percent Cumulative
commercial banks before? 	 Per cent
Yes	 55	 67.9	 67.9
No	 26	 32.1	 100.0
Total	 81	 100.0
The frequency distribution in Table 9.2 shows that 67.9 per cent (N=55) of
these depositors had accounts in conventional banks previously. Only 32.1 per
cent were newcomers into the banking system. This finding uggests that the null
hypothesis cannot be rejected which implies that a majority of depositors who
now bank only at Bank Islam are not new depositors because they have
had accounts in conventional banks previously.
To some extent this finding seems to support the view that Muslims in urban
areas have developed the banking habit and are therefore likely to have kept their
money in traditional banks before the establishment of Bank Islam. This leads to
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an important implication for the market; that the establishment of Bank Islam
branches in the urban areas has only effected a transfer of resources
within the market with little impact on mobilizing new deposits which
the interest-based banks has previously failed to attract because of nba.
This result seems to support the general view that the impact of Islamic banking
in deposit mobilization in the urban areas is expected to be marginal compared to
its potential in the rural areas. It is envisaged that new deposits for Bank Islam
can be mobilized more from the rural areas where a sizeable portion of savings
are being hoarded because of the the absence of halal outlets. The findings of
Professor Ungku Aziz in the late 1950s had shown that Muslims in the rural areas
were highly pious and had preferred to hoard their savings rather than save in the
interest-based banks. It would be of great interest to find out if such behaviour
still exists today and test the impact of Islamic banking on the mobilization of
these rural savings. However as mentioned earlier, it is not possible to carry out
such investigation within the scope of this study owing to the fact that the present
network of Bank Islam branches are concentrated in the urban areas.
This study has also identified the depositors' main reasons for saving in con-
ventional banks before. During the survey the depositors were asked to indicate
three main reasons why accounts were kept in interest-based banks before. The
responses to this question were expected to support the hypothesis by Mohd Yaa-
cob that 'some of them have been saving with conventional banks for safe-keeping
and convenience.'
Our findings are shown in Table 9.3 which indicate that deposits were made
in conventional banks before the establishment of Bank Islam for purposes other
than interest. About 20 per cent of the responses (N=34) indicated that in the
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absence of the Islamic bank there was no other alternative but to keep their money
in the conventional bank. 11.9 per cent indicated that their salaries were credited
directly into the commercial bank and another 9 per cent trusted the banks for
the safety of their money. All three reasons seem to indicate one common purpose
among the depositors, that is, to ensure the safety of their money. This further
supports the argument that Muslims in urban areas had already developed the
banking habit before the establishment of Bank Islam. The second motivating
factor was convenience. 19.6 per cent of the responses indicated that they were
motivated by the close proximity of the conventional bank to their place of work.
This finding therefore supports the hypothesis by Mohd Yaacob. It is clear that
even though depositors who bank exclusively at Bank Islam had held
accounts in conventional banks before, these accounts were kept as a
means to safeguard the safety of their money and for convenience rather
than for the aim of earning interests.
Table 9.3	 Frequency Distribution: Purpose of Saving in
Conventional Banks before.
Why did you save in 	 Frequency Percent Cumulative
commercial banks before? 	 Percent
No Bank Islam branch	 34	 20.2	 20.2
Near to workplace	 33	 19.6	 39.8
Salary paid in the bank	 20	 11.9	 51.7
Safety of money	 15	 9.0	 60.7
Others(Miscellaneous)	 41	 24.4	 85.1
(gives only 2 reasons) 	 25	 14.9	 100.0
Total	 168*	 100.0
Note:* refers to total response, not cases since each respondent were asked to give 3 main reasons (i.e 3 x 56).
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9.2.2 Depositors With Other Accounts in Conventional Banks
As shown earlier this group forms the majority of Bank Islam depositors as
more than half (61.4 per cent) of the sampled population belonged to this group.
This raises the question of the type of accounts held and the reason for opening
these accounts.
Man (1986) believes that depositors would hold current account in the con-
ventional banks, presumably for transactional purposes as these accounts do not
yield any interest.
Our results show that only a few depositors had current accounts in the con-
ventional banks. A majority of accounts were in the form of savings. As can be
seen in Table 9.4, 79 per cent (N=102) of these depositors had savings account in
conventional banks. 13.2 per cent had current accounts and an insignificant 2.3
per cent made fixed deposits.
Table 9.4 Frequency Distribution: Type of Account In Other Banks
What account do you hold Frequency Per cent Curnulativ
in the other banks?	 Percent
Savings account	 102	 79.1	 79.1
Current account	 17	 13.2	 92.2
Fixed deposit	 3	 2.3	 94.6
Savings & Current	 7	 5.4	 100.0
Total	 129	 100.0
The high proportion of savings account held can be explained by the fact that
these accounts were relatively easy to open. Compared to the current account
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which requires an introducer and a minimum deposit of M$500 anybody can open
a savings account with a deposit as little as M$1.
Table 9.5
	 Crosstabulation: Type of Account in other banks BY
Income; Controlling for Account in other bank? Value=Yes
Type of account	 Income	 Row Tota
700 & below 701-140( 1401 & above
Savings	 37	 37	 13	 87
row	 42.5%	 42.5%	 14.9%	 100%
Current	 4	 9	 10	 16
row	 17.4%	 39.1%	 43.5%	 100%
Column Total	 41	 46	 23	 110
	
37.3%	 41.8%	 20.9%	 100%
chi-square=10.20	 d.f= 2	 Significance 0.00604
It is obvious that the current account requirements can generally be fulfilled
by depositors with high income. A crosstabulation between the type of account
held in other banks and the income of these depositors seems to confirm this. As
can be seen in Table 9.5 even though depositors at all levels of income tend to hold
more savings rather than current accounts it is apparent that the current account
is least held by those with low income (17.4%) while savings is least popular among
the high income group (14.9%). This relationship is supported by the chi-square
value of 10.20 which is higher than the critical chi-square statistics (2=5.99) at
0.05 level of significance and 2 degrees of freedom. 270 The null hypothesis of no
association between the type of income held and income is rejected. The result
270 The degree of freedom for the chi-square statistic is calculated as (r - 1) (c - 1) where r=number
of rows and C=number of columns of the crosstabulation.
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is likely to hold in the population since the observed significance level (0.00604)
is lower than the 0.05 confidence level. It can therefore be inferred that savings
accounts in the conventional banks are most likely to be held by low income and
middle-income earners and the current accounts are most likely to be held by
those with high income. It can therefore be inferred that the additional
accounts maintained in the conventional banks are mainly in the form of
savings accounts belonging to low and middle income depositors whilst
a smaller percentage of current accounts tend to be held by those with
high income.
In relation to the high proportion of savings accounts held in the conventional
banks is the question of whether this group of depositors are after all attracted by
the higher rates of interest offered by these banks.
Our findings in regard to this question are presented in Table 9.6. It is evident
from this table that the relatively higher rates of interest had very little impact
on these depositors. Only 1 per cent of the responses indicated that savings were
made in the conventional banks because of the higher rates of interests offered
on deposits. Conversely, a greater percentage of responses show the importance
of factors related to convenience namely the number of bank branches (22.5%),
the availability of ATMs (21.2%) and locational convenience especially from home
(11.1%). Apparently these are the three factors that Bank Islam lacks at its present
stage of development.
This finding suggests that even though a high proportion of Bank Is-
lam depositors hold interest-bearing savings accounts in other banks
they were not typically attracted by the higher rates of interest paid on
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these accounts. Deposits were made in the conventional banks mainly
for the purpose of convenience specifically to take advantage of the
many branches and the ATM facility which Bank Islam stifi lacks. Other
things being equal it is expected that this group of depositors will trans-
fer all their accounts to Bank Islam once these facilities are made avail-
able in future.
Table 9.6 - Frequency Distribution: Reasons for Deposits in Other
Banks
Why do you also save	 Frequency Percent Cumulativi
in other banks?	 Percent
1.Many branches	 87	 22.5	 22.5
2.ATM available	 82	 21.2	 43.7
3.Near home	 43	 11.1	 54.8
4.Near workplace	 40	 10.4	 65.2
5.Near to where I shop	 31	 8.0	 73.2
6.Wellknown	 23	 6.0	 79.2
7.Fast and efficient service	 16	 4.1	 83.2
8.Salary paid there	 16	 4.1	 87.3
9.Higher Interest rates	 4	 1.0	 88.3
(gives only one reason)	 45	 11.6	 100.0
Total	 387*	 100
Note:* refers to responses, not cases since respondents were asked to give three main reasons. (i.e 3 reasons x 129
cases)
Nevertheless, our findings seem to suggest that accounts held in the conven-
tional banks were mainly supplementary accounts. As evident in Table 9.7, Bank
Islam is typically the primary bank for these depositors because 72 per cent (N=93)
342
had more savings in Bank Islam than the conventional bank and 58 per cent did
more business or had more transactions at Bank Islam compared to the conven-
tional bank.
Table 9.7 - Frequency Distribution: Bank with more savings and
transactions
In which bank do
	
Frequency Per cent Cumulative
you have more savings?
	
Per cent
Bank Islam	 93	 72.1	 72.1
Conventional bank	 36	 27.9	 100.0
Total	 129	 100.0
In which bank do you
have more transactions?
Bank Islam	 75	 58.1	 58.1
Conventional bank	 54	 41.9	 100.0
Total	 129	 100.0
In summary the results in the preceding section show that Bank Islam de-
positors are generally not influenced by interest-rates offered by the conventional
bank.
9.2.3 Religosity: Comparison Between the Two Groups
To see if there are differences in the behaviour of these two groups in terms of
their religious commitment in avoiding r-iba two hypothetical questions (see items
B.1 and 2 in Part Two of the Bank Islam Questionnaire) were put forward in the
questionnaire to test the following null hypotheses.
1. H0 : Depositors who bank only at Bank Islam and depositors with accounts
in conventional banks are equally likely to close their account at Bank Islam
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if the rates of profit on savings are less competitive than the rates of interest
on savings at conventional banks.
Table 9.8 Crosstabulation: Bank Loyalty BY The Two Main
Groups of Depositors
	
Account iii	 Account in	 Row
Will close account? Bank Islam Only Other Banks Also Total
Yes	 0	 6	 6
	
column %
	
0%	 4.7%
2.9%
No	 81	 123	 204
	
column %
	
38.6%	 95.3%
97.1%
	
Column Total	 81	 129	 210
	
38.6%	 61.4%	 100%
chi-square =3.878
	
d.f= 1 Signiflcance= 0.04892
Table 9.8 shows that those who bank only at Bank Islam are likely to be more
committed in avoiding rib a. None of these depositors would close their accounts
at Bank Islam if the rates of profit paid on their savings cannot compete with the
interest on savings in conventional banks. On the other hand about 4.7 per cent
(N=6) of those with other accounts in conventional banks would consider closing
their accounts at Bank Islam.
Even though the chi-square value (3.878) is quite small it is well above the
critical chi-square value 3.841 at 0.05 confidence interval at one degree of freedom.
The null hypothesis of no association is rejected which implies that the two groups
of depositors are likely to differ in their loyalty to Bank Islam if the rates of profit
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on savings are relatively lower than interest on savings at conventional banks.
These differences are likely to hold in the population since the observed significance
level (P=0.0489) does not exceed the 0.05 confidence level. It can therefore be
inferred that depositors who bank only at Bank Islam are relatively more
committed in avoiding nba and can be regarded as the loyal customers
of the Bank.
Another appropriate measure of depositors' commitment in avoiding nba is
their unwillingness to invest in the Amanah Saham National (ASN) unit trust
scheme. On the assumption that all the depositors of Bank Islam have the ability
to pay271 it is envisaged that only Muslims who are strongly committed to avoiding
nba would not participate in this scheme on the basis that some of the ASN
investments are held in the shares of interest-based banks.
The following null hypothesis was tested.
2. Null hypothesis H0 : Depositors who bank exclusively at Bank Islam and
depositors who hold other accounts in conventional banks are equally likely
to invest in the ASN.
Even though the figures in Table 9.9 suggests that Bank Islam depositors do
not typically buy ASN shares (mode= 126, 60%), it is also evident that more than
half (50.4 percent, N= 65) of those with accounts in conventional banks had made
such investments. In contrast less than a quarter (23.5%, N=19) of depositors
who banked exclusively at Bank Islam did not invest in the ASN. This pattern
of investment behaviour seems to suggest that there is a relationship between
depositors who avoided the interest-based banks and their unwillingness to invest
As described in Chapter V, a unit holder in the ASN scheme is required only to pay M$10 or the
equivalence of 2 to participate in this scheme.
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in the ASN. This is confirmed by the cu-square test, which shows a cu-square
value=15.037 which is higher than the tabulated chi-square value (3.841) at the
0.05 confidence level, at 1 degree of freedom. The null hypothesis of no association
can therefore be rejected arid this is likely to hold in the population since the
observed significance level (P=0.0001) is lower than the 0.05 critical point. It
can therefore be inferred that depositors who bank exclusively with Bank
Islam are less likely to invest in the ASN compared to the other group
of depositors. Since the ASN investments are also held in the nba banks
the above finding suggests that depositors who bank exclusively at Bank
Islam are relatively more committed in avoiding nba.
Table 9.9 - Crosstabulations: ASN BY Category of Depositors
	
invest in ASN? Account in	 Account in	 Row
other banks als Bank Islam only Total
Yes	 65	 19	 84
row %
	 51.6%	 32.4%	 (40.0%)
column %
	
50.4%	 23.5%
No	 64	 62	 126
row %
	
77.4%	 48.6%	 60.0%
column %
	
49.6%	 76.5%
Column Total	 129	 81	 210
	
61.4%	 38.6%	 100%
chi-square= 15.0367	 d.f= 1	 Significance=0.00011
Thirdly, depositors commitment in avoiding nba can also be measured by their
willingness to bank only with another Bank Islam branch if the present branch is
forced to close. It is envisaged that pious depositors would prefer to bank only
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with an Islamic bank once the facility is introduced in the market. A strong
motivation to avoid nba would be reflected by the willingness to remain with the
Islamic bank even if it required some sacrifice in terms of convenience. On the
other hand, depositors who attach more importance to convenience rather than
the religious motivation to avoid nba are likely to prefer the nearest bank, even
if it is a conventional bank. Based on our earlier findings, it is hypothesized that
depositors who bank exclusively at Bank Islam are likely to be more committed to
remain with Bank Islam compared with depositors who bank both at Bank Islam
and the conventional banks. As shown in Question B.2; Part Two of the Bank
Islam Depositors Questionnaire; depositors were asked to indicate their next bank
choice if the present branch were to close. The purpose of the question was to test
the following null hypothesis.
3. Null hypothesis H0 : Depositors who bank exclusively with Bank Islam and
depositors who bank both with Bank Islam and the nba banks are equally
likely to choose another Bank Islam branch if the present branch closes.
The results of the crosstabulation in Table 9.10 show that unlike the previous
hypothesis, it is evident that there is no difference between the behaviour of the
two groups in this case. A majority of depositors in each group had chosen to
bank with another Bank Islam branch even if it meant going to another area to do
their banking. The computed chi-square value (0.887) is lower than the tabulated
chi-square statistic (3.841) at the 0.05 and 1 degree of freedom critical point. This
implies that the null hypothesis that both groups of depositors are equally loyal
to Bank Islam cannot be rejected. It can therefore be inferred that Bank Islam
depositors are generally loyal to the bank and are not likely to trade
interest-free banking for convenience.
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Table 9.10 - Crosstabulatjon: Next Bank Choice BY The Two Main
Groups of Bank Islam Depositors
Next Bank Choice	 Accounts in	 Account in	 Row
Bank Islam only Other Banks to Total
Other bank in this area	 22	 43	 65
row %
	
33.8%	 66.2%	 (31.0)
column %
	
27.2%	 33.3%
Bank Islam in another
area no matter how far	 59	 86	 145
	
40.7%	 59.3%	 (69.0)9
	
72.8%	 66.7%
Column Total	 81	 81	 210
	
61.4%	 38.6%	 100%
chi-square= 0.887
	
d.f= 1 Significance= 0.346
In summary, the profile of the urban depositors of the Islamic bank in Malaysia
is characterized by
i) a majority of depositors holding secondary accounts in the interest-based
banks; not to earn interest but mainly for the purpose of convenience specifically
to take advantage of the extensive branch network and the ATM facility which the
Islamic bank still lacks.
ii) depositors who are not new entrants to the banking system which implies
that the establishment of Islamic banks in the urban areas has little impact in
mobilizing new deposits which were not mobilized previously by the interest-based
banks. However depositors who bank exclusively with Bank Islam are more re-
ligiously committed in avoiding nba in the form of interest or in interest-related
investments.
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iii) depositors who have a strong loyalty to Islamic banking as reflected by their
willingness to remain as depositors even if it involves some sacrifice of convenience.
9.3 Factor Analysis: Selection Criteria (Bank Islam Depositors)
The findings in the preceding sections seems to suggest that Bank Islam de-
positors are generally not concerned with the rates of returns on their savings.
Depositors are in general religiously committed in abiding by the Islamic ban
against rib a. Even though there seems to be some trade-off between the religious
motivation and convenience as reflected by the high proportion of accounts still
held in conventional banks it has not been established whether depositors are mo-
tivated to bank with Bank Islam because of the convenient location of the bank
branch or because of the religious motivation. This section will attempt to deter-
mine which of these two factors is the stronger motivation. The method of factor
analysis will be applied. This is because factors such 'religious motivation' and
'convenience' have many connotations. As noted by Norusis 272 such factors are
not single measurable entities but are the constructs of a number of other directly
observable variables. By factor analysis these observable variables can be clustered
into factors, each reflecting an underlying property (such as convenience) which is
commonly shared by a certain group of variables.
In this analysis, a list of fourteen variables273
 which are likely to have influenced
depositors' decision to choose Bank Islam as their primary bank will be factor anal-
ysed. There are four steps in factor analysis (Norusis 1988:201, De Vaus 1991:258)
which involve namely;
272 1985:128
273 as shown in Part Two of the Bank Islam Depositors' Questionnaire
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1. The selection of variables to be factor analysed.
2. The extraction of an initial set of factors.
3. The extraction of the final set of factors by rotation.
4. The computation of scores for each factor for use in subsequent analysis.274
9.3.1 STEP 1: Is Factor Analysis Feasible?
The first step in factor analysis is to determine whether the variables in the
data set contain the ingredients for a successful factor analysis. There are different
ways of checking this and we shall consider each in turn.
(i) The Correlation Matrix
First, a correlation matrix for the 14 variables (as shown in Table 9.11) is
produced to see whether each variable correlates reasonably well (at least with a
correlation coefficient of 0.09) with at least one of the other variables in the set.
This is because low correlations between variables would imply that they do not
share common factors and the use of factor analysis would not be appropriate. The
correlation matrix in Table 9.11 shows that the fourteen variables have sufficiently
large correlations as required which means that all of them may be factor analysed.
274 This step will not be carried out in this study since our main aim is only to identify the factors.
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Table 9.11 - Correlation Matrix: Variables-ENFR TO BRCH
EVR
Pt B LI C
OW IlK
'JORti3
LNORIB
P LS I NV
DHO1E
P RSA V
IS L1
PARK
PTRP
PIP LOA '!
L0A
B RC 11
	
ENFR	 PUBLIC	 DWRK	 "IOPIB	 LNORIB	 PLSINV	 DUC'fE
1 . 00001)
	
.29602	 1.001)00
	
.19982	 .27081	 1.00000
	
04085	 .21215	 .14363	 1.000110
	
.08439	 .04243	 .10938	 .41310	 1.00000
	
.10488	 .17798	 .07203	 .43228	 .59771	 1.00000
	
.1071.3	 .20279	 .40290	 .14658	 .08623	 .14971	 1.00000
	
.08186	 .18102	 .03435	 .46352	 .35614	 .49043	 .21786
	
- .02068	 .12317	 - .10633	 .22352	 .12610	 .13452	 .00999
	
16433	 .14553	 . 2321	 .02171	 .09157	 .03689	 .24353
	
.07645	 .28495	 .23901	 .18127	 .03624	 .16944	 .26500
	
.11691	 .15769	 .16043	 .20461	 .44790	 .39088	 .08315
	
.20485	 .17023	 .14563	 .16564	 .46189	 .33770	 .11146
	
.21561	 .21813	 .26025	 .11979	 .16308	 .19051	 .36222
PRS AV
ISLL
PARK
PTRP
TYPLOAN
LOAN
BRC H
	
PRSAV	 fSL'1
1.00000
	
.23945	 1.00000
	
.00650	 - .09485
	
.16313	 -.02143
	
.24355	 .10163
	
.25653	 .09513
	
.12275	 .09751
PARK	 PTRP	 TYPLOAN	 LOAN	 BOCH
1. 00000
	
.53732	 1.00000
	
.33997	 .31983	 1.00000
	
.36995	 .27433	 .84263	 1.00000
	
.26962	 .37382	 .28342	 .33323	 1.00000
RAISER-'IEYER-OLEI>i 1EASURE OF A!PLING ADEQUACY = . 73335
BARTLETT TEST OF SPHEPICITY	 910.10796 SIt3NIFICANCE =	 .00000
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(ii) The KMO statistic
The relevance of factor analysis for the data set may also be determined statis-
tically. The first statistics called the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sam
pling adequacy, is an index which compares the observed correlation coefficients
between pairs of variables to the size of the partial correlation coefficients when
the linear effects of other variables are eliminated. 275 The rule is, variables which
share common factors should have small partial correlation coefficients Hence if
the sum of the squared partial correlation coefficients is small when compared to
the sum of the squared correlation coefficient, the KMO value is close to 1. Smail
KMO values indicate that factor analysis is not suitable, since correlations between
pairs of variables cannot be explained by the other variables. Kaiser (1q74) regards
KMO=0.9 as marvellous, 0.8 as meritorious, 0.7 as middling, 0.6 as mediocre and
0.5 and below as miserable.276 In the case of this study the KMO value for the data
set is found to be average at 0.73335 which indicates that factor analysis would be
feasible.
(iii) The Bartlett Test of Sphericity
This test is used to test the null hypothesis that the correlation matrix is an
identity matrix. Variables do not share common factors in an identity matrix where
all the diagonal terms are 1 and all the off-diagonal terms are zero. The calculation
of the Bartlett Test value for the correlation matrix in Table 9.11 shows a very
high value (919.1) and an associated probability (P=0.000) which is lower than
the 0.05 level of statistical significance. The null hypothesis that the correlation
matrix is an identity can be rejected. This suggests that factor analysis can be
275 Norusi8 1985:129.
276 Norusis 1985:129.
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applied to the data since it is unlikely that the correlation matrix is an identity.
The results of these three indicators show that all fourteen variables can be
retained for factor analysis in order to identify a smaller set of factors that have
influenced depositors to select Bank Islam as their primary bank.
9.3.2 STEP 2: Initial Extraction (How many factors?)
Since the objective of factor analysis is to extract as few factors as necessary
the researcher has to determine the suitable number of factors to be extracted.
At the initial stage factor analysis will extract as many factors as there are
variables using principal-component analysis. As explained by Bryman277:
[In principal-component analysis] the first component or axis that is extracted accounts for
the largest amount of variance shared by the tests. The second factor consists of the next
largest amount of variance which is not related to or explained by the first one. In other words,
these two factors are unrelated or orthogonal to one another. The third factor extracts the
next largest amount of variance, and so on. There are as many factors as variables, although
the degree of variance which is explained by successive factors becomes smaller and smaller.
In other words, the first few factors are the most important ones.
It is worth noting that specifying the number of factors to be extracted is not a
straightforward process. It requires trial runs extracting various numbers of factors
before the most appropriate number is selected. In some cases the aid of subjective
judgement is also necessary. 278 For this study several runs of factor analysis were
tried to extract 4 through 6 factors consecutively. The results were then compared
277 1991:258.
278 Jaeger 1990:357.
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and analysed. In the final analysis it was found that the extraction of four factors
seems more justified based on the following guidelines.
. Guideline 1: The Eigenvalues
Table 9.12 shows that initially factor analysis will extract fourteen factors from
the fourteen variables. One of the purposes of the initial extraction is to show the
eigenvalues or variance accounted by each factor and the cumulative percentages of
these variances which will help to determine the number of factors to be extracted.
There are two parts in Table 9.12. The first part is represented by the first
two columns which provide information about each of the fourteen variables. The
second part which comprises the last four columns describes the factors. The
variable names are listed in Column 1. The communality in Column 2 indicates
the amount of variance that each variable explains. Since 14 factors have been
extracted from 14 variables this implies that each variable will have a variance
or commnnality of 1.279 Column 3 lists the 14 factors that have been extracted.
The total variance explained by each factor or the eigenvalue is listed in Column 4
while the percentage of the total variance 280
 attributed to each factor is shown in
Column 5 with the cumulative percentages in column 6. For example 73 per cent
of the total variance is attributable to the first six factors.
Thus the information in the first row indicates that the ENFR variable has
a communality or variance of 1.281 The first factor extracted; Factor 1 has an
279 All the fourteen variables are expressed in a standardized form with a mean of 0 and a standard
deviation of 1. Each variable is therefore standardized to have a variance or communality of 1
(Norusis 1985:130).
280 The total variance is 14 since 14 factors has been extracted.
281 Since 14 factors have been extracted from 14 variables this means that one variable will represent
one factor. If less than 14 factors are extracted then the communality of each variable will be less
than 1. A variable with a high communality of 0.8 for example, will indicate a high correlation
between that variable and other variables with which it shares a common factor.
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eigenvalue of 3.880 which accounts for 27.2 per cent of the total variance. 14.3 per
cent of the total variance will be explained by the second factor. Hence if only two
factors are extracted in this analysis the total variance explained will be 42 per
cent.
Table 9.12 - Initial Extraction:Initial Statistics
(Principal-Components Analysis)
VARIABLES	 FACTORS
Variable	 Communalit) Factor Eigenvalue % of variance Cumulative
(1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)
ENFR	 1.000	 1	 3.880	 27.7	 27.7
PUBLIC	 1.000	 2	 1.997	 14.3	 42.0
DWRK	 1.000	 3	 1.422	 10.2	 52.1
NORIB	 1.000	 4	 1.053	 7.5	 59.7
LNORIB	 1.000	 5	 1.011	 7.2	 66.9
PLSINV	 1.000	 6	 0.854	 6.1	 73.0
DHOME	 1.000	 7	 0.727	 5.2	 78.2
PRSAV	 1.000	 8	 0.638	 4.6	 82.8
ISLM	 1.000	 9	 0.622	 4.4	 87.2
PARK	 1.000	 10	 0.512	 3.7	 90.9
PTRP	 1.000	 11	 0.445	 3.2	 94.1
TYPLON	 1.000	 12	 0.381	 2.7	 96.8
LOAN	 1.000	 13	 0.308	 2.2	 99.0
BRCH	 1.000	 14	 0.139	 1.0	 100.0
KEY:
ENFR-encouragement of relatives & friends PUBLIC. bank opering publicity
DWRK- distance from work 	 NORIB- no interest on savings
LNORIB- no interest on loans	 PLSINV-prolt-sharing investments
DHOME- distance from home	 PRSAV- prolts paid on savings
ISLM-runs on Islamic principles	 PARK-parking facilities available
PTRP-public transport convenience 	 TYPLON-types of loans offered
LOAN-opportunity to get loan	 BRCH-number of branches available
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As noted earlier the number of factors to be extracted can be determined
by the eigenvalues. Based on what is known as Kaiser's criterion282
 only factors
having eigenvalues greater than 1 are considered significant and should be included
in factor analysis. 283
 Following Kaiser's criterion the eigenvalues in Table 9.12
indicate that five factors can be extracted from the set of 14 variables. These five
factors will explain 66.9 per cent of the total variance. However it is observed that
the eigenvalue of the fifth factor is very close to 1 and perhaps is better excluded.
• Guideline 2: The Graphical Scree Test
The number of factors to be extracted can also be determined by running the
graphical scree test procedure as proposed by Catell (1966). The scree plot (see
Figure 9.1) is a graph which shows in descending order the variance accounted by
the factors initially extracted. According to Catell only factors which lie above
the point where the eigenvalues seem to gradually trail off should be retained. As
can be seen in Figure 9.1, the graph begins to trail off after the third factor which
indicates that the fourteen variables can be reduced to a set of three factors which
will account for 52 per cent of the total variance.
• Guideline 3: Total Variance Explained
The results of the Kaiser criterion and the scree test suggest that a minimum of
three and a maximum of five factors may be extracted from the fourteen variables.
According to De Vaus 284 , a measure of a good factor analysis is the amount of total
variance in the set of variables that is explained by the factors. The greater the
282 Bryman:258.
283 Any factor having eigeuvalue less than 1 is to be excluded because it explains less variance than a
single variable since each variable has a variance of 1.
284 1991:262.
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Figure 9.1 - Scree Plot- Eigenvalues of the 14 Factors Initially
Extracted
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explained variance the better the solution. However increasing the total variance
explained would require an increase in the number of factors to be extracted which
is not exactly in harmony with the aim of factor analysis. A tradeoff must therefore
be made by minimizing the number of factors needed and maximizing the explained
variance.
The most important figures to look next would be the cumulative percentages
in Column 6. It is noticed that the extraction of four factors would explain only
about 50 per cent of the total variance. Increasing the number to four factors
would account for about 60 per cent whilst five factors wifi explain close to 67
per cent of the total variance. However the eigenvalue of the fifth factor shows
a value close to 1 which signifies the possibility that only one variable may come
under that factor. This is confirmed when an experimental run which extracted
five factors showed that the fifth factor accounted only for a single variable which
was incorporated into Factor 1 if only four factors were extracted. Based on this
final result it is decided that the explained variance will be maximized and the
number of factors will be minimized if four instead of five factors are extracted.
In summary, the initial extraction of factors as shown in Table 9.12 has enabled
us to work out the number of factors needed for the final solution by looking at the
eigemvalues, the scree plot and the total amount of variance accounted for, from
which a trade off could be made between the desirable objectives of maximizing
the total variance explained and minimizing the number of factors required.
The initial extraction of the four factors was then conducted and the output
is shown in Table 9.13.
The final statistics showing the initial extraction of the four factors is exactly
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similar to that in Table 9.12 except that the values of the communalities are now
different since only four instead of fourteen factors have been extracted. As noted
earlier the communalities measure the correlations among the 14 variables to be
factor analysed. The higher the correlations among the variables; which implies the
more they have in common the higher would be their communalities. For example
a communality of 0.71024 for the ENFR variable indicates that the variable has 71
per cent of its variation in common with the other variables in forming a factor.
On the other hand a variable having a very low communality (close to zero) is not
likely to be associated with any other variables in defining a factor.285
Table 9.13 - Initial Extraction: Final Statistics (Principal Component
Analysis)
0.71024
0.58552
0.47420
0.59953
0.62398
0.62806
0.58647
0.59277
0.27868
0.63834
0 .55544
0.82694
0.84738
0.40635
VARIABLE
Variable
ENFR
PUBLIC
DWRK
NOIUB
LNORIB
PLSINV
DHOME
PRSAV
ISLM
PARK
PTRP
TYPLON
LOAN
BRCH
FACTOR
Factor Eigenvalue % of variance Cumulative
1	 3.880	 27.7	 27.7
2	 1.997	 14.3	 42.0
3	 1.422	 10.2	 52.1
4	 1.053	 7.5	 59.7
285 Jaeger 1990:351.
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KEY:
ENFR-encotragenient of relatives & frlend PUBLIC- bank opening publicity
DWRK- dleance from work	 NORIB- no interest on .aviugs
LNORIB- no interest on loans 	 PLSINV-proflt-hanug iuvetznents
DHOME- distance from home
ISLM-runs on islamic principles
PTRP-public transport convenience
LOAN-opportunity to get loan
PRSAV- profits paid on uvings
PARK-parking facilities svaliabk
TYPLON-type of basis offered
BRCH-number of branche, available
9.3.3 STEP 3: Extraction of Final Factors by Rotation
The objective of this procedure is to group the variables having large loadings
(correlations) for the same factors so that each factor will be represented by a
unique and specific cluster of variables. This is done by the varimax orthogonal
rotation which will ensure that the factors produced will be independent or unre-
lated to each other. 286 . First, variables which load (correlate) most highly with the
first factor are clustered together and arranged in descending order according to
the size of their correlations. Then variables which load strongly with the second
factor will form the second factor, and so on.287
The product of the factor rotation is shown in Table 9.14. This rotated factor
matrix is the crucial matrix to interpret the results of the factor analysis.
The interpretation of the four factors being extracted would be based on the
the loadings of the fourteen variables on these factors. Each factor loading is
the correlation coefficient which shows how much weight is assigned to that factor.
Hence the factor loading of 0.71690 in the sixth row of the second column indicates
the strength of the correlation between the variable DHOME and FACTOR 2.
286 The other method is oblique rotation which produces factors which are correlated. For a discussion
of the various methods of rotating variables see Kim and Mueller 1978.
287 It is worth noting that orthogonal rotation has the disadvantage of forcing factors to be unrelated
when they may be related in real life. Oblique rotation may be applied to check this.
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Table 9.14 - Rotated Factor Matrix: Varimax Rotation
Variable	 FACTOR 1 FACTOR 2 FACTOR 3 FACTOR 4 Communaliti
No. & Code	 Being an Convenient	 Loan	 Social	 of Each
Islamic Bank Location Opportunity Influence	 Variable
1. PRSAV	 .75368	 0.59277
2. NORIB	 .75253	 0.59953
3. PLSINV	 .71271	 0.62806
4. LNORIB	 .59969	 .51088	 0.62398
5. ISLM	 .44997	 0.27868
6. DHOME	 .71690	 0.58647
7. PTRP	 .69410	 0.55544
8. DWRK	 .65595	 0.47420
9. PARK	 .62942	 0.63834
10.BRCH	 .52159	 0.40635
11.LOAN	 .88200	 0.81685
12.TYPLON	 .87204	 0.80372
13.ENFR	 .82401	 0.71024
14.PUBLIC	 .66631	 0.58522
Eigenvalue	 3.88032	 1.99714	 1.42271	 1.05374
% of variance	 27.7	 14.3	 10.2	 7.5
Cumulative %
	
27.7	 42.0	 52.1	 59.7
KEY:
ENFR-encouragement of relatives & friends PUBLIC- bank opening publicity
DWRK- distance from work
	
NORIB- no interest on savings
LNORIB- no interest on loans
DHOME- distance from home
ISLM-runs on Islamic principles
PTRP-public transport convenience
LOAN-opportunity to get loan
PLSIN V-profit-sharing investments
PRSAV- profits paid on savings
PARK-parking facilities available
TYPLON-types of loans offered
BRCH-number of branches available
By looking at the variables which load most highly with a factor the researcher
can therefore define a general label for that factor which is representative of the
group of variables under it. Variables with factor loadings smaller than 0.3 are
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normally considered not significant and can be ignored from the factor.288
Hence, based on the clustering of the variables as shown in Table 9.14 the four
factors that have influenced depositors to select Bank Islam can be identified as
follows:-
1. FACTOR 1: Being an Islamic Bank
2. FACTOR 2: Convenient Location
3. FACTOR 3: Loan Opportunity
4. FACTOR 4: Social Influence
9.3.4 FACTOR 1: Being an Islamic Bank
It is thought that 'Being an Islamic Bank' is the most appropriate description
of FACTOR 1 because all the variables under this factor constitute elements which
are unique only to the Islamic bank.
As shown in Table 9.14, FACTOR 1 is the linear combination of variables which
differentiates the Islamic bank from the conventional bank; and can be expressed
as;
FACTOR 1= f11PRSAV + f12N0RIB + f13PLsINv +f14 LNORIB + I15ISLM....
(9.1)
288 Only factor loadings exceeding 0.4 are shown in Table 9.14 for easy interpretation of the results
although the smaller values are included in the calculation of the variances.
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where	 factor loading
PRSAV= profits paid on savings
	 .75368
NORIB= no interest on savings
	
.75253
PLSINV= profit-sharing investment 	 .71271
LNORIB= no interest on loans	 .59969
ISLM= runs on Islamic principles 	 .44997
f's= factor score coefficient1
Note; 1 This score is the value of the factor which is calculated in STEP 4 of factor analysis. However STEP 4 Is
beyond the scope of this study. The relevance of equation 9.1 is to show the linear combinations of the variables.
The clustering of Variables 1 to 4 namely 'profits paid on savings' (PRSAV),
'no interest on savings' (NORIB), 'profit-sharing investment' (PLSINV) and 'no
interest on loans' (LNORIB) portrays an underlying factor which emphasizes
the uniqueness of the Islamic bank. The suitability of the factor label is further
supported by the ISLM (runs on Islamic principles) variable which denotes in
general terms the set of principles which underlies the overall Islamic characteristic
of the Islamic bank.
Since FACTOR 1 has the highest eigenvalue and variance (eigenvalue=3.88,
variance=27.7%) it necessarily represents the most important factor that has influ-
enced depositors to bank with Bank Islam. In other words the Islamic charac-
teristic of Bank Islam as represented by its overall Islamic operation, its
interest-free savings account, the payment of profits instead of interest,
its profit-sharing investment account and the availability of interest-free
loans is the most important factor that has influenced depositors' pref-
erence for Bank Islam.
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Obviously not all depositors would be homogeneously influenced by the five
variables in FACTOR 1. Some might have been interested oniy in ensuring that
their savings were free of interest oblivious of the return offered by the bank.
Others might have quite happy to bank with Bank Islam as long as they knew
that the bank operated on Islamic principles while a few might have opened an
account just for the sake of securing a loan from Bank Islam. It is therefore worth
examining the differences in depositors' behaviour in this respect.
Table 9.15 shows the extent to which depositors have been influenced by each
of the FACTOR 1 variables in their selection decisions.
Table 9.15	 Frequency Distribution (%): Islamic Variables - Degree
of Influence on Depositors' Preference for Bank Islam
Degree of Influence/ Value ISLM PRSA\ NORIB PLSINV LNO1UB
______________ (%) (%) (%)	 (%)	 (%)
None	 1	 4.3	 34.3	 37.6	 59.0	 68.6
Little	 2	 1.4	 7.6	 6.7	 6.2	 8.5
Cumulative%	 -	 5.7	 41.9	 44.3	 65.2	 77.1
Quite Strong	 3	 10.0	 11.4	 8.1	 4.3	 4.8
Strong	 4	 44.8	 32.4	 30.0	 19.0	 9.5
Very Strong	 5	 39.5	 14.3	 17.6	 11.5	 8.6
Cumulative%	 -	 94.3	 58.1	 55.7	 34.8	 22.9
Median Value	 4	 3	 3	 1	 1
ModeValue	 4	 1	 1	 1	 1
Note: N=210. Since variables are ordinal, the median is the most appropriate measure of central tendency.
(i) Runs on Islamic principles
It is evident in Table 9.15 that a majority of depositors (94.3 per cent) have
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been strongly influenced by the knowledge that the operation of Bank Islam was
based on Islamic principles. This high response may be explained by the fact
that an increasing number of Muslims in Malaysia have become more aware of
their religion since the outbreak of the Islamic resurgence in the 1970s and the
establishment of Bank Islam as an Islamic alternative to conventional banking
provided a welcome opportunity for them to express their faith in the economic
field. It is therefore important for Muslims to be assured that Bank Islam is run
on Islamic principles to ensure that it is Islamically genuine and legitimate from
the point of the Shariah.
(ii) No interest on Savings
Another important aspect of depositors' behaviour that can be derived from
Table 9.15 is the relatively high importance attached to the savings account. This
is indicated by depositors' ratings for the 'no interest on savings' (NORIB) and the
'profits paid on savings' (PRSAV) variables. About 58.1 per cent indicated that
they were at least moderately influenced by the knowledge that savings would be
free of interest at Bank Islam and 55.7 per cent were quite attracted by the fact
that profits would be paid on savings.
It is worth noting, however, that the percentage of depositors not concerned
by the nature of the savings account is almost proportional with those who were
strongly influenced by it (34.3% : 32.4% and 37.6% : 30.0% respectively). Nev-
ertheless the findings suggests that, on the whole a majority of depositors
were motivated by the religious incentive to free their savings from in-
terest and by the monetary incentive in the form of profits paid on their
savings. As we have seen in Chapter VII, the savings account attracts the most
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number of depositors and this finding may partly explain the reason behind it.
(iii) Profit-sharing Investment
In contrast to the savings account, the profit-sharing investment account did
not seem to attract many depositors in general as indicated by the the values of the
median and the mode (values=1 respectively). This result supports the fact shown
in Chapter VII that the investment accounts attract fewer depositors. Only 34.8%
were at least strongly attracted by the fact that the returns on investment deposits
at Bank Islam would be based on profit-sharing; while the remaining 65.2% did
not find it important.
Two plausible explanations may account for such behaviour. Firstly, the con-
cept of profit-sharing on the basis of mudarabah on which the investment account
operates is relatively new to many Malaysian Muslims. Unless one is involved
in Islamic economics or Islamic studies, the term rnudarabah is quite unknown to
the ordinary man in the street. This opinion is supported by the following find-
ing which shows that depositors were more familiar with the savings and current
accounts compared with the profit-sharing investment account.
As shown in Table 9.16; 95.7 per cent (N=127) of depositors knew about the
current account and 82.4 per cent (N=173) were aware of the savings account. In
contrast, 60.5 per cent (N=127) have never heard about the investment account.
Given this situation, it is not surprising that only about 30 per cent of depositors
have been influenced by the investment account when selecting Bank Islam as their
primary bank.
The second plausible reason for the unpopularity of the investment account
among individual depositors may be attributed the minimum investment deposit
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of M$500 which is rather high even for the medium income earner. At the outset,
Muslims in Malaysia generally save in small absolute amounts because of their low
income levels. The more suitable invebtment outlets for such savings would be the
Unit Trust Scheme (ASN) or the Tahung Haji. As described in Chapter V, an ASN
investment can be made with as little as M$1O. Tabung Haji, on the other hand,
accepts small amounts of deposits through various saving schemes and converts
these savings into investments.
Table 9.16 - Frequency Distribution (N=210): Awareness of Deposit
Accounts
Awareness/ Valu Current Savings Investment
Account Account Account
Know	 1	 201	 173	 83
__________________ (95.7%) (82.4%) (39.5%)
Do not know 0
	 9	 37	 127
_________________ (4.3%) (17.6%) (60.5%)
Mode/Median	 1	 1	 0
It is therefore envisaged that because of the high minimum deposit a majority
of depositors who were highly influenced by the investment account would be those
with high income. This hypothesis was tested by comparing if depositors in the
various income groups differ with respect to their scores on the influence of the
PLSINV variable on their decisions to bank with Bank Islam.
First it was noted that depositors can be divided into three income categories
namely low, medium and high income. Since the Kruskall-Wallis Test is to be
applied; the null hypothesis (Ho) and the alternative hypothesis (Hi ) were stated
as follows;
367
H0 : the means of the PLSINV scores for the 3 income groups are equal.
H1 : the means of the PLSINV scores for the 3 income groups are not equal.
Table 9.17 - Kruskal-Wallis Test Comparing the Mean Ranks (mean
degree of influence) of PLSINV Between Income Groups (N=180)
Variable Income Group Cases Mean Rank
PLSINV High
	
39 k1=108.97
Medium	 74	 k2 = 89.55
Low	 67 k3 = 80.80
Note:
High=MS1401 and above
Medium=M$701-M$ 1400
Low=M$700 and below
Chi-square value=9.2964 d.f=2 Significance=0.0096
The Kruskal-Wallis test shows that the mean degree of influence for the three
income groups are not equal. It is also evident that the mean rank of the high
income group ( ki = 108.97) exceeds that of the low and medium income categories.
This suggests that depositors with high income are more likely to be attracted by
the investment account facility than those with medium or low income. The chi-
square value=9.2964 is higher than the tabulated chi-square value=5.991 at 0.05
confidence level; 2 degrees of freedom. 289 The null hypotheses that depositors in
all income groups are equally influenced by the PLSINV variable can be rejected.
The observed significance level (P=O.0096) is lower than the 0.05 confidence level
which implies that the variations between the three groups are likely to hold in the
population. It can therefore be inferred that depositors with high income are
289 the degree of freedom is k - 1 where k=number of samples or groups.
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more likely to be influenced by the profit-sharing investment account
offered by Bank Islam. In contrast to the ASN investment scheme which
aims to pool the small investments of the Malays/Muslims, it seems that
the Bank Islam investment account has been tailored for those in the
high income category.
Our earlier findings (in Section 9.3) have shown that Muslims who bank exch
sively with Bank Islam do not typically invest in the ASN. There may therefore be
a need for the management of Bank Islam to consider devising other forms of 'af-
fordable' investment schemes targeted on the the medium income earners who are
still reluctant to participate in the ASN. Such schemes would provide some means
for these Muslims to convert some of their savings into profitable investments.
(iv) Interest-free Loans
With regard to the influence of the LNORIB variable oniy 22.9 per cent were
motivated by the interest-free loan facility when opening their accounts at Bank
Islam. This small percentage implies that whilst most depositors were used to debt-
financing as commonly practised by conventional banks, it is likely that many were
still ignorant of the new concepts of Islamic financing introduced by Bank Islam
and were therefore not influenced by them in the decision to bank with Bank Islam.
In relation to this, the distribution of depositors who were aware of the Islamic
methods of financing offered by Bank Islam was investigated.
As can be seen in Table 9.18 about 70 to 80 per cent of depositors (N=146-
167) typically did not know most of the Islamic methods of financing available
at Bank Islam. It seems that the terms and the concepts of partnership-profit-
sharing (Musharakah), cost-plus and deferred payment sale (Murabahah, A1-Bai
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Bitharnin Ajil), leasing (Ijarah) and interest-free loans (Qardul Hasan) are alien to
these customers. The only better-known method is the trusteeship-profit-sharing
or Mudarabah. About 41.9 per cent of depositors knew that this method of finance
was available at Bank Islam.
Table 9.18 - Frequency Distribution (N=210): Awareness of Islamic
Modes of Financing Offered by Bank Islam
Awareness/ Value Mudarabah Musharakal Bai Bithamin Murabahah Ijarah Qardul
________________ _________ _________ Ajil
	 llasan
Know	 1	 88	 64	 63	 63	 43	 52
__________________ (41.9%)
	 (30.5%)	 (30.0%)	 (30.0%) (20.5%) (24.8%)
Do not know	 0	 122	 146	 147	 147	 167	 158
__________________ (58.1%)
	 (69.5%)	 (70.0%)	 (70.0%) (79.5%) (75.2%
Mode/Median	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0
Since a vast majority of depositors were ignorant of the concepts of Islamic
financing introduced by Bank Islam, it is hypothesized that only those who received
loans from Bank Islam would be be highly iiifluenced by the LNORIB variable.
In relation to this the Mann-Whitney U-Test (hereafter the U-test) was carried
out. The aim of the test is to see if depositors have the same mean scores for the
LNORIB variable irrespective of whether they had a loan from Bank Islam or not.
Since the U-test is a two-tailed test the null and alternative hypotheses are stated
as follows:-
Let u, and u2 be the mean ranks (mean degree of influence) of the LNORIB
variable for depositors who received and who did not receive loans from
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Bank Islam respectively. Thus;
H0 : u 1 =u2	 Hj:u1.u2
Table 9.19 - Mann-Whitney U-Test To Compare the Mean Ranks of
LNORIB Between Depositors Who Received and Did Not Receive
Loans
Variable GET LOAN. Cases Mean Rank
	
LNORIB Yes	 21(10%) u1= 130.02
	
No	 189 (90%) U2 102.78
U value = 1469.5 z = -2.3744 Significance (2-tailed) = 0.0177
Table 9.19 shows that the mean ranks of the LNORIB variable are not equal
between the two groups of depositors. The mean rank of depositors who received
loans from Bank Islam(ui = 130.02) is higher which indicate that this group of de-
positors is more influenced by the interest-free loan package in their bank selection
decision compared to the other depositors. The z score for the sample (z=-2.3744)
is higher than the tabulated zo.025 =1.96 . The null hypothesis of equal mean
ranks for the LNORIB variable can be rejected. The observed 2-tailed probability
(P=0.017) is also smaller than the 0.025 level of significance which implies that the
U-test results are likely to hold in the population. It can therefore be inferred that
only those who received loans from Bank Islam are most likely to be
influenced by the interest-free loan facility when choosing Bank Islam
as their primary bank.
In summary it can be concluded that;
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.71690
.69410
.65595
.62942
.52159
. Depositors select Bank Islam as their primary Bank mainly because it is an
Islamic Bank which operates on Islamic principles and provides an Islamic
alternative for Muslims to institutionalize their savings without interest as well
as earn profits.
. With the exception of those with high income, individual depositors are typ-
ically not attracted by the profit-sharing investment account. Depositors are
also generally not infiuenced by the interest-free loans available at Bank Islam.
9.3.5 FACTOR 2: C venisit Locstoi
This is the second important factor that has attracted depositors to Bank
Islam. As shown earlier in Table 9.14, FACTOR 2 accounts for 14.3 per cent of
the total variance and together with Factor 1 explains about 42 per cent of the
total variance.
Factor 2 is the linear combination of five variables which, as expressed in
equation 9.2, are all related to the issue of easy access and locational convenience.
FACTOR 2= I21 DHOME + I22PTRP + I23DWRK +I24PARK + f2&BRCH.... (9.2)
where	 factor loading
DHOME= distance from home
PTRP= near to public transport facilities
DWRK= distance from work
PARK= availability of parking spaces
BRCH= number of branches available
f's= factor score coefficient
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ALL five varLables are moderately correlated with FACTOR 2 with factor load-
ings ranging between 0.21 to 0.71 The variables 'distance from home' (DHOME),
'distance from work' (DWRK) and 'the number of branches available' (BRCH)
secni to indicate that locational convenience associated with Bank Islam was also
taken into consideration by depositors in selecting Bank Islam as their primary
bank. The fact that depositors were also influenced by the availability of park-
ing spaces (PARK) and public transport convenience (PTRP) suggests that Bank
Islam should also be easily accessible.
Table 9.20 shows the extent to which depositors were influenced by the conve-
nient location variables when opening their accounts at Bank Islam.
Table 9.20 - Frequency Distribution (N=120): Convenient Location
Variables-Degree of Influence
Degree of Influence/ Valu PTRP DWRK BRCH PARK DHOMF
______________ (%) (%) (%) (%)	 (%)
None	 1	 43.3	 53.8	 50.0	 61.4	 55.2
Little	 2	 11.0	 7.1	 17.1	 8.1	 14.3
Camulative%	 -	 54.3	 60.9	 67.1	 69.5	 69.5
Quite Strong	 3	 12.9	 10.5	 15.2	 10.5	 11.0
Strong	 4	 26.2	 20.0	 14.8	 16.2	 16.2
Very Strong	 5	 6.6	 8.6	 2.9	 3.8	 3.3
Cumulative%	 -	 45.7	 39.1	 32.9	 30.5	 30.5
Median Value	 2	 1	 1.5	 1	 1
Mode Value	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1
Given that depositors were mainly attracted to Bank Islam because of its
Islamic characteristic it was expected that most depositors would not be highly
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influenced by locational convenience. This is confirmed by the low values of the
median and mode in Table 9.20. It is evident that except for the easy accessibility of
the bank by public transportation, the other convenience variables were considered
important only by about 31 to 39 per cent of the depositors.
(1) Public Transport Convenience
This is the most important convenience variable though it was considered im-
portant by less than half (45.7%) of total depositors. This finding tends to suggest
that these depositors would be willing to bank with Bank Islam even though the
bank may not be near to their home or place of work on condition that it is easily
accessible by public transport. As we have seen earlier in Chapter VIII (Figure 8.2)
the Jalan Raja Laut branch was indeed conveniently located between two main
traffic arteries which were well-served by buses from various destinations around
the city.
(ii) Parking Available
it is also interesting to note that depositors who place importance on
public transport convenience also consider the parking facifities as im..
portant. As shown in Table 8.21 the Spearman Correlation Coefficient (p) shows
a strong positive relationship (p=0.533) between the PTRP and PARK variables.
This may suggest that depositors who own cars do not always drive to the bank
but use the public transport. The observed significance level (0.000) indicates that
this association is very likely to hold in the population. One possible explanation
could be that it is sometimes more economical to use public transport because a
short visit to the bank is not commensurate with the high charge for parking.
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Table 9.21 - Spearman Correlation Between Parking and Public
Transport Convenience (N=210)
PTRP Observed
______ ________ Significance
PARK p=O.533	 0.000
(iii) Distance from Work
Studies on bank selection decisions, for example by Kaufman (1969) and Bow-
ers (1969) have shown that the convenient location of banks from both home and
workplace were considered most important by households when selecting their pri-
mary banks. This study, however shows that the above finding does not hold for
the depositors of the Islamic bank because of the religious motivation. In fact as
shown by the values of the mode and the median in Table 9.20 the Islamic bank
depositors were typically not influenced by the distance of the bank from where
they worked.
The following null hypothesis was however tested to find out which depositors
have been influenced by this variable.
• H0: Depositors are equally influenced by the distance of the bank from their
workplace.
The crosstabulation in Table 9.22 shows that depositors are not equally influ-
enced by the distance of Bank Islam from where they worked. About 61 per cent
(N=128) of depositors were not concerned by this variable, of whom 73.4 per cent
(N=94) worked in places located more than 2 miles from the bank. On the other
hand 41.4 per cent of depositors (N=87) worked within the radius of 2 miles from
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the bank and a majority of them (60.9 %, N=53) have been influenced by the close
proximity of the bank from their workplaces.
Table 9.22 - Crosstabulation: Influence of Distance From Work BY
Distance From Work in Miles.
Distance from Work - Distance	 From Work	 Row Total
Degree of Influence 0-2 miles more than 2 mile
No-little influence	 34	 94	 128 (61.0%)
Row %
	
(26.6%)	 (73.4%)
Column %
	
39.1%	 76.4%
Moderate-Very strong	 53	 29	 82 (39.0)
Row %
	
(64.6%)
	
(35.4%)
Column %
	
60.9%	 23.6
Column Total	 87	 123	 210
41.4%	 58.6%	 100.0%
Chi-square value29.85 D.F = 1 Significance = 0.000
Since the computed chi-square value, 29.85 is greater than the tabulated chi-
square value (3.841) at the 0.05 confidence limit at 1 degrees of freedom we can
reject the null hypothesis that depositors are equally influenced by the distance
of Bank Islam from their places of work. The above results suggest that only
depositors who work near to the bank tend to be more influenced by
the distance of the bank from work. However a majority of Bank Islam
depositors work in places located more than two miles from the bank
and but not discouraged by the distance because of the stronger religious
motivation.
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(iv) Distance From Home
It is also hypothesized that only a minority of depositors; specifically those
who live near the bank would be more influenced by the distance of the bank from
their homes.The following null hypothesis was then tested.
• H0 : Depositors are equally influenced by the distance of Bank Islam from
their homes.
Our results are shown in Table 9.23.
Table 9.23 - Crosstabulation: Influence of Distance From Home BY
Distance From Home in Miles.
DHOME	 Far	 From Home	 Row Total
Degree of Influence 0-2 mile more than 2 miles
No-little influence
	 12	 134	 146 (69.5%)
Row '/.
	
(8.2%)	 (91.8%)
Column /	 48.0%	 72.4%
Moderate-Very strong 	 13	 51	 64 (30.5)
Row Y.
	
(20.3%)	 (79.7%)
Column %
	
52.0%	 27.6%
Column Total	 25	 185	 210
11.9%	 88.1%	 100.0%
Chi-square value6.204 D.F = 1 Significance = 0.01274
Table 9.23 shows that depositors are not equally influenced by the distance
of Bank Islam from their homes. A vast majority of depositors(N=185, 88.1%)
live more than two miles from the bank and of these 91.8 per cent (N=134) were
not affected by the distance of the bank from their homes. It is found that only
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11.9 per cent of depositors (N=25) live within 2 miles from Bank Islam and more
than half of them (N=13, 52.0%) have been at least moderately influenced by the
proximity of the bank from where they live.
The chi-square value= 6.204 is higher than the tabulated chi-square (3.841)
at the 0.05 confidence level at 1 degrees of freedom. The null hypothesis can
therefore be rejected. The observed significance level is also lower than the 0.05
confidence level which implies that the result is likely to hold in the population.
It can therefore be inferred that only a minority of Bank Islam depositors
are most likely to be influenced by the distance of the bank from their
home. It is also evident that this involves only those who live near the
bank whilst the vast majority of depositors live away from the bank and
are not influenced by such factor.
In terms of the relative influence between the distance from work and the
distance from home, it was noticed earlier in Table 9.20 that the proportion of
depositors influenced by the former was higher (39.1%) than the latter (30.5%).
This tendency is probably due to the fact that 82.8 per cent (N=174) of depositors
in the sample were gainfully employed and since the the bank business hours were
restricted between 10.00 a.m and 3 p.m during the weekdays and 9.30 a.m and
11.30 a.m on Saturdays it is most likely that most depositors would tend to visit
the bank from work rather than from home.
Interest-free Banking or Convenience?
The next question that arises is whether depositors who are influenced by
the convenience variables are more likely to forgo Islamic banking for the sake of
convenience. The hypothetical question relating to depositors' next bank choice
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was again put to the test but this time using the Mann-Whitney nonparametric
test to compare the mean ranks of the convenient location variables between the
loyal and less loyal depositors.
Table 9.24 - Mann-Whitney U-Test To Compare the Mean Ranks of
the Convenient Location Variables Between Loyal and the Less Loyal
Depositors.
Variable Next Bank Choic Mean Rank U value z valu Probability(2-tailed
DHOME	 Bank Islam	 tLi= 98.60 3711.5 -2.710	 0.006 *
Nearest bank	 U2120.90
PTRP	 Bank Islam	 U3=100.09 3927.5 -2.036	 0.0417k
Nearest bank	 u4=117.58
DWRK	 Bank Islam	 U5= 98.20 3654.0 -2.847	 0.004 *
Nearest bank	 U6=121.78
PARK	 Bank Islam	 u7=101.18 4086.5 -1.761	 0.0782
Other bank	 u8=115.13
BRCH	 Bank Islam	 u9=101.73 4165 -1.446	 0.1481
Otherbank	 u10=113.92 ______ ______ _________________
Note: N210
Bank Islam (in another area)145 cases.
Nearest bankr65 cases.
significant.
The U-test results in Table 9.24 show that depositors who were less loyal to
Bank Islam have relatively higher mean ranks (u2, U4, v.6, v.8, uio) which implies
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that these depositors were more influenced by the five convenience variables com-
pared to the the other group of depositors who preferred Bank Islam as their next
bank choice. However the null hypotheses of equal mean ranks can only be rejected
for the first three variables in Table 9.24 (namely DHOME, PTRP and DWRK)
because only the z scores for these variables are higher than the decision rule value
of zo.025 = 1.96. It is also evident that the results of the U-test for the PARK and
BRCH variables are not likely to hold in the population because their observed
probabilities (0.078, 0.1481 respectively) are higher than the 0.05 confidence level.
The above results suggest that only depositors who attached high im-
portance to the distance of Bank Islam from work or home and its
accessibility by the public transport are likely to forgo banking with
Bank Islam for the sake of convenience. This would involve only a minority
of depositors as indicated in the earlier analyses.
9.3.6 FACTOR 3: Loan Opportunity
This factor is labeled in accordance with the LOAN variable which has a very
high factor loading of 0.8820. In fact TYPLON, the only other variable 290 is also
strongly correlated (factor loading= 0.87204) with FACTOR 3.
Hence FACTOR 3 may be expressed as the linear combinations of the two
variables as follows:-
FACTOR 3= f31LOAN + I32 TYPLON.... (9.3)
0 The LNORIB variable can be ignored since it correlates better with FACTOR 1.
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where	 factor loading
LOAN= opportunity to get loan	 .88200
TYPLON=types of loans offered	 .87204
f's= factor score coefficient
Since FACTOR 3 is the third important factor as indicated by its eigenvalue it
explains 10.2 per cent of the total variance. It is also expected that the proportion
of depositors influenced by this factor would be relatively small. This is confirmed
by the figures in Table 9.25.
Table 9.25 - Frequency Distribution: FACTOR 3 Variables - Degree
of Influence on Depositors' Preference for Bank Islam
Degree of Influence! Vaiw LOAN TYPLON
______________ (%) (%)
None	 1	 63.3	 61.4
Little	 2	 9.0	 7.6
Cumulative%	 -	 72.3	 69.0
Quite Strong	 3	 9.0	 10.0
Strong	 4	 15.7	 17.6
Very Strong	 5	 2.9	 3.3
Cumulative%	 -	 27.6	 30.9
Median Value	 1	 1
Mode Value	 1	 1
Only 27.6 per cent of depositors were at least moderately influenced by the
opportunity to get loans from Bank Islam. 63.3 per cent were not influenced at
all. Similarly 30.9 per cent were attracted by the types of loans offered by Bank
Islam.
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It is hypothesized that depositors who rated highly for FACTOR 3 would be
those who have managed to secure loans from Bank Islam. The U-test results as
shown in Table 9.26 seem to support this expectation.
Table 9.26 - Mann-Whitney U-Test of Association between FACTOR
3 Variables and GET LOAN?
Variable GET LOAN 7 Mean Rank U value z value Probability(2-tailed)
	
LOAN Yes	 u1= 140.62 1247.0 -3.2440 	 0.0012
	
No	 U2= 101.60
	
TYPLON Yes	 U3 140.83 1242.5 -3.2192	 0.0013
	
No	 U4= 101.57
Note:
Yes= 21 cases (1O'/.)
No189 cases (90Y.)
It is evident that depositors who received loans from Bank Islam have higher
mean scores for the LOAN and TYPLON variables which indicate that they
are more influenced by both variables than the other depositors. The z values
are -3.2440 and -3.2192 respectively which are higher than the critical value of
z .ü25 = l.96. The null hypotheses that u1='u2 and u3 =u4 are rejected. These vari-
ations in mean ranks are also likely to hold in the population since the observed
probabilities (0.0012 and 0.0013 respectively) are lower than the 0.05 confidence
interval. It can be inferred that only depositors who received loans from
Bank Islam had been strongly influenced by Factor 3 when selecting
the Bank as their primary bank.
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9.3.7 FACTOR 4: Social Influence
As we have seen earlier in Table 9.14, FACTOR 4 is the linear combinations
of two variables representing social influence as shown in equation 9.4.
FACTOR 4= I41ENFR + f42PUBLIC.... (9.4)
where	 factor loading
ENFR= encouragement of relatives and friends 	 .71024
PUBLIC= bank opening publicity 	 .58522
f's= factor score coefficient
Social influence has often emerged as one of the common factors in studies on
bank selection decisions. For example studies by Anderson and Cox (1976) and
Tan (1981) have found that 'recommendation by friends' was ranked more influ-
ential than 'locational convenience'. Whilst these findings apply to the depositors
of conventional banks our findings show that social influence plays a less im-
portant role in determining the bank selection decisions of Islamic bank
depositors. The results of the factor analysis ranked social influence as the fourth
important factor and compared with other variables it explains only 7.5 per cent
of the total variance for the variables in the data set.
As can be seen in Table 9.27, only 31.9 per cent depositors have been at least
moderately influenced by their relatives or friends to bank at Bank Islam. On the
other hand, almost three-quarters (74.8%) seems to have selected Bank Islam on
the basis of their personal preferences.
About 50 per cent of depositors have been influenced by the opening public-
ity of Bank Islam in 1983. One would expect that the first depositors of Bank
Islam would tend to have been more influenced by such publicity compared with
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subsequent depositors.
Table 9.27 - Frequency Distribution (N=210): Social Influence -
Degree of Influence on Depositors' Preference for Bank Islam
Degree of Influence! Valu ENFR PUBLIC
______________ (%) (%)
None	 1	 57.1	 38.1
Little	 2	 11.0	 11.9
Curnulative%	 -	 74.8	 50.0
Quite Strong	 3	 15.2	 12.4
Strong	 4	 14.8	 31.9
Very Strong	 5	 1.9	 5.7
Cumulative%	 -	 31.9	 50.0
Median Value	 1	 2.5
Mode Value	 1	 1
Table 9.28 - Kruskall-Wallis Test To Compare the Mean Ranks of the
Bank Opening Publicity Variable Between First and Non-First
Depositors.
Variable When was account Number of Mean Rank
________ pened?	 Cases	 __________
PUBLIC	 1983	 47	 k1= 132.07
	
1984-1985	 45	 k2= 109.29
	
1986-19S8	 53	 k3= 101.75
	
1989-1991	 65	 k4= 86.72
chi-square value=17. 1413 d.f=3 Significance=0.0007
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Table 9.28 shows the results of the Kruskall-Wallis test which compares the
mean ranks k 1 , k2 , k3 and k4 between the first depositors who opened their account
in 1983 and subsequent depositors in the following years.
It is evident that the mean ranks between the four groups are not equal. It is
also noticed that the mean rank for first depositors who opened their accounts in
1983 exceeds that of the other depositors. The value of the chi-square=17.1413 is
higher than the tabulated chi-square value= 7.815 at the 0.05 significance level and
3 degrees of freedom. The null hypothesis that k1 =/c2 =k3 =k4 is rejected. Since
the observed significance (0.0007) is higher than the 0.05 confidence interval the
variations in mean ranks are likely to hold in the population. It can therefore
be deduced that the influence of the bank opening publicity is greatest
amongst first depositors compared to subsequent depositors.
In conclusion Muslims in the urban areas are attracted to Bank Islam mainly
because it offers an Islamic alternative which is fundamentally different from the
traditional bank in terms of its operation and the types of services offered. The
influence of contextual factors such as locational convenience and easy accessibil-
ity are second in importance whilst social influence plays a less important role in
determining depositors' preference for Bank Islam as their primary bank. These
findings show that an Islamic bank operating side by side with a relatively de-
veloped conventional banking system can still create its own niche in the market
for pious Muslims who are committed in avoiding mba. The bank selection deci-
sions of these Muslims are fundamentally different from the typical conventional
bank customer who places high importance to locational convenience; 291
 or social
291 as shown in the studies by Kaufman (1969) and Bowers (1969).
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infiuence292 . For the religious Muslim the motivation to avoid nba surpasses all
other factors in their bank selection decision. An important question that arises
however is whether Islamic banking can go beyond this captive group of depositors
and penetrate further into the market especially in attracting other Muslims who
currently bank only with the interest-based banks.
9.4 Analysis of Muslim Depositors of Riba Banks
Whilst the analysis in the preceding sections was confined to the depositors
of Bank Islam, the subject of interest in this section will be Muslims who do not
bank with Bank Islam but have accounts in the interest-based banks. This group
of Muslims forms a segment of the market which is still uncaptured by Islamic
banking. It seems that the religious factor is not a sufficient motivation for them
to open an account at Bank Islam. In this section an attempt will be made to
examine the perceptions of this group of Muslims on the question of nba. Their
reasons for not banking with Bank Islam and the factors which have influenced
them to bank only with the interest-based banks will also be identified. This
information will provide an insight on how this group of Muslims differ from the
depositors of Bank Islam and how they may be attracted to Islamic banking in
future.
9.4.1 Perception of Riba and Interest
One of the possible reasons why this group of Muslims continue banking with
the conventional banks even after the establishment of Bank Islam may be their
ignorance of the Islamic rule on nba and its modern connotations. It is possible
that some of these Muslims may have never heard of the word nba before. On
292 
as reported by Anderson and Cox (1976).
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the other hand, those who know about the Islamic prohibition of nba may not
exactly know what nba is. This problem is further complicated by the controversy
between nba and interest.
The following null hypothesis was tested to find out if Muslims who banked
with the interest-based banks were really ignorant of nba.
1. H0 : Muslims who bank with the Islamic bank or the interest-based banks
are equally aware of the word nba.
Table 9.29	 Crosstabulation: Heard of Riba By Respective Banks
Depositors
Have you heard o Depositors	 Row Total
nba before?	 Bank Islam Conventional Bani
Yes	 209	 168	 377(99.2%)
Column %
	
99.5%	 98.8%
No	 1	 2	 3(0.8)
Row %
	
.5%	 1.2%
Column Total	 210	 170	 380
	
55.3 %
	
44.7%	 100%
Chi-square value= .58821 D.F = 1 Significance = 0.44311
Table 9.29 shows that almost 100 per cent (99.5%, N=209) of Bank Islam
depositors have heard of nba before and close to 99 per cent (98.8%, N=d68)
of the conventional bank depositors were also aware of mba. The close margin
suggests that Muslims who bank with the interest-based banks were not ignorant
of the word nba. In fact our results show that this group of depositors are as
equally aware of nba as the depositors of Bank Islam. This is confirmed by the
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computed chi-square value (.58821) which is lower than the tabulated chi-square
value (3.84 1), at 0.05 significance level, at one degree of freedom; which necessarily
means that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. It can therefore be inferred that
like the depositors of Bank Islam, Muslims who bank with the interest-
based banks are not ignorant of nba. This general awareness may be seen as
one of the direct effects of the Islamic resurgence on the Malaysian Muslims. As
noted earlier in Chapter VI, the prohibition of nba was one of the central issues
being raised by the Islamic opposition party, PAS, in their propagation for the
establishment of an Islamic State. The prohibition of nba was also emphasized by
the Muslim youth organizations in calling Muslims to adopt Islam as a complete
way of life. These organizations have indeed been instrumental in creating an
awareness among Muslims on the Islamic injunction against nba. As indicated by
our finding the prohibition of nba has become common knowledge to the ordinary
Muslim. What constitutes riba is of course another question.
In order to find out depositors' understanding of the true concept of nba that
is prohibited in Islam, the following null hypothesis was tested.
2. H0 : Muslims who bank with the Islamic bank or the interest-based banks
are equally agreed that interest is the same as nba.
Only the opinion of depositors who were aware of nba is taken into account
in Table 9.30. It is evident that close to 70 per cent of Bank Islam depositors
(68.9%, N=144) perceived that interest was the same as nba; 18 per cent thought
that interest was not nba while 12.9 per cent were unsure. On the other hand, less
than half of the conventional bank depositors (45.2%, N=76) knew that interest
was indeed mba. The rest of them were either unsure (32.7%, N=55) or did not
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agree (22.0%, N=37) that both interest and nba were prohibited in Islam. These
results imply that Muslims who bank with the Islamic bank are typically aware of
the similarity between nba and interest. In contrast a high proportion of Muslim
depositors of the interest-based banks do not have a clear understanding of the
true concept of nba that is prohibited by their religion.
Table 9.30 - Crosstabulation: Opinion on Riba & Interest By
Respective Banks' Depositors.. .(controlling for Have you heard of
riba?= Yes)
Is interest the Bank Islam Conventional Bani 	 Row
same as nba? Depositors Depositors	 Total
Yes	 144*	 76 *	 220(58.4%)
Column V.	 68.9%	 45.2%
No	 38	 37	 75(19.9%)
Column 'fl	 18.2%	 22.0%
Unsure	 27	 55*	 82(21.8%)
Column '/.	 12.9%	 32.9%
Column Total	 209	 168	 377
55.4 %
	
44.6%	 100%
Chi-square value=26.446 D.F = 2 Significance = 0.00000
This difference in perception between both groups of Muslims are likely to hold
in the population. As shown by the chi-square statistics the null hypothesis can be
rejected. This is because the computed chi-square value ( 26.446 ) is greater than
the tabulated chi-square value ( 5.991 ) at the 0.05 confidence limit at 2 degrees
of freedom. The null hypothesis that Muslim depositors of Bank Islam and the
conventional banks equally agree that interest is the the same as nba can therefore
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be rejected. The difference of opinion is likely to hold in the population since the
observed significance level (P_0.000) is lower than the 0.05 confidence interval.
We can therefore conclude that even though Muslims who bank entirely
with the interest-based banks know that nba is forbidden in Islam they
generally do not have a clear understanding of the true concept of nba
that is prohibited by their religion. Their willingness to continue bank-
ing with the interest-based banks may be partly explained by this igno-
rance.
The attitude of these Muslims towards interest and nba may also be explained
by their willingness to invest in the ASN. As shown in Table 9.31 more than 70 per
cent (71.2%, N=126) of these Muslims held ASN shares compared to the relatively
lower percentage of Bank Islam depositors (40%, N=84) who did not participate
in the scheme.
Table 9.31 - Crosstabulation: Invest in ASN By The Respective
Bank Depositors
Do you invest in Baank Islam Conventional Ban] Row Total
the ASN?	 Depositors	 Depositors	 Total
Yes	 84	 121*	 205(53.9%)
Column 'I,	 40.0%	 71.2%
No	 126*	 49	 175(46.1%)
Column 7.
	
60.0%	 28.8%
Column Total	 210	 170	 380
55.3 %
	
44.7%	 100%
Chi-square value= 36.75 D.F = 1 Significance = 0.00000
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The computed chi-square value (36.75) is higher than the tabulated value
(3.841) at the 0.05 level of significance; at one degree of freedom. The null hy-
pothesis is therefore rejected. Since the observed significance level (P=0.000) is
lower than the 0.05 confidence level it can be inferred that Muslims who bank with
the interest-based banks are more likely to invest in the Amanah Saham Nasional
compared with the Muslim depositors of Bank Islam.
We can therefore conclude that the Muslim depositors of the interest-
based banks lacked the religious motivation to bank with the Islamic
bank because of their perception that interest was not the same as
mba. Because of this ignorance they are less committed in avoiding nba
compared with their Bank Islam counterpart.
9.4.2 Reasons For Not Banking With Bank Islam
On the assumption that Muslims who bank exclusively with the interest-based
banks are relatively less committed in avoiding nba the relevant question that
arises is whether these depositors were not motivated to bank with the Islamic
bank because of the lower rates of returns on deposits offered by the bank. During
the survey, these depositors were asked to indicate three main reasons for not
banking with Bank Islam. The frequencies of their responses are summarized in
Table 9.32.
The list of factors in Table 9.32 shows that the rate of return was the least
important factor that had discouraged these depositors from banking with the Is-
lamic bank. Only two depositors indicated to have been disappointed by the lower
rates of returns on the savings offered by Bank Islam. Other depositors (43.9%)
were generally discouraged by the fact that ATMs were unavailable and that there
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were too few Bank Islam branches. This finding suggests that this group of Mus-
lims preferred the conventional bank over Bank Islam for the same reasons that a
majority of Bank Islam depositors maintained their accounts with the conventional
banks. The rate of return factor is not important to both groups. Instead they
were more concerned with the ATM service and the number of branches which the
Islamic bank still lacks.
Table 9.32 - Frequency Distribution: Reason for Not Saving in Bank
Islam
Why do you not have an Frequenc Percent Cumulative
account at Bank Islam?	 Percent
1. No ATM	 119	 23.3	 23.3
2. Too few branches	 105	 20.6	 43.9
3. Don't know what
services are available	 85	 16.6	 60.5
4. Salary paid here	 71	 13.9	 74.4
5. Expensive loans	 23	 4.6	 79.0
6. Not interested	 22	 4.3	 83.3
7. Slow & Inefficient 	 16	 3.1	 86.4
8. Lower returns on saving	 2	 0.4	 86.8
9. Others	 30	 5.9	 92.7
(gives only 2 reasons)	 37	 7.3	 100
Total	 510*	 100.0
Note:* refers to response not Cases since each respondent was asked to give three main reasons (i.e 170 x 3 =
510)
The preceding result seems to imply that in the absence of the religious moti-
vation, the bank selection decisions of Muslims who bank entirely with the conven-
tional banks may not be different from the typical conventional bank depositors
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who view convenience as a key determinant of bank patronage. Previous research,
for example by Foster (1968), Kaufman (1969), Bowers (1969) and Bennett (1972)
in the United States has shown that location is the most important bank selection
criterion. On the other hand, other studies have found that social influence293
and financial considerations 294 rather than convenience are the main determinants
of bank patronage. Which of these factors are important to Muslims who bank
with the interest-based banks will be further investigated. Our objective in the
following section is to ascertain the main factors that have influenced Muslims to
bank entirely with the interest-based banks with the view that such knowledge
may provide some insight on how a fully-fledged Islamic bank such as Bank Islam
may increase its market share of deposits in the competitive urban market.
9.5 Bank Selection Criteria (Riba Banks' Depositors)
9.5.1 Factor Analysis
As in the previous analysis of Bank Islam depositors the bank selection deter-
minants of the interest-based bank depositors will be identified by factor analysis.
There are fifteen variables to be analysed. However before a smaller set of under-
lying factors can be derived from these variables it is necessary to assess whether
factor analysis can be applied to the data set.
A correlation matrix as in Table 9.33 was first run to obtain the KMO measure
of sampling adequacy and the Bartlett Test of sphericity. The statistics for the
Bartlett test is recorded at 800.17 with zero level of observed significance which
indicates that the correlation matrix is not an identity matrix and is therefore
293 Anderson & Cox 1976.
294 Chua 1989.
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Table 9.33 - Correlation Matrix-DEMPLY to WLKNWN
OEM PLY
ENCFR
ADVERT
DW RK
DHOM E
DE HOP
PA RE
PT R P
FASTS V
ATM
RAV
LOAN
TYP LOAN
BRCH
WLKNWN
	
DEMPLY	 ENCFR	 ADVERT	 DWRK	 DHfE	 DSHOP
1.00000
	
.02875	 i;00000
	
.03839	 .39711	 1.00000
	
-.16968	 -.04547	 .07662	 1.00000
	
.01819	 .23702	 .28179	 .20067	 1.00oOO
	
.06274	 .29519	 .29374	 .19285	 .44770	 1.00000
	
.04364	 .16888	 .31746	 .08076	 .24423	 .46417	 1.00000
	
.00703	 .22412	 .25109	 .14497	 .29243	 .54390	 .56865
	
-.07088	 .19831	 .26704	 .10295	
.31840	 .31316	 .38769
	
-.15500	 .10016	 .17162	 .35063	 .28255	 .28494	 .19597
	
.04768	 .19822	 .33741	 .10079	 .30954	 .37790	 .36983
	
.04138	 .12858	 .37577	 -.09716	 .18871	 .21993	 .29549
	
.03433	 .08353	 .34979	 -.04529	 .11488	 .22018	 .33919
	
-.16745	 .10599	 .18490	 .23046.	 .31590	 .31603	 .28127
	
-.02719	 .14794	 .25720	 .18670	 .26250	 .35973	 .32105
	
PTRP	 FASTSV	 ATM	 RSAV	 LOAN •TVPLOAN	 BRCF{
PTRP	 1.00000
FASTSV	 .34512	 1.00000
ATM	 .29589	 .39845	 1.00000
RSAV	 .37386	 .35411	 .21892	 1.00000
LOAN	 .23445	 .22188	 .15922	 .48968	 1.00000
TYPLOAN	 .21923	 .23478	 .15798	 .44377	 .71949	 1.00000
BRCH	 .21576	 .44192	 .46291	 .22480	 .17600	 .21439	 1.00000
WLKNWN	 .35255	 .43012	 .34393	 .31469	 .25053	 .29517	 .68452
WLKNWN
WLKNWN	 1.00000
KAISER-MEYER-OLKIN MEASURE OF SAMPLtNG ADEQUACY = .81039
BARTLETT TEST OF SP1IERECITY = 800.17117, SIGNIFICANCE =
	 .00000
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suitable for factor analysis. The KMO statistic on the other hand yields a value at
0.810. This high value suggests that the correlations are on the whole sufficiently
strong for factor analysis to be carried out. Following the above procedure, it is
then necessary to determine the number of factors that can be extracted from the
list of 15 variables. Since this number can be ascertained by the eigenvalues, 15
factors are initially extracted 295 to see the eigenvalues for all the factors and the
percentage of variance explained by each of them.
The initial extraction of the fifteen factors is shown in Table 9.34
Table 9.34	 Initial Extraction:Initial Statistics
(Principal-Components Analysis)
Commun
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
VARIABLE
Variable
DEMPLY
ENCFR
ADVERT
DWRK
DHOME
DSHOP
PARK
PTRP
FASTS V
ATM
RSAV
LOAN
TYPLON
BRCH
WLKNWN
FACTOR
Factor Eigenvalue % of variance Cumulative
1	 4.695*	 31.3	 31.3
2	 1.801*	 12.0	 43.3
3	 1.316*	 8.8	 52.1
4	 1.029*	 6.9	 59.0
5	 0.956	 6.4	 65.3
6	 0.881	 5.9	 71.2
7	 0.715	 4.8	 76.0
8	 0.671	 4.5	 80.5
9	 0.597	 4.0	 84.4
10	 0.573	 3.8	 88.3
11	 0.444	 3.0	 91.2
12	 0.408	 2.7	 94.0
13	 0.400	 2.7	 96.6
14	 0.263	 1.8	 98.4
15	 0.243	 1.6	 100.0
295 the number of factors initially extracted is equal to the number of variables in the set.
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KEY:
DEMPLY-salary paid in this bank 	 DSHOP-distance from where I shop
ENCFR-eucouragement of relatives/friends ADVERT. advcrtiments
DWRK- distance from work	 DROME- distance from borne
PARK-parking facihtic available
FASTSV-fast counter service
RSAV.rate of interest on savings
TYPLON-types of loans offered
WLKNWN-wellknown bank
PTRP.public transport convenience
ATM.autoteller machines avaIlable
LOAN-opportunity to get loans
BRCH.number of branches available
The importance of the eigenvalues, as we have seen in the previous analysis of
Bank Islam depositors, is associated with the Kaiser criterion which allows only
factors having eigenvalues greater than 1 to be significant enough to be factor
analysed.
Looking at the eigenval'ues in Table 9.34 it is noticed that four factors have
eigenvalues greater than 1, ranging from 4.695 for the first factor and 1.029 for the
fourth factor. Thus in accordance to the Kaiser criterion four factors should be
extracted in this analysis. All four factors will explain 59 per cent of the variance.
The graphical scree-test also denotes a similar number of factors to be ex-
tracted. As shown in Figure 9.2 the scree-plot begins to level off after the fourth
factor which is indicative that only the four factors above the scree should be factor
analysed.
Based on the Kaiser criterion and the graphical scree-test it is apparent that
the fifteen variables can be reduced to a smaller set of four factors to represent the
bank selection criteria of the Muslim depositors of the interest-based banks.
The initial extraction of the four factors is shown in Table 9.35. Because
the initial extraction of factors did not show which variables belong most clearly
to which factors the varimax orthogonal rotation was carried out so that each
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Figure 9.2 - Scree Plot- Eigenvalues of the 15 Factors Initially
Extracted
4.696 +	 *
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I
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E
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V
A
L
ii
E
S	 1.802 +	 *
	
1.316 +	 *
	
.957 +	 *	 *
	
.881 +	 *
	
.672 +	 *	 *
	
.573 +	 *	 *
	
.401+	 *	 *	 *
	
.243 +	 *	 *
.000 +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	 9	 10	 11	 12	 13	 14	 15
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factor would be represented by a unique cluster of variables. The rotated factor
matrix as shown in Table 9.36 provides a clear picture of the four factors and its
accompanying variables.
Table 9.35 - Initial Extraction: Final Statistics (Principal Component
Analysis)
VARIABLE	 FACTOR
Variable Communality Factor Eigenva1ue % of variance Cumulative
DEMPLY	 .38863	 1	 4.695	 31.3	 31.3
ENCFR	 .76263	 1	 1.801	 1.801	 43.3
ADVERT	 .61561	 2	 1.316	 12.0	 52.1
DWRK	 .3993	 3	 1.029	 8.8	 59.0
DHOME	 .44304	 4
DSHOP	 .65279	 5
PARK	 .61665	 6
PTRP	 .66655	 7
FASTSV	 .44919	 8
ATM	 .53082	 9
RSAV	 .51404	 10
LOAN	 .78837	 11
TYPLON	 .78875	 12
BRCH	 .66885	 13
WLKNWN	 .55821	 14
KEY:
	
DEMPLY-salary paid in this bank
	
DSHOP-distance from where I shop
ENCFR-encouragement of relatives/friends ADVERT- advertisements
DWRK- distance from work
	
DHOME- distance from home
	
PARK-parking facilities available 	 PTRP-public transport convenience
FASTSV-fast counter service 	 ATM-autoteller machines available
RSAV-rate of interest on savings 	 LOAN-opportunity to get loans
TYPLON-types of loans offered	 BRCH-number of branches available
WLKNWN-wellknown bank
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Table 9.36 - Rotated Factor Matrix: Varimax Rotation
Variable	 FACTOR 1 FACTOR 2 FACTOR 3 FACTOR 4
No. & Code Convenience 	 Easy	 Financial	 Social
Accessibility Services Available Influence
1. BRCH	 .77907
2. ATM	 .70021
3. WLKNWN	 .61993
4. DWRK	 .55849
5. FASTSV	 .50219
6. DEMPLY	 -
7. PTRP	 .78028
8. DSIIOP	 .71517
9. PARK	 .71426
10.TYPLON	 .87575
11.LOAN	 .87138
12.RSAV	 .54213
13.ENCFR	 .88646
14.ADVERT	 .66274
15.DHOME	 -
Eigenvalue	 4.69568	 1.80169	 1.31622	 1.02990
%of variance	 31.3	 12.0	 8.8	 6.9
Cumulative %
	
31.3	 43.3	 52.1	 59.0
KEY:
DEMPLY-salary paid in this bank 	 DSHOP-distance from where I shop
ENCFR-encouragement of relatives/friends ADVERT- advertisements
DWRK- distance from work	 DHOME- distance from home
PARK-parking facilities available 	 PTRP-public transport convenience
FASTSV-fast counter service 	 ATM-autoteller machines available
RSAV-rate of interest on savings 	 LOAN-opportunity to get loans
TYPLON-types of loans offered	 BRCH-number of branches available
WLKNWN-wellknown bank
The variable groupings in the rotated factor matrix seem to suggest that Mus-
urns who prefer to bank entirely with the interest-based banks do so because of
the following four factors:-
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. FACTOR 1: Convenience
• FACTOR 2: Easy Accessibility
• FACTOR 3: Financial Services Available
. FACTOR 4: Social Influence.
The clustering of the variables and their respective loadings under the four
factors indicate that 'convenience' is the key determinant which distinguishes the
bank selection decision of Muslim depositors of the interest-based banks and the
Islamic bank. Whilst both groups were relatively unaffected by social influence296
and were less concerned with the rates of return and the types of loans offered by
their respective banks, it is clear that various aspects of convenience as represented
by Factor 1 as well as Factor 2 were of primary importance to Muslims who bank
exclusively with the interest-based banks.
9.5.2 FACTOR 1: Convenience
The importance of convenience as the main bank selection determinant for
the Muslim depositors of the interest-based banks is denoted by the fact that this
factor has the highest eigenvalue and explains 31.3 per cent of the total variance.
As shown by Equation 9.5, Factor 1 is the linear combinations of five variables
representing convenience as follows;
FACTOR 1= I11BRCU + I12WLKNWN + I13 ATM + I14DWRK +I15 FASTSV ...(9.5)
296 Social influence was also ranked fourth in the bank selection criteria of the Bank Islam depositors.
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where	 factor loadings
BRCH= number of branches	 .77907
ATM= autoteller machines available	 .70021
WLKNWN= weilknown bank	 .61993
DWRK= distance from work	 .55849
FASTSV= fast counter-service 	 .50219
f's= factor score coefficient
All five variables are moderately correlated with FACTOR 1 with factor load-
ings ranging between 0.502 to 0.779. The variables 'many branches' (BRCH)
and 'distance from work' (DWRK) indicate the importance of the locational con-
venience of the interest-based banks to these depositors. The 'availability of au-
toteller machines' (ATM) and 'fast counter service' denotes, on the other hand,
the importance of transactional convenience to the depositors. The 'well-known
bank' variable may also be indirectly associated with convenience in the wider
sense. The relatively strong weight of this variable in Factor 1 may be attributed
to depositors' great concern for the safety of their deposits. In the light of the
scandals of the deposit-taking cooperatives and the collapse of a few commercial
banks during the recession it is plausible that depositors consider it important and
convenient to deposit their money in banks which are well-known and have a good
business reputation. The label 'convenience' is therefore justified to represent the
variables in FACTOR 1 in the broad sense.
The extent to which depositors have been influenced by each of the convenience
variable under FACTOR 1 is depicted in Table 9.37.
It is evident from the frequency distribution in Table 9.37 that a very high
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proportion of Muslims who bank entirely with the interest-based banks are highly
convenience-oriented. The measures of central tendency (median=4, naode=4)
indicate that, these Muslims were typically strongly motivated by the numerous
bank branches (BRCH), the distance of the bank from work (DWRK) and the
availability of electronic banking through the auto-teller machines (ATM). The
speed of services being offered at the bank counters (FASTSV) was relatively less
important as indicated by the values of the median and the mode (respective
values=3).
Table 9.37 Frequency Distribution (N=170): FACTOR 1 Variables -
Degree of Influence on Depositors' Preference for Interest-Based Banks
Degree of Influence/ Value BRCH DWRK ATM FASTSV WLKNWN
______________ (%) (%) (%) (%)	 (%)
None	 1	 9.4	 11.2	 14.7	 15.9	 18.8
Little	 2	 6.5	 6.4	 5.3	 10.6	 4.7
Cumulative%	 -	 15.9	 17.6	 20.0	 26.5	 23.5
Quite Strong	 3	 11.2	 11.2	 7.1	 37.6	 16.5
Strong	 4	 51.8	 41.8	 54.1	 28.8	 43.5
Very Strong	 5	 21.1	 29.4	 18.8	 7.1	 16.5
Cumulative%	 -	 84.1	 82.4	 80.0	 73.5	 76.5
Median Value	 4	 4	 4	 3	 4
Mode Value	 4	 4	 4	 3	 4
The strong influence of convenience on the bank selection decisions of these
Muslims is in contrast with its impact on the depositors of Bank Islam. As shown
earlier in Table 9.20 the latter were relatively not influenced by convenience in
their decision to bank with Bank Islam. Except for the accessibility of Bank Islam
by public transportation which was considered important by 45 per cent of the
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Islamic bank depositors more than 60 per cent of them were not influenced by the
other dimensions of convenience.
(a) Locational Convenience
It is evident in Table 9.37 that the greatest motivation for Muslims to bank
with the interest-based banks is locational convenience in terms of the numerous
branches and the close proximity of these banks to the depositors' workplaces.
More than 80 per cent of depositors have been at least moderately influenced by
both variables (84.1% and 82.4% respectively).
Our findings also show that there are no significant differences between the
influence of the BRCH variable on different subgroups of the sample.
Table 9.38 - Kruskal-Wallis Test Comparing the Mean Ranks of
BRCH in terms of Age, Income and Occupation
Variable	 Subgroup	 Cases	 Mean Rank Significanc
AGE: 1 (in years)
18-25	 41(24.1%) k1 = 72.65
26-40	 111 (65.3%) k2 = 89.80	 0.1133+
41 and over	 18 (10.6%) k3 88.28
BRCH: INCOME:2(M$)
Many	 700 & below	 59 (36.6%) k4 = 73.26
Branches 701-1400
	 53 (32.9%) k5 = 84.10	 0.2128+
1401 and above	 49 (30.5%) k6 = 86.96
OCCUPATION:3
Professional/
Administration:4
	85 (53.1%) k7 = 85.20
Clerical	 47 (29.4%) k8 = 69.17	 0.0994+
Unskilled & Others 28 (17.5%) k9 85.25
Note: 1 N=170, 2 N=161, N=160, includes technicians and executives, + not signicant.
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As shown by the Kruskall-Wallis Test results in Table 9.38 even though there
are differences in the mean ranks of various subgroups in terms of their age, income
and occupation these differences are not likely to hold in the population since the
observed significance levels are higher than the 0.05 confidence limit.
The null hypothesis of equal independent means can therefore be accepted;
which suggests that urban Muslims who bank entirely with the interest-based
banks are homogenously influenced (in this case strongly influenced) by
the extensive branch network of the conventional banks in their bank
selection decisions.
On the other hand, our results on the impact of the DWRK variable show that
the Muslim depositors of the conventional bank were not homogeneously influenced
by the locational convenience of the interest-based banks from their workplaces.
It is found that certain groups of depositors are likely to be more influenced than
others by this factor in their bank selection decisions.
The Kruskall-Wallis Test and U-Test results in Table 9.39 show that the fol-
lowing groups of depositors are more likely to have been strongly influenced by the
convenient location of the interest-based banks from their work places.
As can be seen in Table 9.39 the demographic profile of a depositor who is
strongly influenced by locational convenience of the interest-based banks from
his/her place of work is rather distinct: age between 26-40, working within 2 miles
from the bank, with college or university education and tend to work as profes-
sionals, technician or executives earning above average income. These inferences
are made on the basis that the null hypothesis of equal mean ranks for the DWRK
variable between depositors in terms of their age, education, income, occupation
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and the distance of their workplaces from their banks can be rejected respectively.
Table 9.39 - K-W and U-Test results Comparing the Mean Ranks of
DWRK in terms of Age, Distance from Work, Education, Income and
Occupation
Variable	 Subgroup	 Cases	 Mean Rank	 Z, x2	 Signiflcanc
AGE: (in years)	 K-W TEST:
18-25	 41 (24.1%)	 k 1	 71.21
26-40	 111 (65.3%) k2 = 96.13* X2 =18.6	 0.0002
41 and over	 18 (10.6%) k3 = 52.50
Distance FAR FROM WORK (in miles): 	 K-W TEST:
From 0-2
	
135 (79.4%) k4 = 93.61*
Work 3-5
	 15 ( 8.8%) k5 = 54.07	 23 83	 0.0000
more than 5	 20 (11.8%) k6 = 54.33
EDUCATION:	 U-TEST:
secondary or lower	 85 (50.0%) u = 77.88
college or university	 85 (50.0%) u2= 93.12* z=-2.1303	 0.0331
INCOME:' (M$)
700 & below	 59 (36.6%) k7 = 67.59
701-1400	 53 (32.9%)	 k8 = 86.66 X2=8.8691	 0.0119
1401 and above	 49 (30.5%) k9 91.02*
OCCUPATION:2
Professional3
	85 (53.1%) k10 = 87.73*
Clerical	 47 (29.4%) k, 1 = 78.82 X2=7.7406	 0.0209
Unskilled & Others	 28 (17.5%) k12 = 61.38
Note: 1 N=161, N=160, includes technicians & executives
The computed chisquare values of the K-W tests are higher than the tabulated
chisquare value ( 2 =5.991), at 2 degrees of freedom. Similarly, the computed z
value (z=-2.1303) is higher than the z0.05=1.96 critical value. These statistics
imply that the null hypothesis of equal means can be rejected. These differences
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are also likely to hold in the population since all the observed significance levels are
lower than the .0.05 confidence level. We can therefore infer that Muslim depositors
who are strongly influenced by the locational convenience of the interest-based
banks from their workplaces are likely to be between 26-40 years old, working
within 2 miles from the bank, with college or university education and tend to
work as professionals, technician or executives earning above average income.
Whilst the age and place of work of the depositor are rather self-evident in
the sense that only depositors who are of working age 297 and work near the banks
will be necessarily more influenced by the DWRK variable, it is interesting to
note that the more affluent depositors tend to be more influenced by this variable
compared with the lower income or the lower educated depositors. This tendency
seems to suggest that depositors with higher socio-economic status are the most
convenience-oriented within the group. They regard banking as a convenience
good and it is an important criteria for a bank to be conveniently located near
their workplaces.
(b) Transactional Convenience
Besides locational convenience, the influence of 'transactional convenience' is
also significant among Muslims who bank entirely with the interest-based banks.
This is indicated by the high ratings given to the ATM and FASTSV (fast counter
service) variables. Eighty per cent of the sampled population (as seen earlier in
Table 9.37) were at least moderately influenced by the availability of ATMs and
73.5 per cent by the fast counter services. It is also noted that more than half
(54%) have been strongly motivated to bank with the interest-based bank because
of the ATM.
297 The working age in Malaysia is defined between 18-60 years old
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Whilst depositors are generally homogeneous in rating the influence of the
ATM in their bank selection decisions, two distinct characteristics of depositors
who were most influenced by the availabffity of the ATM in their bank selection
decision can be identified. Firstly, our findings show that this facility has a greater
impact on the younger rather than the older depositors.
The Kruskall-Wallis Test results in Table 9.40, shows that depositors between
the ages of 18 and 25 years old have the highest mean rank (k 1 = 92.35) for the
ATM variable; followed by the majority who were 26 to 40 years old with mean
rank k2 =87.97. The lowest mean rank (k3 ) is recorded by those over forty years
old. As the chisquare value ( 2 =9.8076) is higher than the tabulated chisquare
statistic ( 2=5.991) at two degrees of freedom we can reject the null hypothesis of
equal sample means at the 0.05 critical point.
Table 9.40 - Kruskal-Wallis Test Comparing the Mean Ranks (mean
degree of influence) of ATM in terms of Age
Variable Subgroup	 Cases	 Mean Rank Significance
ATM Age (in years)
18-25	 41 (24.1%) k1 = 92.35*
26-40	 111 (65.3%) /C2 = 87.97	 0.0074
41 and over	 18 (10.6%) k3 = 52.50 X29.8076
We can therefore conclude that the younger rather than the older urban
Muslims are more likely to be most influenced by the availability of
the ATM in their decision to bank primarily with the interest-based
banks. A plausible explanation for this tendency is that younger people are more
adaptable to change compared with the older generation who tend to be more
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conservative and preferred to do their banking by the traditional way.
It is also found that the influence of the ATM is greatest amongst the convenience-
oriented professional and semi-professionals compared with depositors in the other
professions. The availability of the ATM seems relatively less important to deposi-
tors in the administrative services and its importance continues to decrease as one
moves down the occupational ladder.
Table 9.41 - Kruskal-Wallis Test Comparing the Mean Ranks (mean
degree of influence) o ATM in terms of Occupation
Variable	 Subgroup	 Cases Mean Rank Significanc
ATM Occupation2
Professional3 	40 (53.1%) k4 = 96.59*
Administration	 45 (29.4%) k5 = 78.81	 0.0326
Clerical	 47 (29.4%) k6 = 75.50 x2=8.7622
Unskilled & Others 28 (17.5%) k7 = 68.63
Note: 2 N=160, includes technicians, includes executives.
As can be seen in Table 9.41 the mean rank of the professionals is the highest
where k4 =96.59. The mean rank of the administrators and executive is very much
lower where k5 =78.81 while depositors in the clerical pooi scored 75.50. These dif-
ferences are likely to hold in the population since the chisquare value (X2=8.7622)
which is higher than the tabulated X 2 =7.815 at 3 degrees of freedom which allows
us to reject the null hypothesis of equal sample means at the 0.05 confidence level.
We can therefore deduce that the impact of the ATM in attracting urban
Muslims to the interest-based banks is greatest among the young de-
positors and the the high-income earners in particular the professionals
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and semi-professionals. This finding is in close agreement with the results of an
earlier comparative study of the ATM and non-ATM users in Malaysia 298 ; which
showed that active ATM users in Malaysia tend to be "highly educated, aged be-
tween 25-34 years with above average income". It was also reported in the study
that unlike the inactive cardholder, the active ATM users tend to 'rely less on
the traditional ways of conducting financial transaction' through the bank coun-
ters. Assuming that Muslim depositors who were strongly influenced by the ATM
would also constitute the active ATM users it is likely that they would conduct
their banking transactions less frequently through the bank counters.
In relation to this it is hypothesized that depositors who attach more impor-
tance to the ATM would be moderately influenced by the fast counter service and
the reverse is likely to apply to depositors who prefer to carry out their transactions
through the bank counters.
The Spearman Rank Correlation between the ATM and FASTSV variables
seems to support this hypothesis.
Table 9.42 - Spearman Correlation Between ATM and Fast Counter
Service
ATM
FASTSV p=O.3127
Significanc	 0.000
Note:	 N170
As shown in Table 9.42 there is a positive correlation between ATM and
298 
reported by Oliver Ho (1987:7).
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FASTSV. The correlation coefficient (p=0.3127) however shows a moderate re-
lationship which suggests that depositors who are influenced by the ATM are also
influenced by the fast-counter service but at a lesser degree; and vice-versa. The
observed significance level (P=0.000) indicates that the relationship is likely to
hold in the population at the 0.05 level of statistical significance.
We are now able to identify that depositors who attached high importance on
the availability of the ATMs and the proximity of their banks from where they
work are of high net worth. These depositors tend to work as professionals or
semi-professionals, with high education and above average income and belong to
the 26-40 working age group.
Because a majority of these depositors have been strongly influenced by the
BRCH, DWRK and ATM variables under FACTOR 1 it is envisaged that their
decision to bank primarily with the interest-based bank is based on the combination
of the three factors simultaneously. Hence in the context of Bank Islam, even
though the Bank Islam branch in this study is conveniently located in the same area
as the interest-based banks our findings have shown that a majority of depositors
who bank with the interest-based banks were working in locations very near to
both banks.
The following null hypothesis was tested to examine if any relationship exist
between the DWRK, ATM and BRCH variables.
• H0 : Depositors who are influenced by the convenient location of the con-
ventional banks in their bank selection decision are equally not influenced
by the ATM and the availability of many interest-based bank branches.
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Table 9.43 - Crosstabulation: ATM By BRCH ...Controffing for
DWRK= Influenced (N=140)
ATM	 BRCH	 Row Tota
Not Influenced Influenced
Not Influenced	 8	 12	 20(14.3%)
Total 7,
	
5.7%	 8.6%
Influeiiced	 9	 111*	 120(85.7)
Total 7,
	
6.4%	 79.3%
Column Total	 17	 123	 140
12.1 %
	
87.9%	 100%
Chi-square value=16.97 D.F = 1 Significance = 0.0004
The crosstabulation in Table 9.43 shows the relationship between the influence
of the ATM and the BRCH variables amongst depositors who were influenced by
the distance of the interest-based banks from their place of work (DWRK). It is
evident that out of 140 depositors who were influenced by the convenient location of
the bank from their workplaces, 79.3 per cent (N=111) were also influenced by the
availability of the ATM in their bank selection decisions. On the other hand only
5.7 per cent (N=8) were not influenced at all by the ATM and BRCH variables.
The chisquare value (16.97) is higher than the critical chisquare value (3.841) at one
degree of freedom. The null hypothesis of no association between the ATM, BRCH
and DWRK variables can be rejected at the 0.05 level of statistical significance. It
can therefore be inferred that even though the Islamic bank may be conveniently
located as the interest-based banks, the convenience-oriented Muslim depositors
would still prefer the interest-based banks because the availabifity of the ATMs
and the extensive branch network provided by the interest-based banks were also
important to them. In other words, the Muslim depositors of the interest-
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based banks are attracted to these banks because of the combination of
locational and transactional convenience as well as the convenience of
branch-banking which the Islamic bank still lacks.
9.5.3 FACTOR 2: Easy Accessibility
FACTOR 2= f2lPmP + I22 DSHOP + /23PARK.....(.fi)
where	 factor loadings
PTRP= public transport convenience 	 .78028
DSHOF= distance from shopping centre	 .71517
PARK= availability of parking facility	 .71426
f's= factor score coefficient
As shown in Equation 9.6 FACTOR 2 can be seen as an extension of FAC-
TOR 1 because it represents another aspect of convenience which is related to
the accessibility of the bank either by public or private transportation as well
as its proximity to the shopping centres. Since the majority of depositors have
been strongly influenced by the variables under FACTOR 1 it is expected that
the impact of the variables under FACTOR 2 would affect a smaller percentage of
depositors. This is confirmed by the frequency distribution in Table 9.44.
It is evident that public transport accessibility is the most important variable
in FACTOR 2. Compared with the other two variables, about 61.2 per cent of
depositors have been influenced to bank with the interest-based banks because of
the convenience of public transport. Only 37 per cent have been strongly influ-
enced by the convenient location from the shopping centre and 30 per cent by the
availability of parking facilities.
412
Table 9.44 - Frequency Distribution (N=170): FACTOR 2 Variables -
Degree of Influence on Depositors' Preference for Interest-Based Banks
Degree of Influence/ Valuc PTRP DSHOP PARK
______________ (%) (%) (%)
None	 1	 32.9	 32.4	 41.2
Little	 2	 5.9	 11.8	 9.4
Cumulative%	 -	 38.8	 44.2	 50.6
Quite Strong	 3	 12.4	 13.5	 14.1
Strong	 4	 40.6	 37.1	 30.0
Very Strong	 5	 8.2	 5.2	 5.3
Cumulative%	 -	 61.2	 55.8	 49.4
Median Value
	 3	 3	 2
Mode Value	 4	 4	 1
The nonparametric tests also show that depositors who have been most influ-
enced by the public transport convenience are distinguisable in terms of their level
of education, income and occupation.
It is evident from the results of the K-W and the U tests in Table 9.45 that
depositors who were less educated, with low income of M$700 or less and employed
in the clerical or unskilled jobs had higher mean scores for the PTRP variable com-
pared with their respective counterparts. The z value for the U-test (z= -2.219)
and the chisquare values for the K-W tests ( 2=8.564 and 2 =10.283) are higher
than their respective critical points at the 0.05 level of statistical significance.299
The null hypothesis of equal means can therefore be rejected which implies that the
lower income and less educated depositors are more concerned with the easy acces-
sibility of the interest-based banks by public transportation rather than locational
or transactional convenience. The importance of public transport convenience to
The tabulated ZO.O5z1.96 and the X.O5' 2 d.f5.991.
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these small savers may serve as a useful criterion for selecting suitable locations
for the establishment of minibranches in the lower income states.
Table 9.45 - Kruskal-Wallis Test & U-Test Comparing the Mean
Ranks of PTRP in terms of Education, Income & Occupation
Variable	 Subgroup	 Cases	 Mean Rank Significanc
Public	 Education:1	 U-Test:
Transport secondary or lower 85 (50.0%) U1 93.42*	 0.0265
Convenience college or universit3 85 (50.0%) u2 = 77.58	 z=-2.219
Public	 Income:2(M$)	 K-W Test:
Transport 700 & below	 59 (36.6%) k3 88.31*
Convenience 701-1400	 53 (32.9%) k4 = 87.01	 0.0138
1401 and above	 49 (30.5%) k5 = 65.70 X2=8.5649
Public	 Occupation:3	 K-W Test:
Transport Professional	 40 (25.0%) 1c6 = 62.0
Convenience Administrator 	 45 (28.1%) k7 = 81.10	 0.0163
Clerical	 47 (29.4%) k8 = 86.65 X2=0.0163
Unskilled & Others 28 (17.5%) /c9 = 94•39*
Note: 1 N=170, 2 N=161, N=160.
9.5.4 FACTOR 3: Financial Services Available
FACTOR 3 represents the influence of the financial services offered by the
interest-based banks and is comprised of three variables as shown in equation 9.7.
FACTOR 3= I21 TYPLON + f22LOAN + f23 rtsAv . ... (9.7)
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where	 factor loadings
TYPLON = type of loans offered 	 .87575
LOAN = opportunity to get loans 	 .87138
RSAV: rate of return on savings 	 .54213
f's= factor score coefficient
Since it is the third important factor extracted from the data set, the influ-
ence of FACTOR 3 influence on the Muslim depositors' decision to bank with the
interest-based banks is expected to be relatively less significant.
The values of the median and the mode of the frequency distribution in Table
9.46 show that Muslim depositors of the interest-based banks were gener-
ally not influenced by the types of loans, the rate of return on savings or
the opportunity to secure loans in their decision to bank primarily with
the interest-based banks. More than half (51.2%) of these Muslim depositors
were not influenced at all by the types of loans offered by the interest-based banks.
Similarly 55.3 per cent were not concerned at all with the opportunity to secure
loans from these banks and oniy 39.4 per cent regarded the rate of return paid on
their savings account as relatively important. A plausible explanation is that more
than half of these depositors (54.7%, N=93) were public sector employees who
were more likely to make use of the government housing loan facility rather than
borrow from the interest-based banks. The current interest-rate charged by the
government on such loan is 4 per cent per year compared with the rates charged by
the conventional banks some of which exceed 10 per cent per annum. The above
finding further support our earlier findings that individual Muslim depositors
bank primarily with the interest-based banks because of the convenience
provided rather than to earn interest.
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Table 9.46 - Frequency Distribution (N=170): FACTOR 3 Variables -
Degree of Influence on Depositors' Preference for Interest-Based Banks
Degree of Influence/ Va1u. TYPLON LOAN RSA'
______________ (%)	 (%) (%)
None	 1	 51.2	 55.3	 48.8
Little	 2	 0.5	 8.8	 11.8
Curnuiative%	 -	 57.7	 04.1	 60.6
Quite Strong	 3	 23.5	 20.0	 28.2
Strong	 4	 15.3	 13.5	 10.6
Very Strong	 5	 3.5	 2.4	 0.6
Cumulative%	 -	 42.3	 35.9	 39.4
Median Value	 1	 1	 2
Mode Value	 1	 1	 1
This finding, however, differs from that of an earlier study by Chua (1989)
which examined the bank selection decisions of Malaysian households of an urban
residential area near Kuala Lumpur. The study, which was carried out on a sample
consisting of 68 per cent non-Malays, revealed that 'financial services offered ' by
the conventional banks which included loans, overdrafts and the rate of interest on
deposits were rated most important relative to convenience and social influence.
The difference between our results and that of Chua indirectly shows that different
marketing strategies may be applied to attract different groups of potential depos-
itors to Islamic banking. Whilst promotional appeals emphasising on relative rates
of profits on deposits may be the most effective approach to attract non-Muslims
to Islamic banks the provision of convenience-banking may be quite sufficient to
induce the less strict Muslims to shift their funds from the conventional commercial
banks to the Islamic bank.
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9.5.5 FACTOR 4: Social Influence
Corresponding to our earlier findings on the bank selection criteria of Bank
Islam depositors it is also found that social influence plays a less important role in
the bank selection decision of the Muslim depositors of the interest-based banks.
Social influence is ranked fourth in importance and represents the linear combina-
tion of two variables as shown in Equation 9.8.
FACTOR 4 f41ENCFR + I42 ADVERT .....(9.8)
where	 factor loadings
ENCFR = encouragement of relatives/friends	 .87575
ADVERT = advertisements	 .87138
f 's= factor score coefficient
Table 9.47 shows that less than 30 percent of depositors were socially influ-
enced in selecting their present bank. About 28.9 per cent have been at least
moderately motivated by the advertising promotion by the banks and a lesser
proportion (21.2%) have been encouraged by their relatives or friends.
The nonparametric tests do not show any significant difference on the impact
of the two social influence variables on the various subgroups. This suggests that
Muslims are generally not influenced by social influence in their decision
to select the interest-based banks as their primary bank. This finding is
also in agreement with the findings of the study by Chua (1989) but contradicts
that of Anderson and Cox (1976) which reported 'recommendation by friends' as
more influential than locational convenience.
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Table 9.47 - Frequency Distribution (N=170): FACTOR 4 Variables -
Degree of Influence on Depositors' Preference for Interest-Based Banks
Degree of Influence/ Value ENCFR ADVERT
______________ (%)	 (%)
None	 1	 65.3	 57.6
Little	 2	 13.5	 13.5
Cumulative%	 -	 78.8	 71.1
Quite Strong	 3	 8.8	 17.1
Strong	 4	 11.2	 10.6
Very Strong	 5	 1.2	 1.2
Cumulative%	 -	 21.2	 28.9
Median Value
	 1	 1
Mode Value	 1	 1
From the analysis of the above four factors it can be concluded that;
1. The factors influencing the bank selection decisions of Muslim individuals
who bank primarily with the interest-based banks are quite similar with
that of the typical conventional bank depositors even though the impor-
tance attributed to some factors may differ between the two groups. The
Muslim individuals were highly influenced by both locational and trans-
actional convenience and to a lesser extent by the accessibility of public
transport, the products and financial services offered and social influence.
2. The main attraction of the interest-based banks to their Muslim depositors
is the combination of an extensive branch network, their convenient location
from depositors' work places and the availability of the ATMs.
3. Depositors with high education, high income and professional positions tend
to highly convenience-oriented and are strongly influenced by the conve-
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nient location of the interest-based banks from their place of work and the
transactional convenience provided by the ATMs.
4. The impact of the ATM is greatest among the younger depositors which
implies that the importance of the ATM will remain high as the current
population ages.
5. The rates of return on deposits and the types of loans are relatively unim-
portant to most Muslim depositors of the conventional banks.
6. On the whole convenience is the prime reason why Muslim depositors bank
primarily with the conventional banks.
9.5.6 Market Implications
9.5.6.1 Convenience Banking
Perhaps one of the most important market implications that emerges from the
preceding analysis is the ability of Islamic banks to provide convenience-banking
to the attract patronage from a wider section of the Muslim population. Whilst
the religious motivation may be sufficient to sustain patronage from the existing
depositors of Bank Islam we have identified that both locational convenience in
the form of an extensive branch network and transactional convenience through
the ATMs are important to Muslims who currently bank exclusively with the
conventional banks. The present package of Islamic banking services offered by
Bank Islam does not seem to fulfill the banking needs of these Muslims. Hence
even though existing Bank Islam branches may be conveniently located in the same
area as the interest-based banks the lack of the ATM and the limited number of
branches puts Bank Islam at the disadvantage in the competition for deposits from
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these convenience-oriented Muslims.
As a new player in the market Bank Islam is indeed very far behind in the
competition for deposits through its branches. Its current branch network cannot
match the convenience of branch banking that the four well-known top banks in
Malaysia are providing to their depositors. The Central bank records30° show that
there were 186 branches of the Malayan Banking Berhad (MBB) at the end of
September 1988. The second largest bank Bank Bumiputra Berhad (BBMB) had
124 branches at the same date followed by Public Bank Berhad and the UMBC
with 64 and 62 branches respectively. In comparison to the widespread branch
network of these interest-based banks there were only 22 Bank Islam branch offices
throughout the country at the end of June 1988 and the number rose only to 29 by
1991. For depositors who enjoy having their money within their easy reach almost
anywhere throughout the country it seems that Bank Islam does not have much
to offer in terms of branch banking.
In terms of the ATMs Bank Islam is one of the few banks which does not offer
such services to its depositors. Even though the management has announced its in-
tention to install the ATMs in mid-1992 30 ' the project is still in its planning stage.
All the major banks in Malaysia are already providing this service with fierce com-
petition for customers. 302 The establishment of shared ATM networks 303 has also
enabled smaller banks to participate in offering this service in the market. It is en-
visaged that the provision of the ATM service is essential for all banks in the urban
300 
'Money and Banking in Malaysia' Bank Negara Malaysia 30th Anniversary Edition 1989.
Berita Harian 30 June 1991.
302 To boost depositors' self-esteem and pride in owning an ATM card, the banks have promoted their
own imaginative ATM card labels; the more well-known ones are the MBB's Kawanku (My Friend),
BBMB's Juwara (Champion), Public Bank's PR Card and Kwong Ylk Bank's Boss.
303 for example the Group Electronic Automated Teller Network or GREAT.
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areas, including Islamic banks, since urban depositors are generally convenience-
oriented and their loyalties are easily influenced by the type of convenient banking
services that a bank could offer. 304 Our findings have also shown that the demand
for the ATMs is also high amongst the depositors of Bank Islam especially those
who still hold accounts in the interest-based banks. It is envisaged that the in-
troduction of the ATMs would not only attract the convenience-oriented Muslim
depositors of the interest-based banks but is also likely to induce the Islamic bank
depositors who hold accounts in the conventional banks to bank exclusively with
the Islamic bank.
9.5.6.2 The Establishment of Islamic Counters
As Bank Islam is approaching the end of its ten year monopoly of Islamic
banking in the Malaysian market in 1993, an Islamic Banking Sector has been
opened at the Central Bank in June 1992 to deal with the imminent establishment
of Islamic banking units by conventional banks. These units will be allowed to
compete in offering Islamic financing by murabahah (cost-plus), ijarah (leasing),
al-Bai Bithamin Ajil (instalment sale), export finance syndications and investment
funds. 305 The conventional banks are also allowed to open Islamic banking windows
to accept deposits from the public under the supervision of the Central Bank.
In view of the impending competition for deposits between the Islamic and con-
ventional banks an attempt is made in this study to gauge the response of Muslim
depositors in both banking systems towards the introduction of such facility. Our
results show that a majority of depositors were not opposed to the idea.
304 Ismail, Bashir "Banking World"May; 1987:37.
305 New Horizon Magazine, No.6 July 1992:16.
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Table 9.48 - Crosstabulation: Opinion on the Introduction of Islamic
Counters By Respective Banks' Depositors
Islamic Counters	 Bank Islam Conventional Bani Row Total
at conventional banks? Depositors Depositors
Agree	 149	 129	 278(73.2%)
Column %
	
71.0%	 75.9%
Disagree	 50	 33	 83(21.8%)
Column 'fl	 23.8%	 19.4%
No Opinion	 11	 8	 19(5.0%)
Column %
	
5.2%	 4.7%
Column Total	 210	 170	 380
	
55.3 %
	
44.7%	 100%
Chi-square value=1.19720 D.F = 2 Significance = 0.54958
It is evident in Table 9.48 that almost three quarters of total Muslim depositors
sampled from both Bank Islam and the conventional banks welcomed the idea
of Islamic counters. Only 21.8 per cent (N=83) did not agree to it and 5 per
cent (N=19) expressed no opinion. It is noticed, however, that the proportion of
conventional bank depositors who agreed was slightly higher than the Bank Islam
depositors. Nevertheless, this difference is not likely to hold in the population.
As can be seen in Table 9.48, the chisquare value ( 2 =1.197) is lower than the
x.os =5.991 at 2 degrees of freedom. The null hypothesis cannot be rejected which
implies that both groups of depositors equally agree with the introduction of the
Islamic counters.
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Table 9.49 - Crosstabulation: Conceived Benefits of Islamic Counters
By Respective Banks' Depositors
Islamic Counters	 Bank Islam Conventional Bank Row Total
at conventional banks?
	 Depositors Depositors
AGREE:
Avoid nba	 73	 48	 121(35.8%)
Column %
	
40.3%	 30.6%
Convenient	 25	 45	 70(20.7%)
Column °/
	
13.8%	 28.7%
More Competitive	 31	 30	 61(18.0%)
Column %
	 17.1%	 19.1%
DISAGREE:
Bank Not Totally Islamic
	 52	 34	 86(25.4%)
Column %
	
28.7%	 21.7%
Column Total	 210	 170	 380
	
55.3 %
	
44.7%	 100%
Chi-square value=13.02494 D.F = 3 Significance = 0.00458
What benefits do these depositors perceive from these counters? Even though
there seems to be a consensus on the introduction of the Islamic counters, both
groups of depositors had different perceptions on the benefits that would emanate
from such counters. As shown in Table 9.49 a majority of Bank Islam depositors
(40.3%, N=73) anticipated the religious benefit in terms of the avoidance of r-iba as
the prime benefit followed by convenience and competition which would improve
the quality of consumer services. However almost an equal proportion (48% and
45%) of Muslim depositors of the conventional banks, considered the religious
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advantage and convenience as important respectively. About 30.6 per cent forsee
the opportunity to evade nba while another 28.7 per cent liked the idea without
having to give up the convenience that they currently enjoy from the conventional
banks.
Here again we see that convenience is considered relatively important by the
conventional bank depositors compared with the depositors of Bank Islam.
9.5.7 Policy Implication
An important policy implication that emerges from the analysis of both groups
of depositors is the need to educate the population about the principles of Islamic
banking and the different types of services that can be offered by the Islamic bank.
Since the present government aims to develop a dual banking system whereby the
new Islamic banking system will complement the existing conventional banking
structure it is only relevant that the awareness of the new system and a knowledge
of Islamic methods of financing should be promoted via in the education system.
It is a more effective way of explaining the complexity of the methods such as
mudarabah and musharakah compared with advertisements which is effective to
the extent that it only excites short-lived interest in the Islamic banking products
that is being marketed.306
At present, Muslims are generally ignorant of the banking services that are
available at Bank Islam. To a society which has only known debt-financing as
the only method of borrowing from banks it is essential o educate them on the
new concepts of profit-sharing, partnerships, deferred payment sale, leasing and
markup sale. The lack of understanding of the bank's concepts and operations have
306 Wilson 1990:24.
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led many to think that an Islamic bank is a welfare organization not a financial
institution. 307 There is also the misconception that the markup or profit margin
imposed by Bank Islam is similar to nba. Such suspicion has to some extent
tarnished the image of Bank Islam and raised questions on an otherwise perfectly
legitimate method of financing.
As can be seen in Table 9.50 the nonparametric U-tests show that Muslims
who banked with the interest-based banks were generally less aware of the Islamic
concepts of financing compared with the depositors of Bank Islam.
In terms of the deposit accounts, it seems that depositors of both banking
systems were equally aware only of the savings accounts. Both groups were also
relatively less familiar with the profit-sharing general investment accounts corn-
pared with the depositors of Bank Islam.
In terms of the financing accounts, it may be worth noting that, the depositors
of both banks were typically not familiar with the Islamic methods of financing.308
However, the observed significance levels (as indicated by *) suggest that the con-
ventional bank depositors were relatively more ignorant of the A1-Bai Bithamin
Ajil, Al-Musharakah, Mudarabah, Murabahah and Al-Qardul Hasan compared with
the depositors of Bank Islam at the 0.05 level of significance. However both types
of depositors were equally unaware of the Al-Ijanah or lease financing which is the
least known compared to other five methods of Islamic financing.
307 Malaysian Business June 1991:9.
308 As seen earlier in the frequency distribution Table 8.18 the values of the median and the mode
show that the depositors of Bank Islam typically did not know about the Islamic method8 of
financing offered by Bank Islam. The same tendency is also noticed amongst the conventional
bank depositors.
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Table 9.50 U-Tests Comparing the Mean Ranks of Depositors'
Awareness of the Banking Services Provided By Bank Islam
Bank Service	 Bank Islam Conventional Bani U-value Significance
Depositors Depositors
Mean Rank	 Mean Rank
DEPOSIT:
Savings Account	 192.52	 188.00	 17425.0	 .5543
Current Account	 219.36	 154.85	 11790.0	 .0000*
General Investment 	 204.60	 173.09	 14890.0	 .0006*
FINANCING:
A1-Bai Bithamin Ajil	 208.00	 168.88	 14175.0	 .0000*
Al-Musharakah	 200.00	 178.26	 15770.0	 .0094*
Mudarabah	 202.62	 175.53	 15305.0	 .0039*
Murabahah	 201.00	 177.53	 15645.0	 .0054*
A1-Ijarah	 196.40	 183.21	 16610.0	 .0759
Al-Qardul Hasan	 200.55	 178.09	 15740.0	 .0039*
FEE-BASED SERVICES:
Foreign Exchange	 192.17	 188.44	 17500.0	 .6922
Remittances & Transfers 	 196.93	 182.56	 16500.0	 .1342
Travellers'Cheque:	 200.64	 177.97	 15720.0	 .0109*
In terms of the fee-based services, depositors of both banking systems seems to
be equally aware of the more commonly known foreign exchange and transfers ser-
vices though the conventional depositors were typically less aware that travellers'
cheques could also be bought at Bank Islam.
It can therefore be inferred from the above findings that Muslims who bank
exclusively with the conventional banks are in general relatively less aware of the
Islamic banking services available at Bank Islam. Even though the Bank Islam
depositors were also typically not familiar with the Islamic financing products
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offered by Bank Islam the religious motivation was strong enough to attract them
to Bank Islam. Because of the lack of religious motivation, it seems that Muslims
who banked with the conventional banks need to be educated and convinced of
the relative merits of the Islamic financial products that Bank Islam can deliver
as an incentive to bank with Bank Islam.
9.6 Summary of Findings
The findings obtained from the bank selection analysis of the Muslim depositors
of Bank Islam on the one hand and the Muslim depositors of the conventional
banks on the other will be summarized in this section. These findings may serve
as signposts in the future development of the retail banking sector of Bank Islam
as well provide some insights on how the market for Islamic banking services may
be expanded.
• Bank Islam Depositors
1. A majority of Bank Islam depositors did not bank exclusively at Bank Islam
but held secondary accounts at the interest-based commercial banks.
2. In relation to 1., deposits were made in the conventional banks mainly for
the purpose of convenience specifically to take advantage of the extensive
branch network and the ATM facility which Bank Islam still lacks.
3. A majority of Bank Islam depositors who banked exclusively with Bank Is-
lam had held accounts in the interest-based banks before the establishment
of Bank Islam.
4. Deposits were held in the conventional banks previously for the sake of
safety and convenience rather than for the aim of earning interest.
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5. Based on 1. and 3., the establishment of Islamic banking in the urban
areas has only effected a transfer of resources within the market with little
impact on mobilizing new deposits which the interest-based banks had failed
to attract because of nba.
6. Depositors who banked exclusively with Bank Islam and depositors who
banked both with Bank Islam and the conventional banks are equally ioyal
to the bank.
7. Depositors who bank exclusively with Bank Islam are more religiously corn-
mitted in avoiding nba.
8. The most important factor that had influenced depositors to select Bank
Islam as their primary bank was the overall Islamic characteristic of the
bank. Contextual factors in the form of locational convenience and easy
accessibility were second in important whilst social influence played a less
important role in determining depositors' preference for Bank Islam.
9. Depositors had been strongly influenced by the knowledge that the oper-
ation of Bank Islam was totally run on Islamic principles. This implies
that Bank Islam depositors are likely to prefer a fully-fledged Islamic bank
rather than special Islamic counters at the conventional banks.
10. Savings account depositors have been motivated by the religious incentive
to free their savings from interest and by the monetary incentive provided
by the profits paid on the savings accounts.
11. The profit-sharing investment account had managed to attract only the
high income depositors. The introduction of other forms of 'affordable' in-
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vestment schemes may be more suitable to mobilize investible resources
from the the medium income earners.
12. More than half of Bank Islam depositors tend to be influenced by the easy
accessibility of the bank by public transport and a lesser proportion by the
proximity of the Islamic bank from their homes or workplaces.
13. A majority of Bank Islam depositors worked and lived more than 2 miles
from the bank and were generally not concerned by the distance of Bank
Islam from these two places.
14. Depositors who were religiously motivated to bank with Bank Islam were
also influenced by the accessibility of the bank by public transport.
15. Depositors who were influenced by the accessibility of Bank Islam by public
transport or by its convenient location from work or home were more likely
to forgo Islamic banking for the sake of convenience.
. Muslim Depositors of Riba-Banks
1. A majority of Muslims who banked only with the interest-based banks were
either unsure or did not perceive that interest is prohibited in Islam.
2. Muslims who bank with the interest-based banks are more likely to invest
with the Amanah Saham Nasional compared with the Muslim depositors
of Bank Islam.
3. Convenience is the most important factor that has influenced urban Mus-
urns to bank primarily with the interest-based banks.
4. Urban Muslims who preferred to bank entirely with the interest-based banks
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have been strongly influenced by the combination of three factors namely
convenient location from work, the availability of the ATM and the exten-
sive branch network of the conventional commercial banks.
5, Whilst the high income and more educated depositors who banked entirely
with the interest-based banks were generally strongly influenced by loca-
tional and transactional convenience, the low income and less educated
depositors were more concerned with the accessibility of the interest-based
banks by public transport.
6. Muslim depositors who banked with the interest-based banks were generally
not influenced by the interest-based financial services offered by these banks.
7. Social influence plays a less important role in attracting Muslim depositors
to the interest-based banks.
8. On the whole convenience is the main reason why some Muslims choose to
bank primarily with the interest-based banks.
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Chapter X
Summary and Recommendations
10.1 Summary
This section summarizes the conclusions derived from this study.
. Justification for Islamic Banking
The justification for Islamic banking lies in the fact that Muslims view eco-
nomics and finance as an integral part of the Islamic system of life. Economic re-
lationships are very much governed by ethical values that the economic behaviour
of the individual Muslim differs from that of the economic man in many respects.
Even though the elements of the Islamic economic system may seem utopian in
nature, it serves as the frame of reference in any Islamic economic analysis since it
is the ultimate system that all Muslims wish to accomplish.
The freedom of individual enterprise in the Islamic economic system is guided
by ethical restraints to remove the impediments to economic and social justice.
One of the ways stated in the Shariah to eliminate these obstructions is by their
prohibition. In the context of finance and banking the prohibition of nba is a key
factor.
There is a general consensus that the rate of interest represents an element of
nba and is therefore prohibited in Islam. As a general rule, nba consists of three
main elements namely (i) an excess demanded over and above any borrowed funds
(ii) this excess is fixed in relation to time and (iii) this excess is fixed in advance.
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The prohibition of nba does not imply that capital has no price in the Islamic
economy. The Quranic principle that Allah has forbidden nba and permitted
trade309 broadly implies that the remuneration for capital is tied to profits. In
relation to this, profitsharing serves as the most appropriate Islamic alternative to
replace the interest-based debtor-creditor relationship in conventional banking.
• Literature Review
The review of the theoretical and empirical literature of the development of Is-
lamic banking shows that there exists a dichotomy between the theory and practice
of Islamic banking. The theory of Islamic banking advocates that the backbone
of Islamic banking should be built on the notion of profitsharing both on the as-
sets and liabilities side in order to achieve the socio-econornic objectives of the
Islamic economy. The alleged advantages of the profitsharing banking system is
the relative stability of the system in withstanding shocks and its efficiency in the
allocation and distribution of resources. The objective of Islamic banking, there-
fore, as conceived by Muslim economists, is not confined only to the elimination of
nba but to introduce a profitsharing banking system which contributes positively
towards justice and development. Empirically, though, whilst the mobilization of
profitsharing deposits has been relatively successful, the adoption of profitsharing
methods of financing on the asset side by Islamic banks either in the Islamic or
conventional setting were below the theoretical expectations. The experience of
Pakistan and Iran show that the elimination of nba from the entire banking system
can be achieved without major problems but the conversion into a banking sys-
tem based entirely on profitsharing and equity participation is more difficult and
requires basic changes in the attitude of banks and society from debt-financing to
309 Quran 2:275
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equity financing. Legal reforms to safeguard the interest of the bank and clients;
and comprehensive retraining of staff to deal with project-related lending opera-
tions are also necessary to facilitate such transformation. Similarly, Islamic banks
operating in interest-based environments in the Middle-East have proved their vi-
ability as an alternative to conventional banks. However, the concentration on
short-term trade financing based on the markup rather than profitsharing to fi-
nance the productive sectors provides evidence that Islamic banks are not superior
to their conventional counterpart as alleged in theory. This implies that the role
of Islamic banking as an effective instrument in socio-economic development has
still not been explored.
• The Malaysian Setting
The overview of the structure and development of the Malaysian economy has
shown that the 'hostile' context in which the Islamic bank was forced to operate
was further aggravated by the recessionary climate. When Bank Islam was opened
in 1983, the Malaysian economy had just undergone a period of impressive growth
in the 1970s and was about to face the uncertain futures associated with the
onset of the recession. As a result the first half of the 1980s was a difficult and
challenging period when structural adjustments had to conform to the impact of
the recession. Following economic recovery in 1987, there was a distinct shift in
development policy to promote the private sector and specifically manufacturing
as the main engine of growth. It is therefore expected that the marketing strategies
of financial institutions will be geared to finance private sector investments in the
manufacturing industries.
It is also important to recognize that Islamic banking in Malaysia was intro-
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duced in a relatively developed interest-based financial environment in which 38
commercial banks, 41 finance companies and 12 merchant banks came under the
supervision of the Central Bank. At the same time, development banks and spe-
cialized institutions, designed both to finance development in specific economic
sectors and to facilitate the achievement of the New Economic Policy, had also
been established. A process of financial deepening was also taking place. With the
introduction of a wide range of interest-based financial instruments for the money
market the accumulation of financial assets was faster than the accumulation of
non-financial wealth or GNP. There was also greater competition in retail banking
within the banking sector. The market-oriented approach to interest-rate determi-
nation, computerisation and the ATMs; and the widespread network of branches
of the major banks have created competition both amongst commercial banks and
between commercial banks and finance companies.
• Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad
(i) Profile
The actual development of Islamic banking in Malaysia pertains to the evo-
lution; and the legal, organizational and operational framework of Bank Islam
Malaysia Berhad. The establishment of Bank Islam as the first fully-fledged Islamic
bank in Southeast Asia may be attributed to a combination of two factors; specifi-
cally "the presence of an Islamically-conscious population with political muscle and
a government that is not unsympathetic to the Islamic cause." 310 . The demand for
Islamic banking from Malaysian-Muslims was triggered by the Islamic resurgence.
In addition the feasibility of Islamic banking was attested by the impressive success
of Tabung Haji. From the political perspective, the Malay-led government had the
310 Ariff 1988:209
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political will to respond to the demands of the Muslims who form the majority of
the electorate. In general the favourable political climate has played a major role
in leading to the birth of Bank Islam.
The operational framework of Bank Islam outlines a comprehensive range of
Islamic banking services in compliance with the Shariah. On the asset side, these
include mudarabah and musharakah as recommended in theory; and a range of
trade-related methods of financing based on the markup. Initially, the Malaysian
Government Investment Certificates (MGICs) have been created by the govern-
ment to enable the Bank to participate in the money market. Subsequently, private
debt certificates have also been developed to keep pace with the current develop-
ments in the Malaysian securities market. In addition, the Bank fulfils its social
responsibility by giving qard-al hasan loans to the hard-core poor from its zakat
funds.
(ii) Performance
Except for its capital base, the market shares of Bank Islam had expanded
considerably until the end of the 1980s. By this date, its market shares of assets
and deposits were 2 per cent and 2.4 per cent respectively putting it amongst the
ranks of medium-sized banks by national comparison. It is however relevant to
note that the capital base of Bank Islam was expanded in January 1992 following
capital restructuring in conjunction with the Bank's public listing on the main
board of the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange.
Even though the market share of Bank Islam is relatively small compared to the
industry total, it has a competitive position amongst other interest-based banks of
similar size. In 1990, its returns on equity were the highest relative to four other
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public-listed medium-sized banks. This implies that Bank Islam has provided a
more attractive return on investment to its shareholders. The capability of the
management in generating profits from its assets has also improved as denoted.
by the annual increase in its pre-tax return on assets ratios; which also compare
favourably with that of the other medium-sized banks.
The performance of Bank Islam in deposit mobilization does not seem to differ
from that of Islamic banks in the other parts of the world. In particular, the bulk
of its deposits is made up of investment accounts. Deposit growth in the initial
two years was mainly attributable to the religious motivation as attested by the
substantial flow of investment deposits despite relatively lower rates of returns
offered by Bank Islam. This implies that Bank Islam has played a developmental
role of mobilizing deposits that had not entered the financial system previously
because of nba. Nevertheless, after the idle resources prior to the establishment
of Bank Islam had been absorbed, further mobilization of investment deposits in
particular, seemed to depend more on the expected rates of returns rather than
piety; as indicated by the decrease in the total deposits base during the period of
rising interest rates in 1990 and 1991. This implies that even though Bank Islam
enjoyed a monopolistic position in the Islamic sector it does face competition for
deposits from the interest-based banks.
In terms of the expansion of its branch network, however, Bank Islam has
not reached the captive markets of Muslims in the rural areas. The Bank has
concentrated its branch network mainly in the capital towns and in secondary
towns having at least 10,000 Malay population.
On the asset side, the financing activities of Bank Islam had been constrained
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mainly by the unfavourable loan climate during the recession initially; and the
decline of its deposits base in recent years. Bank Islam had reacted to the hostile
environment during its infancy by concentrating on trade-related and soft areas of
finance. However, the continuous deemphasis on equity participation even after the
recession reflects the corporate objective of Bank Islam; specifically "to operate as a
commercial bank" which by its nature will be more inclined towards trade-related
debt-financing rather than equity participation. Looking from this perspective,
Bank Islam has proved its viability in the market.
In general, Bank Islam has played a limited role towards the socio-economic
development of the Muslim community especially in terms of exploiting the benefits
that can be reaped from profitsharing methods of financing. Equity-participation
has only been confined to large corporations to minimize the risk of loss. Finance
to the middle and lower income groups has been concentrated on housing. Like the
other Islamic banks, the financing portfolio of Bank Islam has mainly been geared
towards the provision of interest-free finance to the extent that nba is not involved
in any of its transactions. This supports Nienhaus' thesis that Islamic banks in a
conventional environment do not differ significantly from the interest-based banks.
The only 'superiority' of Bank Islam over its conventional counterparts is that a
majority of its loans are in the longer term and the cost of borrowing does not rise
with the rise in interest-rates.
• Depositors' Survey - main conclusion
Since the findings of the survey have been summarized at the end of Chapter
IX, it would be appropriate to present here only the main conclusion that is derived
from it.
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Our findings have shown that the depositors of Bank Islam are attracted to the
Islamic bank purely because of the religious motivation to avoid nba. This implies
that an Islamic bank operating in a relatively developed interest-based banking
system can still create its own niche in the market for pious Muslims who are com-
mitted in avoiding nba. However, to expand its market share beyond this group of
pious Muslims the Islamic bank needs to adapt itself to the demands of the mar-
ket. Muslim depositors of the conventional banks are highly convenience-oriented.
For them, the religious motivation is not a sufficient attraction to bank with Bank
Islam. Our findings also show that these convenience-oriented Muslims are of high
net-worth belonging to the high income group. These are potential depositors who
should be the main targets of Islamic banks. The provision of convenience banking
may be the most appropriate strategy to capture this potential market of Mus-
lim depositors. Since the present package of Islamic banking provided by Bank
Islam does not fulfill the banking needs of these depositors the introduction of
Islamic banking counters by the conventional banks may serve as the second best
solution to bring Islamic banking to a wider section of the Muslim population
Nevertheless, the dissemination of knowledge on Islamic banking and finance is an
essential prerequisite to create an awareness of the Islamic alternative to western
banking as well as to eliminate the misconceptions concerning nba, the cost-plus
method of financing and the separation of funds by conventional banks operating
Islamic counters. Unless these misconceptions are dealt with Islamic banking will
not become fully acceptable to all Muslims in Malaysia.
10.2 Future Prospects
The future prospects of Islamic banking in Malaysia look bright. As Bank
Islam is reaching the end of its protected monopoly position as a supplier of Islamic
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banking services, the forthcoming amendments to the Islamic Banking Act 1983
and the Banking and Financial Act 1989 will permit all existing Malaysian financinl
institutions and commercial banks to offer Islamic banking services. In preparation,
the Central Bank opened an Islamic Banking Sector in June 1992 to assist domestic
commercial banks wishing to develop Islamic banking counters and to erect a
supervisory structure for these Islamic banking services.
The government has also taken an active role in permitting public sector em-
ployees to make the choice between obtaining government loans on traditional or
nba-free terms. A Bai Bithamirt Ajil (deferred payment sale) scheme was launched
in May 1992 which allows Malaysian civil servants to obtain financing for the pur-
chase of cars without interest
Existing foreign banks have already displayed a willingness to expand their
activities in this direction. For example the Standard Chartered Bank has intro-
duced a deposit account called the interest-free 'Dividend Savings ' account for
depositors who do not want to accept interest on their savings. Deposits can be
made with a minimum of M$500 and would be invested by the Bank in the MGICs.
These moves should have an impact on both the supply of and the demand
for Islamic banking services which suggest that Islamic banking is firmly estab-
lished within the Malaysian economy. It seems that supply will be forthcoming in
response to additional demand for these services. Therefore, the future output of
Islamic banking services in Malaysia is likely to be demand-determined.
On the demand side it seems that there is unmet demand in the rural areas:
given the more extensive branch networks of the interest-based banks which will
be extending their range of banking services to include Islamic banking services,
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this unmet demand should be moderated if not fully met when Bank Islam loses
its monopoly position. Yet the question remains whether the pious rural Muslim
population will be willing to bank with a nba bank even though it offers an Islamic
banking facility. This is a topic for future research.
As for the future of Bank Islam, the bank is now playing a leading role in the
development of the secondary market in Islamic financial instruments. It also has
plans to develop the capital market by setting up an Islamic unit trust. Its leading
role is likely to continue. It is envisaged that initiative and innovations in Islamic
financial instruments will remain the domain of Bank Islam.
The opening of Islamic windows by the conventional banks is of course only
one route to expand the supply of Islamic banking services. Another route would
be an increase in Islamic banking establishments. A plausible option is the estab-
lishment of Islamic banking subsidiaries by the conventional banks which could
solve the problem of the separation of funds. The establishment of specialized
Islamic financial institutions such as an Islamic merchant bank, a mudarabah bank
or a musharakah bank is also more appropriate for the provision of banking ser-
vices based on profitsharing. Whilst promoting healthy competition, such moves
are likely to be modest in scale since the market cannot obviously support many
institutions supplying these services.
10.3 Further Research
The survey undertaken in this study has compared the bank selection decisions
of Muslim depositors of Bank Islam and those of the conventional banks. However,
the range of issues relating to the deposit side of the balance sheet is wider than
this. It would for example be interesting to find out:
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(i) whether the results presented here carry over to depositors in other parts
of the country.
(ii) whether the 'service' expectations of the Islamic bank's depositors coincide
with those of the bank officials.
(iii) whether rural and urban depositors have different characteristics when the
branch network of Bank Islam reaches the rural areas.
Each of these issues can only be adequately addressed through substantial
further research.
Another limitation of this study is its focus on the deposit side of the balance
sheet. It would be interesting to carry out an in-depth analysis of Bank Islam's
financing activities. For example a survey of business customers in receipt of
financing from Bank Islam could serve to highlight the contribution of Bank Islam
to the socio-economic development of Muslim entrepreneurs in Malaysia.
Also with the ending of Bank Islam's monopoly, comes the obvious concern
about the likely impact on Bank Islam of the introduction of Islamic counters
by the conventional banks. This too is an issue worthy of considerable further
research.
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PART V
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i\u Act to piovide for the licensing and regulation of
Islamic banking business.
[
BE IT ENACTED by the Duli Yang Maha Mulia
Sen Paduka Baginda Yang cli-Pertuan Agong with the
advice and consent of the Dewan Negara and Dewan
Rakyat in Parliament assembled, and by the authority
of the same, as follows:
PARr I
PRELIMINARY
1. (I) This Ad may be cited as the Islamic Banking Short title,
Act 1983 and shall come into force on such date as the commence-
Minister may by notification in the Ga:ctte appoint
(2) This Act shall apply thioughout Malaysia.
2. In this Act unless the context otherwise requires— Iterpreta-
on
cc bran ch" iii relation to an Islamic hank includes a
mobile branch of the bank nd a branch established
and maintained for a limited period only,
"Central Bank" means the Central Bank of Malaysia
esLihlihed by the Central Bank of Malaysia Ordinance 61158.
I9S.
"company" has the meaning assigned to it by the
Companies Act 1965,
	
Act 1:5.
"corporation' has the meaning assigned to it by the
Companies Act 1965;
"depositor" mcans a person sho has an account at
dli I sld 111 IC hit ii k, v hether the account is a current
a(ount. a :tvings account, an investment account or
,inv r(li.i ilepuit accnirit,
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"Islamic bank" means any company which carries on
Islamic banking business and holds a valid licence; and
all the offices and branches in Malaysia of such a bank
shall be deemed to be one bank;
"Islamic banking business" means banking business
whose aims and operations do not involve any element
which is not approved by the Religion of Islam;
"investment account liabilities" in relation to an
llamic hank means the deposit liabilities at that bank
in respect of funds placed by a depositor with that
bank of a fixed period of time under an agreement to
share the profits and losses of that bank on the invest-
ment of such funds;
"licence" means a licence granted under section 3;
"other deposit liabilities" in relation to an Islamic
bank means the deposit liabilities at that bank other
than savings account, investment account, sight and
t'me liabilities and deposit liabilities from any other
,lctIO2	 Islamic bank, any licensed hank under the Banking
Act 1973 or the Central Bank,
"public company" has the meaning assigned to it
Act 125.	 by the Companies Act 1965;
"savings account liabilities" in relation to an islamic
bank means the total deposits at that bank which
normally require the presentation of passbooks or such
other documents in lieu of passbooks as approved by
the Central Bank for the deposit or withdrawal of
nioncys;
"share" rrierns share in the share capital of a corpora-
(ion and includes stock. except where a distinction
between stock and share is expressed or implied;
"sight liabilities" in relation to an rslarnic bank means
Iie total deposits at that bank which are repayable on
((cmand. hut does not include savings account liabilities
or the deposits of any other Islamic hank, any licensed
Ic! 102	 kink under the Banking Act 1973 or the Central Bank;
subsidiarv" ha'; the meanin g assigned to it under
Irf !?5.	 Sect IOfl s i the C'ompiiiie.s Act I Q65:
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"time llal)llltjes" in relation to an Islamic bank means
the total deposits at that hank which are repayable
otherwise than on demand, bt does not include savings
account liabilities or the deDosits of any other Islamic
bank, any licensed hank wider the Banking Act 1973 ,fcl ioz
or the Central Bank
P\Rr 11
LICENSING OF ISLAMIC BANKS
3. (1) Islamic banking business shall not be transacted
in Malaysia except by a company which IS in the
possession of a licence in writing from the Minister
authorizing it to do so.
(2) A company which desires authority to carry on
Islamic banking business iii Malaysia shall apply in
writing through the Central flank to the Minister for a
licence under this section and shall supply—
(a) a copy of the memorandum of association and
articles of association or other instrument under
which the company is incorporated, duly veri-
fied by a statutory declaration made by a senior
officer of the company; and
(h) such other document or information as may be
called upon b y
 the Minister.
(3) Upon receiving an application under subsection
(2) the Central Bank shall consider the application and
make a recommendation to the Minister stating whether
a licence should be gratited or not and the conditions,
ii WV. to he attached to the licence
(4) Upon receiving an application under subsection
(2) and the recommendation of the Central Bank under
subsection (3), the Minister may, subject to section 4,
grant a licence, with or 'vithout conditions, or refuse
a licence
(5) The Central Bank shall not recommend the grant
of a licence, and the Minister shall not grant a licence,
unless the Central Bank or the Minister, as the case
ma y
 be. is satisfied--
(a) that the aims and operations of the banking
business which it is desired to carry on will not
involve any clement which is not approved by
Lhc Rd i2 jO of Islam; and
Islamic
banking
business
to be
transacted
oniy bya
licensed
Isiamic
bank
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(I;) that there is, in the articles of association of
the bank concerned, provision for the establish-
ment of a Syar'iah advisory body to advise the
bank on the operations of its banking business
in order to ensure that they do not involve any
element which is not approved by the Religion
of Islam.
(6) Any person who contravenes the provisions of
this section shall be guilty of an offence and shall on
conviction be liable to a fine not exceeding twenty
thousand ringgit or to imprisonment for a term not
exceeding three years or to both such fine and imprison-
inent.
Minister	 4. (1) The Miiiister may at any time, on the recommen-
may vary
or revoke	 dation of the Central Bank, vary or revoke any existing
Condition
	 condition of a licence or impose conditions or additionalof licence
conditions.
(2) The Minister shall, prior to any action under
subsection (1), notify his intention in writing to take
such action to the Islamic bank concerned and shall
give the bank an opportunity to submit within such
period, being not less than fourteen days, as may be
specified in the notification reasons why the condition
of the licence should not be varied or revoked or condi-
tions or additional conditions should not be imposed.
(3) Where a licence is subject to conditions, the
Islamic bank shall comply with those conditions.
(4) Any Islamic bank which fails to comply with any
condition of its licence shall he guilty of an offence and
shall on conviction he liable to a fine not exceeding
twenty thousand ringgit.
b	
5. (1) No company shall be granted a licence under
ared	 section 3 nor shall any company licensed thereunder
in certhin
	 carry on business in Malaysia without the written(aces	
consent of the Minister if its capital funds unimpaired
by losses or otherwise is less than the minimum amount.
(2) For the purposes of this section—
"capital funds" means paid-up capital and reserves
and any other sources of capital as may be defined and
computed in such manner as may be prescribed by
notice in writing from time to time by the Central Bank;
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"minimum amount" means such amount of capital
funds to he maintained by art Islamic bank as may be
prescribed by the Minister on the recommendation of
the Central Bank by notification in the Gazette.
(3) The prescription of the minimum amount to be
maintained under subsection (2) shall be complied with
within such uniform period of grace being not less than
three months as may be specified in the notification.
6. (I) No company shall be granted or shall hold a Foreign-
hcence if the Minister is satisfied that it is or has become
foreign-owned or controlled.
(2) For the purposes of this section, a company shall
be deemed to be foreign-owned or controlled if fifty
per centum or more of its capital issued and paid-up
is owned by or on behalf of persons who are not citizens
of Malaysia, or if a majority of the persons having the
direction, control or management of the company are
not citizens of Malaysia.
7. Except with the consent in writing of the Central Opening
Bank, no Islamic bank may open a new branch, agency CS
or office in any part of Malaysia or outside Malaysia.
8. (1) Subject to subsection (2), every Islamic bank may sia,c
establish a correspondent banking relationship with any 	 b'
1	 t	 i	 r t	 ,	 corre-oan ouislue iviaia)sla.	 pondent
banking(2) The Central Bank may prescribe by notice in relationchip
wi iting that no Islamic bank shall, except with the ttd°
a ppro' al of the Minister on the recommendation of the ''"'
Central Bank, establish a correspondent banking
relationship with any batik established in any of the
countries specified in the notification or with any bank
oned or controlled by time government or an agency
of the government of any such country.
9. Every Islamic bank shall pay to the Central Bank Licence fee
such annual licence fee as the Minister, on the recom-
mendation of the Central Bank. may by notification in
the Gazette prescribe.
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Res:rictiun	 JO. Except with the Consent in writing of the Ministert1 the use
iii certain	 no Islamic bank shall be licensed by a name which
ssords in an includes any of the words "Central", "Commonwealth",I .Iaxri ic
htnk	 "Federal", "Federation", "Malaysia", "Malaysian",
name	
"National", "Reserve" or "State" either in the National
Language or in English o in any other language.
Rc'cuinn	 I. (I ) Subject to subsection (2), if any Islamic bank-ni Iicene
(a) is pursuing aims, or carrying on operations,
ino1ving any element which is not approved
by the Religion of Islam;
f IS carrying on its business in a manner detri-
mental to the interests of its depositors and
other creditors:
(C) has insuilictent assets to cover its liabilities to
the public;
(d) is contravening any provision of this Act; or
(e) has ceased to carry on banking business in
Malaysia,
the Minister may. on the recommendation of the Central
Bank, revoke any licence issued to such bank.
(2) The Minister shall, prior to any such revocation,
notify his intention to take such action to the Islamic
bank concerned and shall give the bank an opportunity
to submit within such period, being not less than
twenty-one days. as may be specilled in the notification
reasons wh y
 the licence should not he revoked.
3 Where the licence of an Islamic bank has been
icoked under subsection (fl. the bank may within
thirty clays of the revocation appeal against the revo-
cation to the High Court, which may make such order
thereon as it thinks proper. including any direction as
to the costs of the appeal.
(41 The Central Bank shall he entitled to he heard
"ii any such appeal.
(SI The making of an appeal under this section shall
in no vav vffect the exercise cu t the powers and duties
t'i the Central Rank under sections 37. 39 and 40
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12. (1) Where an order of revocation becomes effective Ellectot
revucatkn,uiidei section 11—
	 licence.
(a) notice of the revocation shall be published in
the Gazette; and
(1') (he Islamic bank shall as from the date of the
notice cease to transact any banking business in
Malaysia except as may be approved by the
Minister on the recommendation of the Central
Bank for the purposes of winding up of its
banking business.
(2) The provisions of paragraph (b) of subsection (1)
shall not prejudice the enforcement by any person of
any right or claim against the bank or by the bank of
any right or claim against any person.
13. The Central Bank shall cause to be published In ibiitjon
the Gazette in each year a list of all Islamic banks to
which licences have been issued under this Act, and if banks.
any licence is issued, revoked or surrendered during
the interval between the publication of two such lists.
notice thereof shall also he caused to he published in
the Gazette.
PART III
FINANCIAL REQUIREMENTS AND DUTIES OF
ISLAMIC BANKS
14. 11 The Central Bank may require an Islamic bank Maintenance
of capitalto maintain capital funds. unimpaired by losses or funds
otherwise, in such proportion to such assets of its
branches and offices both in Malaysia and outside
Malaysia or only of its branches and offices in Malaysia
as may
 he prescribed from time to time by the Central
Bank b y
 notice in writing.
(2) "Capital funds" in subseLtion (I) shall have the
meaning assigned to that expression in subsection (2)
nt sctiuri 5 hut
	 ith such modifications as may he
pcc;ficd from time to time for the purposes of sub-
sect inn I I) b th' Central Bank by notice in writing
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Maui-	 15. W Every Islamic bank-
tenince
(If rcccr c
funds	 (a) shall maintain a reserve fund; and
(b) before any dividend is declared shall transfer to
the reser'.' e fund out of the net profits of each
year, after due provision has been made for
zakat or taxation—
(1) so long as the amount of the reserve fund
is less than fIfty per centum of the paid-up
capital. a sum equal to not less than fifty
per centum of the net profits;
(ii) so long as the amount of the reserve fund
is fifty per centum but less than one
hundred per centum of the paid-up
capital, a sum equal to not less than
twenty-five per centum of the net profits.
(2) If the Central Bank is satisfied that the aggregate
reserve fund of an Islamic bank is adequate for its
business, it may by order in writing exempt the bank
from the provisions of subsection (1) for a period of
one year.
Percentage 16. (1) The Central Batik may from time to time
of 1iiuid	 prescribe by notice in writing to each Islamic bank a
minimum amount or amounts of liquid assets to be
held by the bank at all times.
(2) The minimum amount or amounts of the assets
so prescribed to he held shall be expressed in the form
of—
(a) a percentage or percentages which such assets
shall bear to the sight, savings account, time
and other deposit liabilities of each Islamic
bank and such other liabilities thereof as may
he determined by the Central Bank, either
jointly or separately; and
C/i) a percentage which such assets shall bear to the
inestment account of each Islamic bank;
uid such percentage or percentages may be varied by
the (entral Bank from time to time by notice in writing
to the hank.
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(3) Whenever the Central Bank issues a notice under
subsection (I) each Islamic bank shall be allowed such
uniform peiiod of grace, being not less than one weelc
as may be specified in that notice in which to comply
with the provisions thereof.
(41 An Islamic bank shall not, duiing any period jn
which it has failed to comply with any notice under
siihsccflon (1). without the approval of the Centrl
l3ank. lend or advance any money to any person.
5 For the purpose of computing the minimum
amount or amounts of liquid assets under this section
and the sight, savings account, investment account,
time and other deposit liabilities of an Islamic bank
carrying on business in Malaysia and elsewhere and
such other liabilities of such bank as may be deter-
tiined by the Central Bank, the offices and branches of
such bank in Malaysia shall be deemed to constitute
a separate bank carrying on business in Malaysia.
(6) For the purposes of this section liquid assets
shall be—
((1) notes and coin which are legal tender in
Malaysia;
(h) balances at the Central Bank. not including the
reserve specified in paragraph (c) of subsection
(1) of section 37 of the Central Bank of
Malaysia Ordinance 1958;
(e) inestiiient certificates issued under the Govern-
nient Investment Act 1983; and
(h such other assets as may be approved by the
Minister on the recommendation of the Central
Bank.
(7 The Central Bank may by notice in writing require
each Islamic bank to render such return or returns as
the Central Bank deems necessary for the implenien-
tatiwi of this section
A n s Ilamtc bank vli icli fat Is to corn pl y with
any of the p1 o isions of this section shall he liable
on heini called upon to do so by the Central
Bank. a penalt y of not more than one-tenth of one
per Lentuin of the amount of the deficiency for every
ci a. d cit i n wh icli the deficiency coriti flues.
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(9) Arty Islamic bank which fails or refuses to pay
a penalty under subsection (b) shall be guilty of an
ollence under this Act
Airditur	 17. (1) Notvithstanding the provisions of the Corn-
and
uiditor	 panies Act 1965, every Islamic hank shall appoint
Ieport	 annually an auditor approved by the Minister.
.lu 125
(2) The Minister on the recommendation of the
Central Bank may appoint an auditor—
(a) if the Islamic bank fails to appoint an auditor;
or
(h) if he considers it desirable that another auditor
should act with the iuditor appointed under
subsection (I),
and may fix the remuneration to be paid by the Islamic
hank to that auditor.
(3) The duties of the auditor appointed under sub-
sections (I) and (2) for an Islamic bank shall be—
(a) to carry out for the year in respect of which he
is appointed an audit of the accounts of the
bank; and
(h) to make a report in accordance with section 174
Act 125 of the Companies Act 1965 upon the annual
balance sheet and profit and loss account of the
bank.
(4 1 he report of the auditor referred to in paragraph
(b) of subsection (3) shall be laid together with the
report of the directors of the Islamic bank at the
annual general meetrng of the bank; and a statutory
declaration made by a senior officer of the bank to the
effect that the report was so laid shall accompany the
documents forwarded under paragraph (c) of sub-
section (1) ot section 18.
(5) No person haing art interest ir an Islamic bank
otherwise than as a shareholder, and no director or
officer of that hank, shall be eligible for appointment
as an auditor for that bank: and any person appointed
as auditor to an Islamic bank who after such appoint-
ment acquires such interest or becomes a director or an
oflicer of that hank shall forthwith cease to he the
auditor.
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(6) The duties, powers and liabilities imposed and
conferred by section 33 in relation to an investigation
by the Central Bank of the affairs of an Islamic tank
under section 31 or 32 are hereby imposed and con-
ferred in relation to auditors appointed tinder this
SeCt Ion.
(7) Any Islamic bank which fails to comply with the
requirements of subsection (4) shall be guilty of an
offence and shall on conviction be liable t a fine not
exceeding twenty thousand ringgit.
18. (I) Every Islamic bank shall—	 Audited
balance(a) exhibit in a conspicuous position in every office sheet.
or place of business in Malaysia-
(i) a copy each of its latest audited annual
balance sheet, profit and loss account,
together with any note thereon, and the -
report of the auditor;
(ii) the full names of all its directors; and
(iii) the names of all subsidiaries for the time
being of the bank;
fI') withiii fourteen days of the hiyiug of its
accounts at its annual general meeting publish
in at least two daily newspapers published in
Malaysia and approved by the Central Bank a
copy each of its latest audited annual balance
sheet, profit and loss account, together with any
note thereon, and the report of the auditor; and
(c) within six months after the close of each
financial year or such further period as the
Central Bank may approve, forward to the
Central Bank—
(1) two copies each of its latest audited
annual balance sheet, profit and loss
account, together with any note thereon,
and the reports of the auditor and the
directors;
(n) in the case of an Islamic hank with
branches outside Malaysia, two copies
each of its latest audited annual balance
sheet and profit and loss account in
respect of its operations in Malaysia, and
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two copies each of its latest audited
annual balance sheet and profit and loss
account in respect of its operations in
each country outside Malaysia.
(2) The form and content of the balance sheet and
profit and loss account shall, together with the report
of the directors, be as approved by the Central Bank.
(3) The Central Bank may require any Islamic bank
to submit such further or additional information as it
may deem necessary either by way of explanation,
amplification or otherwise with regard to the balance
sheets and profit and loss accounts forwarded by that
bank under paragraph (c) ofsubsection (1) and that
information shall be submitted within such period and
in such manner as the Central Bank may require.
(4) Any Islamic bank which fails to comply with the
provisions of this section shall be guilty of an offence
and shall on conviction be liable to a fine not exceeding
twenty thousand rtnggit.
Siatitics	 19. (1) Every Islamic bank shall send to the Central
to be
	 Bank in such form as may be prescribed by the Centralftirn,Thed Batik—
(a) a statement showing the liabilities and assets of
its banking offices and branches in Malaysia at
the close of business on the last business day
of each month within such period as may be
prescribed by notice in writing from time to
tune by the Central Bank;
(b) a statement giving an analysis of loans,
advances and investment of its banking offices
and branches in Malaysia as at such intervals
and ithin such period as may be prescribed
by notice from time to time by the Central
Bank:
(c) not later than six months after the close of its
financial year, a statement showing the income
and expenditure in respect of its business in
Malaysia;	 -
id) notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (3)
of section 34, a statement showing such credit
information of its customers as is required for
the purposes of the credit bureau established
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under section 30 (1) (rnmrn) of the Central Bank 61/58
of Malaysia Ordinance 1958 at such intervals
and within such period as may be prescribed
by notice in writing from time to time by the
Central Bank; in4	 / •l
(e) any such statistical information as may be
requested by the Central Bank.
(2) Except for the purposes of paragraph (d) of sub-
section (1). any information received from a bank under
this section shall be regarded as secret between that
hank arid the Central Bank.
(3) Any Islamic batik which fails to comply with any
tequirernent set out in subsection (1) shall be guilty of
an offence and shall on conviction be liable to a fine
not exceeding four thousand ringgit for every day
during which the default continues.
(4) It shall be the responsibility of the Central Bank
to prepare and publish consolidated statements aggre-
gating the figures in the returns furnished under
paragraphs (a) and (b) of subsection (1).
20. An Islamic bank which operates branch offices or Information
agencies outside Malaysia shall furnish to the Cetra1 	 r
Bank any information relating to the operations of such
oftices or agencies as may be requested by the Central
13 an k
PART IV
OVvNEIthHIP, CONTROL AND MANAGEMENT OF
ISLAMIC BANKS
21. (1) 'Whenever a change is about to occur in the inft,rniatiori
control of an y Islamic bank, the hank shall report the °	 T1geIn Control
proposed change to the Central Bank. 	 of Islamic
banks
(2) \Vheneer a loan or advance is made by any
Islamic bank secured in the aggregate by twent y
 per
Lentum or more of the paid-up capital shares of an
other Ts!ttnie bank or of any licensed bank under the
Eanking Act 1973 incorporated in Malaysia or of any
 ,.,
finance company licensed under the Finance Compintcs t
Act l96). the Islamic bank shall report the fact to the
Central Bank
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(3) The lepolts requucd to be made under sub-
section (2) shall contain the following-
i) the names and addresses of the borrowers:
(ii the name ot the Islamic bank, the licensed bank.
or finance company issuing the shares by which
the loan or advance is securcd
(iii) the number of shares by which the loan or
advance is secured: and
(ii) the amount of the loan or advance.
(4) The reports under subsections (1) and (2 shall
be in addition to any report which may be required
put suant to the provisions of any other written law.
(5) For the purposes of this section, the expression
"control" in relation to an Islamic bank means the
oossession directly or indirectly of the power to direct
or cause the direction of the management and policy
of the bank
(6) Any Islamic bank which fails to comply with
the provisions of subsection (I) or (2) shall be guilty
of an offence and shall on conviction be liable to a
fine not exceeding twenty thousand ringgit.
22. (1 Every Islamic bank shall obtain the approval
of the Minister of any proposed—
(a) arrangement or agreement-
(i) for the sale or disposal of its shares or
business, or
(ii) affecting voting power, management or
other matters,
which vrll result in a change in the control or
management of the bank; and
hi scheme-
(i for reconstruction of the hank, or
(ii) for dlnalgamation, merger or otherwise
between the hank and any other cor-
poration,
v herein the whole or any part of the under-
takin g or the propert y of the bank is to be
tran'ferrcd to another corporation
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(2) The Minister, on the recommendation of the
Centri'l Bank, may approve or refuse to allow the
proposed arrangement, agleement or scheme, but the
a rriioaI of the Minister shall not be unreasonably
withheld.
23. (I) Withnut preudice to anything contained in the DLquaL1fica
tion ofCompanies Act 1965, any person who is a director, dirto
manager, secretary or other officer concerned in the and
em1oyees
management of an Islamic bank shall cease to hold of banks
office—	 At 125
(a) if he becomes a bankrupt, suspends payment or
compounds with his creditors; or
(b) if'
 lie is convicted of an offence involving dis-
honesty or fraud.
(2) No person who has been a director of, or directly
concerned in the management of, an Islamic bank or a
licensed bank under the Banking Act 1973 which has Act 102
been wound up by a court shall, without the express
authority of the Minister, act or continue to act as a
director of. or be directly concerned in the management
of, an y
 Islamic bank
(3) Any person who acts in contravention of sub-
section (I) or (2) shall be guilty of an offence and shall
on conviction he liable to a fine not exceeding twenty
thousand ringgit or to imprisonment for a term not
exceedin g
 three years or to both such fine and imprison-
merit
PART V
RESTRICTIONS ON BUSINESS
24. (I) No Islamic bank shall—
	
Restrictioiis
on payment
(a) pay any dividend on its shares until all its
capitalized expenditure (including preliminary of navances
expenses. organization expenses. share-selling anoans.
commission, brokerage, amounts of losses
incurred and any other item of expenditure
not represented by tangible nssets has been
completely written off:
11) i:rant an ad ance. loan or credit facility against
the security
 of its own shares: or
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(c) grant unsecured advances, unsecured loans or
unsecured credit facilities in excess of, in the
aggregate and outstanding at any one time,
ten thousand ringgit to any corporation which
is deemed to be related to the bank as described
Ia I2	 in se(tion 6 of the Corn panics Act 1965, other
than an Islamic bank, a licensed bank under
•ia I,? the Banking Act 1973, a finance company
licensed under the Finance Companies Act
1969, or any other financial institution
approved by the Central Bank.
(2) For the purpose of this section "unsecured
advances", "unsecured loans" and "unsecured credit
facilities" mean respectively advances, loans and credit
Licitities made without security, or, in respect of any
aclance. loan and credit facility made with security,
inv portion thereof which at any time exceeds the
market value of the assets constituting the security or,
w'ere the Central Bank is satisfied that there is rio
cstab!ished market aliie, the value niade on the basis
of a valuation approved by the Central Bank.
Prohibition 25. (1. Except as provided under paragraph (c) of sub-
ot IOfl '
	 section (1) of section 24 and subsection (2) of thiset . to
directors	 section, 110 Islamic bank shall grant advances, loans or
r wd
employees	 credit facilities to—
'a) any of its directors, officers or employees or
other persons being persons receiving remune-
ration from it (other than accountants, advo-
ates and solicitors, architects, estate agents,
doctors and any other persons receiving remu-
neration from it in rcpcct of their professional
services),
h) any firm in which any of its directors, officers
or employees is interested as partner, manager,
agent or guarantor,
() any corporation in vhch any of its officers or
employees is ,a director, manager. agent or
guarantor. or any corporation in the shares of
hich an of its offlcrs or employees has any
material interest as cleternlined by the Central
Batik:
475
IPt. V, S. 25J
ISLAMIC BANKING	 23
( ' I) any corporation in which any of its directors
(not being an executive director, he being within
the ambit of thc provisions of paragraph (c)
pursuant to subsection (3)) is a member,
director, manager, agent or guarantor, or any
corpoi ation in the shares of which any such
director of the Islamic bank has any interest
whatsoever directly or indirectly; or
(e) any individual for whom any of its directors,
officers or employees is a guarantor
(2) An Islamic bank may grant to any of its officers
or cniplovees loans which are provided under its appro-
pr!ate scheme of service and, where the bank is satisfied
that special or compassionate circumstances exist, a
loan not exceeding at any one time six months' remune-
ration of that officer or employee on such trms and
conditions as the bank thinks fit.
(3) The provisions of paragraph (c) of subsection (1)
and of subsection (2) shall als3 apply to the executive
directors of Islamic banks -
(4) The provisions of paragraph (d) of subsection (1)
shall not apply to the granting of advances, loans or
credit facilities by an Islamic bank to—
(a) a corporation which is listed on a recognized
stock exchange arid in the shares of which no
director of that Islamic hank has, directly or
indirectly, any material interest as determined
by the Central Bank; and
(h) a public compan y in whiLh a director of that
lslani,c hank has no interest in his personal
capacity, as determined by the Central Bank:
Pruvided that for the purposes of this subsection the
director concerned is not an e'.ccutive director of that
l'himic hank
(5) 1-or the purposes of this section, "director",
"officer" or "employee" includes a spouse. p ir:nt or
clild of a d'rector, an officer or employee.
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6. No I liii ic b ink shall grant any advance, loan or
LiCdTt laLilit under the exemption referrcd to in sub-
section (4 ol sect ion 25 unless the following conditions
are satisfied
tn) that the advance, loan or credit facility meets
the sLindnrds of credit-worthiness required of
citli'r applicant borrowers,
(In) that the terms of the advance, loan or credit
ftcihitv are not less favourable to the bank than
those offered to others,
that th2 grant of the advance, loan dr credit
facility ill s3rvc the hest interest of the bank;
and
(J) that the advance, loan or credit facility has been
approved b y the votes of not less than two-
I lijrjs of all the other directors of the bank at a
diil' constituted rnce i ng of the full board of
dir'ctors and the approval has been recorded
in th nilnLltcs of Ihat meeting
Rectriction 27. Cl) No !slLUflle ki'ik shall grant any customer any
i;frcdii t'	 reclit Facilities or incur an y other liabilities on his behalf
ctistc'mcr	 (0 an aggregate amount in e'css of such percentage
i may
 he determned from time to time by the Central
l3aiik in relation to such lank's capital funds unrmpaired
l-t ' lo'scs or otht'rvise
(2) Subsection (1 shall not a pply to—
(a) transactions with other Tslaniic banks, with
.f'i 102	 licensed banks tinder the Banking Act 1973 and
with finance companies licensed under the
4cr	 rirmt'ce Companies Act I %9:
(h) a ii' laci lit tes ri m ii ted in respect of jill ports into
or exports from Ma!a sj:i or Ii ide within
vTaJa'sia ariainst letters of credit or bills of
exciriti ge: or
'1 fl' other tranS,iCt 1onS 	 l ichi the ('enti al Bank
riii' appro s.e from time to time
For the purposes of subsection (1), the expression
n ii ' i in Is" shall ha v the meaning assigned to It by
i.t' (2)
	 f section 5
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28. (I) Icr d ircc f or of an Islamic hank Wilt) IS ifl any Dtcck'cure
matinci liatue ei . wliethci dii ectly or iiidii ectly,
intciested in an ad ailce, loan or credit facility or
proposed advance, loan or credit facility from that
Islamic hank shall as soon as practicable declate the
nature of his interest to the board of dii ectors of that
Islamic hank and the secretar y of that Islamic hank
shall cause such declaration to he circulated forthwith
to all the directors
(2) The requirements of subsection (1) shall not apply
in any case where the interest of the director consists
only in being a member or creditor of a corporation
which is intetested in an advance, loan or credit facility
or pioposed advance, loan or credit facility from that
Islamic bank if the interest of the director may properly
be regarded as not being a material interest
(3) For the purposes of subsection (I), a general
notice gien to the board of directors of an Islamic
bank by a director to the effect that lie is an officer or
member of a specit9ecl firm or a member of a specified
corporation and he is to he regarded as interested in
any advance, loan or credit facility which may. alter
the (late of the notice, he made to that firm or corpora-
tion shall he deemed to he a sufficient declaration of
interest in relation to an y adance. loan or credit facility
so made if--
(a) it specifies the nature and ectent of his interest
in a specified firm or corporation;
(Ii) his interest shall not he different in natui c or
greater in extent than the nature and extent co
specified in the notice at the time any advance,
loan or credit facility is made; and
(c) it is given at the meetin g of the directors or the
director takes reasonable steps to ensure that
it is brought up and read at the next meeting
of the directors after it is ien
(4 Eerv director ot an Tslamie hank who holds any
ollicc or possesscs an y prt)pert 'herehv whethc'i
directl y or indirectl y
 duties or iiiteret might be cieatcd
in conflict with his duties or interest as a director shall
declare at a meeting of the directois ol' the !!i mic bank
the fact and the nature. thiiracter and c'te'it ot the
conflict
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(5) ilie decla; atin'i referred to in subsection (4) shall
he made at the first meeting of the directors held—
(a) after he becomes a director of the Islamic bank;
or
(I') (if already a director) after he commenced to
hold ollice or to possess the property as the
case may require.
(6, l'he secretary of the Islamic bank shall cause to
be brought up and read any declaration made under
subsection (1) or 4) at the next meeting of the directors
after it is given, and shall record any declaration made
under this section in the minutes of the meeting at
which it was made or at which it was brought up and
icad.
(7) Any directoi who acts in contravention of sub-
section (1) or (4) shall be guilty of an o'ence and shall
on conviction he liable to a line not exceeding twenty
thousand ringgit or to imprisonment for a term not
exceeding three years or to both such fine and imprison-
ment
11rntat,nn 29. (1) Any credit facility granted by any Islamic bank
on credit
fciIrtyfrr to any person for the purpose of financing the purchase
Purpt'ceO( ot the holding of shares shall not exceed such per-il
tliepurchace centage of the market value of the shares at the time
nrhokltng	 hc credit facility is granted, as may be directed byof chares
tne Central Bank in writing
(2) A credit facility granted under this section to
tnv person shall be accounted for in an account
ccparatc from thai kept for any other credit facility
cranted to him.
(3) The Central Bank may give direction in writing
to any Islamic bank in respect of the following matters,
that is to say—
(a) the basis and method for determining the
market value of sharts held as security for
such credit facility;
(1') the withdrawal of funds or shares by the person
to whom such credit facility was granted;
(c) the substitution of other shares for shares held
as secunty for such credit facility; and
(d) such other matters as may he deemed necessary.
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(41 An y
 Islamic bank which acts in contravention
of the provisions of this section or any direction given
under this section shall be guilty of an offence under
this Act
30. An Islamic hank, if at any time called upon in Proof of
comphance
writing by the Central Bank to do SO, shall satisfy it with
sections 24,h the production of such evidence or information as 25,26,27
it may require that the batik is not acting in contra- and29
ention of any
 of the provisions of sections 24, 25, 26,
27 and 29
PARr VI
POWERS Of SUPER\'ISION AND CONTROL OVER
ISLAMIC BANKS
31. The Central Bank shall from time to time Itnvectiga-
inestigate, under conditions of secrecy, the books,
accounts and transactions of each Is'amic bank and
of any branch agency or office outside Malaysia
opened by an Islamic hank
32. The Minister max' at an y time direct the Central Spectai
Bunk to make an investigation, under conditions of fub0n
secrecy, of the hooks, accounts and transactions of an
tsktniic hank, if he hs reason to believe such Islamic
hank is carry ing on its business in a manner detri-
mental to the interests of its depositors and other
creditors, or has insufficient assets to cover its liabilities
to the public, or is contravening the provisions of this
Act or of the Centrat Bank of Malaysia Ordinance 61/58
1958.
33. (I) Subject to subsection (2). for the purposes of Pobducon
an investigation under section 31 or 32. an Islamic books and
hank shall afford the Central Bank access to its hooks. documentc
accounts and documents and shall give such infor-
mation and I acilitics as ma y he required to conduct
the incstigation
(2) Books, accounts and documents shall not he
required to he produced at such times and at such
places as shall interfere with the proper conduct of
the normal dail y business of the bank concerned
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(3) An Islamic bank which fails to allow access to
its hcoks. '.uunts and documents or to give infor-
mation or ftcilities in accordance with subsection (I)
shall he ziiiltv of an offence and shall on conviction
he liable to a lIne not exceeding four thousand ringgit
br ever' day during which the default continues.
(4) Foi the purposes of an investigation under
section 31 or 32 all officers and employees of the
Cciitial Bank shall he deemed to be public servants
r , c	 within the meanin g of the Penal Code.
Cap 15
ftmkin 34. (I) Except a provided in sections 3! 'and 32,
no hing in this Act shall authorize the Minister to
direct the Central Bank. or shall authorize the Central
Bank. to enquire specifically into the affairs of any
mdii idual customer of any Islamic bank and any
incidental information relating to the affairs of the
iiidividual customer obtained by the Central Bank in
the course of an inspection or investigation made by
the Central Bank under the provisions of this Act
shall he secret between the Central Bank and that
hank.
(2t Nothing in this section shall be deemed to limit
any powers conferred upon the High Court or a Judge
" " thereof 1w the Bankers' Books (Evidence) Act 1949
or to prohibit obedience to an order made under that
Act.
(3) Eept with the consent of the Central Bank in
"'riting and to the extent specifled therein, no officer
of an y Islamic bank and rio person who by reason of
lus C lpacitv or office has by any means access to the
iccords of that hink. registers or any correspondence
or n'i'terial with regard to the account of any individual
Lustoi 1 cr of thai hank shall give, divulge or reveal any
;nbormrtinn whatsoever regarding the moneys or other
;cicant particulars of the account of the customer
unless--
(a) the customer or his personal representative
iiies his permission so to do
(I,) the customer is'declared bankrupt: or
I c) the 'nfrmatron is required to assess the credit-
\c()rthiness of the customer relating to a hona
uif ' commerc i al transaction or a prospective
coin ruercial transaction
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(-i) I lic j)IO\ isions of subs.ction i3, shall not apply
to the giving of information to auditors appointed under
section 17. officers and employ 2e5 of the bank who ate
resident in Malaysia
(5) An\ per sun ho acts in contravention of the
pr OVISIOnS of this sction shall be guilty of an offence
and shall on conviction be liable to a fj iie not exceeding
lortv thousand ringgit or to imprisonment for a term
not exceeding three years or to both such fine and
nil pr iso ii men t
35. (I) Every Islamic hank shall send to the Central Action to be
Bank within such period as may be piescribed by notice taken ifadvances
in writing from time to time by the Central Bank after areagaunsi
interests ofthe last day of each month a statement in the form tO cieposutoi
he prescribed by the Central Bank showing particulars
of all advances, loans or credit facilities granted by
it to—
(a) any corporation which is deemed to be related
to the bank as described in section 6 of the
Companies Act 1965; 	 , 125.
(b) any corporation or public company referred
to in subsection (4) of section 25; and
() any individual in whom and any firm or
cot poratton in which any of its directors is
interested, directly or indirectly, as declared
under the provisions ot section 28, other than
ad ances, loans and credit facilities particulars
ot which have already been supplied pursuant
to the preceding paragraphs.	 -
(2 11 on examination of (lie particulars supplied by
an lsamic hitik under subsection (I) it appears to the
Centi at Bank that any such advance, loan or credit
facilit y i being granted to the detriment o the interests
of the depositors of that bank, the Central Bank may
h order in writing prohibit that bank from granting
in further advance, loan or credit facility or impose
snch restrictions on the 2rant thereof as the Central
E3ank thinks (it. and rna further direct that bank to
ccurc repa y ment of an y
 such advance, loan or credit
facility
 within such time and to such extent a ma" l'
cn-'ruie(l in the or'Jei
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(3 1 Any Islamic bank hich has been issued with an
flrder by the Central Bank pursuuIt to this section may
appeal in riting to the Minister, who may, as he thinks
lit. eoiitirm. vary or revoke the order of the Central
Bank
36. An Islamic bank which considers that it is likely
unable	 to become unable to meet its obligations or is about toto meet
tblintion	 suspend payment shall forthwith inform the Central
to inform
Central	 Bank of that fact.
hank
A.ti,in l'v
Central
Hank
if bank
unable to
meet obliga-
(ions or
(o.lduct tog
business to
the detri-
ment of
depositors
37. (1) Where--
(a) an Islamic bank informs the Central Bank-
(i that it considers that it is likely to become
unable to meet its obligations; or
(ii) that it is about to suspend payment;
(h) an Islamic bank becomes unable to meet its
obligations or suspends payment; or
(c) after an investigation is made under section 31
or 32 the Central Bank is of the opinion that
an Islamic hank-
(i is following unsound or improper
practices;
ti is likely to become unable to meet its
obli gations or is about to suspend pay-
ment;
iii has contravened or failed to comply with
any provision of this Act;
(1s4 has contraened or failed to comply with
any condition imposed on its licence; or
(v) is likely to he carrying on its business in
a manner detrimental to the interests of
its depositors.
the Central Bank. with the concurrence of the Minister.
'ii ecrcise such one or more powers specified in
suh	 him (2) as it deems to be necessary
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(2) Subject to subsection (I), the Central Bank
may—
(a) issue orders to the bank to take such steps as
the Central Bank may consider necessary to
rectify the matter and the bank shall carry
out such orders within such time as may be
prescribed by the Central Bank;
(h) prohibit the bank from extending any further
advance, loan or credit facility for such period
or periods as may be specified and subject to
such exceptions if any and other conditions as
the Central Bank may impose;
(c) remove from office any of its directors or
appoint any person as its director;
(d) appoint a person to advise the bank on the
proper conduct of its business;
(e) assume control of, and carry on, the business
of the bank or appoint some other person to
assume control of, and carry on, the business
of the bank; or
(f) present a petition to the High Court for the
winding up of the bank by the Court.
(3) Where the Central Bank has appointed a person—
(a) to be a director of the bank under paragraph
(c) of subsection (2);
(b) to advise the bank on the proper conduct of its
business under paragraph (ci) of subsection (2);
or
(c) to assume control of, and carry on, the business
of the bank under paragraph (e) of subsection
(2),
the Central Bank may fix the remuneration and
expenses to be paid to that person by the bank.
38. Where the Central Bank has acted under paragraph Effect of
(c) of subsection (2) of section 37 with respect to an remOvai ofoffice ofIslamic hank, the following provisions shall have dirtoror
effect---	 apporntmentof a
threttor(a) notwithstanding anything contained in the ofabank
Companies Act 1965 and the articles of by the
Centralassociation of the bank, the rights of the mem- Bank
hers or holders of shares to elect directors of 
,lc, 125
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the kink in lace of those who are removed
horn office by the Central Bank shall cease to
he e\elcisahle,
(1') an director jeinoved from office under that
paragraph shaH cease to hold office, and shall
not be entitled to claim any compensation for
the loss or termination of office; and
(c) eeiv removal or appointment under that para-
graph shall he final and conclusive and shall
not be questioned in any Court.
Control of 39. (I) V/here the Central Bank has assumed or has
apponted another person to assume control of the
cnaI hu'ne's of an Islamic bank in pursuance of paragraph
() of sub vection (2) of section 37, the Central Bank or
I hat person shall, subject to subsection (2), remain in
control of the bank and continue to carry on the
business of the bank in the name and on behalf of the
bank unttl such time as the Central Bank is satisfied
that the reasons for v hich it assumes control or has
appointed another person to assume control have ceased
to exst.
(2) \Viiere the Central Bank has assumed control, or
has 'ippointed another person to assume control, of
the husness of an Islamic bank in pursuance of para-
graph (e) of subsection (2) of section 37 the Htgh Court
may, upon application of the bank, order that the
Central Bank shall cease to control the business of the
hank as from a date specified in the order if the High
C ourt is satisfied that it is no longer necessary for the
r ,tcti'mn of the d positors of the bank that the Central
Uan should remain in control of the business of the
I i uk
(3) Wheie the Central Bank has assumed control,
01 has appointed another person to assume control, of
(he business of an Islamic bank in pursuance of para-
graph (c) of subsection (2) of section 37. or ceased to
control the hu$Iness of an Islamic bank in pursuance
of this section. the Central Bank shall notify that fact
in the Ga:c'tte.
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40. (1) Where the Central Bank has assumed control, Islanuc
bank underor has appointed another person to assume control, of nolo(
the business of an Islamic bank in pursuance of para- Bank to
giaph (e) of subsection (2) of section 37, the Islamic co-operate
with Centralhank shall submit its business to the control of the Bank.
Central Bank or to that person and shall provide the
Central Bank with such facilities as the Central Bank
requires to carry on the business of that bank.
(2) Any Islamic bank which fails to comply with
subsection (1) or with any requirement of the Central
Bank thereunder shall be guilty of an offence and shall
on conviction be liable to a fine not exceeding four
thousand ringgit for every day during which the default
continues.
41. Any reference in this Part to an Islamic bank shall Extension
of jurisdic-be read as including a reference to a subsidiary of an
Islamic bank.	 subsidiaries
of banks
42. (1) The Central Bank may, with the approval of Moratorium
the rvlinister, if it considers it to be in the interests of
the depositors of an Islamic bank, make an order pro-
hibiting the bank from carrying on banking business
or from doing or performing any act or function
connected with banking business or any aspect thereof
as may be specified in the order.
(2) The Central Bank may, with the approval of
the Minister, if it considers it to be in the interests
of the depositors, apply to the High Court for an order
staying the commencement or continuance of any pro-
ceedings by or against the bank in regard to any
business of the bank. Such an order shall be valid for
a period not exceeding six months.
(3) So long as an order under subsection (1) remains
in force the licence granted to the bank under this Act
shall he suspended.
(4) Where an order has been made under subsection
(1), the Central Bank shall notify that fact in the
Gazette
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Amendment 43. (1) Every Islamic bank shall, prior to the making
onton of any amendment or alteration in the memorandum
of association or articles of association or other instru-
ment under which it is incorporated, furnish to the
Central Bank particulars in writing of such proposed
amendment or alteration for its approval.
(2) Every Islamic bank shall, within three months
after the making of any amendment or alteration in the
memorandum of association and articles of association
or other instrument under which it is incorporated,
furnish to the Minister through the Central Bank parti-
culars in writing (verified by a statutory declaration
made by a senior officer of the bank) of such amend-
ment or alteration.
(3) Any Islamic bank which fails to comply with the
requirements of subsection (1) or (2) shall be guilty of
an offence and shall on conviction be liable to a fine
not exceeding two thousand ringgit for every day during
which the default continues.
PT VII
MISCELLANEOUS
Indemnity 44. (1) Neither the Government nor the Central Bank
nor any officer of either shall be subject to any action,
claim or demand by or liability to any person in respect
of anything done or omitted to be done in good faith
in pursuance or in execution or intended execution, or
in connection with the executing or intended execution,
of any power conferred upon the Government, Central
Bank or the officer by this Act.
(2) For the purposes of this section a Minister and
any public officer shall be deemed to be an officer of
the Government; and the Governor and Deputy
Governor of the Central Bank and any director or
employee thereof and any person holding any office
therein or appointed by the Central Bank under para-
graph Ic), (d) or (e) of subsection (2) of section 37 shall
be deenied to be an officer of the Central Bank.
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45. Where an Islamic bank becomes unable to meet its orityof
obligations or suspends payments, the assets of the
	
'
bank in Malaysia shall be available to meet all sight account
and savings account liabilities of the bank in Malaysia; bilu
and such liabilities shall have priority over all other
liabilities of the bank.
46. (1) Any person who, being a director or manager PenaItion
of an Islamic bank—
	
directOrs
(a) fails to take all reasonable steps to secure managers.
compliance by the bank with the requirements
of this Act and of the Central Bank of Malaysia 61/58.
Ordinance 1958 (hereafter in this section
referred to as "the Ordinance"); or
(b) fails to take all reasonable steps to ensure the
correctness of any statement submitted under
the provisions of this Act or the Ordinance,
shall be guilty of an offence and shall on conviction be
liable to a fine not exceeding twenty thousand ringgit
or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three
years or to both such fine and imprisonment.
(2) In any proceedings against a person under sub-
section (1) it shall be a defence to prove that he has
reasonable grounds to believe that another person was
charged with the duty of securing compliance with the
requirements of this Act or the Ordinance or with the
duty of ensuring that those statements were accurate
and that that person was competent and in a position
to discharge that duty.
(3) A person shall not be sentenced to imprisonment
for any offence under subsection (1) unless in the
opinion of the Court he committed the offence wilfully.
47. Any director, manager, trustee, auditor, employee Offences by
or agent of any Islamic bank who—
(a) wilfully makes or causes to be made a false and agents
entry in any book of record or in any report,
slip, document or statement of the business,
affairs, transactions, condition, assets or
accounts of the bank; or
(b) wilfully omits to make an entry in any hook
of record or in any report, slip, document or
statement of the business, affairs, transactions,
condition, assets or accounts of the bank, or
wilfully causes any such entry to be omitted: or
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(c) wilfully alters, abstracts, conceals or destroys
an entry in any book of record or in any report,
slip, document or statement of the business,
affairs, transactions, condition, assets or
accounts of the bank, or wilfully causes any
such entry to be altered, abstracted, concealed
or destroyed,
shall be guilty of an offence and shall on conviction be
liable to a fine not exceeding fifty thousand ringgit or
to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or
to both such fine and imprisonment.
Offence.c by 48. (1) Where any offence agaiflst any provision of this
Act has been committed by a corporation, firm, society
servants and or other body of persons, any person who at the time
agen S 
of the commission of the offence was a director, ma-
nager, secretary or other similar officer thereof or was
purporting to act in such capacity shall be deemed to
be guilty of that offence unless he proves that the offence
was committed without his consent or connivance and
that he exercised all such diligence to prevent the com -
mission of the offence as he ought to have exercised,
having regard to the nature of his functions in that
capacity and to all the circumstances.
(2) Where any person would be liable under this Act
to any punishment or penalty for any act, omission,
neglect or default, he shall be liable to the same punish-
ment or penalty for every such act, omission, neglect or
default of any clerk, servant or agent, or of the clerk
or servant of the agent, provided that the act, omission,
neglect or default was committed by the clerk or servant
in the course of his employment, or by the agent when
acting on behalf of the person, or by the clerk or
servant of the agent when acting in the course of his
employment in such circumstances that had the act,
omission, neglect or default been committed by the
agent his principal would have been liable under this
section.
Prohibition 49. Any director, officer or employee of an Islamic
"0 reveipt o(
commission hank, or other persons being persons receiving remune-
bc ctff	 ration from the Islamic bank, who asks for or receives,
consents or agrees to receive any gift, commission,
emolument, service, gratuity, money, property or thing
of value for his own personal benefit or advantage or
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fui that of any of his relatives, Iroin any person other
than from that bank, for procuring or endeavouring to
procure for any person any advance, loan or credit
facility from that bank or the purchase or discount of
any draft, note, cheque, bill of exchange or other obli-
gations by the bank, or for permitting any person to
overdraw any account with that bank, shall be guilty
of an offence and shall on conviction be liable to a
fine not e'cceeding twenty thousand ringgit or to
imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or
to both such fine and imprisonment.
59. Any Islamic bank which contravenes or fails to General
comply with any provision of this Act or regulations penalty.
made thereunder for which no penalty is expressly
provided shall be guilty of an offence and shall on con-
viction be liable to a fine not exceeding fifty thousand
ringgit.
51. (1) The Governor of the Central Bank, with the Powerof
concurrence of the Minister, may compound any offence
	 j°
punishable under this Act by accepting such sum of
money as he thinks fit, being not exceeding the amount
of the maximum fine to which that person would have
been liable if he had been convicted of the offence.
(2) Any moneys paid to the Governor pursuant to
the provisions of subsection (1) shall be paid into and
form part of the Consolidated Fund.
52. No prosecution in respect of any offence under this Consent of
the PublicAct shall be instituted without the consent in writing Prosecutor.
of the Public Prosecutor.
53. (1) The Cential Bank may with the approval of the Regulations
Minister make such regulations as may he required from
time to time for cat rying into effect the objects of this
Act
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection
(I . regulations may be macic-
(a to provide for co'itrol by the Central Bank with
rtspect to the acquisition or holding by an
Islamic bank of shares of any corporation or
the acquisition or development by the bank of
inv immovable property.
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(h) to provide for control by the Central Bank with
respect to an Islamic bank becoming a partner
or proprietor of any firm with unlimited liahi-
lity;
(c) to provide for control by the Central Bank with
respect to the granting of any credit facility to
any person for the purpose of financing the
acquisition or holding of immovable property,
shares and contracts in consumer credit and
commodity futures;
(a') to provide for the declaration by directors of
Islamic banks to the board of directors of their
respective Islamic banks of the number and
description of any shares in any corporation
which are held by or in trust for them or of
which they have any right to become the holder
(whether on payment or not) or in which they
have, directly or indirectly, any beneficial
interest, and of the nature of their interest as
partner, director, manager or agent in any firm
or corporation; and
(e) to provide for the declaration by executive
directors, officers and employees of Islamic
banks to the respective hoards of directors of
such Islaniic banks or such other person as may
be specified in the regulations of the following
kinds of interest held by or for any of them or
any of their spouses or children
(1) the number and description of any shares
in any corporation which are held by or
in trust for any such executive director,
officer, employee, spouse or child or of
which he has any right to become the
holder (whether on payment or not) or
in which he has, directly or indirectly,
i'nv beneficial interest;
(ii) the nature of any interest a partner,
director, manager or agent in any firm
or corporation; and
(ii '
 all other assets
Rank	 54. No lslame hank shall do an) business with the
h( )tda	 public oil any day declared a hank holiday under the
(0!	 1MO isious of section 57 (1) of the Banking Act 1973.
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55. An Islamic bank which is incorporated under the Applicanon
Companies Act 1965 shall be subject to the provisions
of that Act as welt as to the provisions of this Act, Act 125
s.-ive that where there is any conflict or inconsistency
between the provisions of that Act and the provisions
of this Act the provisions of this Act shall prevail
56. The Minister may, with or without conditions, Eemptton.
exempt any Islamic bank from any provision of this
Act
PART VIII
CONSEQUENTIAL AMENDMENTS
57. (1) Section 2 of the Banking Act 1973 is amended— Amendment
of Banking
(a) by inserting immediately after the definition of 	 1973
"depositor" the following new definition:
'"Islamic bank" means a bank licensed
under the Eslamic Banking Act 1983,'; and 'let 276
(h) by inserting immediately after the words "other
licensed bank" in the definitions of "other
deposit liabilities", "sight liabilities" and "time
liabilities" the words ", any Islamic bank".
12) Section 9 ot the Banking Act 1973 is amended
by substituting foi paragraph (b) of subsection (1) the
following:
"(h) no bank shalt hereafter be licensed by a name
which includes----
(i) any of the words "Central", "Com-
monwealth", "Federal", "Federation",
"Malaysia", "Malaysian", "National",
"Reserve", or "State";
(ii) any of the words "Islamic" or 'Muslim"
or any other words capable of being
Lonstrued as indicating that the bank
/ carzies on Islam'c banking business,
either in National Language or in English or in
an other language
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(3) Section 59 of the Banking Act 1973 is amended
by deleting the word "and" at the end of paragraph (b)
of subsection (1), substituting a semicolon for the full
',lop at the end of paragraph (c) of that subsection
aim inserting immediately thereafter the word "and",
nd inserting immediately aftet that paragraph the
following new paragraph (d):
"(ci) an y
 Islamic bank ".
:\Iuendment 58. (1) Section 4 of the Companies Act 1965 isof
CCTPIICS amended by inserting immediately after the words
Act 1965	 "1973" in the definition of "banking corporation" the
.fct 125
	
words "and art Islamic bank as defined in the Islamic
,1t 776
	 Banking Act 1983"
(2) Section 218 of the Companies Act 1965 is
amended by substituting for paragraph (j) of subsection
(1) the following:
C') the company has held a licence under the
tct 102	 Banking Act 1973 or the IslamIc Banking
1,276 Act 1983, and that licence has been revoked
or has expired and has not been renewed;
or".
Aniendmer't
'f the
('entral
of
Malavcia
Ord !rtance
61/58
.1
59. (1) Section 2 of the Central Bank of Malaysia
Ordinance 1938. which in this section is referred to as
the Ordinance", is amended—
(a) by inserting immediately before the semicolon
at the end of the definition of "bank" the words
"or the Islamic Banking Act 1983";
(lii) by inserting immediately after the definition of
'Govrnor" the following new definitions:
'investrnent account liabilities" in re-
lation to an Islamic hank means the deposit
liabilities at that hank in respect of funds
placed bY a clepoctor with that bank fcr a
fixed period of time under an agreement to
share the profits or losses of that hank on
the investment of such funds
"Islamic bank" means a bank licensed
under the Isltmic Bankin g Act 1983:': and
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(c) by inserting immediately after the words "in
relation to a bank" in the definition of "other
deposit liabilities" the words "other than an
Islamic bank" and by inserting immediately
after the semicolon at the end of that definition
the following words
"and in relation to an Islamic bank means
deposit liabilities at that bank other than
savings account, investment account, sight
and time liabilities and deposit liabilities
from another bank or the Central Bank:".
(2) Section 37 of the Ordinance is amended—
(a) by inserting immediately after the words "pay-
able to or by banks" in paragraph (b) of sub-
section (I) the words "other than Islamic
banks";
(b) by inserting immediately after the words "each
hank" in paragraph (c) of subsection (1) the
woids ", other than an Islamic bank," and by
substituting a seniicolon for the full stop at
the end of that paragraph;
(c) by inserting immediately after paragraph (c) of
subsection (I') the following new paragraph (ci)
"(ci) a reserve to be held by each Islamic
bank at the Central Bank comprising
such amounts expressed as a percentagc
of each bank's sight. savings account.
investment account, time and other
deposit liabilities as may be approved
by the Minister on the recommendation
of the Board, whether denominated in
Malaysian or foreign currency "; and
(ci)by inserting immediately after the words "para-
graph (c)" in subsection (2) the woi dc 'or (ci)".
(3) Section 41 of the Ordinance is amended by
sLibstituting for the words "banks or groups of hankc"
in the first pragniph the words "banks other than
Islamic banks or groups of such banks, nor shall it
discriminate amon g Islamic hinks or groups of Tslamic
banks."
(4'i Section 42 of the Ordinance is amended jv
incerting immediatel y
 after the words "Bankin g Act.
I p 73' the words "or the Islamic Banking Act 1 93". 	 '
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(5) Section 51 of the Ordinance is amended—
(a) by deleting the words "interest charge" in
paragraph (a) of subsection (4); and
(h) by deleting the word "interest" in paragraph
(b) of subsection (4).
Amendment 60. Section 2 of the Finance Companies Act 1969 is
amended by substituting for the words "to carry on
Act I99	 banking business in the Federation" in the definition
.lct6	 of "hank" the words "under the Banking Act 1973 or
an islamic bank licensed under the Islamic Banking
ct276	 Act 193".
f .IIIk flHII ISI1%S IFII'I t\'FG'U	 I%I tU
'. 1 rr,rtJI lilt 10,111 tI tr IQ11
Jft,i'i SI '0
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5
LAWS OF MALAYSIA
Act 275
(LOVERNMEN1' INVESTMENT ACT 1983
An Act to confer on the Minister power to receive
tiivestments of moneys for a fixed period and to pay
dividend thereon.
[
BE IT ENACTED by the Duli Yang Maha Mulia
Sen Paduka Baginda Yang di-Pertuan Agong with the
advice and consent of the Dewan Negara and Dewan
Rakyat in Parliament assembled, and by the authority
of the sarre, as follows:
1. This Act may be cited as the Government Invest-
ment Act 1983.
2. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires— Tnterpreta-
tion
"investment" means an investment made in accord-
aiice with section 3;
"investment certificate" means a receipt in the form
of an investment certificate, issued in accordance with
section 6;
"Minister" means the Minister charged with the
responsibility for finance.
3. (1) The Minister is hereby authorized to receive, on Powerof
behalf of the Government of Malaysia, at such times Ministerto recetve
and up to such maximum amounts as he may from investment'
time to time specify, investments of moneys from any
person of a sum of ten thousand ringgit or a multiple
of ten thousand ringgit.
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(2) The total amount of moneys received under
subsection (1) not repaid at any one time shall not
exceed an amount to be specified from time to time by
the Yang di-Pertuan Agong by order published in the
Gazette.
(3) An order under subsection (2) shall, as soon as
possible after its publication, be laid before the Dewan
Rakyat.
Application 4. The moneys received under section 3 (1 shall be
of moneys 
applied, and are hereby appropriated, to the following
purposes:	 -
(a) repayment of the moneys so received, to such
extent as the Minister may determine;
(b) payment, with the prior approval of the Dewan
Rakyat signified by resolution, into the
Development Fund specified in the Second
Act 6!.
	
Schedule to the Financial Procedure Act 1957,
for the purposes of that Fund.
Period of	 5. Any person making an investment under section 3
investment. (1) shall thereupon declare the period for which the
investment is made, which shall be one full year or
more; and at the end of that period the money invested
shall be repaid in the manner hereinafter provided.
En.es(me't 6. The Minister shall issue a receipt in the form of an
certificate. investment certificate in the Schedule for every invest-
ment made.
Transfcrnf 7. Investment certificates shall be transferable by
invectment
certiticate	 endorsement and delivery.
Dividend. 8. (1) No interest shall be paid on investments but
there shall instead be paid dividends in accordance
with this section.
(2) The Minister shall from time to time, by order
published in the Gazette, declare the rates of dividends
to be paid on investments.
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(3) Dividends on each investment shall become due
annuaUy on the anniversary of the date of its making
and shall be paid at the Federal Treasury to the holder
of the investment certificate relating to the investment
on presentation of the investment certificate to the
Ministcr, who shall endorse, or cause to be endorsed,
particulars of the amount of dividend paid and the date
of payment on the back of the investment certificate;
and such endorsement shall be conclusive evidence that
(lie dividend specified in the endorsement has been paid.
(4) No dividend shall be due or payable on any
investment after the period for which the investment
was made.
9. (1) An investment shall be repaid on maturity to Repayment
the holder of the investment certificate relating to the vestment
investment on his tendering to the Minister the invest-
ment certificate.
(2) No investment shall be repaid except upon
surrender of the investment certificate relating thereto
to the Minister for cancellation.
ID. The moneys represented by investment certificates, lnvestmenfs
and the dividends thereon, are hereby charged upon
and shall be payable out of the Consolidated Fund, to be a
charge on
Consok-
dated Fund.
11. No stamp duty shall be leviable or payable on any Investment
investment certificate or on the transfer thereof. to be free
of stamp
duty.
12. The Minister may, by notification in the Gazette, Delegation
delegate to the Accountant General or the Central by Minister
of hisBank of Malaysia any or all of the powers or duties powers
conferred upon him by this Act.	 and duties.
13. Any person who forges or alters any investment OITc,,
certificate or any word, figure, marks, sign, signature,
or facsimile upon or attached to any investment certi-
ficate, or who offers or utters or disposes of any invest-
ment certificate knowing the same to be forged or
altered shall on conviction be liable to imprisonment
for a term not exceeding fifteen years.
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SCHEDULE
(Section 6)
GOVERNMENT iNVESTMENT ACT 1983
iNVESTMENT CERTIFICATE
The Minister of Finance hereby acknowledges the investment
inthe Federal Treasury of the sum of S................................
(say.............................................................................)
by....................................of .......................................
fora period of................................years.
l)ated this.........day of...........................19......
(Signature)
Minister of Finance
DICFTAI( OLEU IAATM PECEVA%AAN HEGA*A • KUAC A LUMFUft
DEWOAN FERINTAII PAlM IOIIB MAC 1983
Harga: 50 sen
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Appendix E
111MB - Distribution of Profits
E. PROFITABILITY ACCOUNTING FOR THE WHOLE BANK
XII. PROFITS ATTRIBUTABLE TO DEPOSITORS AND BANK
12.1 The tasks of consolidating all the relevant figures
for profitability accounting from Branches and the relevant
Departments in the Head Office and computing the final profit
figures for the whole Bank belong to the Accounting Division.
12.2	 There are two levels of consolidated profitability
accounting, namely
(a) profitability for payment of profits to the Depositors
(b) profitability of the Bank
12.3	 The	 :'-cise is to be done monthly for month-end positions.
12.4 For computing profitability for the purpose of payment
of profits to the Depositors, use the Format given in Appendix
II after substituting the word Branch with the word Bank above
Columns °-'. Thereafter execute the following steps:-
Step 1 -- Consolidate the average daily balances
of various types of deposits for the
month for all Branches and enter the
502
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consolidated figures in the appropriate
places in Column 1.
Step 2 -- Multiply Column 1 by Column 2 and fill
in the products in the appropriate
places in Column 3.
Step 3 -- Consolidate for all Branches
(a) Month-end	 balance	 in	 the	 Branch
	
Financing	 and	 Investment	 Income
Account
(b) Month-end balances in the Branch
Foreign Exchange Income Account
and enter the consolidated figure in
the bottom line of Column 4, and further
distribute	 this	 total	 figure	 among
various	 types	 of deposits	 using the
weighted proportions in Column 3.
Step 4 -- Apportion the profit figures for various
types of deposits in Column 4 between
Depositors and Bank by using the proportions
in Column 5 and Column 8 respectively
and enter the products in Column 6
and Column 9 respectively.	 -
Step 5 -- Calculate the percentage rates of profits
for the Depositors and Bank for various
types	 of	 deposits	 through	 dividing
the figures in Column 6 and Column 9
respectively by the average daily balances
for the month in Column 1 and subsequently
multiply the resultant tigures by 12
and enter the products in Column 7
and Column 10 respectively.
Step 6 -- For every rate of profit for the respective
type of deposits in Column 7 calculate
the	 12-month	 moving	 average	 for	 the
latest	 twelve	 months	 (including	 the
month in question).
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12.5 It is to be emphasised that the final rates of profits
obtained in Step 6 above are the relevant rates of profits
that the Bank will pay all Depositors for their deposits
throughout all its Branches. These rates of profits will
be current from the 16th day of the following month until
the 15th day of the month after.
12.6 It is the duty of the Accounting Division to have
these rates computed accurately and to inform all Branches
before the 16th day in the relevant month.
12.7 BrQr.ches are to post these rates on the Notice Board
for Rates of Profits during the relevant dates, that is from
16th day of the relevant month until the 15th day of the
following month.
XIII. PROFITS OF THE BANK
13.1 For computing the profits of the Bank for the month
in question the following additional steps will have to be
executed:-
Step 1 -- Take the figure at the bottom of Column 9
in the Format above.
Step 2 -- Consolidate	 the	 month-end	 balances	 in
the Fees and Comissions Accounts of
all Branches.
Step 3 -- Consolidate the monthly profits of the
Shareholders' Funds by adding the following:-
(a) Month-end balance in , the Shareholders'
Funds Profit Account (Treasury
Department)
(b) Month-end balance in the Shareholders'
Funds Profit Account (Investment
Management Department)
(c) Month-end balance in the Shareholders'
Funds Dividend Account (Acconting
Division)
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Step 4 -- Obtain the Bank's Gross Profits by
adding the results from Step 1, Step 2,
and Step 3.
Step 5 -- Calculate the Bank's Total Operational
Expenditures by consolidating the
operational expenditures of all Branches
and the Head Office.
Step 6 -- The Bank's Gross Profits (Step 4) less the
Banks Total Operational Expenditures
(Step 5) gives the Bank's Net Profit
for the month.
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Appendix F
Sum of Digits
Suiii of Years Digits 'reclinique (SOD)
Repaynif'ilt S( hedule
- 1
= (SOD)"
- (SOD)
w Iier
n(n + 1)SOD=m+(n-1)+(n-2)...+1=
2
n = the duration of fiiiaiiciiig
SOD = he sum of all the years (hglts coirespondiiig to that duration.
P = selling price, ( ( ost-price + profit ni.0 gin)
hence if
V = 4 years
P = $10000
45
SOD=4+3+2+1=--=10
R i = $4000
R2 = $3000
114 $1000
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ANALYTICAL DIVISION
FACULTY OF ECONOMICS & ADMINISTRATION
UNIVERSITY OF MALAYA
BANK ISLAM: DEPOSITORS QUESTIONNAIRE
iNTRODUCTION
Assalamualaikum
We are conducting a survey on banks in Malaysia and would like to know your
opinion. We assure that all information you give wifi be kept confidential and no name
will be recorded.
For office use only
Interviewer: Tick (d)
i.Day:	 Monday	 0	 Tuesday	 0
Wednesday 0	 Thursday	 0
Friday	 0	 Saturday	 0
2. Time of Interview:	 From .........to.........
3. Date
4. Name of Interviewer:
5. Checked by:
6. Date............................
508
PART ONE
ACCOUNT BACKGROUND
1. When did you open an account at Bank Islam?
1983	 Di	 1988	 06
1984	 02	 1989	 07
1985	 03	 1990
	
08
1986	 04	 1991
	
09
1987	 05
2. Type of account you hold at Bank Islam (tick more than once where appropriate)
Savings Account	 Current Account	 General Investment
Di	 02	 03
3. Do you also hold accounts in other banks now?
Yes	 0 1	 (If Yes, go to PART A)
No	 02	 (IfNo,g0t0PARTB)
PART A
(To be answered by depositors who also have accounts in other banks)
(i) In which bank do you also have an account?
(tick the bank you do most business with)
Bank Bumiputra
	 Dl
Bank Simpanan Nasional
	 02
Malayan Banking
	 03
UMBC
	
04
Public Bank
	
05
Others
	 06
(ii) Type of account you hold at that bank
(tick more than one if appropriate)
Savings Account	 Current Account	 Fixed Deposit
Di	 02	 03
509
(iii) Please tick 3 MAIN REASONS wily you also keep aCcounts in other banks
(Chooc 3 only)
ATM facilities available	 0 1
Well known bank	 02
It has many branches 	 03
Near workplace	 04
Near to where I shop	 05
Near my home	 06
Fast and efficient service 	 07
To apply for housing loan 	 0 8
Encouragement of friends & family 	 0 9
Higher interesi.s on savings 	 0 10
Other (please specify)	 0 ii
(iv) In which bank do you have more savings?
Bank Islam	 0 1	 Commercial Bank	 02
(v) In which bank do you frequently go or have more business done?
Bank Islam	 0 1	 Commercial Bank	 02
PLEASE GO TO PART TWO
PART B
(For depositors who have accounts only at Bank Islam)
1. Have you ever saved in commercial banks before)
Yes	 Di	 No	 02
2. If Yes,
2.1 in which bank did you save before?
(tick your main hank only)
Bank Buiniputia
	 Dl
Bank Simpanan Nasionai
	 02
Malayan Banking
	 03
UMBC
	 04
Public Bank
	 05
Other than the above
	 06
510
Dl
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
Dio
Dii
012
2.2 From the list below, please tick 3 MAIN REASONS why you kept accounts in
commercial banks before?
3 reasons only
ATM facilities available
Well known bank
Near workplace
Near my home
It has many branches
Fast and efficient Service
Salary paid here
Encouragement of friends & family
Higher interest on savings
Got a loan from that bank
No Bank Islam branch
Others (please specify)
5].]-
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0,
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
PART TWO
A. From the list below, tick (/) to show how each has influenced you to open an
account at Bank Islam
Degree of Influence
Factor
None	 Little	 Quite	 Strong	 Strongest
Strong
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
1.Encouragement of friends
2. Bank Islam Opening Publicity
3. Distance from workplace
4. No Interest paid on savings
5. No interest on loans
6 Profit sharing Investments
7 Distance from home
8. Profits paid on savings
9 Runs on Islamic Principles
10 Parking Faciliuea Available
11. Near Public Transport
12 Types of Loans offered
13 Opportunity to get a loan
14 The number of branches available
0
0
0
D
0
0
0
0
•0
0
0
0
0
B.	 1. Bank Islam now pays profits on your savings account. Would you close your
account at Bank Islam if this rate of profit is lower than(cannot compete with) interest
rates on savings in other banks?
Yes	 Di	 No	 02
2. If this Bank Islam branch has to close, which bank would you next choose
(1) another bank in this area	 Di
(2) another Bank Jslam branch even if u is quite far 	 D2
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3. Have you secured any loan from Bank Islam?
Yes	 Di	 No	 02
4. How far is this Bank Islam branch from
(i) your workplace?
0-2 miles	 0 1 3-5 miles	 02 more than 5 miles 03
(ii) your home
0-2 miles	 0 1 3-5 miles	 02 more than 5 miles 03
PART THREE
A. From the list below please tick (1) for the services which you know are provided by
Bank Islam
Table A.
SERVICES OF BANK ISLAM
1. DEPOSITS
1.1. Savings Account
1.2. Current Account
1.3. General Investment Account
1.4. Special Investment Account
(2) LOAN/FINANCING
2.1. A1-Bai Bithamin Ajil
2.2. Al-Ijarali
2.3. A1-Musharakah (Profit and Loss Sharing)
2.4. A1-Mudharabah (Trustee Profit Sharing)
2.5. Al-Murabaha (Cost Price + Markup Sale)
2.6. Al-Qardul Hasan YPEIM (interest-free short loan)
Di
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
Dio
(3) OTHERS
3.1. Foreign Exchange Buying & Selling
	 Dii
3.2. Travellers t
 Cheque
	
012
3.3. Remittances and Transfers
	
013
513
1
1
1
I
1
1
1
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1	 2	 3
1	 2	 3
1	 2	 3
1	 2	 3
1	 2	 3
1	 2	 3
1	 2	 3
1	 2	 3
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4
	
5
	
6
4
	
5
	
6
4
	
5
	
6
4	 5
	
6
4
	
5
	
6
4	 5
	
6
4
	
5
	 6
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
4	 5	 6
4	 5	 6
4	 5	 6
4	 5	 6
4	 5	 6
4	 5	 6
4	 5	 6
4	 5	 6
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
B. 1. Have you heard of the word 'RIBA'?
Yes	 Di	 No	 02
2. If Yes, do you think Bank Interest is the same as 'nba'?
Yes 0 1 No 02 Not sure	 03 Dontt know 04
3. Would you agree if a commercial bank (not Bank Islam) opens a special counter to
provide bank services according to Islamic principles?
Disagree	 0 1 Agree	 03 No opinion	 05
Quite Disagree	 02 Quite Agree	 04
Pleasegive your reason ............................................................................................
PART FOUR
Below are statements which might describe this BANK ISLAM branch.
Please circle the correct number to show how much you agree or disagree with each
statement as follows.
1. strongly disagree	 4. no opinion
2. disagree	 5. quite agree
3. somewhat disagree	 6. agree
7.strongly agree
Strongly Quite	 no	 quite	 strongly
disagree disagree disagree opinion agree	 agree	 agi et
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7
A.
1 well known bank
2 many branches
3. near to workplace
4 near to my home
5 near to public transport
6 parking available
7 easy to reach
B
1 enough bank services provided
2 satisfied with profits on savings
3 loans that I want are available
4 expensive loan payment
C.
1 many counters opened at peak hours
2 courteous counter services
3 fast and efficient counter service
4 bank officers ready to help
PART FIVE
Listed below are services that can be provided by Bank Islam. Please tick ()to
show how much YOU NEED each of these services.
Service	 Do not	 No	 Quite	 Need
Need
	 Opimon Needed
I
	
2	 3
	
4
1 ATM
2. Bank Islam pays zakat on
savings on your behalf
3 piggy banks for children
4 housing loan/financing
5 interest free short term loans
6 separate counters for women
PART SIX
We need some information about yourself to enable us to make meaningful
interpretation of the data obtained. All information will be kept confidential and no
names will be recorded.
Please tick ( in the suitable box for each question.
1. Sex	 Male	 01	 Female	 02
2. Age	 18 - 25 years	 0 1
26-33	 02
34-41	 03
42-49	 04
5Oandover	 Os
3. Race	 Malay	 Di Indian	 02
Chinese	 03 Others	 04
4. Religion Islam	 Di Others	 02
5. Marital status	 married	 0 1 single	 02
other than the above	 03
515
6. Your highest level of education
Dl
02
03
04
05
Primary School
Secondary School
College Diploma
University
No Formal Education
7. Your Job (if currently employed)
Professional
Administrative/Managerial Officer
Executive Officer
Lecturer
Teacher
Clerk
Police or Army
Typist
Nurse
Technician
Own business
Self-employed
Labourer/Unskilled worker
Others (please specify)
Di
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
Dio
Dli
012
013
014
8. In which sector do you work?
governmentlpublic sector	 Di
private sector	 02
self-employed
	
03
semi-government agency	 04
charitable organisation	 05
others (please specify) 	 06
9. If you are not working. Are you a
housewife/homemaker
	 Dl
student
	
02
pensioner	 03
unemployed
	
04
others (please specify) 	 Os
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10. Do you also save in these institutions?
(Please tick more than one if appropriate)
Co-operative
	 Dl
Tabung Haji	 02
11. Do you invest in Amanah Saham Nasional?
Yes	 Di	 No	 02
12. If you have an income, how much do you earn monthly? (fixed mcome)
less than $400	 Di
$400 - $700
	
02
$701 - $1000
	
03
$1001 - $1400
	 04
$1401 - $1700
	
05
$1701 - $2100
	 06
$2101 - $2500
	
07
$2501 - $3500
	 08
$3501 - $5000
	 09
More than $5000	 010
13. Please give your comments and suggestions to improve the services of bank Islam.
a. Comments
b. Suggestions
THANK YOU FOR YOUR CO-OPERATION
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Appendix H
Conventional Bank Depositors' Questionnaire
BAHAGIAN EKONOMI ANALISA,
FAKIJLTI EKONOMI DAN PENTABD1RAN
UNIVERSITI MALAYA.
PELANGGAN BANK PERDAGANGAN (BUKAN BANK ISLAM)
COMMFRCIAI. BANK CUSTOMERS (NOT BANK ISLAM)
PENGENALAN
hit rodu into
Assalamualaikum/Selamal Pagi/Solamat Petang
flcnla,nunl,z,ku ,n/ood ,flp , oh ngfcond afternoon
Kanu sedang menjalankan kajian tentang bank di Malaysa Boleh saya bertanya
1) Selain dan di bank mi adakah anda mempunyai akaun di bank lain. Jika tidak bolehkah tuan meluangkan
- sedikit masa untuk meniawab soalselidik mi
Jika Ye, adakah Wan mempunyai akaun di Bank Islam?
Jika Va, minta meaf kami ungin menemuduga mereka yang bukan pelanggan Bank Islam sahaja. Teiima kasih.
.Juka tidak, bolehkan tuan meluangkan beberapa minft untuk menjawab soalselidikini.
Segala maklumat mi adalah dirahstakan dan apabila dikod untuk anabsus komputer, tuada nama akan d,akodkan.
We are condur'n a Survey on banks in Malaysia May lack
1) llecules tl'xc hank, do you have an account at Bank Islam'	 -
If yes, sorry we would liLe In interview only non-customers of Bank Istrim If no, can you spare afew minutes to answer
this qucsliomiaire All information will be kept confidential and no names will be recorded when information are coded
for computer analysis
Untuk Kegunoan Pejabat Sahaja
r' t' iq'ic 1.. ,ndol' qri I 'I
I Ncirria BeII k	 Br ii ik l3tirnrptilui	 IJ	 Public Bank
F1',kyun Bar ikit i	 El	 UMBC	 C]
2 Hail	 Isnlrt C]	 Slaso 1]	 Pobu C]	 Khomls [J	 Jumoot C] Sobtu EJ
3 Moso Ternudugri	 Jcrrn	 0	 hinggo	 I C'
4 lorlkh	 21 /
	
/ 1991
5 Pesponctc.n Muslim	 C]
Non IA jlimn	 I]
ó	 Fi'irmn, fI'Ui'ic	 '1
1	 Di'nmnrik (lC'lr	 (
1',rih	 •	 -	 .
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ISOALSELIDIK BANK
BAHAGIAN 1
Dan senaral di bawah, tandakan ( \I ) untuk menunjukkan eejauh mana Hap-flap faktor mempengaruhi
ends unLuk mombuka akaun dl bank ml.
rrom the list below, tick ('1 ), to chow how each factor influences you to open an account in this bank
Poringkat Pengaruh
t)cree of influence
I - Tiada langsung
I - none
2 - sedikrt
2	 - alittle
Fakior
Tactor
3 — sederhana (lebih kurang)	 5 - amatkuat
3 - aixrage (more or less)	 5 - strongest
4 - kuat
4 - Strong
Peringkat Pangaruh
_________	 Degree of Influence
Ttada	 Sedikit Sodarhana Kuat 	 Amat
Langsung	 (Lebth	 Kuat
kurang)
None	 A Little	 More	 Strong Strongest
or Less
1	 2	 3	 4
	
5
I Arahan M€jikan
Employer's Direction
2 Doron9an keluarga dan kawan-kawan
- Encouragement of friends and relatives
3 Publi&tJ melalul ikian bank
Publicity through bank advertisements
4. Jarak bank In' dengan tempat kerja
Distance of bank from uoilace
5 Jarak bank Iris dangan tempat tinggal
Distance of bank from home
6 Jarak bank Ini dengan pusat membemi bolah
Distance of bank from shopping-centre 	 _______
7 Adanya kemudahan motetak kereta
Availability of parlang spaces
8 Kemudahan pengangkutan swam
Convenience of public trancport
9 Perkhidmalan yang copat dan cekap
lact and efficient service
10 Adanya ken'.udahan ATM
Availability of ATM facility
11 Tlnggtnya kad.ir faedah alas simpanan
	 --
The roLe of intcrrct on savings	 .,
12 Kemudahan moodapat pinjaman
Taseof:fing1n
13 Jenis pinjarnan yang dised'akan
	 ,.
7ypecofloancnitinlnblr
	
. -
14 Banyaknya (iwaiigari di sIiiruh nqaa
Ai'ai tat',!,! v of t,7ani hrc all opr, Iii, country
l' Bank yang iq,t'aual
0 ii'41 -& ,l,flj'?i l'ii,,k	 -
ETh
DJ3
Li
fls
nIo
E:1I
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IlIhi
io
13I
35
I3i
EJ3a
139
Li4
1i
LJ3
1-
1
I
1
1
51617
6	 7
5e-'7
5	 6	 .7
5	 6
56"7
7
5 V7
5	 6	 7
5	 6	 7
2
	 3
2	 3	 4
2	 3	 4
2	 3A"
2	 3	 4
2	 3	 4
2	 3	 '4
2	 3	 4
2	 3	 4
2	 3	 4
:
BAHAGIAN 2
	
1 
SOALSELIDIK BANK	 3
Di bawah mi saah kenyataan tentang cIrI-.lrI yang mungkln ada pada BANK ANDA
Below are a few slaienwnts which might describe YOUR BANK
Sila bulatkan angka yang sesuat untuk menunJukkan sajauh m.ina anda bersetuju atau tidak berseti.jju dengan
setiap kenyataan tersebul seperti berikut
P!eace circle the correct number to show how much you agree or disagree with each statement as follows	 -
Tidak Tidak Kur2ng Thda Agik 5.1UJU $SgM
S.tuJu	 a.tuJu	 ,.tuju P.ndlrian s.tuju	 ..tLJJU
LOKASI	 Sama
LOCATiON	 S.kaiI
Strongly dLc.lgl' z somewhat	 No	 Q.ute	 gru Strongly
disqyce Otn ion ag?ez -
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 67
I Dekat dengari tempat saya bekerja	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7'
Near my workplace
2 Dekat derigan lempal saya linggai	 J"	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7
Near my home
3 Dekat dengan pusat rnembeli b&ah 	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 7
near shopping centre
4 Terdapat kernudahan meletak kareta di sekitar 	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 fr'	 7
kawasan bank
Parking faczhti.es available near the bank
5 Mudah untuk sampai	 1
easy to reach
6 Dekat ciengan kemudahan pengangkutan awam	 1
Near to public transport facihtzes
2	 3	 4	 5	 6
2	 3	 4	 5	 B-'l 7
PERKHIDMATAN BANK
BANK SERVICES
1 Cukup perkhidmatan bank disediakan
Enc'ugh bank services provided
2 Kadar taedah alas sirnpanan cukup memuaskan
Most satisfied with rate in snfrrest on savings
3 Kadar faedah atas pinjaman terlalu ttnggi
Rate of interest on loans is too high
banyakjenls pinjaman
many types of loans offered
5 terdapat kemudahan ATM
ATM facility available
6 Banya}c haunter di buka bila pelanggan ramai
Many ctunterc opened during peak hours
7 Terdapat kaunter pertanyain
Enquiries Counter available
8 Perkhidmatan Maunter bersopart-santun
Court rouc counter services
9 Pnrkhidmatart kaunler cepat dan cekap
rast and efficient counter services
10 Pegawai bank bersedia membantu petanggan
B arik officrrc rradi t help eI4clotn,'rc
r ngai bank suki, diipni'ji
I (fu ull to mnrCl t'aui sffmcerc
'	 idah rnendapnt punji;nnn
to . I hanc
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ISOALSELIDIK BANK —4
BAI4AGIAN 3
Pada masa mi cnlamn dart bank pordagangn biasa terdapat sebuah Bank Islam di Malaysia
If ecuirs th coninxr,ciaI banks, there is an Islamic Bank an Malaysia today
Dalam Jadual A di bawah tandakan ( '1 pada perkhidmatan yang ANDA TAHU ada disedrakan o)eh BANK ISLAM
MALAYSIA BEflI tAD
In TAll I.E A l'eh'u' iuleo' tick (	 )	 the cerr,:ce which YOU KNOW are provided by BANK ISLAM MALAYSIA
IERIlAD
JADUALA
TABLE A
PERKHIDMATAN BANK ISLAM MALAYSIA
BANK ISLAM MALAYSIA BERHAD SERVICES
1. DEPOSIT (SIMPANAN)
DFPOfl S (SAVING)
1 1 Akamni Simpanan
Saving Account
Akaun Semasa
Curtent Account
Akaun Potaburan Am
General Irnxstnient Account
Akaun P&aburan Khas
Sprnal Investment Account
Pelt Simpanan Berkunci
Safe Deposit Box
LLJ P
U2	 Elk
L1
	
Dq
LI
	
Elk7
LI
2. PINJAMANJPEMBIAYAAN
LOANS/FINANCING
2.1 Plrijarnan Bartempoh
Terms I oans
2 11 Al-Mudharabah	 LiTrustee Profit-Sharing
2 1 7	 Al-Musvarakah (Perkongsran Untung-Rugi) 	 7
Pro[il and Loss Sharing	 L_ I
7 1 3	 A-larah (Snwaan) 	 8
tracing
2 1 4	 AI-Murabahah (Jualboli Harga Tarnbah)	 J	 9
Cost Price + Markup Sale
2 1 5	 Al-Bar Bithamin Apt (Jualbeh Harga Tangguh) 	 [ 110
E)rfern.d Payment Sale	 -
2 1 6	 Al-Oardhul--Hasan YPE1M (Pin jaman Jangka Pondek Tanpa Faadah) 
f
l.itrtecl I rrr Crcdit (c1irt term)
L_J L9
LJ5
Ei
LII]s
E1
2 2 Pernblayaan Perdagangan
I ,,,dr I irn vii
2 2 1	 t,taI K,nvJrt
I nUnr of Credit
7 2 7	 Siiral Jamtraan
I ottcn of Gu,arartnq
Li
521.
Lii
[]2
I .I
5 2 Adakah anda borminat untuk mongetahut dongan Iebih lanjut lagi tontang perkhidmatan di Bank Islam?
Are you interested to know more about services at Bank Islam7
Va	 - 1	 Tidak -- 2
Yes	 No	 -
5 3 Dalam sonarai di bawah tandakan 3 sebab utame anda tidak mombuka akaun di Bank Islam
From the list below tick 3 main reasons why you did not open an account at Bank Islam
E2
J3
ftfl
EEL
LI]
LI6
LI7
L18
Eli9
AiO
Liii
I SOALSEIIDtK BANK -
23 Lain—LaIn
other
2 3 1	 Kiriman dan Pindahan Weng
Remittances and Transfers
2 3 2
	
Jualbeli Tukaran Wang Asing
roreign Exchange Sale + Purchase
2 3 3 Cek Kambara
Traveller? Cheque
2 3 4	 Pongurusan PeiaburanlPortfoiio
Portfolio/Investment Management
Risalah Bank Is'am
Bank Islam Brochure
akhbar dan majaiah
Newspaper and magazine
peiaiaran di sekoiah/university
lescons in school/university
rakanileivarga
friends/family
seminar
seminar
radio and T.V
Radio andTV
LI14
L115
	 LI1cLu6	
n5'
Lu17
	 EL.
Els	 it
L16
5 1 Dan mariakah anda mendapat tahu tentang porkhidmatan di atas Adakah dan
Where did you get information about the above services? Did you get it from
tandakan 3 sabab sahaja
-	 tick3 reason only
majikan membayar gaji di bank mi
employer pays yr salary at this bank
tidakberminat ...........................................................................
non interested
tidak tahu jenis porkhidmatan yang disadiakan .................................
don't know the types of services offered
porkhidmatannya lambat dan kurang cekap ..........................
slow and inefficient service
tiadakomudahan ATM ...................................................
no ATM Facilities
kadarpulangan atas simpanan rondah ......................................
low rate of return on savings
tidak menyodiakan pinjaman yang saya inginkan ...........................
does not provide the loan that I want
tidak borjaya mondapat pinjaman di Bank Islam ..................
uncuccessful in getting a loan at Rank Islam
kadar bayarari pinjamarinya mahal ...............
expensive rate of payment on its loans
tidak banyak cawangan
'vit inony brani lies
lain-lain (nyatakan)
ither (pleae specify)
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BAHAGIAN 4
BUTIR DIRI
Kimi memorlukan baberapa makiumat tentang din anda untuk membuat penaksiran yang bermakna bagi data yang
telah kami perolehi Segala makiurnat mi adalah dirahsiakan dan apabila dikod untuk analisis komputer tiada nama
.ikan direkodkan
We m'4 some information iihout you rcrlf to enahL uc to nw' ntii'ainngful i7lterpretation of the data obtained
All information will be kept cnnfuirntuil and no namec will he recorded when infonnation are coded for computer analysis
Sta tandakan (
	
) dalam kotak yang bersesuaman bagi tiap-tiap soalan di bawah
1	 Jantmna	 Lcilakm	 1	 Perempuan rr2
Sex	 Male	 Female
2 Umur	 18	 -	 25 tahun/yenrs Liii 1
26	 -	 33	 1212
34	 --	 41	 3
42	 -	 49
50	 tahun ke atas	 f	 5
year and above
Melayu [
	
1	 India	
[] 2	 Cina	 3	 Lain-Lain [1Malay C"	 Indian -
	 Chinese	 Others	 -
4 Agama	 Islam	 1	 Bukan Islam	 2
Religion	 Islam	 -	 Non-Islam
5 Tarat perkahwinan	 Berkahwmn	 1	 Bujang	 2
Marital status	 Married	 Single
-	 Selain dan di atas	 3
Other than the abotte
3 Bangsa
Race
rn71
EIlig
EIiq
LII
H1
[2
[]3
Li]4
I ii
ISOALSELIDIK BANK 
-.o7
6 Tahap Pendmdikan Tert,nggi anda
Your highest level of educaiwn
Sekolah rondah
Primary school
Sekolah menengah
Secondary school
Diploma (ITM TARC)
t)iploma (ITM TAR()
Univorsiti
Univcrity
Tiada Pendidikan to, mal
No Formal Education
523
[ill
EII1
L1
fl6
L]8
L1
Lilo
Liii
[J12
Li13
Li14
I- 115
E1
Badan berkanun
5cr,:: govt agency
Badan sukarela
ChdrIlczhle (itliiiIt,iJi ion
Lain-lain (nyatakan)
Olhcrs(plrace Specify)
I	 I
I	 J6
SOALSFLIDIt( BANK 
--1
7	 Perkor;aan anda jika ada)
our Job (if rurrnsly em plowed)
Prof essional (bekera sendiri)'
Pro frcsional (Self employed)
Professional (makan gai)
Professional (employed)
Pegawai TadbirlPengurusan
'f?fliflzStrUliT'e/?7za?zUcercal oJfn Cr
Pegawai eksekutif
Executive officer
Pensyarah
Lecturer
Guru
lrs:c h1r
Kerani
Clerk
rolis alau tontera
Police or army
Jurutaip/OMPO
Typist /OMI'L)
Jururawat
Nurse
Juruteknik
Technician
Barnuaga sendiri
Own business
Bekerja sendiri
Self cmpkrye-d
Buruhlpekerja tidak mahur
Labourer/unskilled worker
Lain-lain (nyalakan)
( )tiv'rc (cpec tfy)
8	 Di sektot/orgariisasi mariakah anda bekerja'
In whuh urgunical uInf cC br do you work?
Sektor Awam	 1
(;(ic..rsti?ce?:1/publi( c br
Soktor swasta	 2
Pri rule crc bitT
Bokoija soridiii	 3
'r1f C ,ii7'li'i1ril
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Ill
12
I H
I	 J4
I H
LJ
Va	 I	 II
'(cc
Tidak I ,-t2I.,No	 L
r LsEuoI	 -11
4	 Jika anda tidal'
 lsd'nrja
idaA.ah anda
Sun rum ah
I loucrrg ife/horrirrnizrr
Penuntut
Student
P9sara
I 'en cu' ncr
belum bokirja
U nemp1oied
Lain-lain (nyatakan)
()therc (cprrify)
10 r.nla iiI dan di hank po rdagangan, adakah anda mempunyal simpanan di lain—lain Institusi kewangan?
Jika ya. adakah di
If yes. do you saw at
(tanaakan lebih dan salu 1ika berkenaan)
lick more than one where appropiate
Syarikat Kewangan	 1
rinancr Company
Syarikat Kerjasama	 2
Cooperation
Tabung Haji	 FiTabun,
 Itaji
Lain-lain (nyatakan) 1 1Others (cecify)	 - Li1
It. Adakah anda melabur di Amanah Saham Nasonal
Do you inv& in Amanah Sahani Nasional
Va	 Tidak	 2
No
12 Sokiranya cawangan hank iru terpaksa ditutup di bank manakah anda akan pindahkan akaun anda7
I[ thrc hank brain h have in be loced down, where will you trancfrr your account
Adakah
LV,lt ii hr
di bank lain dalam l'awasan mi	 I
a! a different I'iznk in tliic area	 S
I)' cawangan lain bank mm walaupun agak iauh 	 (	 2at a,u,thrr I'ranrh of thic bank even if it mc quite far
12 (a) lahukah anda samada trdapat cawangan Bank Islam di Kawasan mu'7
	
I )o you & now 	,f	 ic a Hank lclann !Ira,irh in this area7
	Va	 ,,'1	 Tidak	 2
	
rc	 No
iL]
[f
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Ya / Tidak	 2
Na luTh,
lebih5batu
lebih 5 batu lv1
s A i: LD	 - 9
13 Setujukah anda jika sobuah bank prdagangan biasa (Bukan Bank Islam) membuka satu kaunter khas
untuk membari f)olkhidtnatan bank inengikut prinsip Islam
Do you açree if a u'uinie:rial batiI (nol Hank Islam) opens a special counter So provide bank cervices according to
Islamic pi ,,,cs1ilec'
Tidak seluju	 1	 Tiada pendirian
l)icagtre	 No Opinion
Agaksetuju	 2	 Kurangsetuju	
riQuite acsee
	
Quite Disagree	 -
Setuju	 / 5
Agirr
,racori	 t3cLEtM E )'IMPriW Mi N /ICL•7
14 Pernalskah anda mendongar pet kataan F1IBA?	
"?	 (?	 I VL. f M
Ilat¼ you )ii',iid of flu' word 'RIlIA'?
15 Jika ya, pada pandangan anda adakah kadar feadah bank itu sama dengan 'riba
lives, in you, o;'tniou ,s the hank interect sunilar to (the same as) nba?
Va	 I	 lidak	 2	 Kurang Pasti	 3	 Tidak Tabu
Yes	 Na	 "	 Not sure	 Don'S Know 1_.
16 Jika anda bekerja, berapakah jumlah pendapatan kasar bulanan anda? (dart pendapatan Ielp)
If you arc nijiloycd, what is your monthly grow personal income? (from fixed income)
Kurarig dan	 $ 400	 f ] 1
li'cc S bait
	
$400 - -$700	 f ]2
$ 701	 $1000
$ 1001	 -	 $1400	 Li
$1401	 $1700	 LIJ
	
$1701 - $ 2100	 LJ6
	$2101 - $2500	 []7
$ 2501 --
	 $3500	 Liii a
$3501	 s500o	 [J 9
I etiih dan	 $ 5000	 I	 110
Alo,r
11 Lebih kwang borapa jaulikafi flank tnt dati
(i) lompat anda bekerja
0-2batu L,11	 3-Sbatu I 12
(ii) tempat anda tinggal
0•2batu	 3-5balu I 12
rii
i1i-
TEPIMA KASIH AlAS KERJASAMA ANDA
ill ¶NI	 1)111 ()l'i Y()IIR (001'! PA ll()T'!
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